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DYNAMIC EUROPE

DYNAMIC EUROPE

A BACKGROUND OF FERMENT AND CHANGE

by

C. F. STRONG

Author of

MODERN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS,
THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
ETC.

"The morrow of victory is always more
perilous than the eve." —MAZZINI.

"The fact of progress is written plain
and large on the page of history; but
progress is not a law of nature. The
ground gained by one generation may be
lost by the next. The thoughts of men
may flow into the channels which lead to
disaster and barbarism." —H. A. L. FISHER.

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P R E F A C E

I HAVE written this book with the object of helping the English-speaking peoples to share what Mr. Churchill has so rightly called "the august responsibilities of shaping the future." There can be no doubt that those peoples are now called upon to play a leading part in the urgent business of making and maintaining the peace which follows the Second World War. But this is by no means a matter to be reserved to professional diplomats, or even to be confined to discussions at a peace conference. For peace is not merely a set of conditions contained in a peace treaty but a creative process which requires the help of every intelligent citizen to make it real and lasting. Yet clearly that help cannot be effectively given except through the creation of an informed opinion on the issues at stake and the problems that cry out for solution and settlement. What I have written here is, in its modest way, intended to be a contribution to that vital need.

The study of history may too readily be used as a way of escape from our present turmoils. If, as the authors of *1066 and All That* with such diverting consequences asserted, history is what we remember, it cannot help us here. But if, as I believe, history is without meaning unless it assists us to comprehend the present and hence to shape the future, my book may have its uses. For in the pages which follow I do not recount a chronicle or pursue a learned thesis, and still less do I present yet another outline of history. My purpose is more cogent and direct. It is first to examine some vital aspects of the political problem of contemporary Europe, then to survey the background from which that problem has emerged and which alone can explain it, and finally to sketch the possible lines of its solution in the post-war world.

Thus I am here concerned with the living past ; not with the dead yesterdays but with the yesterday that has become to-day. If the age in which we live is one of ferment and change, so is the past from which it draws its being, and I use the term *Dynamic* in the title—not, of course, in its exact scientific or mechanical connotation but in a broad metaphorical sense—to emphasise this continuing process. This dynamic quality in

the development of Europe is what gives to Western Civilisation its fertility and diversification. It was for this priceless heritage that we struggled in the War. It is for the preservation of its roots and the enrichment of its fruits that we must continue to strive when the shouting and the tumult die. But we shall certainly not achieve this by isolating ourselves after the War from the affairs of Europe, to which we truly belong, but only by resolving to become good Europeans. If this book helps a few men and women, whether youthful or mature, among the English-speaking peoples, wherever they may be, to make and keep that resolution, I shall be more than repaid for my labour in writing it.

The writing of the book has been a formidable task, which I should scarcely have accomplished without the help of friends and colleagues, among whom I wish specially to thank Dr. L. Delgado, for his constructive comments on economic questions; Mr. W. J. Bennett, Director of Libraries in the Borough of Tottenham, for his expert aid with books; Mr. C. L. Dering, my old comrade-in-arms, for his devotion in reading the proofs; Mr. F. D. Hayes, for his very practical kindness; and my wife, for her constant sympathy and creative criticism. But the responsibility for its weaknesses and shortcomings, of which I am all too conscious, is entirely mine. Finally, I must express my gratitude to my Publishers for their never-failing patience and generosity, particularly at this time of unprecedented difficulty in book production.

C. F. STRONG.

LONDON,

July 1945.

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INTRODUCTION

THE history of Europe during these last three decades of disaster must finally have convinced us of two truths : first, that making the world safe for democracy is not an exercise in complacency but a creative process to which all enlightened men and women must contribute, not only amid the clash of arms but at all times ; and secondly, that isolation from the affairs of Europe is no longer the "splendid" thing it was once held to be, but the unforgivable sin of British, Imperial, and, one may add, American statesmanship. As Edmund Burke said 150 years ago, when we were locked in a life-and-death struggle with the French, "it is with an armed doctrine that we are at war." But you do not necessarily extirpate a doctrine by the mere act of disarming it, and it is idle to suppose that all we need to do in order to exorcise the spirit of aggressive militarism is to crush it in battle. For our experience clearly shows that we must either create the positive means of holding that spirit in check or pay the price of our neglect in yet another world holocaust.

We cannot escape this obligation by hugging the illusion of a national self-interest which is best served in detachment from its international affiliations. For, splendid and precious though our English heritage is, we are the co-guardians of a larger inheritance, which is called Western Civilisation. Its background is wider than our island, and it is handed down to us through the age-long growth of European society, of which our own community forms a part. Indeed, our national genius, which has contributed so much to that larger association, could not be what it is without the reciprocal gifts it has received from Continental Europe. Nor is it a legacy merely of tangible possessions, which we wish to be left in peace to enjoy, but of something more impalpable, compounded as it is of the Classical spirit, the Christian tradition, the transfusion of Teutonic blood into the Latin body, the effects of modern science, and a set of ideas enshrined in our institutions and informing our way of life.

It is part of the current cant to regard European civilisation as decadent, and to talk as if the only hope of the world lay in the newer countries overseas : the United States and the British Self-governing Dominions. But, as those great peoples are the

first to acknowledge, their communities were founded by Europeans and have thrived by the life-giving stream of European immigration. Their civilisation, no less than ours, was cradled in Europe, which has continued to vitalise and strengthen their own national life. They recognise that without the continuance of a progressive society in Europe they would lose something of their own substance, and so when crises arise to threaten it they are as concerned as the older nations, from whose loins they have sprung, to defend and preserve it. In other words, they cannot do without Europe any more than Europe can do without them.

Indubitably the Europe which finally emerges from the Second World War will be very different from the one that we have known. It is obvious, for example, that former Great Powers like Germany and Italy will not, at any rate for many years to come, be in the position they hitherto held to influence world affairs. It is equally manifest that France, notwithstanding her remarkable powers of recuperation, must take some time fully to recover from her tragic fall and to regain her pre-war standing among the nations. Nor does it require any penetrating prophetic vision to foresee that Russia's tremendous power must be a new factor of immeasurable significance in the post-war international situation. As to Britain herself, while her moral prestige almost certainly stands higher now than at any period in her history, her actual economic strength will be strained to the utmost in competition with Russia on the one side and the United States on the other. These factors, having caused profound disturbances of the pre-war equilibrium, will make it impossible merely to restore it in the post-war world. Yet whatever adjustments may eventuate, Europe must continue to be a formative and directive force in the world's affairs, and her civilisation to inform those whose business it is to order them.

It is to the preservation of this European inheritance, whether the mass of the people fully comprehend it or not, that we have dedicated ourselves in war. It will be at our peril that we shall forget that its maintenance and enrichment are constant and not intermittent responsibilities. We must, therefore, resolve to sustain it with equal zeal now that the armed struggle is closed. Nothing is more calculated to undermine that resolve than a belief in the inevitability of progress, a belief patently untenable in face of the irruption of the barbaric genius of Adolf Hitler

twenty-four centuries after the Golden Age of Pericles in Athens, nearly twenty centuries after the birth of Christ, and five centuries after the Revival of Humanism in the West. Western Civilisation is assuredly no static thing, but neither, on the other hand, has its upward march been unbroken. In his journey through the ages, European man has often left the highway of true advance, and has found his way back to it not by inertia and drift but by valiant striving. Frequently in the past he has seen his inheritance dissipated by the plundering powers of darkness and barbarism, and he has saved it from utter extinction only by emerging as its armed champion at the critical hour. Then with tears and sweat he has slowly reassembled those of his scattered possessions which remain, and by adapting them to the new conditions has set off once more on the path of peace and progress.

So it is with us to-day, but with a difference, resulting from the scientific and technological changes of modern times. These changes have created a situation in which, whatever intermediate steps we may take towards a better world, war throws us back to the lowest stage of mankind's advance. For all our achievements are rendered meaningless when, through lack of human control, the very power which has made them possible is allowed to reduce them to dust and ashes.¹ To secure Western Civilisation against the perpetual recurrence of universal war is therefore our primary duty to it. This requires before all things that we should base our international conduct on the principles of a coherent and active foreign policy, which implies a constant concern with the affairs of Continental Europe. We must not again permit the sacrifice of a million of our brothers and the destruction of our most treasured possessions, in a war in which we are totally involved, only to recoil from the corollaries of that sacrifice and destruction through a revulsion of feeling which suits a mood of war-weariness and a desire for post-war ease. We must, in short, face the truth that we are not only in Europe but of it, and that, therefore, to be a true citizen requires a knowledge of Europe and its problems, which we cannot understand without a proper appreciation of their background.

This is not to exaggerate the light that history may throw upon the present or to assert that the contemporary world will necessarily learn how to grapple successfully with its problems by examining the failure of earlier generations to grapple with

¹ The arrival of the atomic bomb surely makes this a self-evident truth.

theirs. As a scientific statement, the saying that history repeats itself is of very dubious validity, for each event is unique, and not all the concomitant factors in any series of events are present on two different occasions. But so far as it means, in the French phrase, "the more it changes the more it is the same," the dictum embodies a profound truth. This is illustrated, for example, in a story which Plutarch tells of the Persian Wars, when the Persians invaded Greece in 480 B.C., the year of the Battle of Salamis, which, like 1940, the year of the Battle of Britain, was one of the crucial moments for Western Civilisation. Most of the Athenians, he says (according to North's translation), "did convey their aged fathers and mothers, their wives and little children into the city of Træzen [in the Peloponnesus] where the Træzians received them very lovingly and gently. For they gave order that they should be entertained at the common charge, allowing them apiece two oboloes a day, and suffered the young children to gather fruit wheresoever they found it, and furthermore did hire schoolmasters to thê charge of the commonwealth to bring them up at school."

Comment on this ancient parallel of our own recent experience of evacuation in time of war would be superfluous. But analogy-hunting can be a most unprofitable occupation, and it is no part of the purpose of this book to indulge in it. Nevertheless, such an episode may serve to emphasise the depth and antiquity of the roots of our civilisation, and the prevalence, despite the passage of nearly twenty-five centuries, of the humane spirit of the people who first gave it recognisable shape. The average person, no doubt, is more concerned with the future than with the past, but let him remember that, as G. K. Chesterton once finely said, "To-morrow is a gorgon at which we dare not look save through the shining shield of yesterday lest we be turned to stone." In other words, if we wish to understand what is happening in order to plan for the future, we must discover what happened to make the present what it is. "Man," as Aristotle said, "is a political animal." And politics, to quote J. J. Findlay, "is history *par excellence*, simply because it treats of the most general and universal aspect of man's behaviour." Consequently, we cannot avoid politics, and because we cannot avoid politics, we cannot escape the past which has created the political situation of to-day.

In our daily contact with current national politics we are continually driven beyond the confines of purely national

affairs, and so find ourselves surrounded by a mass of continental phenomena which form a sort of trackless jungle. It is evident to us, of course, that Europe is suffering from some chronic sickness and that among the symptoms of this sickness are Germany's perpetual outcry against "encirclement" and her constant clamour for something which she calls "living space" (*Lebensraum*). We know that these demands somehow account for Germany's standing enmity with France, her undying rivalry with Russia, and her unquenchable thirst for conquest, which not only involves her larger neighbours but for ever threatens the independence and liberty of smaller surrounding nations.

We cannot help seeing that, although Germany was defeated and disarmed in 1918, her bellicose spirit was not extinguished but lay dormant in the years immediately following the First World War, to be brought to active life again by the internal revolution which propelled Hitler to political supremacy in 1933, and that the revival of her dreams of world conquest led to her strange courtship of Italy, consummated in the ill-starred union of those unnatural partners known as the Axis. We vaguely realise that it was these preposterous claims of the Germans that led them, in defiance of treaties made less than twenty years before, to reintroduce conscription, to reoccupy the Rhineland, to join with Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact, to incorporate Austria, to annex Czecho-Slovakia, and to invade Poland. We know that the unprovoked attack on Poland was the immediate occasion of the declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France in 1939, yet it is evident that it could not have been the root cause of an upheaval so profound as to develop into a Second World War.

What, then, are the fundamental causes of this political malaise and the recurrent world crises to which it gives rise? Until we trace these causes we cannot hope to cure the disease. And cure it we must, or perish. Any enquiry into these fundamental causes must begin with the realisation that we are here dealing with issues not only of to-day but of yesterday, and that we cannot comprehend their existing form, much less their place in the future, without knowing how they came to be what they are. To understand them, therefore, we are driven back upon the past, remote and immediate, in which we see them evolving. There we behold a spectacle of ferment and change. For the past is never wholly static and always the evolutionary process

is at work. Its tempo and violence vary from one age to another according to the nature of the operative forces. At certain periods and in certain places it is so slow as to be almost imperceptible ; at others it gathers such momentum as to become revolutionary. But whether the changes be slow or fast, moderate or violent, the present and the past are inextricably interwoven, and the Dynamic Europe of to-day is only to be explained by the Dynamic Europe of yesterday.

To help the enquiring citizen in his search for coherence I propose, in the following pages, first to review the complex problem of contemporary Europe in some of its larger aspects, and then to seek the origin and trace the growth of those factors which have created the problem, and of those ideals which, if we could but realise them, might bring us at length to the dawn of an era of international understanding and peaceful progress.

CHAPTER I

EUROPEAN SCENE

ASPECTS OF THE CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM

The Map of Europe

THE European scene is set on a stage roughly in the shape of an isosceles triangle with its base to the east resting on the Ural Mountains, the lower Volga, and the western shore of the Caspian Sea, where it is contiguous with Asia, its two long sides bounded by the sea, and its apex pointing westward in the Iberian Peninsula. This continental area is made up of a large central plain, with mountain ranges to the north in Norway and Scotland and along its southern edge in the Mediterranean countries. The land mass, which breaks to form the British Isles and the many islands of the Mediterranean, is so largely penetrated by inland seas that no point, except in eastern European Russia, is more than 400 miles from the coast. Consequently most of Europe is advantageously situated for marine transport and communication both among its various parts and with the outer world.


Europe is, with the exception of Australasia, the smallest of the five continents, having a land area of somewhat less than four million square miles, which is about one-fourteenth of the terrestrial globe. On this continent live 550 million people, a number slightly more than a quarter of the world's total population. A comparison of these figures fractionally expressed gives some indication of the vastness of the natural wealth of Europe which can sustain, by production, distribution, and exchange, so large an aggregation of human beings in so relatively small a space, and of the consequent importance of its place in the world. The nature of the land varies greatly in different parts of the continent, but few areas are entirely unproductive. There are vast forests in the north, fertile soils in the central plain, and olive groves and vineyards on the rugged slopes of the southern mountains. But it is in mineral resources that Europe is specially rich, particularly in the zone sometimes called the Power Belt, an area about 400 miles wide running diagonally across the continent from the British Isles to the Caspian Sea. This area con-

tains Europe's principal deposits of coal, iron ore, and petroleum. Outside it the chief sources of iron ore are to be found in Sweden and northern Spain, whence they can be easily transported by sea to areas of coal production in the Power Belt.

The effect of the material conditions on the lives of the people has varied greatly in different ages, so that, while the physical map remains static, the political map constantly changes and thus reflects the dynamic background of contemporary Europe. If we disregard the temporary blurring of boundaries through aggressive military occupation and study the political map as it was redrawn after the First World War in 1919,¹ we find that Europe is divided into thirty-five states, counting Eire (Southern Ireland) as an independent state, and including Iceland, proclaimed an independent republic in 1944, and the six very small continental states: Andorra, Lichtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican. The 550 million people dwelling within the frontiers of these thirty-five states share about twenty-eight different languages, profess various religions, and differ widely in their social and economic development, their standards of culture, and their political organisation. This apparently chaotic situation emerges from a past in which states have frequently changed their form and size. The different pictures delineated by the changing frontiers may be likened to a series of snapshots, in which we see momentarily photographed, as it were, the fortunes of states and nations as they are affected by the migrations of peoples, the chances of war, the incentives of spiritual and scientific movements, and the impulsions of economic exploitation.

Europe, then, is not a political term, connoting a political entity, as, for example, is the United States of America or the Commonwealth of Australia. Yet it is clearly something more than a mere geographical expression. It was only gradually that the name Europe was applied to the continent as a whole. In this gradual application it followed the line of historical development, being first given to the area in the south-east corner where European civilisation began, and later spreading westward to the lands along the northern shores of the Mediterranean, next to those bordering the Atlantic, and finally to the centre and east as these areas came slowly under southern and western influences. From the movements implied by this gradual application of the name, combined with the scientific and technological advances of

¹ See later, page 383.



THE PHYSICAL MAP OF EUROPE.

modern times, there have grown up in Europe, in spite of the differences among its states and nations, a community of customs, a reciprocity of interests, and an interchange of ideas that have given its various divisions and peoples a sense of solidarity, if not always of unity, which is a creative factor in the world to-day. Europe, in short, is the home of a civilisation distinct and unique, which, having flowered on this continent, has been carried by Europeans to the four corners of the earth. Because of this common inheritance and this sense of solidarity, the term Europe has ceased to have a mere geographical significance, and has come to connote a region whose peoples together have made, and must continue to make, a vital contribution to the progress of mankind.

Race and Nationality

The explanation of the political divisions of Europe and of the differences among its peoples lies in the past, but if we seek their origin in differences of race we shall not get very far. Race is a term that is often used very loosely and is frequently confused with the term nation; as, for example, when one speaks of the Anglo-Saxon race, or the French race, or the German

race. Probably more pernicious nonsense is written and spoken on the subject of race than on any other political question. The Nazis used it for propaganda purposes and, enlarging on the doctrines of earlier German publicists, built up an entirely spurious philosophy about the Aryans, mainly to justify their policy of aggression and their brutal anti-Semitism. Hitler expatiated on this theme at length in *Mein Kampf*, and Alfred Rosenberg, the philosopher of National Socialism, made it the basis of Nazi ideology.

The Nazi argument, however, was entirely specious. Actually, the term Aryan is so wide as to be utterly meaningless when applied to modern political conditions. The Aryans were originally a race in central Asia, east of the Caspian Sea and north of the western Himalayas, whence they branched off at different periods, westward into Europe and southward into India. From this migration in a remote epoch sprang, on the one hand, the Greeks, Latins, Celts, Teutons, and Slavs, and, on the other, the Hindus. For this reason, the term Aryan is interchangeable with the term Indo-European. The community of origin of these peoples is proved by a comparative study of their languages, and, indeed, the term is more significant in linguistics, or the study of languages, than it is in ethnology, or the study of races. From this we may properly conclude that all the European peoples, except the Basques, Hungarians, Bulgars, Turks, and Finns, in addition to the dispersed Jews—all of them comparatively small groups in Europe—belong to the Aryan or Indo-European family of mankind. But this is only another way of saying that the term Aryan or Indo-European covers nearly all the peoples of Europe.

This ultimate ethnic homogeneity of the vast majority of Europeans was doubtless a highly convenient argument for a horde of destructive revolutionaries whose avowed policy was simultaneously to wipe out the Jewish race (which, it is true, is not Aryan but Semitic) and to replace the historical states system of Europe, based on nationalism, by a so-called New Order, based on race, under which the diversities of Western Civilisation would have been exchanged for a slavish uniformity by the abolition of political boundaries, and the permanent domination by the Germans of all other nations. But it is obviously pointless as a means of classification, and little more helpful for this purpose than to assert that all the peoples of Europe belong to the white race, a distinction which they share

with the people of western Asia and northern Africa. The truth is that, apart from pseudo-scientific Germans, only anthropologists think in terms of a pure racial type, which, like the economic man, is a fiction imagined for purposes of research. For no individual in civilised society combines all the characteristics of one race, and certainly no European is racially pure. Europeans, in fact, are cross-breeds, or, as H. A. L. Fisher succinctly puts it, "Europe is a continent of energetic mongrels."

Nevertheless, there are three fairly well-defined groups within this Aryan stock in Europe, which it is not unhelpful to remember. These we may classify as follows : (1) the Teutons, comprising the English, the Germans, the Scandinavians, and the Dutch ; (2) the Latins, comprising the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the French, and most of the Belgians and Rumanians ; (3) the Slavs, comprising the Russians, the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, and the Yugo-Slavs. But as fast as we find an explanation of political boundaries in so-called racial differences, we can bring forward examples to contradict it. Thus, if there is such a thing as a French race, the Walloons belong to it, and yet these are joined with the Flemings, who are Teutonic in origin, to form the state of Belgium. Or again, if there is such a thing as a German race, the Dutch belong to it ; yet these form the separate state of The Netherlands. Nor is even a common language necessarily the characteristic of a single state, as is seen, for example, in Belgium, which has two official languages : French and Flemish ; and Switzerland, which has three : French, German, and Italian, besides a fourth in wide common use, called Romansch.

But if race has little real meaning as a factor in contemporary Europe, nationality has a great deal. Race has significance only in the dim recesses of pre-history ; whereas nationality is a comparatively modern phenomenon, and is a strongly formative influence in modern politics. The term nationality is often indifferently used to refer to more than one concept, sometimes to a so-called race, sometimes to a nation, and sometimes to a state formed by a nation. Nationality is, indeed, very hard to define, and more than one eminent political scientist—Lord Bryce, for example—has given up the attempt and concluded that it is indefinable. Etymologically the word nation clearly connotes birth and kinship, for it is derived from the Latin word *nascor*, to be born. But its modern essence is that it signifies a spirit of united action struggling to embody

itself in political forms. The great French writer, Renan, for example, said that what causes men to form a nation is the memory of the great things they have done together and the will to accomplish yet more. Nationality thus presupposes a common past and a present desire to continue the common life. John Stuart Mill emphasises this in *Representative Government*, where he says that "a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between themselves and others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively."

It is important, then, to keep in one's mind a clear distinction between a state and a nation. A state is a society politically organised, or, as Woodrow Wilson said, "a people organised for law within a definite territory." But a society so organised need not be based on a nation, and it was because many European states in modern times were not so founded that the last 150 years have seen so many changes in state boundaries. Nationality first emerged in Europe, in a political sense, towards the close of the Middle Ages. The Church Councils which were then constituted to control the Pope and bring order into the Catholic Church were made up of representatives of particular nations, specifically referred to in the records of the meetings. But it was not until after the fall of Napoleon that nationalism began to assume what may be called a militant aspect. The Napoleonic despotism, while consciously destroying state boundaries, had, in fact, unconsciously brought to active life a sense of nationality among the peoples upon whom it was imposed. Hence the nineteenth century is filled with the struggles for national unity. Thus, for example, we see, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the creation of the national states of Greece and Belgium, and in the second half of the century the unification of Italy and Germany. Later on, the national cry is used to justify the establishment of independent Balkan states, like Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The First World War of 1914-1918 resulted in the creation of yet further new, revived, or enlarged national states, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and Yugo-Slavia; as well as of Finland and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In fact, one of the underlying principles of the settlement which ended the First

World War was what was called self-determination. Of this President Wilson, in his Message to Congress in February 1918, said, "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states."

Some writers contend that the principle of self-determination, as enunciated by the American President, has proved a snare and a delusion. But whether this be true or not, there can be no doubt that the settlement after the War of 1914-1918 left two kinds of dissatisfaction: one on the part of the states diminished in order to create new political entities, and the other on the part of minorities whose national aspirations could not be realised and who, therefore, had to remain under what they regarded as an alien yoke. Such a situation is inevitable, because if, out of the political confusions of Europe at any given moment, certain states are integrated on the basis of nationality, it can only be at the cost of disintegrating others, and there are clearly limits to this process. Thus Greece and the Balkan states were created at the expense of Turkey and later of Austria-Hungary; Belgium at the expense of The Netherlands, and later of Germany; Italy, Yugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia at the expense of Austria; the Baltic States at the expense of Russia; and Poland at the expense of Russia, Germany, and Austria. The treaties which ended the First World War confirmed Russia's loss of her former western borderlands, cut Germany in two by establishing the Polish Corridor dividing Prussia and East Prussia, left Austria a deserted island of seven million German souls by handing over her southern Slavs to form Yugo-Slavia with Serbia and her northern Slavs to form Czecho-Slovakia and part of Poland, and cutting her off from her former Hungarian partner. And, finally, the treaties left the Balkans still a festering sore of political exasperation, from which Germany knew how to profit in the spread of the Nazi doctrine and her search for partners in aggression.

So in due time, when the opportunity arrived, Germany incorporated Austria, annexed Czecho-Slovakia, invaded Poland, and made most of the states of south-eastern Europe her satellites in the universal war which resulted from these aggressions. The lesson of all this is that nationalism is both a good and a bad

spirit. On the one hand, it can miraculously survive ages of suppression and even partition and dispersion, as is shown in the history of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia (Bohemia), and Greece. On the other, it may be used as a preparation for aggression, with the object of sheer aggrandisement and hegemony, as in the case of Germany's absorption of Austria and her annexation of the Sudetenland of Czecho-Slovakia, both of which, be it noted, were, not without reason, backed by nationalist arguments. By the same token, the majority of people in every European state that the Nazis overran in the Second World War resisted the aggression on the ground that it outraged the sentiment of national independence.

In nationalism, then, we have in Europe to-day one of the most potent factors of political idealism or expediency, according to its aims and purposes. Some argue that nationalism, having served its turn, must give way in the days ahead to a less exclusive and more cosmopolitan conception of political allegiance.¹ But, necessary though it is to recognise its shortcomings and its potentiality for harm, it is certain that there can be no permanence in any peace settlement which ignores the actual contribution it can make to the good society of the future. From either standpoint its evolution in the European scene will repay our closest study.

Society and Politics

The state, as we have said, is society politically organised, and political institutions are the means adopted by the state to exercise the functions of government. In any modern community there are many relationships existing among men and women which divide them socially into groups. These groups, or units of association, include the family into which its members are born, and those joined voluntarily, for traditional, recreational, vocational, economic, or spiritual reasons; as, for example, a club, a trade union, a friendly society, a professional organisation, or a church. Each of these units of association makes rules for its conduct and welfare, but the community at large, which includes them all, makes rules superior to all others. Such rules for the community as a whole are called laws, and in the act of making laws society becomes the political unit called a state. It is this power to make laws, in fact, which distinguishes

¹ This question is discussed later, in Chapter XXIII.

the state from all other forms of association. Laws, then, are rules of a special sanctity which may override the will of any individual or the rules of any association of individuals within the political community.

This power of the state to make laws is what we call sovereignty. Sovereignty has both an internal and an external aspect. Internally, it implies the power to coerce individual and associated members of the state. Externally, it implies the right of any state to maintain its absolute independence of all other states, even to the point of going to war in its own defence. In order to exercise its sovereign powers, the state has a supreme authority called the government. The government controls the armed forces necessary for the maintenance of order within the state and for the defence of its independence without. Thus government is, in the last analysis, organised force. To carry out its functions properly, government must have three clearly defined powers. First there is legislative power, or the power to make laws. This includes financial power, or the power to raise sufficient money from the community to advance its interests and to protect it within and without. Secondly, there is executive power, or the power to carry out the laws when they are made. Thirdly, there is judicial power, or the power to enforce the laws if they are abused or broken.

Thus the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary are the three necessary departments of government. The confusion and conflict of these three powers are fruitful causes of strife in states. The fall of France in 1940, for example, was not entirely unconnected with the fact that the legislature (the Chamber of Deputies and Senate) was out of sympathy with the executive (Cabinet of Ministers) which was responsible to the Chambers for its direction of the war. Even in Britain, where the Mother of Parliaments sets an example to all the world of the harmonious working of constitutional machinery, the double function of the House of Commons—the making of laws and the control of the executive or Cabinet—is something more than it can reasonably discharge in the parliamentary time available, and there is at the moment a pressing need for the reform of its procedure. In the United States, the executive, or Presidency, and the legislature—House of Representatives and Senate—are quite distinct. But this does not entirely get over the difficulty, because the American electoral system can create a situation in which the President may have majorities against him in both

Houses, and so the legislature may sterilise much of the work of the executive.

The central government of any state is generally assisted by local authorities which it creates, and which it can equally abolish if it wishes. But in some states there are other units of government with much more power than that of mere local authorities. These units are sometimes called states, sometimes cantons, and sometimes provinces. They exist by virtue of some fundamental law which cannot be altered by the mere act of the central legislature. The powers of the two authorities are clearly laid down, and cannot be varied without recourse to some special procedure equally clearly laid down. A political community so organised is called a federal state, and the central authority in such a state is called the federal authority. Examples of federal states are, in Europe, the Swiss Confederation, the German Republic (before Hitler), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and outside Europe, the United States of America, the Dominion of Canada, and the Commonwealth of Australia. In such states, the state or cantonal or provincial authority may enjoy all sorts of functions of government in the state or canton or province, but the one power which such authorities cannot assume is the control of the armed forces, and hence the right to make war. In other words, in a federal state the internal sovereignty may be said to be shared between the federal authority and the state or cantonal or provincial authorities, but the external sovereignty lies solely and absolutely in the hands of the federal authority. In Great Britain there is no such division of internal sovereignty. There the central legislature, or Parliament, is absolutely supreme internally and externally, sharing its powers only with local authorities which it creates by its own act. Such a state is, therefore, an absolute unit, and for this reason is called a unitary state. Among other states of this kind in Europe (as in 1939) are France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

Now, in a well-organised state, whether unitary or federal, there is a recognised set of rules and regulations for the working of the three departments of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. This set of rules is called the constitution, and the state which has it is called a constitutional state. Lord Bryce defined a constitution as "a frame of political society,

organised through and by law ; that is to say, one in which law has established permanent institutions with recognised functions and definite rights." In other words, a constitution is a collection of principles according to which the powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two are adjusted. The constitution may be fully set out on paper, as, for example, the constitutions of the United States, of the Swiss Confederation, of the German Republic (which Hitler overthrew), and of the Italian Kingdom (which Mussolini did his best to destroy). Or it may consist of a few fragmentary laws, passed about the same time ; as, for example, did the constitution of the Third Republic of France, as it operated until 1940. Or, again, it may have been gradually built up from earlier customs and traditions, partly by legal decisions made at various times, and partly through statutes periodically passed by Parliament, as is the British Constitution. But of whichever type it may be, or whether it applies to a unitary or federal state, the constitution, if it functions properly, is at once the safeguard of the rights of the governed and the guide to the political action of the governors.

These considerations should help us to understand one of the fundamental factors in the problem of contemporary Europe, which is the conflict between democracy and dictatorship. This conflict arises from two opposing attitudes to the function of government. It has nothing to do with whether the state has a republican or a monarchical form of government ; for a republic may be in fact a tyranny, as, for example, in Germany under Hitler and in Spain under Franco ; while a monarchy may be highly democratic, as it is, for example, in Britain and in the Scandinavian countries under their normal régimes. On the other hand, a republic may be very democratic, as it is, for example, in Switzerland and the United States ; while a monarchy may support itself by countenancing a despotism, as it did in Italy during Mussolini's period of power.

The relevant question is this : Is the state a means to an end or is it an end in itself ? Or, to put the question more precisely, is government concerned primarily to secure the rights and promote the happiness of the members, individual and associated, of the political community for whose security it is responsible, or is it its business to glorify the state as such and to sacrifice every individual and social interest to that object ? You may consider that that society is happiest which is least

subject to state action. But political control—even a large amount of political control—is not in itself necessarily tyrannical. Whether it is so or not depends upon the nature of the state in any given community, the purpose of the government and the laws, and the part the mass of the people consciously play in their creation. If the state is indeed the whole community organised for law aiming at social betterment and not at mere political power; if the government and the laws have this as their purpose; and if the people truly share in making the government and consequently the laws, then such a community may be rightly called a political democracy.

The word democracy is derived from two Greek words, and means the rule of the people or government by the people. Defined in this simple way, according to its etymology, democracy is patently open to criticism even by its friends and especially under modern conditions. It is easy to ridicule it, as, for example, Bernard Shaw does in *Everybody's Political What's What*, because of the apparent futility of the ballot-box and the party system; easy to condemn it, as Emile Faguet, the French critic, does in his political tract, *The Cult of Incompetence*, on the ground of its tendency to reduce any society to the level of the lowest intelligence in it; easy to revile it, as Byron did when he called it "an aristocracy of blackguards."

But democracy is not merely a form of government: it is also a social condition, whose ultimate aim is the achievement by every citizen of the ability to develop all that is best in him. It is, therefore, fundamentally concerned with human dignity, with the decent rights of man, and these are not to be secured by politics alone, since true democracy postulates a spiritual motive which no electoral system or legislature, however representative and intelligent, can of themselves provide. At the most, the state can do no more than attempt to construct the temple in which the social ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity can live together to the end of human happiness. Democracy is thus not a static but a dynamic force, constantly adapting itself to changing circumstances. It is, in fact, an expanding synthesis of all the strivings after the Good Society which have marked the advance of Western Civilisation, the "progress of all through all under the leadership of the best and the wisest," as Mazzini put it. Such a development is essentially an evolutionary process, and in this sense democracy has nowhere yet been fully achieved and cannot of its nature reach finality

while society lasts. It remains, in short, an idea superior to the political forms in which it seeks to express itself.

Yet, when all this is said, it remains true that, under a properly working democratic constitution, the sovereignty of the people is made operative. In a democratic state like our own, for example, the people ultimately control the government by means of a periodical election which creates the principal House of Parliament, or Commons. The House of Commons in turn creates and controls the Cabinet, in the sense that the Cabinet can only exist while it commands the support of a majority in the Commons. In such a state the reality of political democracy is inescapable, for, after all, the course of modern economic and social life depends very greatly on legislation, and the trend of such legislation is ultimately determined by the nature of the popular majorities which return parties to power. At the same time, the judges are free from all political influence and have complete security of tenure while they continue to do their duty in enforcing the law with absolute impartiality. The same is true in the British Self-governing Dominions, where the democratic checks are created by the same kind of machinery, and in the United States, though there the same end is achieved by keeping the legislature and executive distinct and electing them separately. But, whatever the particular practice may be, the point is that in a political democracy the governmental machinery exists not to enhance the power of the state but to serve and strengthen the social organism. In short, under such a political system the state exists for society and not society for the state.

It does not, of course, follow that the mere existence of the machinery of political democracy necessarily creates a true social and economic democracy. Indeed, there are those who contend that political democracy is a mere façade used by the plutocratic elements as a screen to conceal the inequalities of the society to which it applies. This view leads to the argument that social and economic democracy can never be realised by constitutional means but only by revolutionary methods; by the pressure, that is to say, upon the political machine of the industrial power of the working masses, as the only means of counteracting, as these protagonists would say, the financial power of the plutocracy. This is the standpoint of syndicalism, which means the use of workers' unions, or *syndicats* as the French call them, working for political ends outside the political theatre. Such advocates point to Soviet Russia as an exem-

plication of the truth of their contentions. And, though the historical affiliations of the revolution were not syndicalist but communist, there can be no doubt that the Russian people have succeeded, by means of workers' councils, called *soviets* in Russian, in establishing a true social and economic democracy, through what Karl Marx called the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the precedent development of a political democracy.

Whether the machine works in a political democracy depends upon the vigour of the popular will to work it. How far its operation shall be used for the purposes of creating a social and economic democracy depends in its turn upon the people's desire so to use it and their faith in its power to achieve these ends. At least it may be said that the development of a political democracy is a sound and proper basis for the building up of a social and economic democracy, and indeed in a well-developed political community it is difficult to see how the latter can be achieved except on the foundations of the former. Thus we find that the nationalist claim to political self-determination is generally accompanied by an urge to create a democratic constitution. For a people so seeking its freedom desires, not only the right to govern itself free from the interference of other states, but also the liberty of its individual members and their right to form associations of all kinds—political, social, and economic—within the political community.

Some variant of this form of state was characteristic of the political organisation of most European nations after the First World War. For then, in most states where it was not already existing or in states newly formed as a result of the war, a national democratic constitution was promulgated. In fact, just after the First World War the prospect of the universal establishment in Europe of the liberal state based on nationalism and representative democracy was brighter than it had ever been before in the whole of its history. But a written constitution becomes a mere scrap of paper when the community which formulates it finds itself not sufficiently advanced politically to make it work. And so in the disastrous years which followed the settlement after the First World War, there was a series of apostacies from the democratic constitutional faith, and a new type of autocratic state emerged.

Such a state is diametrically opposed to a political democracy. Autocracy, like democracy, is derived from two Greek words, in this case meaning self-rule, and signified for the Greeks

government at the whim and pleasure of a personal ruler, in contradistinction to the law which was their safeguard against individual caprice. There are two chief characteristics inseparable from the autocratic type of government. First, there is a complete absence of any instrument which can be called a constitution, whereby the rights of the governed and the powers of the government are defined and controlled. Secondly, under an autocracy the machinery of government is deliberately used to enhance the power of the state without regard to the health of the social organism. In other words, politics, instead of being used as the means of securing individual happiness and social progress, becomes the instrument of power as an end in itself. Such an abuse of power is the inevitable concomitant of autocratic government, and power politics, as we have seen it in our own day in the hands of the leaders of the new autocracies, is the cause at once of the ruin of social harmony within the state and of the deterioration of peaceful relations without.

There have been many autocratic states in Europe in the past, usually associated with great hereditary dynasties, as, for example, France under the Bourbons, Prussia under the Hohenzollerns, Austria under the Hapsburgs, Russia under the Tsars, and Turkey under the Sultans. The new type of autocracy which emerged after the War of 1914-1918 appeared first in Italy, then in Germany, then in Spain, and later, in a somewhat milder form, in some of the states in eastern and south-eastern Europe. It was distinguished from the earlier autocracies by two characteristics. First, whereas the earlier autocracies had been traditional through many centuries, the new autocracy was established by means of a counter-revolution against a political system itself achieved through a democratic revolt. Thus in Italy the dictatorship overthrew the democratic system forged and tempered during the nineteenth century in the fires of war and revolution, which had made the House of Savoy a constitutional monarchy. In Germany it overthrew the Weimar Republic set up in the Revolution of 1918 which brought about the fall of the Hohenzollerns. In Spain it overthrew the Constitution of 1932 which the Popular Front was struggling to maintain. Secondly, in the new type of autocracy the dynastic principle was absent, for even where it continued, as in 1937, it did so only on sufferance.

What happened in the making of these latter-day autocracies

was that a hitherto little-known individual appeared at the head of a political party (*Fascist, Nazi, or Falangist*), under the title of leader (*Duce, Führer, or Caudillo*), and became clothed with absolute powers. Under this type of régime the party tried to make itself co-extensive with the community by prohibiting all other parties and making membership of the leader's party the indispensable condition of the enjoyment by the individual of such social and political rights as were allowed in any case to exist. There was, at least in Italy and Germany, a deceptive air of ultimate popular sanction in the establishment of the régime, because the leader was one of the common people who owed nothing to the privilege of birth and breeding, and he began his period of power by assuming the constitutional headship of the state. Thus, in Italy the King invited Mussolini to become Prime Minister and to form a Cabinet, and in Germany Hitler was appointed Imperial Chancellor by President Hindenburg. Moreover, in Germany, where the dictatorship was seen in its most repulsive form, a series of plebiscites, or mass popular votes, held in the most propitious circumstances for the new régime, seemed to give it in its early days an overwhelming democratic sanction. Now, while leadership is necessary in any progressive community, the evil of the position of the new German dictator was his assumption of a sort of Messianic quality which implied that only by an almost religious devotion to him and his cause could the people hope for salvation. And indeed the *Führer's* autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, came to be regarded as the bible of the National Socialist Movement. So in Germany the leadership principle (*Führer-Prinzip*) became the sole basis of national cohesion, and Hitler was able to ride off on the pretence that for the first time in its history the German nation had become politically-minded.

Now, nothing could be farther from the truth than this assertion, because a people cannot maintain a political consciousness without the living means of exercising it through its embodiment in a set of organs, in the operation of which the people play a vital part. But the consequences which inevitably flow from the success of the sort of counter-revolution which we have described are bound to be inimical to this political vitalism and thus to be essentially anti-democratic. First comes the more or less rapid destruction of the political constitution, with the result that the leader, in the absence of those recognisable rules of political conduct and safeguards of popular rights,

becomes a dictator whose word is law and who commands unquestioning obedience. Thus of the three departments of government of which we have spoken, the legislature is nothing more than an assembly of the leader's partisans and a mere audience for his demagogic outbursts; the executive, in the absence of an electoral system, is entirely uncontrolled; and the judiciary, instead of holding office free from political interference, becomes a creature of the executive.

Secondly, the leader and his myrmidons acquire total authority in every aspect of the political and social life of the people. Such a régime is therefore quite properly described as both totalitarian and authoritarian. The inevitable consequence of the establishment of this kind of government is, therefore, the loss on the part of the people not only of political but also of social liberty; that is to say, they suffer not only the abolition of democratic political institutions, such as a legislature freely and popularly elected and the right to form political parties, but the denial of their freedom to form or join social, economic, and spiritual groups, such as clubs, trade unions, and even churches. And having deprived the people of these fundamental liberties, the régime reinforces its despotic grip on the community by the establishment of a secret police, with its licensed "snooping" and torture, and its power to imprison, and even execute, without due process of law; and—even more ruthlessly—by the degradation of the system of public education to the status of a handmaiden of party propaganda and by the prostitution of the service of youth through its indoctrination with the totalitarian ideology.

Thirdly, under such a régime, the state is glorified and made an end in itself, while society is made to subserve a political party, steeped in chicanery and corruption, which pretends to be synonymous with the nation. This glorification of the state within causes a concentration of the national resources and energies on the manufacture of armaments ("guns before butter") and leads inevitably to aggression without. For a dictatorship knows that it cannot justify itself for ever in the eyes of the people merely by its own works within the state's boundaries, and will not be satisfied to defend the state's independence against attack, but must be at constant pains to extend its frontiers at the expense of the independence of its weaker neighbours. Finally, such an autocratic system creates a situation in which the social and political organism atrophies through

lack of exercise under the all-pervading state. So, when the day of disillusionment arrives and the dictatorship is ripe for overthrow, there is no working alternative government ready to replace it, and anarchy and chaos may easily ensue.

Here, then, we have a fundamental issue in the contemporary European scene. Here, in fact, we see the ideal of national representative democracy struggling to resist the growth in the body politic and social of the canker of authoritarianism. By its championship of the Rule of Law democracy stands for social health and political sanity against the caprice of a tyranny masquerading in the cloak of an ideology. This is no easy battle, for the maintenance of individual and social rights is a harder struggle to-day than ever it was in the past, because all the economic tendencies of the contemporary world are towards the mechanisation of life and hence towards the dehumanisation of society. The fact is that the scientific and mechanical progress of the last fifty years, which should have brought happiness to mankind, has so far only succeeded in creating a world of human misery. First, it has destroyed the crafts which gave the individual some pride in his work, and has set up in their place a system of mass production which makes the individual workman a mere cog in the productive machine. Secondly, it has changed the character of the local community by blurring its boundaries and imposing upon it a dull uniformity through mass production and modern transport. Thirdly, it has made possible the invention and universalisation of the cinematograph and wireless, and the exploitation of these beneficent appliances, in a world in which the masses have been made literate but given few cultural standards, tends to create a state of mental passivity unfavourable to the development of speculation and discussion.

In this mechanical world, how a man shall work in one place may be dictated by decisions made a thousand miles away, where his needs are certainly not consulted; how he shall think may be decided in some radio headquarters, whose service tends either to alienate him by its grandiosity or to pander to him by its vulgarity; and how he shall amuse himself may be determined in some film colony on the other side of the world, which knows nothing of his tastes and interests. Accompanying these economic and social compulsions is a greater and greater tendency to political control from the centre, seen most markedly in the increase of modern social legislation, which is

the outcome of the tendency generally known as collectivism. This is by no means the monopoly of democratic societies: it is also characteristic of dictatorships, under which it is used as a kind of sop or palliative to keep the people in good heart. Beneficial though such legislation is, it can only be implemented, even in a political democracy, by the constant enlargement of ministerial powers and the multiplication of government departments. Here lies the danger of a blanketing bureaucracy, of what the late Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart, called the New Despotism.¹ In short, we are constantly faced with the spectre of mere hugeness, which threatens to cast an impenetrable shade across the path of the sun of democracy, whose rays are strongest and most health-giving when they shine on the smaller unit of social and political organisation.

Against this gigantic dehumanising tendency of modern politics and economics, democracy can hope to triumph only through conscious effort. But in conditions of social and economic malaise the people's hold on their own rights and powers may be too easily relaxed. In a phase of post-war disillusionment and a period of mass unemployment, aggravated by cyclical depressions, the way is readily laid open for the advent of an apparent saviour of society in the form of a dictator. Then follows inevitably the exploitation by the dictatorship of the mechanical inventions to complete the destruction of individual initiative and the character of the local community. So may a nation be seduced from its true allegiance.

We cannot dismiss this conflict between the democratic ideal and its authoritarian perversion, as it were with an intellectual shrug, because we are so manifestly involved in it. As a nation we have to battle constantly for the preservation of our own social and political rights and institutions, built up through generations of creative discussion and constructive statesmanship, against the deadly dangers of the Machine Age. And internationally we must ensure that such perversions are not allowed again to develop to the point where they overwhelm our world in war. It is not for us to seek to impose our institutions upon nations which may not want them or which may not be sufficiently advanced politically to live under them. But at least we may learn how the ideal and the ideology have evolved, and thus be in a stronger position to help those European nations

¹ See his book of that title, first published in 1929. For the most recent criticism of the same tendency, see C. K. Allen's *Law and Orders* (1945).

which, conscious of having been misled by the false doctrines of Fascism and Nazism, wish to create for themselves a good society through a better way of political life.

International Relations

When we consider the external relations of states, we touch the most vital aspect of the problem of contemporary Europe. Clearly, under modern conditions it is idle for any European nation to attempt to work out the means of its own welfare without regard to the state of its intercourse with other nations. For not only is there a high degree of economic interdependence among nations to-day, but at any moment a conflict between them may in a flash place the whole of their internal organisation in jeopardy and even bring it crashing down in ruins. It is, therefore, ultimately upon a solution of the problem of international relations that the future well-being of every nation depends. Yet, in spite of this fundamental need of stable relationships and of good neighbourliness among them, the nations of Europe are still far from the establishment of permanent machinery to secure the working of these principles.

In order to understand this it is important at the outset to grasp that the attitude of one state towards another is something quite different from that of one citizen towards another within any given state. If one citizen or a group of citizens within a state does violence to another citizen or group of citizens within that state, the forces of law and order which the government of the state controls are invoked to punish those who are guilty of such violence. If the existing government should fail in this elementary duty of enforcing respect for the law, the law would be brought into disrepute, and ultimately, where a government could not be found to correct this situation, a condition of lawlessness or anarchy would ensue. This anarchical condition is essentially that which characterises the international situation as we have hitherto known it. For the very sovereignty which is the essential quality of the state empowers it to control the relations of its citizens and groups within the state, and yet at the same time gives it the right to behave as it likes in relation to other states.

In fact, the very existence of a number of separate sovereign states implies the absence of an authority with the power to enforce law and order among them. Just as within the state the government may at any moment override the will of an

individual or group within it and thus deprive them of their freedom to act as they like, so an authority which could equally override the will of states would necessarily deprive them of their sovereign powers. Such an authority would, in fact, be not merely international but supernational. To such a deprivation of their sovereign powers the states of Europe have not so far been willing to submit. In the absence of such an authority, therefore, normal relations between states have to be maintained in some other way. They are achieved, in fact, by three principal means: namely, diplomacy, treaties of alliance, and international law.

Diplomacy is a broad term signifying the contact of state with state through the medium of ambassadors. The ambassador represents his government in the state to which he is accredited, and his official residence, or embassy, is subject to the law not of the country in which it is situated but of the country for which the ambassador speaks. All political contacts between states are made through the ambassadors, and they therefore occupy a position of great delicacy. The smooth working of the relationships between states depends very largely on the way the ambassadors handle the affairs of the Powers of which they are the intermediaries. The business of the diplomat is therefore essentially pacific, and the first thing that happens when war breaks out between two states is that the ambassadors and their staffs immediately return to their own countries.

Bismarck used to say that war is the continuation of diplomacy, by which he meant that war should be used to achieve what diplomacy fails to accomplish. There is, of course, a sense in which this is a manifest truism. But for Bismarck it meant the threat of the use of war to achieve diplomatic ends. This is a thoroughly cynical view of international relations and typifies the sabre-rattling methods of Prussian diplomacy which have been the curse of Europe ever since Bismarck's day. The truth is that war should be regarded as a criminal failure of diplomacy, and this gives point to a remark of Bernard Shaw's to the effect that it is precisely when war breaks out that ambassadors should remain at their posts so as to be ready to act at the slightest prospect of composing the quarrel and ending the war. But, in fact, of course, both Bismarck's cynicism and Shaw's remedy presuppose that states are fighting for a limited objective about which some sort of compromise is possible. That was so in all Bismarck's wars, but it does not fit the kind of world war that

our generation has known. In such a war one side is fighting for a world hegemony, and the other for the survival of the very basis of the good life as it conceives it. A total struggle of this kind cannot be stopped by diplomats, however powerful, because a compromise is unthinkable, and until we have removed, by a new conception of international relations, the evils which cause modern war, diplomacy will remain the limited thing it has always been.

The second method by which international relations are governed is by means of treaties. Treaties between states are of varying strength and purpose. Sometimes their object is purely commercial; that is, to secure reciprocal advantages in trade. Sometimes they constitute agreements of a military kind, and then they generally take the larger form of alliances. The primary object of such alliances is to secure a specified period of peace between the states forming them in order to reap mutual benefits which war would destroy. Generally such treaties of alliance contain clauses ensuring the combined action of the states concerned against attack by a third state or combination of states. This is called a defensive alliance, such as that made between France and Russia in 1895 and that between Britain and Japan in 1902. Sometimes they go farther and declare that if one of the allied states goes to war the other will follow. This is called an offensive alliance, such as the one made between Germany and Austria (the Dual Alliance) in 1879, and the one between Germany, Japan, and Italy (the Tripartite Pact) in 1937. Occasionally the arrangement is vaguer than either of these and only commits the states to combined action in certain contingencies. This is hardly an alliance but rather an understanding, of which the best example is the Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia as it existed before the First World War. But whatever form an alliance takes, it in no way diminishes the sovereignty of the states forming it, for there is no authority which can enforce the execution of the agreement if one of the parties to it decides to break it.

Nor does what is usually called international law affect the sovereignty of states. For international law is something very different from the law of an individual state. What we call international law is not strictly law at all, because it lacks the essential quality of law, which is that there shall be some means of enforcing it if it is abused or broken. In other words, international law has not the sanctity of state law because

there is no guarantee that the sanctions for which it allows will operate at the testing time. This was clearly seen, for example, when Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1936. International law is, in fact, merely a collection of conventions and understandings agreed upon between states at various times. At its highest the object of this international code is to prevent, and even to outlaw, war; at its lowest to humanise it. But clearly if it cannot prevent war, it can hardly hope, under modern conditions, to humanise it, and certainly in our time the international conventions and understandings commonly called international law, written though they may be, have been more often broken than observed.

But the very fact that, in spite of its manifest failures, Europe adheres to its belief in an international code proves how deep-seated is her ideal of unity and peace. The truth is that, in the mind and heart of every good European, whether in Europe or oversea, there is a desire for a social and political order among the nations not less real and stable than that between himself and his fellow citizens in his own national community, an ideal of unity and fellowship which shall abolish for ever the horrors of international strife and make all men regard it with as much abhorrence as they would the spectacle of civil war among their own direct kith and kin. This ideal of unity and fellowship derives mainly from two traditions at the very roots of Western Civilisation. The first of these traditions is to be traced from the actual unity of the Roman Empire. That unity was shattered by the barbarian invasions in the fourth and fifth centuries, and ever since that time the sense of its loss has haunted Europe, which constantly seeks to recapture it. The second tradition originated in the Christian message of "peace on earth, goodwill towards men." Though the universality of the Church has since been broken by endless revolts and schisms, the essential doctrine of fraternity remains as a perpetual rebuke to the combativeness of political man.

These prevailing ideals of unity and peace, which originated in our ancient past, are reinforced by the facts of our situation to-day, when every true interest of civilised states impels them to some sort of union and makes war among them a manifest absurdity, and when the thunders of modern warfare are such as to make the prospect of their unchecked crescendo too appalling to contemplate. For, in spite of the separatist strength of state sovereignty and the isolating force of national-

ism, there has grown up, with the advance of science and the progress of technology, an interdependence among states without precedent in the history of the world. As the Industrial Revolution has progressed and spread, and its effects have been felt by all the countries of Europe, those countries have become more and more closely linked together. The printing press, the telescope, the telephone, the steamship, the railway, the telegraph, the cable, the internal-combustion engine, the aeroplane, the wireless, the cinematograph: all these, attributable as they are to the intellectual daring of the European peoples, have tended to give them a sense of unity of purpose. Progress in methods and speed of transport has facilitated contact among these countries and should have brought them together. The correlation of postal, telegraph, and monetary systems, and of patent and copyright laws, has eased intercourse among them in every sphere, commercial and cultural. Music and the arts have become common joys of all nations, and the marvels of science and medicine have overstepped state boundaries and given the peoples of all countries a sense of common enjoyment and benefit. International societies of all kinds—social, religious, and educational—have formed in the wake of these scientific and economic advances. Popular sentiment, again, has followed this unifying trend and made the people appreciate their common interests. Further, the various states have realised that the social evils of disease and crime are best to be combated by international planning and agreements. Finally, all these lines of co-operation have created a condition of economic interdependence which, in recent times, has led to large modifications of the internal economics of states, on the assumption that trade intercourse can make up a country's shortcomings in one direction and thus allow them to concentrate production in another.

The very worst feature of modern war, therefore, is that it immediately disrupts this vast co-operative system. War is a much more terrible scourge than ever in the past. It is no longer a joust or an appeal to chivalry. The analogy of games is no longer relevant to it, and the imagery of victories won on the playing fields of Eton is distinctly outmoded. In fact, war, like industry, has become mechanised. In war, as in industry, the individual is caught up and his individuality crushed by the machine. For the same reasons the battle front ceases to be a mere fighting line for the armed forces, as in the past, and now

directly involves every section of the community. Moreover, both through the disturbance of the co-operative balance of peace-time economy and because of the violation of international idealism, no modern war can be localised. It must, in fact, necessarily become a total war and an ideological war in a sense true of no war of the past. For all these reasons combined, modern war involves greater economic desolation, larger waste of human life, and more intolerable outrage to the co-operative spirit of man and to the blessings of Western Civilisation than in any previous epoch.

If then, from any rational standpoint, war to-day is patently destructive of every advantage of civilisation, how is it possible for it to occur? The answer is that there are nations which still believe, in the face of every self-evident truth to the contrary, that greater economic advantage is to be gained by the conquest and enslavement of other nations than by co-operation with them. The leaders of these nations appear to consider that their people are the victims of the Industrial Revolution, which in its slow spread from west to east has, they contend, given a tremendous initial economic advantage to the nations of Western Europe. Germany, for example, is a land of enormous economic resources, and undoubtedly the Germans are technicians and organisers of the highest ability. Yet, because of the belatedness of their political unification and consequently of the revolution in the methods of exploiting their economic wealth, the Germans find themselves behind in the race for Empire and world markets, to a predominant share in which their resources, energy, and technical skill, they insist, entitle them. This is the gravamen of their grievance against France and Britain. This is the meaning of their earlier cry for a "place in the sun," and of their more recent demand for "living space," an advantage which can only be gained at the expense of their neighbours. And this is the ground of the distinction they and the Italians made between the nations with, as they say, imperial and mercantile advantages (the "Haves") and those to whom they are denied (the "Have-nots").

As a mere matter of economic history, these arguments are perhaps not entirely without cogency, but, falsely believing as they do that "trade follows the flag," the Germans intensify the international anarchy by turning the economic argument into a political ideology. Once grant the economic grievance,

and all the German propaganda about the "Pluto-Democracies" and the Jewish domination of the Anglo-Saxon nations falls into its place. So, instead of working with other nations towards the ideal of international co-operation for the exploitation of the age of plenty and of European trusteeship for backward peoples, they plan a "New Order" which is the very negation of that ideal.

Thus, in pursuit of these false ideals, the Germans over-emphasise the separatism of the sovereign state by deriding collective security as the refuge of cowardly peoples. They pervert the spirit of patriotism by elevating the vice of bullying to a national virtue and justifying it with a bogus philosophy of a superior race, which they call *Herrenvolk*. They abuse such good as may belong to a system of alliances by cynically disregarding international agreements whenever it suits their convenience to do so. And they glorify the state not only internally but externally, and use politics as an instrument of power without reference to its constructive purposes. This philosophy of force and fraud is the inveterate foe of a true international society, for, while its protagonists are prepared, for the accomplishment of their aims, to hazard the gamble of war, there is bound to be among all nations a constant pre-occupation with warlike preparations and a proportionate withdrawal of social energies from their creative functions. Thus are the nations of Europe forced to pursue the more sordid objectives of the Machine Age to their own detriment, instead of fostering its positive elements for their common good. And once the die is cast and war begins, because of its economic and ideological background, no human power can prevent it becoming a world war.

Until this international situation is fundamentally corrected, failure must continue to attend the efforts of peaceful nations to clothe the ideals of peace, fraternity, and unity in political and legal forms. Many attempts, both academic and practical, have been made to do this in the past, and none more honest and real than the constitution of the League of Nations after the First World War. The League was much more solidly founded than any of the earlier schemes for the maintenance of peace, such as the Concert of Europe and the Hague Conferences. Once it was established, it excluded no nation willing to sign its Covenant. It was so organised as to meet changing circumstances. It allowed for the gradual growth of the will to peace

among the nations. It created machinery to deal with every aspect of international intercourse and co-operation. Through the years of its existence it built up a formidable body of legal, political, social, and economic decisions and records calculated to assist in forming the foundations of a true and lasting comity of nations. And yet when the real test came it signally failed to prevent a new outbreak of armed strife among the nations, because its sanctions lacked the force of law and the ability to vindicate it. In other words, the League failed to recognise that, as General Smuts has truly said, "peace unbacked by power remains a dream."

So the armed outrage on Europe's co-operative system had to be resisted by all the force its victims could improvise. For, if such outrages are not resisted, then our civilisation goes down and we revert to barbarism. Those who cause wars to-day have no regard for our common heritage, and the good European is thus forced, as we have said earlier, to become its armed champion, in the hope at last of recreating the good society from the wreckage left behind. Thus the ideal of co-operation and collective security must continue to struggle against the forces of armed domination and hegemony until a way is found to give international law a true force and its rule is made triumphant.

Let us, then, survey the background of the growth of these ideals of the Good Society and try to discover how they have failed to realise themselves in lasting forms against the dark power of the ideologies which are their perversions. For only so can we hope to discover the means of permanently vindicating the true principles of Western Civilisation for the future benefit of mankind.

CHAPTER II

GREEK POLITICS

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE GOOD SOCIETY

The Bases of Greek Civilisation

OUR civilisation rests mainly on three ancient foundations, which were originally laid in Greece, Rome, and Judæa. Greece was its cradle, for there it was born and nurtured. Rome was its carrier, for there was the centre of the Empire whose political unity made possible its spread through western Europe. Judæa was its spiritual fortifier, for there was founded the Christian Church which in its expansion strengthened the gifts of Greece and Rome to the civilised world. From Greece we inherit our sense of the unity of civilisation through the wealth of her culture ; from Rome the principle of the unity of government through her system of law and order ; from Judæa the ideal of the unity of mankind through the gospel of Christian brotherhood. The superstructure that we now know as Western Civilisation is doubtless a highly complicated edifice to stand on such simple foundations, but modern science, which more than anything else has made it so, is itself traceable to the speculative spirit of the Greeks, and our whole way of life to-day could not be what it is but for these classical and Christian origins.

It is in Ancient Greece that the story of Dynamic Europe really opens, for it was in that sunny corner of the Continent that men of our own race were first intrigued by that ferment of the human mind and spirit which has ever since been the constructive agent in the changing life of European society and the communities to which it has given birth in various parts of the globe. Indeed, all that the modern world has of literary grace, of creative art, of scientific speculation, of political philosophy, and of civilised living had its beginnings in Ancient Greece. This truth is evident in our very language. As Charles Seignobos¹ emphasises, all the arts of speech and expression have Greek names in our own and all other modern European tongues ; as, for example, *grammar, rhetoric, metaphor,*

¹ In *The Rise of European Civilisation*, pages 41-42.


hyperbole ; *poetry*, *epic*, *lyric*, *ode*, *elegy*, *epigram* ; *theatre*, *drama*, *comedy*, and *tragedy*. Similarly in science and medicine, most of our words are Greek ; as, for example, *mathematics*, *arithmetic*, *geometry*, *mechanics*, *astronomy*, *physics*, *chemistry*, *botany*, *zoology*, *physiology*, *geography*, *technique* ; *surgery*, *anatomy*, *autopsy*, *symptoms*, and *diagnosis*. Again, in history we have the Greek words *chronology*, *epoch*, and *period*. And finally, in the arts of government and war we habitually use such Greek words as *politics*, *monarchy*, *aristocracy*, *democracy*, *despotism*, and *oligarchy* ; *gymnasium*, *phalanx*, *strategy*, and *tactics*. Moreover, the Greeks, by virtue of their outlook on life and the nature of man, proved highly responsive to the Christian teaching when it reached them, and were the first European converts to it. Greek civilisation is not, therefore, something belonging to the dead past ; not, as someone has called it, merely "a classic frieze against the background of time" ; it is alive and formative in the present. It is not merely a mass of material for the study of archæologists, antiquarians, and the makers of classical dictionaries, but a thing of vital interest for us and our world. It is, in fact, a part of the very tissue of our social and political organism, and to study its evolution is therefore essential to a proper understanding of that organism.

Undoubtedly the Greeks owed much to the earlier civilisations which they displaced, and certainly their peculiar contributions to the arts of the full life were assisted by their constant contacts with other peoples. But the civilisation which they created was, nevertheless, unprecedented and unique. Earlier civilisations, like those of Assyria and Egypt, were static, because the societies which created them were characterised by princely dynasties and rigid caste systems, and their chief purpose was the maintenance of authority and tradition. Greek civilisation, on the other hand, was dynamic, because its interests were human. The Greeks were unhampered by loyalties to dead causes and unprogressive institutions. They were free to create their own life and action and thought. What is more important, they determined to use this freedom. What they, in fact, set themselves to do with it was to think clearly, to feel nobly, and to act fearlessly ; in short, to discover how to live the good life. For the Greeks, man was the measure of all things, a sentiment most finely expressed by Sophocles in the *Antigone* : "Of all strong things none is more wonderfully strong than man." It is this human quality in their outlook

and practice which makes the Greeks so interesting to us, and their contribution to our own way of life so real and abiding. It was also their vivid sense of human values which, in spite of their political disunion, gave the Greeks the strength successfully to defend their civilisation when they were attacked by Asiatic enemies and so to secure it for ever as the basis on which the Western world was to develop. Having survived that onslaught, they went on to complete their work, and when at length they were overwhelmed it was by forces which valued their achievements sufficiently to keep them alive. For the most astonishing thing about Greek civilisation is that it emerged from its barbaric twilight, flourished to its full grandeur, and set to its decline in Greece in the space of a thousand years. Within that comparatively brief epoch it produced all its contributions to Western Civilisation. Then, because of their failure to find the basis of political unity, the Greeks succumbed first to the military might of Macedon under Philip and Alexander and then to the imperialising power of Rome. But by then their founding work was done and its immortality assured, for Alexander imposed it on most of the worlds that he conquered, where it continued in a variety of forms, and the Roman Empire absorbed it and carried it in its own way to the West.

The Greeks were members of the Indo-European race, to which we, in common with most other European nations, belong. Somewhere between 2000 and 1000 B.C. they migrated from the north and gradually spread through what we now call the Balkan Peninsula, to the islands of the *Ægean*, and along the coast of Asia Minor. It is easy for us, with the map before us, to follow the natural lines of such a movement and to understand how it was that tribes, migrating from the far interior and thus having no previous knowledge or experience of the sea, should become seafarers and colonisers.

Here is a peninsula where the disposition of the mountains, the indented nature of the coast, and the many islands in the surrounding sea must inevitably condition the nature of the human settlements in it. The mountains are numerous and high and the plains nowhere extensive. These facts forced the inhabitants to form themselves into small communities and made land communications between them always difficult and frequently impossible. On the other hand, the indentations of the coast are so numerous and deep that no settlement could be far from the sea, and thus the sea became the natural means



THE CRADLE OF WESTERN CIVILISATION.

Ancient Greece and the Greek colonies round the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

of intercourse among the settlements. So while the mountains divided them, the sea tended to unite them. The many islands with which the Ægean Sea, lying between Greece and Asia Minor, is dotted, formed, as it were, stepping-stones between the two areas. Indeed, they are so frequent that anyone sailing on the Ægean never loses sight of land. The Greeks very soon settled in these islands, and so moved on to the coast of Asia Minor. Greek civilisation, then, was not confined to the peninsula, but belonged as well to the islands and to Asia Minor. Indeed, the Greeks later spread northward, southward, and westward also, and founded colonies, which flourished for many centuries, along the coasts of the Black Sea, North Africa, Sicily, southern Italy, southern Gaul, and eastern Spain.

At the time of their southward migration the Greeks were by no means a united people; nor were they at any time in their history in a political sense to become so. Nevertheless, when we find them—about 900 B.C.—firmly settled on the mainland and the islands, they possess three strong unifying factors. First, they believed that they were descended from a common ancestor, named Hellen, and for this reason they called themselves Hellenes and their land Hellas. Secondly, they had a common religion, which played a fundamental part in their lives. Though there were many local cults, all the Hellenes believed in a number of gods, who for them personified the phenomena of nature. Thus Zeus (afterwards the chief god) was the god of the sky, Apollo of the sun, Demeter of the earth, Poseidon of the sea, and so on. To the gods in their home on Mount Olympus the Greeks ascribed human attributes. To their worshippers the gods were men and women like themselves. The Greeks thought of the gods as sharing their joys and sorrows, ready to laugh and rejoice with them in times of elation and success, and protecting and helping them in times of trouble and disaster.

This religion may strike us as primitive, superstitious, and even barbarous, and so it may have been, but it was none the less a highly constructive influence in the lives of the Greeks, and had a significant bearing on the development of Greek culture and society. Through the peculiar sense of camaraderie that the Greek imagined between gods and men, he at the same time propitiated the terrors of nature and reconciled himself to them. By picturing the gods as men like himself, though in a superior mould, he transformed his ugly inner passions into

a beautiful outward form. In short, the Greeks thus felt at home in a world which might otherwise have filled them with a paralysing dread, and this accounts for the serenity of the Greek character which made possible their unique achievements of mind and spirit amid the encircling barbarism.

Moreover, as each tribe traced its descent from a god, the gods were regarded as the founders of society itself. Perhaps the most important social aspect of this Greek religion was that it freed its devotees from the possibility of control by an organised priesthood and thus from the danger of conflict between the secular and spiritual powers. This gave the Greek state a secular air favourable to political freedom. But we must not imagine that, because there was no institutional form of religion in Greece, there was no recognised state religion. On the contrary, it was precisely because of the absence of a church and a priestcraft that religion was more truly bound up with the whole social and political structure. The state to the Greeks, in fact, was as much a religious as a political, social, and economic organism. The gods who controlled the physical world controlled also the destinies of the state. The Church was not, as it is with us, an independent organism within the state, but, in one of its aspects, the state itself. And just as each family and tribe traced its descent from a god, so each state as a unit cultivated a protecting deity. Thus Athens had Athene as its protecting goddess. In fact, as Lowes Dickinson so beautifully says, "Athene and Athens were but two aspects of the same thing, and the statue of the goddess of wisdom dominating the city of the arts may serve to sum up for us the ideal of that marvellous corporate life where there was no ecclesiastical religion only because there was no secular state."

The third unifying factor among the Greeks was a common language. It is true that different tribes spoke different dialects: Doric, Ionic, Æolic, and so forth. But Greek was their common tongue, and in a remarkably short space of time it became a literary vehicle of the most perfect kind. Within a century of the breaking of the dawn of Hellas, Homer, the blind poet of Chios, wrote the great epic poems known as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The subjects with which they deal—the Trojan War and the Wanderings of Ulysses (Odysseus)—had formed the material long before of the traditional songs of minstrels who wandered among the people and beguiled their

¹ *The Greek View of Life*, page 11.

leisure with music and poetry. The society which the poems depict perhaps belonged to the period 1200-1100 B.C. Homer gathered together and enlarged on this material, and it is probable that both poems were in written existence by 800 B.C. But the manuscripts were constantly revised and re-edited, and they did not take their final shape until about the sixth century B.C.

These poems of Homer form a landmark in European history, not only because they furnish a priceless record of early Greek society, but because they constitute the earliest surviving specimen of European speech. We have in Homer a series of most vivid pictures of the legendary Greek heroes in conflict with what they regarded as the barbarian world beyond Hellas. Here are stories of the unending struggles between civilisation and barbarism, between West and East. Here are the gods of the Greeks stepping down to mix with and guide the actions of those on whom is placed the responsibility of preserving the Hellenic world. There is a latent idea in these poems that, in battling against the trans-Hellespontine city of Troy, the Greek princes had a mission to preserve their new civilisation against the earlier static systems. It was prophetic; for what was latent in the earlier period became a dire reality in the historic age when the Greek cities fought for survival against the Persian hordes.

The stories that Homer tells are undoubtedly tales of war and rapine in an age of barbarity. Yet the Homeric spirit is something very near to us. It is a spirit which we have no difficulty in comprehending, because Homer's outlook on the world is very like our own. The heroes of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in spite of their antiquity and their almost superhuman proportions, are imbued with ideals which mean much to us to-day and are such as we should wish always to inspire our own personal and social conduct. The spirit of adventure, cheerfulness in adversity, curiosity about the natural world and inventiveness to overcome the obstacles it puts in man's path, human dignity, tenderness, and beauty in the relations between men and women, the ultimate sanctity of family life, love of the homeland, and the fervour of creative patriotism: all these are to be found in the Homeric saga. These are the standards and ideals which have since inspired European man not only in creating his world in this continent but in carrying its fruits to the four corners of the earth. Nor is this all, for Homer wrote in a language with the same origin as our own, a language which

is dead only in the sense that it is no longer spoken, since it has supplied much of the wealth of our own tongue and remains the vehicle to us of the most priceless gems of European literature.

By the seventh century B.C. we may say that the foundations of Classical Greece had been well and truly laid. By that time there existed in embryo all that was later to characterise Greek society. There were the three unifying principles: consciousness of a common origin, a common religion, and a common language. But there was no political unity. This principle of unity was destined to elude the Greeks for ever. In spite of the three great unifying principles, other factors—the geographical conditions, the tribal origins of Greek society, and their fundamental belief in the small self-contained community—were too strong for them. The glories of Greek literature, art, science, and philosophy have given unity to our civilisation. That the Greeks were never to find the means of political unity was a fatal flaw in their social character; yet it is hard to see how they could have bequeathed to us their incomparable gifts save through the city states in which their life developed.

The Greek City State

In order to comprehend the principles of Greek political organisation, then, it is necessary to realise that the unit of that organisation was the city. In fact, the city was the state, an identity whose significance we appreciate when we remember that there is only one word in Greek for both city and state, the word *polis*. We have a reminder of this in our own language, in which we habitually use words derived from this Greek word in both its connotations, as, for example, metropolis and politics. We shall not, therefore, reach a proper conception of Greek political organisation by thinking either of modern Greece or of a modern city. Modern Greece, small though it is among contemporary European states, would have been unimaginably large to the Ancient Greeks. The average Greek city state was confined to an area no larger than that of an English county and had a population smaller than that of an English town. It therefore lacked most of the characteristics of a state, as we understand it, as well as those of a modern city. From the political point of view, we may certainly say of it, in the terms of our definition of a state, that it was "a people

organised for law within a definite territory," but in most other respects it was very different from a contemporary state. From the municipal point of view it was in hardly any way comparable with our conception of a city, for it was not an urban area measured in terms of acres, and still less was it a sprawling agglomeration of buildings erected in the wake of industrial development.

In Ancient Greece there were innumerable city states, which varied greatly in size, organisation, and development. But most of them conformed to a fairly common physical pattern. The city generally consisted of a walled town, inside which were the civic and political centre, and where arts, crafts, and commerce were practised. Beyond the walls there was a large area where pastoral and agricultural pursuits were carried on, and from which the citizens mainly drew their sustenance. This type of city state originated both in the tribal organisation which characterised the Greeks at the time of their southward migration and in the geographical features of the area in which they settled. That is to say, each settlement was made by people originally of the same kin, and the nature of the land forced them to form an isolated community. A body of people settling in such circumstances would, in any case, have to learn to live largely on the basis of economic self-sufficiency and to organise themselves as a political unit. For the Greeks, however, it was not merely a matter of physical necessity but of spiritual desirability, because they conceived their state not primarily as an area but as a community of persons joined for the purpose of creating and developing the good life. Their attitude is summed up in Aristotle's dictum: "The state exists not merely to make life possible but to make life good."

Thus the state to the Greeks was what society is to us. It was the unit of their whole community life, economic, social, political, and religious. For this purpose a small unit like the city state was essential. The Greeks had no conception of the large state which we know to-day. For them a large state was out of the question for two reasons, apart from the geographical conditions and the economic necessities. First, the principle of kinship was inherent in the community, and secondly the idea of citizenship was direct and personal. That is to say, the state, founded by the tribe, was maintained by a spiritual bond welded by a combination of a sense of common descent from the founders and of religious devotion to the city's gods.

Secondly, the citizen performed his duties actually and in person as a soldier, judge, and member of the governing assembly. The principle of representative democracy, forced upon us in the modern world by the very nature of our massed political communities, was one which never occurred to the Greeks, and which, if it had, they would have repudiated as inimical to social progress and inconsistent with their political purpose. This sense of direct citizenship in relation to economic necessity is well expressed in Aristotle's contention that a state should be large enough to be self-sufficing and small enough to permit of all citizens meeting together in one place.

Now, it is evident that such direct and active citizenship requires not only a limited community but leisure for the citizens to exercise it. It is here that we strike a fundamental difference between our conception of society and that of the Greeks. The Greeks believed in the necessity of the institution of slavery, of a servile class which should do all the menial tasks in order to free the citizens for the exercise of their functions. The institution of slavery was, again, inherent in the origin of the Greek city states. The Greeks were able to settle in Greece only by conquering the earlier inhabitants, and the result of these violent origins was in most cases the enslavement of the conquered. In the typical city state there were broadly three classes : the aristocrats, the artisans and husbandmen, and the slaves. The aristocrats were completely freed from drudgery, the artisans and husbandmen had rights and might even share those of the aristocratic class, but the slaves were entirely without rights.

Doubtless, we may easily exaggerate the difference between the Greeks and ourselves in this respect. The tripartite division of Greek society, especially where the slaves were not too heavily oppressed, was not perhaps in practice so very unlike the social distinctions that we know ; and, in fact, it is precisely like those in some modern civilised communities up to less than a century ago. At least the Greeks were not guilty of the pitiless commerce in slaves in which the nations of Western Europe, including our own, indulged up to the nineteenth century. And, after all, though we have achieved something like political equality, we are very far from the realisation of social equality, even if we believe in it as an ideal. Moreover, the Greeks themselves varied greatly in their attitude, if not towards slavery as an institution, at least towards slaves as a

class, and probably few of them shared Aristotle's extreme view that some men are by nature slaves.

Repellent though the idea of slavery may be to the conscience of the modern civilised world, we have to accept it as an admitted principle of Greek society, and whenever we speak of the citizens in a Greek city state we refer to only a section of the community, which, in fact, was generally outnumbered by the slave class. Grant this and the Greek political scene becomes a vital school of citizenship to the modern world. For the Greeks were the first people in history not only to experiment in forms of government but to speculate on the theory of politics. This required both a limited unit of political organisation and leisure for the citizen class to perform their duties directly as citizens. The city state provided the first condition and slavery the second. The result was that the Greeks had a remarkable variety of political experience in their city states, of the utmost value to us to-day. In the search for political stability they tried every form of government. Where every experiment was possible and every idea had free play, changes were constantly taking place. One constitution succeeded another as revolution followed revolution, so that Aristotle was able to examine no fewer than 158 different constitutions in the preparation of one of his political treatises (which is unfortunately lost). The fundamental fact of Greek political life was that citizenship was not something intermittent, of which the citizen becomes conscious only at such times as he pays rates and taxes or takes part in an election. For the Greek citizen public life was an essential part of the life of a man. The good society could only exist where there was no opposition between the individual and society, where in fact the ends of the individual and the ends of the community were identical. From their search for the best means of securing this identity between the good man and the good citizen, both in practice and in theory, comes the wealth of Greek political experience and philosophy which are the foundations of the ideal of the good society in the evolution of Europe.

In the two best-known city states of Greece we see the extremes of Greek political organisation. In Sparta we find the most rigid and conservative of all Greek political constitutions, in Athens the most flexible and liberal. These two states shared the hegemony of Greece, and at various times each was recognised by a group of city states as the leading city. Sparta

was an unwall'd city situated in the district of Laconia, which it absorbed, in that part of Greece south of the Gulf of Corinth known as the Peloponnesus. Though near the coast in the far south of the peninsula, Sparta was essentially an inland city and a land power. Athens, on the other hand, was on the Ægean coast, and was essentially a naval power.

The Spartan polity exemplified the extreme case of the complete enslavement of a subject race. This arose directly from their history. At first, after they had conquered the original people, known as Messenians, the Spartans lived a life of ease and luxury. But the Spartans were in a minority and the Messenians were a virile people always on the verge of revolt. At an early stage in the history of their settlement, therefore, the Spartans abandoned their easy life, and began to organise themselves so as to be in a constant state of martial preparedness against the original inhabitants. The Spartan constitution and the scheme of military training which were then devised are supposed to have been the work of a legislator named Lycurgus, and, once established, it remained unchanged through many centuries. The corollary of the military organisation of the conquerors was the abject subjection of the conquered, whose only purpose of existence, in the eyes of the Spartans, was that they should labour in order to minister to the needs of their overlords. Thus the Messenians were slaves, or helots, and the Spartans alone had political rights. But political rights consisted solely in the privilege of the state's military service, for the Spartans, in their determination to maintain their superiority, sacrificed every individual interest to the upkeep of a military state.

The whole city was a camp. The family unit was unknown, and life was completely communalised. Children in their babyhood were exposed on the neighbouring mountain-sides so that only the fittest might survive to become soldiers or mothers of soldiers. Education did not go beyond military exercises, and the discipline of both sexes was of the utmost rigour; hence our use of the word Spartan to connote a training of extreme hardihood. Sparta thus developed great military strength, and on this account she was the admiration of all Greece. But she seldom risked her armies in fields far beyond her own borders, or at least outside the Peloponnesus, though on one immortal occasion 300 Spartans sacrificed themselves in

the Pass of Thermopylæ for the deliverance of Greek civilisation from overthrow by the Persian invaders.

As Sparta was organised purely for the purpose of war, she made no contribution to the arts of peace. Nevertheless, her whole history illustrates one of the outstanding qualities of the Greek people, namely their capacity to submit to discipline and law for what they considered to be the good of the community. Moreover, as the type of a disciplined people and a completely planned society, the Spartan state made a strong appeal to certain Greek political thinkers who used it as a pattern in some of their speculations.

Athenian Heyday

A study of the Spartan polity throws into the strongest relief the diametrically opposed constitution of Athenian democracy. In the city state of Sparta we see the Greeks in uniform; in that of Athens we see them in a state of ordered liberty for a period long enough to have produced an extraordinary diversity of political talent and artistic gifts which have contributed more than anything else to the art of civilised living in the modern world. The city of Athens was the focal point of the area called Attica with which the city state came to be broadly coterminous. It is so situated that the economic life of the Athenians was largely maritime. Originally there were four separate Greek tribal communities which at some early period coalesced by consent to form the city state. The descendants of these four Attic tribes formed the main body of full citizens which, at the height of Athens' greatness, numbered about 50,000. The commercial life of the city as it developed, however, attracted numbers of non-Attic Greeks who, though they were not until later actually admitted to citizenship, helped to give the Athenians proper a certain cosmopolitanism which made them more tolerant of new blood than most other Greek communities and fostered in them a liberalism of outlook unknown in any other part of Greece. There was, too, of course, a population of slaves, descended mainly from the original inhabitants who were conquered. Though they outnumbered the citizens, they were not refractory like the helots of Sparta, and the Athenians, not troubled to keep them in forcible subjection, treated them well.

Before the dawn of history, Athens, like most other Greek

states, was ruled by kings, but by historic times the monarchy had been overthrown by an aristocracy. The people, however, were opposed to the rule of the nobles, who governed through what was known as the Council of the Areopagus. About the year 600 B.C., considerable modifications were made by the first great Athenian lawgiver, named Solon, who not only introduced certain popular rights but restored the economy of the state. The Solonian constitution, though not in itself democratic, laid the foundations of the later Athenian democracy. The age of Solon was followed by the tyranny of Pisistratus, whose policy, wise and enlightened though it was, failed to reconcile the Athenians to the loss of their liberties. They expelled the son of Pisistratus, who had succeeded him, and determined never again to allow a tyrant to rule them. From that time the basis of citizenship was gradually broadened by the admission of the non-Attic tribes to the citizen class. In this way the general assembly of citizens, known as the Ecclesia, became more and more powerful. But before the Athenian democracy reached its fullest development there supervened the great struggle with the Persians, in whose permanent expulsion from Greek soil the Athenians played a leading part.

The details of the course of the Persian War need not long detain us ; it is its results which are important in our discussion. The Greeks, though apparently realising that the fate of their civilisation hung in the balance, were, even under this compulsion, unable entirely to overcome their antipathy to union. At no time in this critical struggle was Greece wholly united against the Persians, and, though the final deliverance of the Hellenic world from subjection to an Asiatic culture was ultimately attributable to the alliance of Athens and Sparta, this comradeship-in-arms did not survive the conflict. In 490 B.C. the Athenians defeated the Persians on land at Marathon almost single-handed. Ten years later the Persians invaded Greece again from the north. Athens, closely threatened, was abandoned, and the whole population, after the children and aged had been evacuated southward, put to sea. The Persians took and laid waste the city, but had to fight it out at sea, and in 480 B.C. at Salamis the Greeks, led by Athens, decisively defeated the Persians. The final battle on land was fought in the following year at Plataea, where the Greeks, more united than at any other time, crushed the Persian hosts. The war in Greece proper was over, but continued on the islands and the coast of Asia Minor.

From these the Persians were gradually driven. The peace which was finally made in 448 B.C. stipulated that the Persians should never again venture into any of the Greek lands, and they never did.

The great engagements of the Persian War are rightly regarded as three of the few decisive battles of history. As a result of them Athens became the centre of a league of city states devoted to maritime interests, which secured her material wealth. But during the fifty years following the battles of Salamis and Platea she achieved something more than mere economic success. To the Athenians, flushed with their great victories, all things seemed possible, and Athens became, in fact, what Pericles called the "School of Hellas." For during this period the Athenians completed the establishment of their democracy, and in the domain of the spirit enjoyed an efflorescence of art, literature, science, and philosophy such as no other country has produced in so brief a span. For more than thirty of these fifty years, from about 462 B.C., the Athenians were guided by the genius of Pericles, probably the most versatile statesman in the history of the world. Pericles combined in the highest degree the efficiency of a practical administrator, the vision of a political idealist, and the passion of an artist. Athens under his beneficent leadership became both the pattern of a working democracy and the focus of the artistic and intellectual life of Greece, and the fruits of his work were at once a fulfilment of the promise of earlier phases of Greek culture and a bequest of unique and inestimable value to later generations. It was indeed the Golden Age of Athens.

In politics, Pericles, despite his noble birth, was a democrat. He believed passionately in liberty for all citizens (a body which, of course, in the Greek tradition, excluded the slave class). Under his influence, the Ecclesia gradually assumed the functions formerly discharged by the nobles on the Council of the Areopagus, and the latter was left with nothing but jurisdiction in cases of homicide. The two engines of this democratic development, according to J. B. Bury, were lot and pay. For Athenian democracy knew neither ministers, as we understand them, nor representatives of the people. But if all citizens were to perform their functions personally and directly, there must be a system not of representation but of rota, and some means whereby the poorer citizens could be freed from the work by which they earned their living, without financial loss, to play

their part. Selection by lot achieved the first condition and payment of members, as we should call it, the second. The Ecclesia, thus constituted, acted generally as the legislature of the state, and discussed such questions as taxation and war and peace. But if the Athenian Assembly in these respects resembled our House of Commons, the position of Pericles cannot be compared with that of our Prime Minister. It was in the Ecclesia that he exercised his sway as guide to the citizens of Athens, but he held no office which gave him the right to direct them. He was there the equal of all other citizens, but his integrity, his understanding, and his eloquence were such as generally to command the support of the Assembly.

In this way Pericles created the atmosphere in which the spiritual achievements of Athens in his time were encouraged, and made all citizens feel that they shared in them. In this sphere his determination to restore and enhance the physical beauty of Athens was symbolic of his patriotism and high purpose. With the aid of a great architect, Ictinus, he restored the Parthenon, the temple of Athene, built on the rock fortress of the Acropolis, after its devastation by the Persians. The shell of this lovely building still stands as a model to architects for ever. He encouraged the sculptor, Phidias, who made a statue of Athene, for which the new Parthenon was the shrine, and the exquisitely sculptured frieze with which that shrine was embellished. The statue has long since been destroyed, but the frieze may still be seen at the British Museum. In Periclean Athens Greek plastic art was perfected and reached such heights as have never since been surpassed.

During the Periclean Age Greek drama, too, reached its most perfect form. Near the Acropolis was the great open-air theatre, named after the god Dionysus, which was large enough to accommodate most of the free population of Athens. Religion was the first inspiration, and remained the dominant spring, of Greek drama. But because the drama dealt with religion, it was necessarily concerned with society and politics. In fact, it was a most effective means of forming public opinion, and in this played very much the part played to-day by newspapers and broadcasting. At this period flourished the greatest of the Greek dramatists, all of whom were Athenians either by birth or residence. In the theatre were played the dramas of the great tragic poets, Æschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles, and

the comedies of Aristophanes, whose wit lightly veiled a penetrating criticism of the foibles and weaknesses of the day. It is unnecessary to speak of the abiding influence of these great plays, for they are still performed for our edification and delight. The writing of prose, too, first appeared at this time in the work of Herodotus, the great historian of the Persian War, and (though actually after Pericles) in that of Thucydides, the historian of the Peloponnesian War. Herodotus and Thucydides, indeed, were not only the originators of prose writing in a European language but the creators of the historian's art.

Mathematics and science, which had been developing in Greece before Pericles, though not generally the work of Athenians, were, nevertheless, encouraged in the city, and Pericles was the friend of such scientists as Anaxagoras. The importance of these subjects lay in the fact that they informed the great development of philosophy for which the Athens of the Periclean Age and the following century was most remarkable, particularly in the immortal work of three generations of teachers and pupils represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who laid the foundations of schools of thought whose influence remains effective to this day.

Under Pericles Athenian democracy reached its most perfect form. The panegyric of Athens attributed to Pericles by Thucydides may help us to understand his undying influence upon her greatness and all that she has since meant in the growth of Western Civilisation. Here are some extracts from it (in Jowett's translation):

Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised: and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life. . . . We are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws. . . . We have not forgotten to provide for

our weary spirits many relaxations from toil. We have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year. At home the style of our life is refined, and the delight that we feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us, so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as our own.

Our city is thrown open to the world and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management and trickery but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they (our adversaries) from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are ready to face the perils which they face.

. . . Thus our city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace ; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household ; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless but as a useless character ; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action.

It must seem almost incredible to us, when we contemplate what has happened in the years between, that such a description of the good society, couched in such noble phrases, could have been uttered by a European twenty-four centuries ago. What is even more astonishing is that it is a fair description of Athenian society in its heyday. The very fact that it has been preserved to us should make us ponder on the amazing dispensation of Providence which thus gives us at the same time an example to emulate and the opportunity even yet to realise the ideals which inspired it.

The Survival of Greek Ideas

Pericles prophesied that the Athens of his day would be the wonder of succeeding ages. How true a prophecy! Yet it was not, alas, by virtue of the maintenance of her democratic system that the prophecy has come true. The position of Pericles and the success of his political method demonstrate incontrovertibly and for all time the necessity of leadership in a democracy. He believed, and during his lifetime persuaded his fellow Athenians to believe, in three fundamental principles for the proper working of democracy: first, an informed, active and courageous citizenship; secondly, the use of the instrument of discussion for the creation of policy; and thirdly, respect for the constitution as the safeguard of popular rights. What happened after Pericles' death shows that liberty may be too dearly bought if it triumphs at the expense of order, and that dependence on a leader does not absolve a political society from the need for an eternal vigilance and a critical understanding of the processes of government. For when the great leader had gone, Athens failed to find another of equal calibre, and so the demagogue succeeded the statesman, courage gave way to cowardice, discussion sank to brawling, liberty degenerated into licence, and the Athenians lost all respect for the constitution. Thus, by being carried to excess, the Athenian idea of liberty defeated its own purpose, as surely as did, at the other extreme, the Spartan idea of order.

The two great city states of Greece, with all the rest, fell eventually before the levelling forces of Macedon. Their inability to resist this movement from the north was the result of the internecine strife which began in 431 B.C., shortly before the death of Pericles (429 B.C.). ~~The Athenian Empire, which grew out of the league of states of which Athens was the head~~ after the Persian War and which Pericles did so much to foster, enjoyed half a century of glorious life. Athens undoubtedly abused her position by aggression and exploitation, and the outraged states at last revolted, and, led by Sparta, started the civil struggle known as the Peloponnesian War, which racked Greece for nearly thirty years. Athens was completely overwhelmed, and, although she enjoyed a short period of revival, she never fully recovered. Nor did Sparta, as head of the victorious anti-Athenian alliance, long enjoy her triumph. She, in her turn, gave way to the hegemony of Thebes, which, however, failed to hold the Greek states together.

The Macedonians were a people settled in the north of Greece, who, though the Greeks proper regarded them as barbarians, had a certain admixture of Greek blood and ideas. Under a strong monarchy, Macedonia had built up a powerful military state. While the power of the Greeks was declining that of Macedon was rising, and under Philip II (382-336 B.C.) the attack on Greece began. Athens took the brunt of the onslaught, but neither the memory of her triumphs against the Persians and of her greatness in the age of Pericles nor the oratory of Demosthenes could restore Athenian morale. Gradually and insidiously the Macedonian arms, first under Philip and then under his son Alexander the Great, swept through Greece, and by about 340 B.C. Greek independence was at an end. Alexander, who as a youth had had Aristotle for his teacher, absorbed Greek ideas and spread them through his rapidly built Empire in Asia and Egypt. In these countries the Hellenic culture took on new forms, generally called Hellenistic, which lasted for many generations in the several monarchies into which Alexander's empire was split on his death in 323 B.C.

Yet, while Greece was thus decaying and disintegrating in the political sense, her culture continued to flourish, and it was in this period of decline and disaster that her two greatest philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, whose lives span the century 420-320 B.C., produced their immortal work. The philosopher, or lover of wisdom, appears for the first time in history in Athens. For him the criterion of acceptability of any doctrine was not faith or traditional authority but its appeal to reason. The prototype of this kind of philosopher was Socrates, a younger contemporary of Pericles. For him knowledge was the key to life, and, in endeavouring to teach this lesson to the youth of Athens which gathered around him, he adopted a form of question and answer ever since known as the Socratic method. Socrates has been justly described as the founder of moral philosophy and the human sciences, but we should know nothing of his teaching but for the writing of his most brilliant pupil, Plato, whose books are a lasting memorial to the greatness of his teacher.

Plato was a native of Athens; Aristotle was born in Stagira, in Thrace, and came to Athens when he was about seventeen to join Plato's school. Plato was a mathematician and a poet; Aristotle a biologist. ~~These facts account perhaps for the~~ difference in their approach to the study of politics. But there

are two convictions which they held in common: first, that there is a body of connected truth, by which science must be informed and which it is its business to pursue, and secondly, that man is a political animal and can develop to his full stature only as a member of society. In the work of these two philosophers we find the finest flower of that political idealism of the Greeks which was the counterpart of their political experimentation. They realised the antithesis of the individual and the state, which is the precedent condition of all political thought, and their attempts to resolve that antithesis form the substance of their doctrines. Thus, in Plato and Aristotle ethics and politics are indissolubly wedded; are, in fact, two aspects of the same thing. The marriage of these two principles of social thought and action is the basis of Greek political ideals; their divorce in later ages is the basis of the perversion of these ideals into the ideologies of to-day.

So we find that, in Plato's most important political work, [*The Republic*, an enquiry which begins as a question of ethics—namely, what is justice?—leads out inevitably to a full-dress discussion of politics and the nature of the ideal state.] The discussion, led by Socrates, who appears as the Platonic protagonist in this book, moves inexorably forward to the ideal of an aristocracy of the intellect, of a body of guardians qualified to rule through a rigid system of training. Plato proposed for this purpose a complete system of communism so that his guardians might be untrammelled by any private interest or domestic preoccupation. For, as Socrates is made to say, "Until philosophers become kings in states, or those who are now called kings are imbued with a sufficient measure of genuine philosophy . . . there will be no deliverance for cities, nor yet, I believe, for the human race." It is not surprising, therefore, that in the end Plato is driven to the conclusion that no such state is to be found on earth or is ever likely to be. But this does not destroy its value as an ideal, for, as he adds, "perhaps in heaven there is laid up a pattern of it for him who wishes to behold it, and, beholding, to organise himself accordingly."

In the same way Aristotle, though he approached the problem much more objectively and realistically, presents ethics as a part of politics. It is true that he wrote two books on these subjects, one called *Ethics*, the other called *Politics*; but he divided them only for the purposes of scientific treatment and not because they were capable, to his mind, of ultimate separation, since, for Aris-

totle, "without a social environment there can be no morality." In the *Politics* Aristotle reacts violently against his master's communism, which, he said, if really effective, would create such a dull uniformity as to "reduce harmony to unison and poetry to a single foot." In other words, Aristotle believed in a planned society but saw in the process of creating it the danger, too easily overlooked also by some modern planners, of producing merely a planned individual. All the same, Aristotle, like Plato, was markedly affected in his political views by the spectacle of the licence into which Athenian democracy had degenerated and by the contrary example of the organised community of Sparta. In his examination of many constitutions he had found a cycle of revolutions through which all states seem to pass. The monarchy, or the rule of the one good man, in time degenerated into tyranny, which in its turn was overthrown by an aristocracy, or the rule of the few good. Gradually the aristocracy sank into oligarchy, or the rule of the few bad, against whom the people revolted to establish democracy; but, according to Aristotle, this was bound to lead to chaos. Out of the darkness then again arises the supremely virtuous man, some Cæsar who alone can restore order and reason. The cycle is completed and begins all over again. To break this cycle, Aristotle suggested a form of middle-class government, which he called the Polity, a golden mean between the hardly realisable best and the intolerable worst. This exposition of the cycle of revolutions is not without its lessons for us, though it led Aristotle to a classification of constitutions which is obsolete for modern purposes. But the really interesting thing about it is that it demonstrates the dynamism of Greek politics and the interplay of political practice and ideas in Ancient Greece, and the final lesson of the importance of the constitution as the safeguard against tyranny and oppression.

The ideas of both Plato and Aristotle lived on during the breakdown of Greek independence and the chaos of the early Middle Ages, and, after passing through many transformations in the hands of various thinkers who adapted them for their own purposes, have survived for our guidance to-day. Plato's ideas, indeed, may be traced through the theories of Rousseau, of Hegel, and of Marx in the development of modern totalitarianism and communism. But how utterly foreign are the modern forms of these ideas in practice from those which their classical founders would have promulgated! Plato and

Aristotle conceived the state not as a piece of governmental machinery tyrannically superimposed on society but as society itself striving to realise the good life. For them the individual was not "sacrificed" to the whole, but realised his best self through the community.

In Ancient Greece, then, we see the foundations of the good society well and truly laid. Nothing can destroy the possessions which the Greeks bequeathed to us: the works of art, the poems, the plays, the histories. They are physically with us and always available for our pleasure and enlightenment. Nor are the science and philosophy of the Greeks mere statuesque examples of ancient thought. The appreciation of their first fine careless rapture was doubtless overcast in the intellectual twilight of the Middle Ages. But something of it was recaptured in the Humanist Revival from the thirteenth century onwards, and the threads of their teaching have since been woven into the fabric of our advancing knowledge. ~~The political practice~~ of the Greeks, though it failed to save ~~their independence~~, provides us with examples of political life which repay our closest study. The Athenian political organisation at its best shows democracy at work in a small community. We cannot return to that type of city state, for we cannot put back the clock of industrial advance, but at least we should learn from this classical example that an active and informed citizenship must be real in the local community before it can be effective in the nation state or in a comity of nations. And finally the Greeks teach us this fundamental but as yet unassimilated lesson: that any system of public education which ignores the need of preparation for citizenship is not merely incomplete but without true purpose.

CHAPTER III
ROMAN DOMINION

THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND UNITY

The Roman Republic

THE flower of Greek civilisation must have withered in its garden in south-eastern Europe but for the Romans, who, fortunately for future generations, combined with their military and organising genius a talent for assimilation. The Romans, or Latins, like the Greeks, belonged to the Indo-European race. But not only were these two peoples thus closely related by blood and language; there is evidence that in the nomadic stage, when they were branching off from the main body of the race and before their several southward migrations, they lived together. This period of prehistoric association, no doubt, explains their common religion and the similarity of their original political institutions. For though the Romans gave to their gods a generally more domestic and intimate character than did the Greeks, they believed in the same high gods who personified the phenomena of nature, and most of the Greek gods appear in early Roman history under Latin names. Again, when they finally settled in Italy, the Romans founded a city state in its physical pattern and political form very like the average city state of Greece.

But beyond these similarities the Greeks and the Romans display the greatest differences of character and accomplishment. The Greeks, as we have seen, tended to idealism, and their main achievements were in the realm of art and of the intellect, while their political lessons for us are as much in the sphere of speculation as of practice. The Romans, by contrast, were severely practical, martial because they were practical, and pre-eminent in legal and political administration. The culture of the Romans was little more than a pale reflection of that of the Greeks, but in politics they succeeded triumphantly where the Greeks signally failed. The Greeks, as we have seen, though united by a common civilisation, failed to achieve political unity even among themselves, much less between themselves and other peoples. The Romans in this field of politics, on the other hand,

were definite innovators, for they established an Empire, integrated by a system of law and order universally applied in a way without parallel in history. Their Empire in time expanded to include the Greek lands, and so it comes about that we owe to the Romans not only the foundation in Europe of the principles of law and unity but, because of the unity that they gave to Europe, the dissemination of Greek culture throughout the west of the continent.

The Mediterranean peninsula in which the Romans settled is very different from that which became the home of the Greeks. Mountains and the sea, it is true, greatly influenced the development of both peoples, but, whereas in Greece the mountains break up the land into small isolated areas, in Italy they form a continuous range. Starting at the point where the Alps slope down to the Mediterranean, the Apennines run eastward along the south of the plain of Lombardy, and then southward through the middle of Italy, leaving a wide plain to the west and a much narrower plain to the east. In the Apennines rises the River Tiber which first runs southward through the western plain and then turns west to reach the sea about half-way down the western coast. On the Tiber, some fifteen miles inland, where seven hills cluster to invite human settlement, Rome was founded. As the city slowly established itself, it was protected by its inland position and by the mountains to the east, but when the time came for its expansion it found the river of great advantage for commerce and war, and the passes through the mountains easily negotiable. Geographically Rome looked west, as Greece looked east, and her first great imperial developments were in that direction, leading to her hegemony of the western Mediterranean.

Clearly, then, the geographical position of Rome had an important influence on her development, but this influence must not be exaggerated. For the seeds of her greatness were in the character of her people, and the qualities which made them the builders of so vast an Empire are evident from the very dawn of their history. It was, as F. S. Marvin says, "a case of perfect suitability between the developing organism and its environment."¹ And just as our debt to Greece in the sphere of art, literature, science, and philosophy is seen in the terms of our language which connote these fundamental elements in our culture, so our debt to the Romans in all that concerns

¹ *The Living Past*, page 93.

society, order, law, and government is similarly evident in the language of to-day. R. W. Moore estimates¹ that of the 20,000 words most commonly used in written English over 10,000 are of Latin origin, and he gives as examples in the realm of politics, *liberal, conservative, propaganda, committee, statute, legislation, territory, aggression, conciliation, offence, referendum, and pact*; as well as the words indicative of civic virtue (itself a Latin word), such as *industry, diligence, continence, gravity, and dignity*. We may add to this list words of such universal connotation as *society, civilisation, colony, empire, unity, and religion*.

The Roman state lasted for more than two thousand years, from the founding of Rome about 750 B.C. to the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in A.D. 1453. But during that long period it went through many changes in both size and form. At first, Rome, again like the Greek city states, was ruled by kings, but by about 500 B.C. the monarchy was overthrown and replaced by a republic. Shortly before the beginning of the Christian era the Republic gave way to government by an Emperor. About the middle of the fifth century the Roman Empire in the West collapsed before the onslaught of barbarian invaders, but continued in the East, with its centre at Constantinople, for another thousand years, though towards the end it dwindled to little more than the capital and its immediate environs.

The original city of Rome was surrounded by a wall. Inside the wall was carried on the civic, political, and commercial life of the city. Outside it, was a pastoral and agricultural area, where various families tended their flocks and herds and developed a primitive tillage. The overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic was the result of a popular revolution, and the sovereignty of the state was always considered to be derived from the people. In fact, the very etymology of the word *republic* implies this popular origin, for it is made up of two Latin words *res* (things or affairs) and *publicus* (public or of the people). Hence *res publica* meant the people's affairs. In the Republican constitution of Rome there were three elements of government which were supposed to balance and check one another. First there was the monarchical element represented by the Consuls, to whom had been transferred the powers of the original kings. There were two Consuls, elected annually by the citizens in their assembly, and

¹ In *The Roman Commonwealth*, pages 7-8.

each had the right to veto the other. Secondly, there was the aristocratic element represented by the Senate (literally meaning old men), at first composed of the heads of the richest families and later of all ex-magistrates. Thirdly, there was the democratic element seen in the people's assembly, which, in fact, beyond electing the magistrates, did little more than ratify the decisions submitted to it.

But, despite this supposedly nice balance of political forces, there was constant strife in the city between the aristocratic classes, or patricians, descended from the old Roman families who had founded the city, and the popular masses, or plebeians or plebs. A struggle between these orders went on for about two hundred years until, in 300 B.C., the plebs gained equal rights and their power was secured by the appointment of people's officers known as tribunes. Later the people gained the right to a share in the election of other officers, appointed to assist the Consuls, such as the prætors (chief legal magistrates), the censors (makers of lists of citizens and senators), and ædiles (responsible for the organisation of police and sanitation). The constitution allowed for the replacement, in emergencies, of this system of magistrates by a dictator elected by the people for a period of not more than six months. This expedient was frequently resorted to from the earliest years of the Republic, because the Romans realised that, precious though liberty might be, there were critical times when it must give way to the more urgent demands of efficiency and security. Later the device of dictatorship was deliberately used to cover with a constitutional cloak the despotic acts of some triumphant military commander. But always there remained the theory of ultimate popular sanction, though in normal times it was on the Senate that the stability of the constitution mostly depended. Whatever might be the disasters at home and abroad, the Senate stood firm and brought the Republic safely through the crisis.

Lord Bryce once said that the part the Roman Constitution played in the ancient world was comparable to that played by the British Constitution in the modern world. "Out of the Republic on the Tiber," he wrote, "a city with a rural territory round it no bigger than Surrey or Rhode Island, grew a World Empire, and the framework of that Empire retained till its fall traces of the institutions under which the little Republic . . . had risen. . . . In England a monarchy, first tribal and then feudal, developed from very small beginnings into a second

World Empire of a wholly different type, while at the same time the ancient form of government, through a series of struggles and efforts, guided by an only half-conscious purpose, slowly developed itself into a system monarchical only in name." But whereas Rome developed from a Republic, partly aristocratic and partly democratic, to a despotism, the development of Britain has been exactly the reverse, from a strong monarchy to what is, in effect, a republic partly democratic and partly plutocratic.

The Republican Constitution of Rome was never a fully written instrument of government but, like our own, "a mass of precedents, carried in men's memories or recorded in writing, of dicta of lawyers and statesmen, of customs, uses, understandings and beliefs, bearing upon the method of government, together with a certain number of statutes." This Republican Constitution was designed for a city state. As Rome ceased to be a city state and started on its imperial course, at length becoming a world state, the republican forms became inconsistent with the facts, and imperial greatness finally proved fatal to republicanism. Nevertheless, it was precisely in the flexibility of the constitution that the Romans showed their genius for law and organisation. As each crisis of their advance developed they dealt with it creatively, and as their power and dominion grew they adapted their legal and political experiences, gained internally, to the larger external issues. It was, in fact, the settlement of the internal problem to the satisfaction of all classes that gave them the social and political homogeneity necessary for their ordered expansion far beyond their original boundaries. As all citizens had equal rights, all citizens took part in the expansion and shared its triumphs.

Phases and Principles of Roman Expansion

It cannot be said that Rome, as was once thought to be the case, conquered the world as the result of a set plan to that end laid out in advance. Foreigners were regarded by the Romans not as barbarians, as they were by the Greeks, but merely as enemies. The Greeks, that is to say, thought of the non-Greek world in terms of culture; the Romans thought of the non-Roman world in terms of war, and therefore were not conscious of this other world until they came up against it in the process of expansion. But it is important to realise that

the Romans were warlike not for the sake of war but for the sake of order. Their genius for order was outraged by the disorder which surrounded them. Because they lived in a world of war, they used the instrument of war as the most direct means of achieving their end—namely, the establishment of order—as circumstances dictated. Certainly the Romans accomplished the unity of Europe by their success in war. And certainly they achieved this success by the application of a very simple rule, summed up in the Latin phrase: *divide et impera*—divide and rule. Yet it was not by a blind process of subjugation that they advanced, for as they advanced, their genius for organisation, their ability to impose order, and their readiness to grant certain liberties within its limitations, developed to meet each new phase.

The process of Roman expansion from a city state to a world state began in the first century of the existence of the Republic, and went through four main phases. The first phase saw the conquest of Italy itself. This began with the defeat of the tribes to the south who were Latins like the Romans themselves, and whom Rome bound to herself as *socii*, or allies, in the Latin League, in which the allies fought under Roman generals. Thus assisted, Rome was next able to conquer first her northern rivals, the Etruscans, and then the Samnites to the east. From this series of successes Rome moved to the conquest of the Greek settlements in the south, so that by 270 B.C. she was mistress of all Italy south of the Arno. Rome was now faced with the rising power of Carthage in North Africa, and the warlike Gauls who dominated the plain of Lombardy and constantly threatened the security of the Roman hegemony of Italy, even on one occasion capturing and sacking Rome itself.

The second phase of Roman expansion therefore involved a continuation of the outward movement against these two peoples. The struggle between Rome and Carthage was of titanic proportions, and the Punic Wars between these rivals lasted more than a hundred years, from 264 to 146 B.C. The first Punic War gave Rome Sicily. The second resulted in the final defeat of Hannibal, probably the ablest commander of ancient times, and made Rome mistress of the western Mediterranean. In this period, too, she gradually subdued the Gauls south of the Alps, and finally made a peaceful settlement of the land they occupied. The third Punic War was a war of extermination waged on the slogan "Carthage must be destroyed."

Having finally crushed the Carthaginians on their own territory, the Romans burned the city to the ground and passed the plough over its site to indicate that it should never rise again. By these resounding victories North Africa became a Roman province, and Spain and the islands of the western Mediterranean were added to the Roman dominions. Thus did Rome become, by the logic of war, a sea power as well as a land power.

The third phase of Roman expansion, which opened in the closing years of the struggle with Carthage, followed naturally on Rome's domination of the western Mediterranean, and resulted in her mastery also of the eastern half. In this third phase Rome liberated the Greeks from the thralldom of the Macedonian power, and her absorption and diffusion of Greek culture began. In this phase also she conquered and added to her dominions the other areas bordering the Mediterranean into which Alexander's Empire had been partitioned. So, in this period of her eastern expansion, Rome gradually assumed the guardianship of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, which acknowledged her suzerainty in 168 B.C. By this date, therefore, we may fairly say that the Mediterranean had become a Roman lake.

The fourth phase of expansion filled the last days of the Republic, and is associated with the genius of the great Consul, Julius Cæsar. In this phase, transalpine Gaul (largely modern France) was finally subdued and brought under the Roman yoke. Cæsar himself has described his devastating campaigns in this fair country and his two invasions of Britain which blazed the trail for her conquest and settlement by his successors within a century of his death, in 44 B.C. By the year 50 B.C. Cæsar's conquest of Gaul was complete, and the Rhine was already marked as the north-eastern boundary of the Roman dominions in Europe. Few campaigns in history have been more momentous than those of Cæsar in Gaul, for they paved the way for the Romanisation of western Europe, while Cæsar's success in them led to the series of dramatic events which brought about the overthrow of the Republic and the establishment of Imperial rule.

It is evident, then, that by the death of Julius Cæsar the Roman Empire existed in fact if not in name. Except for the incorporation, which Cæsar had anticipated, of Britain, under the Emperor Claudius (A.D. 41-54) and the addition, which proved to be a mistake, of Dacia, north of the Danube, by Trajan (98-117), the frontiers were destined to remain broadly as Cæsar left them. These frontiers were natural boundaries—the

North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to the north and west, the African desert to the south, the River Euphrates, the Black Sea, and the Rivers Danube and Rhine to the east and north-east. The Empire was an organism co-ordinated and unified by a coherent set of principles. The heart of this organisation was the city of Rome, its arteries were its roads, its nerve centres were its colonies or camps, its life blood was the Latin language and the Roman law, and the spirit informing it was the discipline of its armies.

Roman military service was at first a civic duty which no citizen could escape, and each Roman soldier had to equip himself at his own expense. Later only the poorer citizens were enlisted, and served in return for pay, and the Roman armies were made up to strength by foreign mercenaries or auxiliaries. But in the first two or three centuries, when the great conquests were carried out, the Roman army was a citizen army. The army was under the command of the Consuls. The main unit was the legion, normally divided into ten divisions, called cohorts, of about 600 men. The cohort was again divided into companies or centuries, each commanded by a professional officer called a centurion. The training was hard and the discipline severe, but it was far from denying initiative to the individual soldier. To the Roman citizen soldier, military service was always a burden, but he endured its rigours for the sake of the Republic, and if he carried the Roman arms to the various parts of Europe, he took with them also the Roman law and order.

"All roads lead to Rome," but it is equally true and more illustrative of historical development to say that all roads lead *from* Rome. For from the earliest days of her expansion the basic physical instrument of the unity that Rome imposed on the world was the road. The building of roads was an integral element in each stage of the Romans' military advance. They became the connecting-links between their conquests, and along them the armies moved with great speed. The Roman roads were something quite new as highways in Europe and replaced the earlier type of track. They were built all over Italy, and then all over Roman Europe, and long after the fall of the Empire in the West they remained the chief lines of communication through most of the Middle Ages. The roads linked the camps or colonies, which were, in fact, garrisons of Roman soldiers. The Latin word *castra* means camp, and the place of the original

Roman military camp in the social history of Europe may be judged from the frequency with which place-names derived from this word and its variants appear. In Britain, for instance, these origins are marked by such place-names as Doncaster, Dorchester, and Cirencester. The Romans who manned these colonies were Roman citizens. In fact, the life in each colony was a replica of that of Rome itself. The colony was the means of defence in the area conquered. But it was something more : it was a deliberate means of unifying all the lands conquered. The Roman legionary, in fact, was a colonist, who took with him the Roman way of life.

Latin was the language universally used, except in the Hellenised lands of the south-east, where Greek survived. It was the language of the army and of the government, and was taught in the schools. Only isolated groups of people in remote districts to which the Roman arms did not penetrate—the Basques in the Pyrenees, the Albanians in the Illyrian Alps, the Gaels of Scotland and Ireland—remained untouched by this *lingua franca*. Moreover, being the only written tongue in the West, it was the language also of the Roman law. Law was part of the very roots of Roman civilisation and without it the unification of the Roman world would not have been achieved. The sense of the importance of the law as a safeguard of rights and liberties is evident from the earliest days of the Republic, and it was one of the triumphs of the plebs in their struggle for equality with the patricians that in the middle of the fifth century B.C., they succeeded in having promulgated the first code of Roman law called the Twelve Tables. This early code F. S. Marvin describes as “the fountain from which the stream of written law flowed on in widening courses through all the ten centuries of Roman history, until the great jurists of the Empire reviewed and collected it for the use of all civilised men.”¹

Zenith and Decline

The expansion of Rome to the vast proportions that we have indicated placed upon the Republican constitution burdens and strains which it proved less and less able to bear. Her tremendous conquests yielded her great wealth, mostly the spoils of the eastern campaigns. Successful generals and their vast armies had claims to be satisfied. New ideas were brought

¹ *The Living Past*, page 99.

back from contact with the Greeks. All these fruits of victory were more than the old Roman system could digest without internal upheavals. At home the Assembly of the people had become enfeebled, and the Senate, the one firm rock hitherto, showed itself incapable of meeting this complex situation. The too frequent resort to the expedient of dictatorship by successful generals, like Marius, Sulla, and Pompey, foreshadowed the change in governance which was bound to come if only there should emerge a leader who could combine the necessary political genius with the reality of military power. Such a combination was found in Julius Cæsar, of whom H. A. L. Fisher says that he brought to the task of reorganisation "the greatest civil intelligence which had yet been seen in Europe."

Cæsar was a patrician by birth, but no partisan. If anything, he leaned to the side of the people. He saw what the state required and how it could best be reformed, and he used the opportunity which Fate had given him to carry his plans into effect. He was the Emperor, or commander, by virtue of his success in Gaul, and, having "crossed the Rubicon" in 49 B.C., he became dictator of the city of Rome itself. Having removed his rival Pompey from his path at Pharsalus, he was elected by the Senate in 45 B.C. Consul for life. During the few months of life that were left to him, before the party of jealous Republicans abruptly ended it, he carried out a number of reforms in Rome, in Italy, and in the Roman dominions at large, and laid out the ground for the creation of her imperial government. Julius Cæsar may justly be called the founder of the Roman Imperium, and in fact his personal name came to have a generic significance in the title Cæsar, which has passed into modern languages in such forms as Kaiser and Tsar.

Cæsar's assassination in 44 B.C. only postponed the actual establishment of Imperial government, for his nephew Octavian, after crushing his uncle's assassins and removing his former colleague, Mark Antony, stood master of the world. In 27 B.C. the Senate voted him the title Augustus, a name of religious significance, and the Roman Empire was established in law as well as in fact. Augustus was careful to clothe the revolution in republican forms. He concentrated in his own hands and without limit of tenure the elective offices of the Republic, and thus wielded at once the military power of the Emperor, the political power of the Consul, and the popular power of the Tribune. The Senate, too, in continuing to meet,

gave the appearance of a retention of Republican forms, but it soon became totally enfeebled and degenerated into a mere registry of the Emperor's will. This fiction of the delegation of republican powers to the Emperor later caused many a disputed succession to the Purple, for at no time had it the character of an hereditary monarchy, and, though Augustus called himself Princeps, or first among equals, his powers in fact were absolute.


The Imperial Government, thus established by the military and political genius of Julius Cæsar and the sagacity and acumen of Octavian, solved the problem posed by the growing irrelevance of a republican system to the needs of a world empire. It provided the swift and efficient instrument of action demanded by the vast area, the heterogeneous peoples, and the diverse interests of a world state. In its early years it was the means of introducing wide reforms. It defended the frontiers with standing armies, and put the administration on a business footing by the creation of a new bureaucracy, experts who replaced in the provinces the amateurs who had misgoverned them and the greedy financiers who had impoverished them. If, in achieving these advantages, it in fact destroyed the republican spirit of Rome, it succeeded in restoring some of the ancient dignity of the Roman state.

"If a man," says Gibbon in the *Decline and Fall*, "were called to fix the period of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus." This was the period of the *Pax Romana*, the Roman peace, which lasted from the end of the first to the close of the second century A.D. During this span of a hundred years, the longest period of peace in the history of Europe, the Empire was given a space in which to consolidate the conquests of the Republic, to profit by the reforms of Augustus and the early Emperors, and to apply those principles of co-ordination and unification which we have outlined. The centres of civilisation, the original Roman camps, linked by the Roman roads, grew in beauty and comfort in the hands of Roman technicians who built aqueducts, baths, villas, and amphitheatres wherever they went. Indeed, the principal cities of Gaul and Spain, which thus developed apace, soon began to vie with Rome herself in what Tacitus, in the first century of the Empire, cynically called the "vices of civilisation," and this concentration on urban amenities gives

colour to the view that the Roman Empire was, in effect, "an association of towns." At all events, it was the Romanisation of western Europe, through the medium of Latin and the application of the Roman law, which secured the survival of Græco-Roman culture, and thus enabled Rome to make her lasting contribution to Western Civilisation.

Thus the conquest and pacification were complete, and it was easy to travel along the roads from one end of the Empire to the other without seeing a sign of the military strength which had made it all possible. The legions were on the frontiers, where the Romans were hardly yet conscious of the premonitory signs of the avalanche which was at length to engulf the Empire. For the story of the Roman Empire is not all of decline and fall, and well might the average Roman of the second century regard it as immortal. Yet the end of the second century of the Christian era was to prove its zenith. In the third the decline set in and was not to stop until, its tempo increasing by the beating of the barbarians on the boundaries, the Empire in the West finally collapsed before their onslaughts in the fifth century.

This process of decline lasted for about two centuries, and it was due to several causes of varying importance. The political cause was that the Empire was too big, and such liberty as was granted was merely local and could not interest itself actively in imperial citizenship. The attempts to overcome this problem of hugeness led to the decisive step of the Emperor Constantine (323-337) in dividing the Empire into two, with two capitals, one at Rome, and one on the Bosphorus at Byzantium (Constantinople, so called after its founder). This enabled the Empire in the East to endure for a thousand years after that in the West had fallen, and in this sense was a work of vital influence on the history of Europe. But it did not stop the decline. The economic cause was the inability of the Romans to work out a plan of production, distribution, and consumption, so as to satisfy the needs of its mixed and far-flung subject peoples. Accompanying this weakness was an alarming decline in the population due to the abandonment of agriculture, to infanticide, and plague. This, in its turn, led to the military cause. Since the Imperial Government could not find sufficient forces to hold the barbarians back on the river frontiers, it introduced the system of recruiting soldiers from the barbarians themselves, and this, of course, led to the blurring of the frontiers, the precursor of final submergence.



THE ROMAN EMPIRE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D.

On the eve of the Barbarian invasions

The social cause may be traced to the institution of slavery. The majority of Roman subjects were slaves, who had nothing to lose by change and no urge or means to support the Imperial structure when it showed signs of cracking. The final cause was religious. The spread of Christianity in its early years introduced into the Empire an element of disintegration, for, though the spiritual and secular forces afterwards allied, the Christian communities at first stood aloof from all Roman observances, including Emperor-worship, and thus, as the doctrine spread, it made a larger and larger number of people indifferent to the fate of the Empire, especially since, in those early days, Christians confidently and even eagerly awaited the end of the world.

These elements of enfeeblement, then, paved the way for the break-up of the Empire under the impact of the barbarian invasions. The Roman Constitution which, as we have shown, had begun as a happy blend of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements, ended as an irresponsible autocracy, an inevitable concomitant of Imperial expansion. But the price the Romans paid for their world-wide order was the loss of their liberty, which gradually ate away the ancient virtues and the patriotism which had inspired the original growth. Nor did even the autocracy of the Emperor prove in the end sufficient to send out from the heart of Rome the necessary pulsation to the uttermost parts of the Empire. Nor yet again did the expedient of zoning the Empire for purposes of administration carried out by the Emperor Diocletian (284-305) or the definitive division of it into eastern and western parts by Constantine serve in the long run to save its unity. These contrivances doubtless extended the life of the Empire, but in fact they made the break-up more certain at last. No doubt Constantine was right in his guess that it was in the East that the barbarians would first attack, and indubitably the assault in that direction was forestalled. But it did not stop the assault: it merely deflected it, as we shall show.

The Legacy of Rome

The Roman Empire has been described as the culminating fact of the ancient world. This is true in the sense that Rome consolidated the Mediterranean world, which tended to join, but could not be effectively unified until a people with a genius

for law and order emerged to organise it. But because Rome was the centre of the Mediterranean world she became also the unifier of Europe. The Empire was at last overwhelmed in a physical sense, but spiritually it lived on in a thousand ways, and Rome is the Eternal City in a profounder sense than that of a guide-book or a melodrama. And just as the Roman Empire was the culminating fact of the ancient world, so it was the starting-point of the modern world, for, as F. S. Marvin truly says, "The Roman Empire was in essence the embryo of the modern world, and Europe and the West to-day are Rome enlarged." For, in the very act of disintegrating the Empire, the barbarians who permanently settled in its territory caught the spirit of the Romanised people whom they overwhelmed, and so ultimately succumbed to Græco-Roman civilisation. And it was on these foundations that the modern states system developed. This is evidently what the great historian, Edward Freeman, meant when he said: "It is in Rome that all the states of the earlier European world lose themselves: it is out of Rome that all the states of the later European world take their being."

To Rome, then, first of all, we owe our idea of law and order, which civilised life demands and without which liberty can have no meaning. If freedom is a dynamic principle, it requires for its growth the more static principle of order, so that men may be assured that the liberty they enjoy shall not be suddenly lost through the degeneracy of government, internal and external, into anarchy. This lesson the Romans taught us through their system of law, which is the first and foremost part of their legacy to the modern world. Starting with the famous Twelve Tables of early Republican days, it was moulded, by "widening precedents" and by the "building up of new structures on old foundations," to meet the needs of an expanding Empire. The Roman lawyers who performed the functions of peregrinating Prætors gradually reduced the welter of tribal customs to what in effect became a law of nations (*jus gentium*). In this way Rome established a system of law based on general principles without respect for race, language, or country; in short, universality in place of local prejudices.

Roman law has been called "written reason," and the analogy thus made with Greek science and philosophy is a not unfair one. But, in developing it, Rome produced something of which the Greeks were incapable, and thus made a new and

real contribution to the advance of civilisation. The whole system was finally codified in the *Institutes* and *Digests* compiled under the Emperor Justinian who reigned at Constantinople from 527 to 565. The system survived the breach of Roman unity in the West and continued to be applied in various parts of the old Imperial domains through the darkest days of the early mediæval chaos. So the code had an unbroken existence and at length became the basis of the legal systems of many continental states to-day, though Europe has lost the unity of which the Roman law was at once the symbol and the instrument.

Secondly, we owe to Rome the perpetuation of Greek culture. Though Rome produced great poets like Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, prose writers like Cicero and Tacitus, and historians like Livy, her culture was essentially imitative of Greek models. So in the realm of art were most of her buildings, for her original contributions in this respect, such as aqueducts, were functional rather than æsthetic. The Romans could not, by their very nature, absorb Greek culture in its purest form. But they did something more suited to the times : they popularised it. They thus spread Greek learning through western Europe in a vulgarised form which alone could secure its acceptance among the peoples to whom it was carried. The culture thus disseminated may be called Græco-Roman, but it long outlasted both Greece as a congeries of independent city states and Rome as the heart of an empire. The civilisation of western Europe was built upon the Romanisation of the western populations, in whom it survived defeat by the barbarians who in their turn were at length conquered by it.

Our third debt to Rome lies in her having provided the means of the universalisation of the Christian Church. It is true, as we shall show, that the Roman acceptance of Christianity as the sole religion of the Empire was as much political as it was spiritual in its motives. It is true also that the conditions of its universal establishment led to the most bitter conflicts between the Church and the State. But it is hardly conceivable that the Christian Church, any more than Greek culture, would have spread through western Europe but for the unity which the Roman Empire imposed upon the continent. The fact of that unity is no more, but the ideal remains. And such is the condition of anarchy in international relations which Europe has reached to-day that she must either realise the Roman ideal in practical forms to suit modern needs, or perish.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIAN CHURCH

THE DOCTRINE OF FRATERNITY

The Greek Phase

FEW more astonishing phenomena are to be found in the story of Europe than the rise and spread of Christianity, which is part of the foundations and one of the main pillars of Western Civilisation, and has been from its beginnings among the most dynamic influences making for European growth and change. Starting as an obscure revolt from the Rabbinical tyranny of the Jewish Church in Palestine, it was destined to revolutionise the moral conceptions and religious habits of the European peoples. From being at first the local teaching of a Galilean and his followers, it became a gospel for mankind. Out of the dissident sect of the Jewish faith in which it originated there grew within three centuries of its foundation a universal Catholic Church, from which, through schism, reformation, and revolt, have evolved its multifarious forms to-day, when it is professed by more than one-third of the population of the world.

Before the final collapse of the Roman unity in the West Christianity had spread to all the cities of the Empire, but it was Greek before it was Roman and Judaic before it was either. The religion of the Jews was monotheistic, the belief in one God, and was founded on the ancient books which we call the Old Testament. It was a national religion in the sense that it was confined to the Jewish people, all of whom had strictly to observe certain rites and practices, notably circumcision. Converts were not unknown, but were only admitted to the faith if they observed the ritual absolutely, and consequently Judaism remained exclusive and separatist. Christ was brought up in this Jewish faith and spoke the Aramaic tongue. He took the Jewish holy scriptures as the foundation of His doctrine, but built upon them a new creed. The Prophets had foretold that a Messiah would come, descended from King David. His mission would be to reign over all peoples, to call sinners to repentance, and to prepare them for the end of the world.

Christ asserted that He was this Messiah, and for this He was crucified.

As the teaching spread, the story of the Passion and Crucifixion, told with such beauty and simplicity in the Gospels, not only appealed to the hearts of the European peoples but led them to regard the Jewish race as for ever responsible for this outrage. In the first century of the Christian era the Jews began to be dispersed widely through the Roman world, a process hastened by the destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman legions in A.D. 70. So originated the strange thread in the European story supplied by the wanderings and sufferings of the Jews. Wherever they went they faced persecution for the sins of their ancestors. The anti-Semitism of to-day, complex and confused though its causes and motives may be, is an inheritance from this early attitude to what was regarded as the crime of the Jewish race.

At first the disciples of Christ formed a private society, but within two years of His death, under the influence of James, Cephas, and John, known as the Pillar Apostles, the first public community of Christians was founded in Jerusalem. Both the evangelists of the Gospels and other early disciples were obsessed by the view that the end of the world was approaching, and it is evident, therefore, that they were not expecting to found a permanent universal Church. They were merely making a local appeal to men and women to prepare by repentance for entry into God's Kingdom when the cataclysm should occur. But the teaching spread with amazing rapidity beyond the confines of Palestine to the Jews of the Dispersion in the Hellenistic lands of Asia Minor, and when events falsified the notion that the end of the world was at hand, a great change came over the Christian outlook. This change was mainly due to the missionary work of St. Paul.

St. Paul was a Jewish victim of the Dispersion living in Asia Minor, who, after his dramatic conversion, used his fervent genius to persuade the world to accept "the mystical ideal of fellowship with the risen and eternal Christ." Paul belonged to two worlds, the narrow world of the Jews and the wider world of the Greeks. He spoke and wrote in Greek, and must have been acquainted with the Greek religion. His greatness lay in his use of this advantage to broaden the Christian doctrine so that it might be acceptable to the civilised world beyond the land of its birth. By dropping its purely Hebraic compulsions

he made a clear distinction between the Jewish and Gentile worlds, and for this reason is rightly known as the Apostle of the Gentiles. It was in Greek that his mission, roughly between the years 40 and 60, was carried out, and in the Hellenised world that the message spread. He travelled far and wide, to the great cities of Greece and as far west as Rome, and wherever he went made many converts by his zeal for the faith and the fire of his eloquence. The destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 completed the deliverance of Christianity from Judaism and gave the nascent Church the sense of a world mission.

In the first century of its spread, then, Christianity became Hellenised. This was due to the position of St. Paul and to the fact that there was much in Greek thought and outlook that was receptive of the new faith in the form in which St. Paul presented it. The Christian teaching, in fact, harmonised readily with the Hellenistic view of life, and so the Greek world found it easy to adopt. So it comes about that, as Charles Seignobos points out, the vocabulary of the Church is almost entirely Greek, and we find Greek words like *evangelist*, *epistle*, and *apocalypse* in reference to its writings; *saviour*, *dogma*, *orthodoxy*, and *heresy* in reference to its doctrine; *devils*, *angels*, and *demons* in reference to its beliefs; *baptism*, *catechism*, *hymn*, *homily*, and *eucharist* in reference to its practices; *ecclesiastic*, *parish*, *diocese*, *synod*, and *canons* in reference to its institutions; and *apostle*, *deacon*, *priest*, *bishop*, *acolyte*, and *monk* in reference to the persons in its service. The word *catholic* itself is Greek, and it was in Hellenistic cities that the first synods or councils were held to formulate the dogmas of the early Church and that the Fathers of the Church preached and wrote.

The Church made Universal

When Christianity spread to the West of the Roman Empire, it entered a very different field, and whereas in the East it was quickly and widely adopted, in the West it was for long regarded as an alien creed brought in by foreigners. The Christian communities in the Latin West were confined to the towns, where they were forced to carry out their services as secret societies in the midst of a community largely pagan. The paganism of the West consisted mainly in the worship of the Emperor and of the sun-gods, Isis and Mithras. The cult of Isis had a priesthood organised very much like the later Catholic

Church. Priests, monks, and acolytes attended the goddess and sang matins and evensong in her temple. These practices facilitated the growth of the Christian hierarchy as it gradually replaced the pagan priestcraft. But naturally the Christians held aloof from this pagan worship, and indeed condemned it, as well as the wild practices of the amphitheatre. They also refused to join in the practice of Emperor-worship. For this reason the Christians were suspect. To the distinguished and learned, Christianity seemed "a gloomy infatuation," and the Roman populace tended to ascribe to the Christians the least Imperial calamity.

Christianity thus became an "illicit religion," and it was an easy step from this to persecution. Under the Emperor Nero the Christians were accused of causing the burning of Rome in 64, and were cruelly persecuted as a result. Under Domitian (81-96) Christianity was proscribed as a form of high treason, and under Trajan (98-117) the first legal proceedings were issued against them. After that for more than a century the Emperors were generally more tolerant, and the Church grew apace. Moreover, the leaders of the Church took advantage of this long period of comparative freedom from interference by the secular authorities to build up for themselves an impregnable position. By the middle of the second century the Christian congregations first formed themselves into a confederacy which they called catholic, that is to say, universal, and by the middle of the third century the confederation was complete. The Church was by that time fully organised with a three-fold ministry of bishops, presbyters, and deacons.

The Emperors now saw the growing power of the Church as a menace to their own authority, and there began another dreary period of intermittent persecution which reached its climax under Diocletian. In four edicts issued in 303-304, the Emperor decreed the destruction of all churches, the burning of all Christian books, the imprisonment of bishops, the degradation of the Christians holding public office, and the torture of all Christians who refused to recant. But Christianity, though it suffered severely from this widespread persecution, was far too sincerely held by its adherents, and the Church by this time far too deeply entrenched, for such a policy of extermination to succeed against it, and when in 305 Diocletian retired into private life he did so with the knowledge that his anti-Christian campaign was a complete failure. Within a year of his abdica-

tion there succeeded to the Imperial throne its only occupant to be called Great. This was Constantine, who may fairly be placed in the very short list of men who have changed the course of history, and who, despite some acts of cruelty in his private and public life, came to be regarded, because of his work on behalf of the Christian Church, as a "thirteenth apostle."

Constantine's own religious beliefs were vague and mixed. He was convinced that his great military successes, which made him master of the Empire, were due to the support of the Christian God, and he accordingly issued in 313 his famous edict of religious toleration. But he remained Pontifex Maximus, or High Priest, of Roman Paganism, and it was not until 337 that he himself was baptised, and while his coins had on one side the sign of the Cross, they had on the other a device illustrative of sun-worship. No doubt the situation prompted this eclecticism, for the Christians at that time, according to the estimate of J. B. Bury, constituted not more than one-fifth of the total population of the Empire as a whole, the proportion being much larger in the East than in the West. Yet Constantine recognised the value of the Christian Church as a great political force, and realised that it was better to have the ardent support of a well-organised and closely knit minority than the half-hearted allegiance of a loose and scattered majority. This accounts for his ecclesiastical policy through the remainder of his reign and the position of pre-eminence which the Christian Church achieved as a result of it.

Constantine had already established his new capital in the East at Byzantium, and he made of the city thereafter known as Constantinople a centre of Christian worship. In the Greek world he found Christianity much more widely accepted than in the Latin, and the Church much more pliable to his will. He took an active part in the internal deliberations of the Church, and in 325 actually presided at the Council of Nicea, the first of a long series of General Councils of the Church convened to establish uniformity of doctrine. The Council of Nicea was occasioned by the need to controvert the teaching of a presbyter of Alexandria named Arius, who denied the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father. Arianism, which was thus an early form of Unitarianism, made many converts and was destined to play an important part in the failure of the Goths, who adopted it, to make a permanent settlement in Italy two centuries later. In rebuttal of Arianism, the Council of Nicea formulated the

confession of the Christian faith known as the Nicene Creed, which vindicated the Trinitarian basis of the Holy Catholic Church. In this way Constantine imposed upon the heads of the Church an authoritative discipline designed to achieve the Christian unity of the Empire.

During Constantine's reign, then, though the pagan cults were not actually suppressed, the Christian Church was given an official status, and by the end of the fourth century, after the brief apostasy of the Emperor Julian (361-363), all pagan worship was prohibited and Christianity was proclaimed the sole religion of the Empire. The establishment of the universality of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire was, therefore, due in the first place not to a spontaneous impulse but to an official Imperial act at a time when the majority of the Emperor's subjects were still pagan. Yet it was undoubtedly the vitality of the new religion, compared with the lukewarmness of the old, that made the Imperial edict finally effective.

The Organisation of the Church

Up to the end of the fourth century it was only in the cities that Christianity was practised. In fact, the word *pagan* originally meant peasant, and was used as a term of contempt by the Christians to denote the rustic people who still adhered to the ancient cults. Each city had its Christian community, and in its ecclesiastical organisation it followed the pattern of Roman civil society. Thus, although Christians of all ranks, slave or free, were equal members of the congregation, the community was, in fact, divided into a governing class and a subject class, called respectively *clergy* (clerks) and *laity* (people), both of them, be it noted, words of Greek origin. At the head of each such community was the bishop, whose powers were absolute in the city on its religious side. He represented the community in its contacts with the civil authority, administered Church property, directed the preparation of candidates for ordination, imposed penances, and had the power to excommunicate. He was, in fact, as powerful in ecclesiastical matters as was the Imperial officer in civil affairs.

Just as the Church copied the State in its local organisation, so it did in the larger affairs of the province. As with the provincial assemblies of the Empire, the bishops of a province met periodically in the chief city (*metropolis*) of the province in a

synod at which the bishop (*metropolitan*) presided. The purpose of such synods was to maintain unity of doctrine, and sometimes with this same object there were held councils of the whole Empire, like that of Nicea, known as Œcumenical (universal) Councils. At the Council of Nicea, as we have seen, the Emperor Constantine himself presided. In the East, in fact, the Emperor acted as Supreme Head of the Church, and for the next eleven centuries, until Constantinople fell to the Turks, there was this close relationship between Church and State, so that the chief bishop, or Patriarch, in the East always held a somewhat limited authority.

In the West the reverse was the case, for in Rome the bishop had no such checks upon him. The primacy of Rome, based upon the Apostolic succession from St. Peter, thus came to be recognised. The Bishop of Rome was henceforth known as the Pope (a word of Asiatic origin), and from that time events conspired to make not only his ecclesiastical position more and more independent but his political influence more and more effective. Thus from the beginning the unity of the Church tended to be two unities, a unity of the East and a unity of the West. In fact, with the departure of Constantine to the East the government of the West became steadily weaker until it was finally overthrown by the barbarians. This gave the Pope a position of leadership to which no secular prince could aspire. In later years, indeed, the Popes claimed an actual secular authority based on the so-called Donation of Constantine, backed by a forgery by which it was pretended that when Constantine went East he granted lands and powers to the Pope which made him a political prince. It was on this pretence that the claim to the Papal States was founded, and to it is to be attributed the unfortunate part the secularised Papacy played in delaying the achievement of Italian national unity until the last third of the nineteenth century.

So the power of the Papacy grew in the turmoil following the disintegration of the Roman unity in the West, for it was the one centralising force which stood firm when the secular arm broke. A new prestige, moreover, was given to it by its work in converting the two Teutonic peoples who made lasting political settlements: the Franks and the Anglo-Saxons. And, finally, when the Empire in the West was no more, it was the Pope who attempted to restore it by his coronation of the Frankish Charlemagne in Rome in 800, which was the beginning of the

millennium of existence of that pale political shadow known as the Holy Roman Empire.

But if the Pope in Rome was the inspirer of the conversion of the Teutonic barbarians in the West, the Patriarch in Constantinople was not less the organiser of the conversion of most of the southern and all the eastern Slavs, while lying between these were the Hungarians, the Czechs, and the Poles, who turned to Rome rather than to Constantinople. Whereas the Western Church insisted on the celibacy of the clergy and carried on its services in Latin, the Eastern Church permitted the marriage of priests and taught through the vulgar tongue of the people they converted. These events and practices emphasised the division of the Christian world into two camps, which only became more mutually hostile with the passage of time. The differences between them were too fundamental to be overcome by any practical *rapprochement*, and in 1054 the breach became final and complete. The schism between the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church has never been healed, and the Orthodox Church has remained distinct and separate from the Roman to this day. It was a fundamental rupture, but it was by no means the last of the schisms which were to strike ever and again at the unity of the Christian Church, and which have produced the many and various forms of Christian creed in the contemporary world.

The Church and the Christian Message

The peculiarity of Christianity, as at first taught, in comparison with other religions, was that it appealed to people of humble origin. The insistence in Christ's teaching, so strongly brought out in the Gospels and particularly in that of St. Luke, of the evils of worldly wealth, was a reversal of the earlier morality, and it was in this sense that Christianity wrought a moral revolution, for the gospel of an eternal life at once taught that all men were equal in the eyes of God, and gave them, through the lesson of divine compassion taught in the Crucifixion, a new attitude towards their sufferings in this world. But this simple doctrine of the brotherhood of man, which Jesus and His disciples had taught, soon became entangled in the complexities resulting from the urge or necessity to formulate a theology and to organise a Church. So the ethical and pastoral purities of the early teaching were overlaid by the exigencies of ecclesi-

astical authority, and the unity of the Church came to be regarded as of more importance than the original truth that the chief aim and goal of Christianity was the salvation of the world.

The Church dignitaries could perhaps hardly be expected to apply the doctrine of fraternity to the civil order as they found it, but what they did, in fact, was to gloss over the egalitarianism inherent in the gospel of Christ, and enjoin upon the faithful the importance of submission to established authority and the mute acceptance of the inequalities of society. In the political and social chaos which accompanied and followed the breakdown of the Roman Empire in the West, men, stunned by the overthrow of what had seemed the immortal seat of political authority, might well ask how these things could happen under the guidance of a beneficent Christian God. The answer to this puzzle was given by St. Augustine in his great book, *The City of God (De Civitate Dei)*, one of the classics of the early Catholic Church, which appeared in 416, and was directly inspired by these calamities. St. Augustine explained that, man's nature being twofold, he owes allegiance to two cities, the city of his birth and the City of God, and that the heavenly state is not affected by earthly affairs. The human race, he said, is a single family, and its final destiny is to be reached not on earth but in heaven. But if St. Augustine's thesis seemed somewhat recondite and remote from the realities of the time as the average citizen understood them, it was destined to play an important part in mediæval politics, for on it was based the theory of the Holy Roman Empire, which was erected on the imperial ruins caused by these events, and which attempted to reconcile Europe to the loss of its political unity by emphasising the sanction of the universal Church.

But, despite this philosophical division between Church and State, great worldly wealth and political influence did, in fact, accrue to the Church, and in the manipulation of its mundane riches and its pursuit of secular power the Church itself tended to vitiate the moral revolution which Christianity at first achieved. It was inevitable, therefore, that it should suppress any attempt to return to the first principles of Christian teaching. This was seen particularly when, as frequently happened from the later Middle Ages onwards, the Scriptures were translated into the vernacular. Whenever the original documents of the Faith were thus restudied, and a new understanding of them made possible by their rendering into the vulgar tongue, some social

ferment followed, but the Church was always concerned to keep it from influencing practical politics. This detachment of the Churches from the vital business of social reform has continued to characterise them into our own epoch, and may well account for the admitted decline of their influence in an age of growing industrialism and an awakening social conscience.

The Christian Church was indubitably a great civilising influence, which strengthened the foundations of our society by coming to the rescue of Græco-Roman civilisation in the days of its bankruptcy, but the Church's preoccupation with unity of doctrine, ecclesiastical authority, economic strength, and political power led it farther and farther from the idealism of its founder. Yet Christianity is greater than the Churches and has survived all the abuses to which they have subjected it. For the underlying truth of Christianity, as George Fox said, "speaks to man's condition" and thus offers him the spiritual motive power without which he cannot reach the goal of the Good Society. The pristine doctrine of fraternity which Christ taught is written plain and large in the New Testament for all the world to read, despite the ecclesiastical overgrowth which tends to obscure it, and only if institutional religion proves itself capable at last of recapturing the vitalism of the ideal of the brotherhood of man and applying it to the actualities of our tortured age can it hope to lead the world to the state of moral sanity and peace which its first teacher envisaged.

CHAPTER V
IMPERIAL DISINTEGRATION

THE TEUTONIC INFUSION

The German Peoples

THE great river boundaries of the Roman Empire divided Europe into two. In the Imperial lands to the west and south of the Rhine and Danube lived a civilised and peaceful people, united under a common government, and, in the later days of the Empire, Christianised, at least in the towns. To the east and north of the rivers, roving hungrily, were the barbarians, primitive, warlike, tribal, and heathen. When, in the latter half of the fourth century, the barbarians began a permanent encroachment on the Imperial domain, the European story entered a highly dynamic phase. These movements, in fact, caused a violent and fundamental transformation of the European scene and laid down the conditions for the evolution of the states system of Europe as we know it to-day.

This vast series of movements is variously called the migration of the peoples and the barbarian invasions. Both phrases are significant. It was a migration in the sense that the barbarians, like the Greeks and Romans before them, felt steadily drawn to the south and west, towards the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in search of more prosperous conditions of living. In this sense the movement was of the nature of an infiltration rather than a deluge, as Milton calls it in *Paradise Lost*, a gradual rather than a catastrophic process. On the other hand, it was an invasion in the sense that in the fourth century the river frontiers were rudely broken by the barbarians lining them, because they were set in more urgent motion by the pressure upon them of an easterly and much more barbarous people of a different race. The migration and invasion, thus violently synchronising, caused a series of warlike movements which disrupted the Empire, shattered its peace, and, in the space of less than two centuries, changed the face of Europe.

The barbarians who lined the river frontiers of the Rhine and the Danube were Teutons or Germans, and the land they occupied was generally known to the Romans as *Germania*.

Only one serious attempt was made to bring them under the Roman yoke in the hope of incorporating Germania in the Roman Empire. This was in the reign of Augustus, but when his offensive was brought to a disastrous end by the destruction of his army in the year A.D. 9 he decided thenceforth to stand on the defensive and to make the rivers the permanent frontiers. From that time the chief business of the Roman legions was to hold back the barbarians from spreading into the Imperial lands. The defence of the frontiers was a constant preoccupation of the Imperial Government, but the Roman legions managed for a long time, in spite of periodical incursions, to force the barbarians to remain on the eastern banks of the rivers.

The Teutons did not constitute a race. They belonged, like the Greeks and Romans, to the Aryan race, and spoke a tongue which was one of the family of Indo-European languages. Of the early history of this remarkable people we know very little, for there are no Teutonic sources. Tacitus, the Roman historian and biographer of Agricola, the most brilliant of the Roman Pro-consuls in Britain, tells us a good deal in his *Germania*, which appeared about A.D. 100. But in this work Tacitus was more propagandist than ethnologist, since his purpose was to extol the primitive virtues of the Germans in contrast to what he was pleased to regard as the vices of Roman civilisation. At least it is certain that the qualities in the Germans which Tacitus admired, notably initiative, fecundity, and love of liberty, were those which the Romans by his day were beginning to lose or forget, and it was precisely these qualities which enabled the Germans at length to overthrow the Roman Empire in the West.

The original home of the Teutons was in Scandinavia, whence many of them wandered southward, leaving the rest to found in due time the modern nations of Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes. The wanderers divided into two main groups, the West Germans and the East Germans. The former turned westward towards the Rhine, on whose eastern banks they settled. Of the West Germans the most important divisions were the Angles and Saxons, who occupied the lands from the southern end of present-day Denmark to the mouth of the Rhine, and the Franks who remained along the middle reaches of the river. These peoples were destined to play a most important part in the history of Europe, for they became the founders of the mediæval kingdoms of England and France. The East Germans,

otherwise known as the Goths, continued their movement southward, at length reaching the banks of the Danube. The Goths, again, fell into two main divisions, the West Goths, or Visigoths, and the East Goths, or Ostrogoths. In the lands to the north of the Danube, where they settled, they were divided by the River Dniester. Between these two main bodies of West and East Germans on the river boundaries there were several other Teuton peoples, including the Alemanni, the Burgundians, the Vandals, and the Lombards.

At this stage in their development the Germans were no longer nomadic, but, on the other hand, their tillage was of a very rudimentary kind, and when they had gathered in the crops from any particular patch of ground they let the land return to pasture. In fact, they still measured their wealth in terms of cattle rather than of land. They had no towns, but lived in wooden cabins in ill-defined villages. Thus it was very easy for them to move their families and such primitive chattels as they possessed. They were organised in independent tribes, each of which had a leader, a council of nobles, and an assembly of free men. But the main purpose of this organisation was war, among themselves and against others. Actually they were probably no stronger in an absolute sense in the fourth century than they had been in the first, but the conditions in the later period made it possible for them to succeed where their predecessors had failed.

From about the second century A.D. onwards, as the population of the Roman Empire fell and its military strength consequently declined, the Emperors adopted the policy of admitting bands of barbarians into the Imperial domain as tillers of the soil (*coloni*) and as military mercenaries (*fœderati*). In this way the border line was blurred and the Roman resistance weakened, for the barbarians, as allies of the Romans, learned a good deal about their methods of war, so that when the time came the mass incursion was made to that extent easier. Moreover, many of these barbarians rose high in the Imperial service, and by the fourth and fifth centuries the command of the Imperial forces was largely in their hands.

In the middle of the fourth century the barbarian mass on the frontiers was set in motion by the westward pressure of the Huns, who came out of the East, plundering and slaughtering. The Huns were Mongols and in no way related to the Teutons, although the greatest of their leaders, Attila, was afterwards

idealised as a benefactor of mankind in the mediæval German legend, the *Nibelungen*, and in spite of our modern habit, induced by the experiences of two world wars, of calling the Germans Huns, they must be clearly distinguished both in their origins and in their gifts to the modern world. For, in fact, the Huns contributed nothing to human progress, and, after a little more than a century of bestial marauding and rapine in Europe, the wave receded and they disappear from history. But by their unchecked rush to the Empire's boundaries they set up a disturbance which passed, like a magnetic wave, through all the Teutonic peoples there and did not stop until the Empire in the West had been completely overwhelmed.

The Gothic Invasion and the Lombard Settlement

The first people to feel the effect of the Hunnish pressure were the Ostrogoths, whom the Huns crushed and subjected. To escape a similar fate the Visigoths, farther to the west, pleaded with the Emperor to be allowed to settle within the confines of the Empire, and in 376 the Emperor granted their request. This was the beginning of a movement which resulted in the incursion of the Visigoths, first into Italy, where they were later succeeded by the Ostrogoths, and then into Spain and a large part of Gaul. The Goths had already been converted to Christianity while they were still outside the Empire. But the form of Christianity they adopted was Arianism, which had already been condemned by the Catholic Church as a heresy. So, while the early conversion of the Goths shows them to have been a by no means untutored people before their arrival in the Empire, this fact turned out to be a great misfortune for them, because, as they could not cast off their heretical Christianity, they were never able to assimilate the people whom they conquered.

No sooner had the Visigoths settled in Thrace than they revolted, and in 378, at the battle of Adrianople, they utterly defeated the Romans and slew the Emperor Valens. Under their leader, Alaric, they gradually moved across Greece, and at length invaded Italy. In 409 Alaric laid siege to Rome and in 410 sacked it. The Emperor then made peace with Alaric and recognised the Visigoths, who entered the service of the Empire. Meanwhile, the Vandals, who, though a Teutonic people already converted to Arian Christianity, were much

more barbarous than the rest, had invaded Gaul and had passed into Spain. The Visigoths offered to drive the Vandals out of Spain for the Emperor, an offer which was accepted. They thus moved westward out of Italy into southern Gaul, and in 418 established themselves in Aquitaine. This became the centre of the Visigothic kingdom, which at its fullest extent stretched from the Loire to Gibraltar and from the Atlantic to the Rhône. Later, attacked to the north by the Franks and to the south by the Imperial forces from Constantinople, their dominion was much diminished, and was finally extinguished after three centuries of existence by the attacks of the Moors. In 429 the Vandals crossed into Africa, where they established their ephemeral empire, and thence carried out raids on surrounding lands, including the sack of Rome in 455.

The situation in Italy during the next twenty years was one of the utmost confusion. The Emperor in the West had become little more than a figurehead, and there appeared on the Imperial throne a series of puppets. The real power was in the hands of a succession of barbarian chieftains in the service of the Empire. One of these, Odoacer, of Vandal extraction, is memorable for having actually carried out the work of finally deposing the Emperor in the West. The last of the Emperors was a weakling and a usurper who, by a strange irony, bore the names in a diminutive form of the founder of the City and the creator of the Empire, for he was called Romulus Augustulus. In 476 Odoacer defeated the barbarian leaders who had put Romulus on the throne, and then dethroned him. Odoacer sent a mission to the Emperor at Constantinople, bearing the insignia of the imperium, thus recognising the technical unity of the Empire. In return he was given the title of Patrician, and remained in fact master of Italy. His overlordship, however, was not to last long, for the Emperor in the East continued the policy of playing off one barbarian chief against another, and for this purpose found the leader of the Ostrogoths a useful tool.

By this time the Ostrogoths, with the recession of the Huns, had entered the Empire. Under their leader, Theodoric, they were now ready to serve the Emperor's turn and march into Italy. Theodoric was in many ways the most remarkable personality thrown up from the barbarian world during this period. He had all the dominant and violent characteristics of his people, but he had, besides, the qualities of receptivity, adaptability, and tolerance. He entered Italy in 488, and in 493

he murdered Odoacer with his own hands, thus becoming undisputed master of Italy. He then began what was for that period a reign of extraordinary benevolence, which deserved a better fate. For it is true to say that Theodoric came nearer than any man after him for thirteen centuries to creating a united Italy. If he had succeeded, as his policy merited, in consolidating the Italians and the Goths, Italy might have been spared more than a millennium of the degradation and disunity which made it possible for Metternich, as late as the nineteenth century, still contemptuously to describe her as a "geographical expression," and which was only brought to an end within the last hundred years through the political evangelism of Mazzini and the happy conjunction of Cavour's diplomatic genius, Garibaldi's fiery patriotism, and King Victor Emmanuel's capacity for Fabianism.

But the very tolerance which Theodoric displayed was resented by his subjects. Arianism was something that the Catholic Italians could not suffer, and the Ostrogoths remained strangers and enemies among them. So, in spite of his bringing peace and prosperity to Italy, his reign was a failure, and his only memorial is his tomb which may still be seen in the lovely city of Ravenna. He died in 526, and the Ostrogothic Kingdom of Italy survived him but twenty years. The Emperor Justinian, who succeeded to the throne at Constantinople in the year following Theodoric's death, determined to reconquer the West. The campaign, under the Imperial commander Belisarius, followed a route with which we have all so recently become familiar. It opened in Africa, where the Vandals, who for more than a hundred years had been the terror of the Mediterranean peoples, were so decisively defeated that they were never heard of again. Imperial forces next conquered Sicily, and then crossed into Italy, where in 540 they captured Ravenna. Thirteen years later the Ostrogoths, crushed and dejected, asked the permission of the Emperor to leave Italy. This having been granted, they crossed the Alps and disappeared from history.


Within less than forty years of the departure of the Ostrogoths from Italy the place they had left vacant was filled by the Lombards, a much less attractive body of Teutons than the Goths. The Lombards emigrated, leaving none of their number behind, and crossed the river boundaries in the wake of the Goths. Justinian had not hesitated to use some of them, Arian Christians though they were, against the Ostrogoths in his campaigns for the

reconquest of Italy. They had thus tasted the sweets of this delectable land. Taking advantage of the weakening of the defences of Italy when Justinian's forces had been largely withdrawn, they invaded the country in 568. Thus Justinian lost in the long run, for if he had not driven out the Ostrogoths they might have helped to withstand this last Teuton wave to wash over the Empire. As it was, the Lombards established themselves in North Italy and set up their capital at Pavia. The Lombards, though they migrated *en masse*, were not a united people like the Ostrogoths, and they settled in scattered bands in various parts of the country. If one thing was required to complete the disunity of Italy besides the departure of the Ostrogoths, the Lombards supplied it. By settling in the north, they cut the Pope off from his northern allies in Gaul, and so were directly responsible for the Pope's appeal for aid to the Franks, which in its turn led to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire. They have left their name on the map of Italy in the Plain of Lombardy, but contributed little else to the lasting memorials of their age.

The Frankish Kingdom

The story of the settlement of the two great bodies of West Germans—the Franks and the Anglo-Saxons—is very different from that of the East Germans or Goths. For, whereas little finally remained of the Goths beyond a name falsely given to a type of architecture and an island in the Baltic, the contributions of the Franks and Anglo-Saxons to Western Civilisation were profound and permanent.

In the fourth century the Franks, as we have seen, were settled on the Rhine. Here they were divided into two main groups, those who remained in Germany and were the originators of the Franconians and the Hessians, and those who crossed the Rhine into Gaul towards the end of the fourth century. Those who thus migrated westward were again divided into two: the Salians who settled to the north of the Somme and the Ripuarians whose settlements stretched from the Rhine westward to the Moselle and the Meuse. Gaul at the time when the Franks invaded it had lost all semblance of unity. A Roman patrician named Syagrius attempted to keep the Roman standard aloft in the valley of the Seine, but nowhere else north of the Alps did even the shadow of a Roman writ run. South of the Loire the Visigothic kingdom was still intact, while in the valley of




THE TEUTONIC INFUSION

GERMAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE BY ABOUT 530.

Showing, besides the permanent settlements, the temporary conquests of the East Goths in Italy and of the Vandals in Africa, and the confinement of the Roman power to the limits of the Empire in the East

the Rhône another Teutonic people, the Burgundians, had settled, and about the upper waters of the Rhine yet another, the Alemanni.

The story of the settlement of the Franks in Gaul is that of the reign of their first great king, Clovis, who ruled from 481 to 511, for just as Theodoric founded an Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy, Clovis founded a Frankish kingdom in Gaul. But whereas Theodoric's kingdom proved ephemeral, that of Clovis proved permanent. He has indeed been justly described as the creator of the mediæval monarchy of France. Clovis was a Salian Frank, and he led the Salians from Flanders into that part of Gaul which is now France, and there began a career of unbroken success. Clovis scored three great victories: over Syagrius at Soissons in 486, over the Alemanni in Alsace



THE TEUTONIC INFUSION

THE SITUATION BY ABOUT 600

Showing the replacement of the East Goths by the Lombards in Italy and the disappearance of the Vandals through the partial Roman recovery of western Mediterranean lands, lost a century later to the Moors

in 496, and over the Visigoths at Vouille, near Poitiers, in 507. The result of the first of these victories was the establishment of his capital at Paris, of the second his conversion to Christianity, of the third the expulsion of the Visigoths from Gaul and the extension of his sway to the Pyrenees.

Clovis' conversion to Christianity was the most significant happening in this series of events. Unlike the Goths, the Franks were unconverted before their arrival on Roman soil. From the moment of his conversion, therefore, Clovis had the tremendous advantage of being a member of the Catholic Church and did not suffer Theodoric's handicap of incurable heresy. Clovis was, in fact, the first barbarian leader to be baptised into the Catholic Church. The incorporation of the Franks and the Latins in Gaul was thus facilitated, and Clovis

and his house became the recognised champions of the Papal power in Gaul from this time on. In Gaul, therefore, the infusion of Teutonic blood into the Roman body was seen at work in its most effective form. The Teutonic conqueror thus became the champion of the militant Church. He showed himself ready to carry out his rule through the recognised hierarchy of the Church, and in return the clergy and their flock were prepared to work hand in hand with him.

The assimilation of Teuton and Latin was made all the more effective by Clovis' conquest of all the other Frankish tribes in Gaul. One after the other he brought them under his sway, and so formed a dominion stretching from the Pyrenees to the River Ems beyond the Rhine. It was not, of course, a united kingdom, but rather a sort of federation of princes under one dominant tribe and personality. The Merovingian dynasty which Clovis founded was thus in by far the strongest position of any Teutonic royal house that had been set up on the ruins of the Roman Empire. Clovis died in 511, at the early age of 45, and was buried in the Church of the Holy Apostles in Paris, which he himself had built. He left behind him a firmly established throne which was later, in the days of the degeneracy of the Merovingian house, to be taken over by a family of royal officials which completed the union of Teutonised Gaul with the Papacy and established the Mediæval Empire.

The Anglo-Saxon Conquest

The conquest of Britain by those groups of the Germanic peoples known as the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes was quite unique in the process of Teutonic infusion. For here there seems to have been a complete if slow annihilation of the Romanised people of Britain, at least in the eastern half of the country. The Roman occupation of Britain had lasted for nearly four centuries, from its beginning in the middle of the first century to its abandonment by the Roman legions in 410. It had been an effective occupation, and a source of both pride and profit to the Romans, who had exploited the land and covered it with roads and villas, and finally Christianised it. The Roman hold on the island, however, gradually loosened with the growth of the complications on the Continent occasioned by the barbarian assault on the main body of the Empire, and in 410 it ceased altogether when the Roman legionaries abandoned

the island. The Romanised Britons were left unprotected to face a double attack, the raids of the Picts and Scots in the north and the forays of the Saxons in the south. What happened during the next two centuries we can only conjecture, but there is some evidence that there occurred a series of catastrophes in which the Romanised Britons were wiped out or driven completely into the west, where they were given the German name Welsh, meaning foreigner.

There were three main waves of attack by three groups of Teutonic tribes which crossed the North Sea. The Jutes settled in the south-east (Kent), the Angles on the east coast (Anglia and Northumbria) and later on in the middle of the country (Mercia), and the Saxons to the north of the Thames (Essex), around its middle reaches (Middlesex), and along the south coast (Sussex and Wessex). These people were organised in tribes. The leader of the tribe was the head of a people not a territorial monarch, and it was not until much later that the leader in war became a king. At length they coalesced into seven kingdoms (the Heptarchy), and later these were reduced by internecine strife to three (Wessex, Mercia, and Northumbria). The House of Wessex, to which such kings as Egbert, Alfred, Edward the Elder, and Athelstan belonged, triumphed over the rest and established a single monarchy, though this was not for more than three centuries after the original settlement; and no sooner had this unity been achieved than it was broken by the incursions of the Danes in the ninth century.

The Anglo-Saxons in the process of settlement destroyed the Roman towns and themselves lived in villages, cultivating the land in common on the open-field system. They brought with them their Teutonic institutions and exercised a rudimentary form of popular government in the hundred courts. The king was helped by the Witan, a body of nobles who met in council. Meanwhile, the Celtic inhabitants who escaped annihilation gradually withdrew and continued their own life in the extremes of the island: in Wales and Scotland. Some of the Britons fled south-westward and, crossing the Channel, settled in the north-west corner of Gaul, where, known as Bretons, they gave their name to the land of Brittany.

Despite these catastrophic events, the religious life of the country was not entirely broken, for some of the monks who had formed religious communities in Roman times fled to

Ireland, and in the later sixth century their successors returned to Scotland and northern England, where they carried out a widespread conversion. *This northern religious movement* was going on when St. Augustine arrived in Kent from Rome in 597, and Britain began to enjoy once more the civilising influences of contact with western Europe. The southern and northern processes of conversion went on apace, and when finally they met in the middle of the seventh century the old ritual and the new clashed only to merge. The decision was in favour of the southern form, and there was thus established a community of outlook which played an important part in the political unification of the English people under the beneficent guidance of the House of Wessex.

Slav Migrations

Besides the Teutons in their various groupings, the Slavs took part in the invasion of the Empire and in the redistribution of the population of Europe. The Slavs, like the Germans, are members of the Aryan race and speak an Indo-European tongue. From the scant evidence available it appears that they originated in a region north of the Carpathians between the Vistula and the Dnieper. They were very much less advanced than the Germans, and the ease with which they were taken captive at this time gave rise to the synonymy of the word slave with Slav. Indeed, it became a generic term in common use, replacing the old Latin word *servus*.

The Slavs were divided into two main branches at this time : the southern Slavs and the western Slavs. The southern Slavs, of whom we first hear at the siege of Constantinople by the Moslems in the seventh century, migrated south-westward into the Empire and settled along the Balkan coast of the Adriatic, whence they spread through the Balkan Peninsula, where they mixed with the Greek population. Only in Albania, in Rumania, and on the Greek coasts and islands did the original inhabitants remain unadulterated by this admixture. Thus began the long process of Slav infiltration in the Greek Balkans which had not created a true national amalgam before the Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries overwhelmed Greek and Slav in a common holocaust. Nor was it until more than four centuries later that, as the Turkish power weakened, the Aryan peoples of the Balkans were to find the strength, born of

a militant nationalism, to expel the Turks from most of the peninsula and to establish national states in that tortured land.

The western Slavs did not in fact enter the Imperial domain, but followed in the wake of the Teutons, occupying the eastern lands they had vacated westward of the Vistula and southward to the Danube, where they are known to have been settled as early as the sixth century. So they filled the regions afterwards to be known as Poland and Bohemia. Somewhat later the northern Slavs, to whom the modern Russians belong, appeared on the European scene, and thus was set the stage for the titanic struggles between Germans and Slavs which have continued to our own day.

Lasting Effects of the Invasions

The Teutonic invasions brought about the disintegration of the Empire in the West and caused vast changes in the distribution of the population of Europe. The effects in these respects varied in different parts of the Imperial lands. Broadly speaking, the results in the case of the East Germans who crossed the lower Danube were less permanent and coherent than in that of the West Germans who crossed the upper Danube, the Rhine, and the North Sea. This was mainly due to three fundamental differences in the nature and methods of their movements and settlement.

First, as we have seen, the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards had already been converted to the Arian form of Christianity before they entered the Empire, while the Franks and Angles and Saxons were still heathen. Thus, whereas the heresy of the Danubian Teutons, which they could not throw off, was anathema to the people they conquered, the Franks and Anglo-Saxons found through their conversion to the Roman form of Christianity an ultimate community with the Romanised peoples of the West. Secondly, each group of East Germans when they crossed the Danube moved as a whole people, completely uprooting themselves and leaving no remnants behind. The Franks and Anglo-Saxons, on the other hand, left many of their people behind and were never completely detached from them. They were thus constantly replenished in their new homes by a stream of immigration from the old. Thirdly, the East German warriors were mounted, while the West Germans fought on foot. The result was that, while the Goths tended to

form an isolated aristocracy amidst the conquered, the Franks found a *rapprochement* with the Romanised people at length much easier, and while the Gothic settlement proved superficial and ephemeral, that of the Franks was fundamental and permanent.

So it was that the East Germans made only one lasting contribution to European development. By their use of cavalry in battle they revolutionised the art of war and laid the foundations of chivalry, which was destined to become a characteristic feature of mediæval society. For the rest they have left hardly a trace. The Vandals were utterly destroyed. The Ostrogoths, after their repassage through the Alps, disappeared into the northern mists and as a people were never heard of again. The Lombards were so diffused through Italy that they soon lost any homogeneity. The Visigoths, after three centuries of aristocratic isolation in Spain, lost their identity in the Moorish conquest and occupation. Thus the East Germans played an important part in the disintegration of the Roman system in the West without creating any permanent institutions to replace it.

The story of the West Germans—the Anglo-Saxons, the Franks, and some other smaller groups who crossed the North Sea, the Rhine, or the upper Danube—is very different. The first onrush of these invaders was indeed utterly destructive. Just as in Britain there seems to have been a violent displacement of the Romanised population, at least in the eastern half of the country, so on the west bank of the Rhine, in an area of not less than 50,000 square miles, the Latin-speaking population was almost entirely replaced by German-speaking peoples, and the same thing happened south of the upper Danube in such areas as Bavaria and parts of Switzerland. In this phase of the onslaught the barbarians ravaged the countryside and destroyed the towns which mostly became little more than enlarged villages. Churches, schools, and theatres disappeared, and the roads and aqueducts, though not of course physically demolished, were allowed to fall into utter disrepair. The Roman peace was at an end. But the first phase of destructiveness wore itself out, and was succeeded by one in which the conquerors and the conquered who remained farther west sought a mutual accommodation.

To the Romanised population of Gaul all this seemed unmitigated disaster, but with the breakdown of the Roman system through the atrophy of its nerve-centres and the decay of its life-lines, they had to reconcile themselves to the barbarian

settlement and make the best possible local arrangements for living side by side with their conquerors. The clash of cultures at first adversely affected the Romanised population. Spoken Latin, which the invaders did not understand, became so debased that soon even the Latin-speaking people were unable to read it. The original population gradually picked up habits of disorder from the barbarians, and thus Europe reverted to a permanent state of war. But, thanks to the vigorous kingship of Clovis and the early Merovingians, and later to the constructive leadership of the Carolings, culminating in the enlightened rule of Charlemagne, the two peoples gradually coalesced to lay the foundations of the French nation, which was afterwards to be called, with every justification, the Mistress of Western Civilisation. The ultimate Anglo-Saxon settlement of Britain was somewhat different because the remaining Romanised population constituted only a Celtic fringe. But it was no less permanent and effective when the invaders had hammered out, through internecine strife, the means of their unification and developed to a newly civilised condition largely through their membership of the Roman Church and their affiliations with western Europe.

The immediate effect of the impact of the Teutonic peoples on the Latin world was, therefore, to introduce a long period of anarchy, and to cause for a time a reversion to barbarism in lands which for ages had known the blessings of civilisation. Six centuries of intellectual darkness, it has been said, were the price paid for the failure of the Romans to hold back the barbarians. But the Dark Ages heralded by these movements were not so dark as historians have been wont to paint them, for, though the boundaries of the Empire were broken for ever and the Roman order lay in ruins, the most promising of the newcomers came rapidly under the influence of the Catholic Church, and ultimately found a means of coalescence with the conquered. And, in any case, the last days of the Roman Empire in the West were themselves not so enlightened, and there was already a tendency to barbarism within her boundaries through internal decline. Nor is it anything but idle to speculate on what might have been. The historical fact is that the invasion of the Roman Empire, by the West Germans at least, introduced into the anæmic body social and politic of the West an infusion of new and vigorous blood which revitalised it and so ultimately contributed a new element to the compound of Western Civilisation.

CHAPTER VI
MEDIÆVAL UNITY

THE DREAM AND THE REALITY

The Middle Ages

THE great epoch known as the Middle Ages is generally regarded as having lasted roughly a thousand years, from the fifth to the fifteenth century. But one should avoid the tendency to fix the period tidily between exact dates, since it induces the erroneous notion that during that millennium Europe presented an unchanging scene. In the light of the rapid and revolutionary changes which occurred on either side of it, the mediæval period appears comparatively static, but it gives a wholly false impression of the continuing dynamism of the European story to think that a detached era of some new and peculiar quality came out of the blue precisely in 476, when the last Emperor in the West was deposed, and disappeared with equal abruptness and exactitude in 1453, when the Turks captured Constantinople.

What happened in the Roman Empire in the West in 476 was by itself of little moment : it was important only to the extent that it marked, in a rather dramatic, or even melodramatic, way, the culmination of a long process of internal decay and of weakening through the external pressure of the barbarians. And what happened in the Empire in the East in 1453, shocking though it was to the civilised conscience of Europe at the time, and significant though it is as a landmark in European history, merely brought to a climax by an outstanding event a protracted phase of increasing Moslem predominance in the Levant and the Balkans, which, even so, was to become much more widespread before it reached its peak. The truth is that one period passes imperceptibly into the other, and between them are broad stages of transition, the events in which have their causation in the preceding period and set the stage for the succeeding acts of the drama of European change. While, therefore, there is every argument of convenience for distinguishing the epochs which we usually designate as ancient, mediæval, and modern

times, it must not be forgotten that their concatenation is never catastrophically broken.

The classical period of Greece was, as we have seen, characterised by unity of civilisation ; that of Rome by unity of government. The Middle Ages saw a new kind of unity, that inspired by the Catholic Church. The Church, in fact, replaced the Empire as the coherent and directive force in society, and for this reason the mediæval period was markedly unpolitical. The Middle Age, for the major part of its course, gathered a sort of intellectual mist which tended to obscure the Western mind, distort its vision, and shut it off from the Greek tradition, to whose spirit, indeed, our own age is much more akin than it is to that of the mediæval world. Such political speculation as there was did not concern itself with ideas, known no less to the Greeks than to ourselves, about the forms and objects of government and the rights of the people. It was confined within an ecclesiastical penumbra, where the light and shade were confused, and, though the teaching of Plato and Aristotle survived, their doctrines were annexed by Churchmen like St. Augustine at one end of the period and St. Thomas Aquinas towards the other, and forced into a mould of mediæval scholasticism which the Greek philosophers would surely have failed to recognise. So when creative speculation began to revive, as the freshening breezes of the Renaissance slowly dispersed the mediæval fog, the first problem for political philosophers, in their efforts to recapture the Greek spirit, was to disentangle the State from the Church.

Yet the mediæval Church made a great contribution to progress which we must not underestimate. That contribution was nothing less than the salvaging of Western Civilisation from the threat of its complete engulfment in the ruins of the Roman Empire. The Papacy furnished, as it were, a raft to which the survivors of the wreck of the Roman ship of state might cling. It supplied the one factor of stability in a disintegrating world. It championed the forces of order and unity against those of disorder and anarchy. And if, in pursuing these laudable objectives, the Catholic Church made of the mediæval period an Age of Faith rather than an Age of Reason, it at least thereby headed Europe's escape from the Dark Ages. The monasteries, of which the Papacy was the sponsor, constituted the outposts of this civilising force. They undoubtedly made for uniformity, but they were by no means confined to purely religious exercises,

for the monks were farmers as well as teachers, and so provided both an example of social economy and a way of academic and technical education at a time when Europe would otherwise have been deprived of these benefits.

The Papacy, however, was not content with a universal Church : it was responsible also for an attempted revival of a universal state through the creation at the opening of the ninth century of what came to be called the Holy Roman Empire. But this aim of political unity remained a dream, because the forces of separatism were too strong for it. Most of the mediæval period is thus filled with the strange spectacle of a theory of unity which almost every reality of the time belied. For in the heart of the Empire itself its very elements, ecclesiastical and political, hardly ever ceased to be at variance and were sometimes even at war, while on the continental periphery, as we shall see, there occurred throughout the period events of the most tumultuous kind, associated with new barbarian invasions, which caused political developments entirely outside the control of the Empire and rendered the world unity implied in its theory ever more obsolescent and irrelevant as the centuries passed.

A study of the dream of mediæval unity and of the co-eval changes which constantly militated against its materialisation is, therefore, necessary to a comprehension of the existing problem of Europe, for it was this antithesis which largely shaped the vital conditions of European growth in the modern period.

The Holy Roman Empire : the Germans in Italy

The Holy Roman Empire began its career of a thousand years when in 800 Pope Leo III attempted to restore the Roman Empire in the West by crowning Charlemagne Emperor in Rome. Charles the Great was the outstanding political figure of the Middle Ages. Though he is claimed as a national hero by both the Germans and the French, he was, in fact, neither German nor French, but Frankish before either the Germans or the French had any national consciousness. He was a Teuton, in spite of the French name by which he is best known, and a typical one, tall, athletic, and genial. He combined with the powers of a great warrior the qualities of statesmanship and vision, and, though himself illiterate, was a patron of arts and

letters. In his daily life, through the various phases of his rising fortune and in spite of his contact with the centre of Latin civilisation, he retained his Frankish dress and habits. But in all things connected with religion and culture he took guidance from Rome and did all in his power to extend her sway, both among his own people and those to the east of the Frankish domains proper whom he conquered and brought into subjection.

As King of the Franks Charles inherited his realm and power from his father, Pepin, in 768. Pepin's family, known in history as the Carolings, had been mayors of the palace or chamberlains to the royal house of the Merovings, founded by Clovis. The later generations of the Merovings were so degenerate that the real power passed to the mayors of the palace and the monarchs became "do-nothing kings" (*les rois fainéants*). In the middle of the eighth century the Pope, harassed by the Lombards, who had seized certain Church lands, appealed to Pepin who, in return for a promise of aid, was anointed King of the Franks by the Pope in 747, a ceremony which marked the origin of the practice of anointing kings in western Europe. Pepin then defeated the Lombards and restored the Church lands to the Pope, who gradually transformed them into a temporal dominion, backing his claim by the pretended Donation of Constantine, which was first put forward by the Papacy at this time. In this way the Apostolic successor of St. Peter became an independent prince in the heart of Italy. Thus the two movements—the rise of the Caroling dynasty and the Pope's lust for worldly wealth and pomp—worked together to bring about that curious act in the drama of Europe which restored the Empire in the West.


Charlemagne's reign was almost entirely taken up with military expeditions. Charles, with his mounted army, was irresistible. He subdued the Lombards in Italy and assumed the Iron Crown of Lombardy. He conquered the Bavarians and occupied their lands. He destroyed the Asiatic Avars, who had wandered into Europe, and began the policy of settling Germans in what afterwards became the *Ostmark*, the Teutonic borderland for defence against the Slavs, which was the nucleus of modern Austria. He crossed into Spain and annexed the northern region between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, which, as a defence belt against the Moors, became known as the Spanish March. His toughest fights, however, were with the wilder and still

heathen Germans, and particularly the Saxons who had not crossed over to Britain. Time and again he crushed them and time and again they revolted. But by massacre and baptism at the point of the sword he at length brought them under the dominion of the Franks and the Church.

Such was Charles's widespread sway by the year 800. At that time there was no recognisable Emperor at Constantinople, where power had been usurped by Irene, the mother of the young Emperor, whom she blinded and deposed. Moreover, Rome was becoming increasingly alienated from Constantinople through the growth of opposing attitudes to Christian doctrine. So every argument of principle and expediency urged the Pope to the act which he carried out when Charles in this propitious year, on a visit to Rome, attended a thanksgiving service at St. Peter's. At this service the Pope placed a crown on his head, while the Church rang with the cry: "To Charles Augustus, crowned by God, the great and peace-making Emperor, be life and victory!"

This was the act which ended the shadowy allegiance of the West to the Emperor at Constantinople and established the Holy Roman Empire. It marked the consummation of the marriage of the Franks to the Church, whose cause they had first espoused under Clovis, and the identification of the Teuton with the system he had set out to overthrow. But, like all political restorations, this one, which attempted to revive the Empire in the West, proved delusive. For, as Lord Bryce truly says, "As well might one hope to stop the earth's course in her orbit as to arrest that ceaseless change and movement in human affairs which forbids an old institution, suddenly transplanted into a new order of things, from filling its ancient place and serving its former ends."

So far, then, as the creation of the Holy Roman Empire was an attempt to restore world unity comparable to that of the Roman Empire, it remained a dream. The reality was something very different. Charlemagne's empire was a personal creation, too vast and various to be governed by an individual except one of his heroic stature and dominant mind. The rift between the Latin world of the West and the Teutonic world across the Rhine was too wide and fundamental to be bridged by political means. The dismemberment of Charles's empire was, therefore, inevitable, and within thirty years of his death in 814 it fell apart.



EMPIRE OF CHARLES THE GREAT AS DIVIDED AMONG HIS THREE GRANDSONS BY THE TREATY OF VERDUN, 843.

The empire held precariously together under Charlemagne's one surviving son, but on his death the Frankish custom of dividing inheritances between sons brought the disrupting tendencies to a head. After much squabbling and fighting Charlemagne's three grandsons agreed to a formal partition of the Empire at the Treaty of Verdun in 843. By this important treaty, Charles, the youngest brother, took the Romance-speaking lands to the west of the Meuse and the Rhône, which were called West Francia and afterwards Francia or France. Louis, the middle brother, took the German-speaking lands to the east of the Rhine, which were called East Francia, and afterwards Deutschland by the Germans, Allemagne (from Alemanni) by the French, and Germany by ourselves. Between these two domains lay an indeterminate collection of middle territories stretching from the Zuyder Zee to Rome. These went to the eldest brother, Lothair, who also succeeded to the title of Emperor, and were called Lotharingia (Lothringen in German and Lorraine in French). It would, of course, be wrong historically to think of this division as anything more than tentative, or to regard it as inspired by nationalism, a principle which does not emerge as a conscious force till much later in the

European story. Yet it is evident that the Treaty of Verdun marks an important stage in the evolution of the national states system of Europe as it afterwards developed. It marked off the lands that were to become France and Germany, and left between them the luckless domains that were to be a constant source of strife between the two nationally conscious peoples on either side of them up to our own day, when the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine still change hands.

Gradually the Carolingian house weakened, and each of the three kingdoms became a prey to anarchy. They broke up into a number of petty monarchies and duchies, and by the beginning of the tenth century Charlemagne's empire was unrecognisable. But the dream of a world state coterminous with a world religion was by no means over. In Germany the Saxons, the Franconians, the Thuringians, the Bavarians, and the Swabians, in their separate duchies, struggled for mastery, though one of them was always recognised as king. In 936 Otto of Saxony succeeded to a fairly strong throne. Otto used the German clergy to assist him to govern, and this alliance of State and Church created the great bishoprics in Germany and led Otto into Italy. Italy at this time was in a deplorable condition. Amidst the plundering incursions of Magyars in the north and Moors in the south, there was not even a strong Pope to maintain a semblance of peace and order, while Rome itself was the victim of factions.

In these circumstances Otto determined to bring order to Italy so that he might secure some kind of ecclesiastical strength in the centre and give himself prestige with the German clergy. In 951 he entered north Italy and had himself crowned King of the Lombards. In 962 he made another expedition, this time to Rome, to help the Pope. In return the Pope crowned him Emperor. Now, Otto's imperium was very different from that of Charlemagne. Charlemagne was a Frank and master of many countries and peoples. Otto was a mere German king. In Germany he might have established a lasting united state. Instead he allowed himself to be drawn off from his proper task by the lure of the Iron Crown of Lombardy and the prestige of an Imperial title utterly foreign to his actual position. Thus was established the so-called Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which was not only a contradiction in terms but an unworkable conjunction in fact. From the time of Otto it became the custom for one of the German kings to summon the

"Roman Expedition," set out for Italy, assume the Lombard crown, and have himself crowned Emperor.

So began the age-long interference of the Germans in Italy, which has not yet ceased, and the protracted and bitter conflict between the Popes and the Emperors, which was to fill many sad and tragic pages of the history of both peoples. The struggle hopelessly weakened both protagonists and made a shambles of both countries, reducing each of them to a congeries of petty principalities and republics, and causing a situation of disunity from which neither nation fully recovered until the lifetime, and even within the memory, of some still living. In Germany the appearance of union was maintained through the element of federalism, whereby each state, large or small, had a political life of its own under the Imperial ægis, and through the operation of the electoral principle, which gave certain leading princes of the Empire, lay and ecclesiastical, the right to elect the Emperor; hence the appearance in European history of such titles as the Elector of Saxony, the Elector of Brandenburg (afterwards Prussia), the Elector of the Palatinate, and the one most familiar in our own national story, the Elector of Hanover.

The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was to continue for more than eight centuries from the time of the Emperor Otto I. For nearly five hundred years the Imperium passed from one dynasty to another, until in the fifteenth century it went to the Austrian family of the Hapsburgs who, despite the electoral machinery, were to hold it until, shorn of all reality, it was finally abolished in 1806 by a *pronunciamento* of Napoleon. Such was the First Reich, which remained a shadow because it struggled to achieve the impossible feat of applying to a Teutonic realm an institution essentially Latin in its inspiration and inception. The Second Reich was that created by the military and political mastery of Bismarck in 1871, and was more real because it was based on the national unity of the German people. The Third Reich was the name given by Hitler to the régime he forcibly established in place of the Weimar Republic that emerged in 1919 from the ruins to which the First World War had reduced Bismarck's Empire. Is it not strange to reflect that, just as the First Reich was mortally debilitated by the lure of Italy, so the Third Reich helped to destroy itself by the same fatal attraction? Here, surely, is a profoundly significant truth which should not be without its lesson for us who have the duty of shaping a new international order!

New Invasions and Feudalism

We have referred to tumultuous events on the continental periphery which mocked the reality of mediæval unity. Among these events were new barbarian invasions which synchronised with the break-up of Charlemagne's empire and aggravated the crisis caused by it. The invaders belonged to different races and made their attacks on different parts of Europe, but they were alike in the fact that they were all non-Christians. From Scandinavia came the Norsemen, of Teutonic origin, who mainly attacked the west of Europe, and from Asia came the Hungarians, or Magyars, of Mongolian origin, who attacked the east. The third group of invaders were the Saracens, the general name given by Christian Europe to all those peoples who had adopted the Mohammedan faith, which originated in Arabia among a people of Semitic race. All these invasions had a profound influence on the political and social development of Europe, and it is impossible to understand the present European situation without appreciating the part played in its evolution by these shattering movements.

Up to the end of the eighth century that section of the Teutons left behind in the Scandinavian lands when the main body set out on their southward migration had remained outside the influence of Latin culture, of the Christian faith, and of the long arm of Charlemagne. Then suddenly they began a series of wild incursions into the mainland of Europe which lasted for more than a century and had permanent effects both on the descendants of the marauders themselves and on the people in whose lands they at last settled. These plunderers are variously known by the general names of Norsemen, Northmen, and Vikings (men of the fjord or creek). There were then, as there are still, three sections of this Scandinavian branch of the Teutonic people : Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes. They were at this time without any moral code. Their natural religion led them to believe in such gods as Thor (thunder), Woden (war), and Frigga (earth and fertility), and in a Valhalla in which all who died fighting might secure a place and enjoy war and feasting for ever. All this one may read in the Icelandic sagas, which, though written centuries later when the marauding days were over, retain to an extraordinary degree the wild and rugged atmosphere of the great days of the Vikings.

Impelled by the poverty of their own lands and the prospect

of glittering prizes in the comparatively wealthy lands of western Europe and from the untapped resources of eastern and northern countries, they developed their attacks at a most advantageous time, when the break-up of the Empire of Charlemagne offered golden opportunities in Europe for rapine, pillage, and booty. Their movements went through three fairly well-defined phases : plundering raids, settlement, and conquest. The Danes mainly coasted along the North Sea and attacked the shores of Germany, France, and England. The Norwegians went chiefly to Scotland and the islands to its north ; to Ireland, Iceland, Greenland, and probably even to America five centuries before its acknowledged discovery by Columbus. The Swedes kept to the east of civilised Europe and moved along the waterways of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Along these routes they established trading stations at such places as Novgorod and Kieff, which became the centres of the first organisation of the Russian Slavs.

In England and France their early attacks took the settled peoples completely by surprise, and the speed with which they moved in their light craft enabled them to plunder and escape with the booty. When the coasts had been ravaged beyond further productivity, the Danes were forced to go up the rivers, and, as they could no longer make their escape, they settled in encampments with their families. From this it was not a long step to the conquest of the people around them. In this way they made themselves masters of the east of England and the north of France. Alfred's great struggle against them and their confinement to the area known as the Danelaw by the Treaty of Wedmore in 878 marked an important stage in the development of the English kingdom. And after Canute's conquest and reign (1017-1035) the Danes gradually became an incorporate part of the English people, thus making a vital contribution to the English nation as it finally emerged.

In France the Danish conquest had a more disintegrating effect. There the Norsemen arrived at a time when the Carolingian monarchy was weakening, and the only man found capable of putting up any resistance to the Danes was Odo, Count of Paris. In 885 they laid siege to Paris and Odo succeeding in holding them off. As Alfred had forced the Danes to be confined to eastern England in 878, so Odo managed to keep them in the area north of Paris, and in 911 the King consented to cede to them the region called after them Normandy, with its

capital at Caen. Rollo, the first Duke of Normandy, set up a strong integrated dukedom, which played an important part henceforth in the history of both France and England. In 987 Hugh Capet, ruler of Paris, was appointed King of France, and so founded the dynasty with which, in one or other of its branches, the French monarchy was to be associated for the next thousand years ; until, in fact, the last King of France was driven from the throne in 1848.

The Danes were not successful in similarly establishing a permanent settlement in Germany, where, after many destructive raids, they were finally driven off at the end of the ninth century. Where they settled the Norsemen showed a remarkable talent for assimilation. As Normans in France they became French, and in their new home made lasting contributions to the art of war, to culture, and to social and political organisation. Norman knights undertook expeditions to the Mediterranean and made conquests in Sicily and Italy, where they attracted by their feats of arms the admiration of the later Mediæval Age. Within a century and a half of the foundation of Rollo's dukedom, the Normans conquered England and thus supplied the final strengthening and enriching element in the amalgam which is the English nation.

While, amid the anarchy caused by the break-up of Charlemagne's Empire in the ninth and tenth centuries, the Danes attacked it in the west, it was assaulted in the east by the Hungarians, or Magyars, who were destined to establish a powerful Roman Catholic state which was to be in constant conflict with Germany. The Magyars belonged to the Mongolian race. They entered Europe through southern Russia and moved up the valley of the Danube, replacing the vanquished Avars. Like the Danes, they used surprise tactics based on speed, but whereas the Danes used their light boats for this, the Magyars were mounted on swift-moving horses from which they fought with bows and arrows. At first they carried everything before them, and spread ruin and desolation in the settled regions of Germany, and even as far as Italy. It was the Saxon King, Henry the Fowler (918-936), who first held the Magyars by a system of fortifications and the formation of cavalry units to match their mounted tactics. Henry's work was carried on by his son, Otto the Great, who ended the Magyar menace at the Battle of Lechfeld, near Augsburg, in 955. After this crushing defeat the Magyars stopped their raids and settled

down permanently on the plains of the middle Danube. In the year 1000 the Magyars were converted to Latin Christianity and gradually built up the powerful kingdom of Hungary, which remained a tower of strength to Christian Europe and which, five centuries later, took the shock of the Turkish flood into the heart of Europe.

Immediately, the effect of these attacks, settlements, and conquests was to hasten that process of disintegration which was already taking place all over Europe, and which goes by the name of feudalism. The term Feudal System, often applied to it, is most misleading, for as a system it was nothing more than a legal theory worked out retrospectively when the thing itself was largely in decay. Whatever feudalism was, it was not a system; in fact, it was in many respects the very antithesis of a system. It had both a political and a social aspect, and from both points of view it grew empirically out of the facts of the time, which encouraged the growth of local lordships. Politically, the essence of feudalism was the break-up and decentralisation of government. The king wanted military service, and when he became too weak to demand it directly, the only way he could obtain it was by getting lords, as his lieutenants, to raise the necessary levies for him. Gradually this war leadership became identified with great landed estates over which the duke or count or baron began to act as an independent sovereign.

On his estate the lord would build a castle where he defended his independence. Thus there were innumerable domains, each with its own little army ready to make war on its neighbours. It is easy to see how such a tendency was hastened and reinforced by the Danish attacks. The essence of their movements, as we have said, was speed, and when they attacked a locality the local lord could not wait for help to come from the centre. He therefore gathered armed resistance on his own initiative. His land became an independent holding, and the lands granted to the Danes became equally independent. By the eleventh century this political growth had reached its zenith, and was stayed by the device of a strong point with a castle known in England as a burh or bury, and hence the modern word borough and such place-names as Edinburgh and Bury St. Edmunds.

The relationship of the baron to the king percolated through the community so that the principle was established that "every man must have a lord," and the lord's men were called vassals. Thus society came to be conceived as a pyramid, with the serfs

or villeins at the base, and the emperor, who was called God's vassal, at the apex. Socially, feudalism developed in the economy of the manor, where payment was made in service instead of in money. Such a service economy, as opposed to money economy, was inevitable in this period, because money was scarce and paper money and credit not yet invented. Feudalism and the manorial system thus at once reflected and reinforced the comparatively static quality of mediæval society. On the one hand, it produced the most characteristic and attractive quality of the Middle Ages, which was chivalry. On the other, it doomed the vast mass of men and women to serfdom, a condition in which they remained in most European countries until the eighteenth, and in some even well into the nineteenth, century; until, in fact, the socially dissolving effects of the Industrial Revolution were gradually felt in its passage from the west to the east of Europe.

The Lesson of the Middle Ages

It is not surprising that, under the influence of the dissolving forces that we have noted, many of the characteristics of the Middle Ages were already disappearing before the fifteenth century, the period to which the Renaissance is customarily assigned. In fact, the last hundred and fifty years of what is usually regarded as the mediæval period constituted a transitional age, marked, in the realm both of thought and of action, by developments which not only stultified all that the Holy Roman Empire represented but laid out the ground for the mighty changes of the succeeding epoch.

Paradoxically, feudalism, though clearly a decentralising force, in one sense added to the shadowy claims of the Mediæval Empire to be a world monarchy, without increasing their substance, for the horizontal organisation of society was a continent-wide phenomenon, and so tended to hinder the vertical division into well-defined states. And yet, well before the close of the Middle Ages there were evident signs of the emergence of that principle of modern political growth that we call nationalism, which was the very antithesis of the idea of the Mediæval Empire, though as yet it was only at the dawn of the day in which it was to become a conscious militant force carrying all before it in the creation of the modern democratic state. The first of these premonitory signs was the Conciliar Movement in

the Church; the second the evolution of the unitary state in France and England, and the drawing together of the petty kingdoms in the north of Spain against the Moors.

The Conciliar Movement arose out of the degradation into which the Papacy had fallen through its increasing conflict with the secular arm. Such was the scandal of this struggle that in 1305, when a Frenchman was elected Pope (Clement V), he took up his residence at Avignon in France, and so began the period known as the Babylonian Captivity, in which the Popes remained for the next seventy years under French ascendancy. This was followed by the election of an anti-Pope and the period, lasting from 1378-1417, known as the Great Schism, in which there were actually two Popes fulminating against each other and splitting Western Christendom into two allegiances. A new Charlemagne or a new Otto might have saved the situation, but the Empire was as incapable as the Papacy of producing a real leader: they were both degraded beyond redemption. The last thinker to make an attempt to defend the secular power was Dante, the author of the *Divine Comedy*, in his *De Monarchia*, written in Latin early in the fourteenth century. But Dante's championship of the Imperial cause did nothing to stop the scandal of the Church, and some means had still to be found to bring it to an end.

The method suggested was to call a General Council of the Church. This idea came more and more to be accepted as the only way to heal the schism, and the first Council was called at Pisa in 1409. It failed of its purpose, but another attempt was made at the Council of Constance (1414-1418). It succeeded in forcing obedience to one Pope, and laid down the principle of permanent Conciliar control of the Papacy. But at the Council of Basel (1431-1443) the constitution proved itself unworkable, and from that time the Conciliar system as a method of Church government was dropped. But the Conciliar Movement has great significance in other ways. The organisation and procedure of the Councils acknowledged the national divisions into which Europe was now falling. At Constance, in fact, the method of voting by nations was adopted, and five such nations—Italian, French, German, Spanish, and English—were recognised. So, while the spirit of mediæval unity was still sufficiently alive to cause such an œcumenical body as this to be convened, it is evident that it emphasised the very force that was destroying it.

At the same time, in France and England, where the ghost of

the Holy Roman Empire was effectively laid, political feudalism was overborne by the creation of integrated states under strong kings ; whereas in Germany and Italy, where its chains continued to clank, though the process of state integration went on, it was over much more confined areas, and the division into a number of petty states continued long after the end of the mediæval period. This movement of state integration was assisted by the growth of towns and the rise of a merchant class whose interest it was to support a strong monarchy, which in its turn found the merchants useful allies. Thereby a money economy was gradually introduced, and in the course of time this ate into the service economy of the manor and at length destroyed the manorial system. Though feudalism has now passed away, it is evident that it played an important part in the evolution of modern society and the making of the modern state. It certainly created the landed aristocracies of Europe whose vested interests have almost everywhere retarded social and political progress, and in some countries, such as France and Russia, required a bloody revolution to undermine or destroy them, and whose privileges even yet have hardly anywhere entirely disappeared. But, on the other hand, feudalism seems to have been a necessary means of bridging the gulf between the chaos of the early Middle Ages and the order of modern times, and to that extent we owe it a debt not unlike that which we owe to the mediæval Church.

As to the Holy Roman Empire, which the Church, in the pursuit of a political unity, inspired, it was perhaps ultimately less an attempt to reconstitute the broken dominion of Rome than an illustration of the truth that Europe was haunted by that lost unity. Well might the seventeenth-century Thomas Hobbes, in *The Leviathan*, pursuing this phantasmic parallel, describe the Papacy as "no other than the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." So might Voltaire, writing in the eighteenth century, with equal reason describe the Holy Roman Empire as not Holy nor Roman nor an Empire. These immortal strictures on the great ecclesiastical and political institutions of the Middle Ages, made while the Empire still existed, were justified by the facts. For at no time was the Holy Roman Empire a political force commensurate with its claims. In theory it was a world state : in fact its authority was confined to Germany and to a less extent to Italy. In these countries its effect was to atomise the political organisa-

tion of peoples whose national unification might otherwise have been antedated by many centuries. Even within its own German orbit it could not prevent the emergence of an independent Swiss Republic in the thirteenth century or the growth of the military might of Prussia in the eighteenth. It exercised no authority whatever in France and England, where strong integrated states developed amid the mediæval chaos of the centre and east of Europe. Nor did it affect the political development of the Scandinavian countries or of Russia. Finally, the Byzantine Empire continued, in spite of it, until the dawn of modern times.

Yet the dream of the Holy Roman Empire, inspired as it was by a belief in the need for European unity which it had inherited from the Roman Empire, was a good dream. It failed to materialise because it confronted a very different world from that which Rome had united, without sufficiently adapting its methods to meet the changed circumstances. The Germans constituted a new force in political Europe, which the Romans, in the great days of the Empire, had held in check by the simple expedient of fixing the Imperial boundaries at the Rhine and the Danube. But now the Roman frontiers were broken beyond repair, as a result both of the actual Germanic infusion in the West and of the rising political consciousness of the Germans who remained to the east and north of the rivers. After the disruption of Charlemagne's empire it was, paradoxically, the French part of it which set out on an independent career, and the German element which resumed and maintained the Imperial idea in Europe. This created a dichotomy from which Europe has never recovered, and to-day the problem of European unity is essentially that which the mediæval world failed to solve. The Holy Roman Empire may not have left much of value behind, but at least it has bequeathed to us its dream and the task of making that dream come true.

CHAPTER VII

MOSLEM INCURSION

THE TURKISH DOMINATION OF THE LEVANT AND THE BALKANS

The Rise of Islam

NO movement in all history is more astonishing in its speed and scope than the rise and spread of Mohammedanism, and few phenomena have had a more marked and sustained effect upon the dynamic story of Europe. In its beginnings thirteen centuries ago Islam threatened to destroy the very body of European society, still prostrate from the weakness caused by the combined effect of the loss of Roman co-ordination and the transfusion of Teutonic blood. That first phase of the Moslem incursion into Europe left Spain under Moorish domination for the next five centuries. In the eleventh century the Seljuk Turks, proselytes to Mohammedanism, intolerantly expropriated the cradle of Christendom, from which several Crusades during the next two hundred years failed to dislodge them. In the fourteenth century, Islam, reinforced by the Ottoman Turks, again rocked the foundations of Western Civilisation by a barbaric surge which during the succeeding three centuries gradually flooded the whole of south-eastern Europe up to the very gates of Vienna. Since that tide of conquest and oppression began to recede in the seventeenth century, the existence of Turkey in Europe has given rise to recurrent political storms of such violence that no considerable European power has entirely escaped their repercussions. And still to-day, such is the abiding influence of Turkish policy on the European scene that it is impossible to comprehend the situation in the Balkans and the everlasting continental complications which it causes without a knowledge of its Islamic background.

The most amazing thing about the growth of Islam is not so much that, as a religion, it has spread far and wide in Africa and Asia, so that to-day something approaching 300 million people, or 15 per cent. of the world's population, profess it, as that Mohammed and his successors established an empire by the sword from the unpromising ground of a country two-thirds of whose soil is rock or desert and whose population was

insignificant in size and influence. For of Arabia, where the movement originated, little had been heard until the seventh century, when the iconoclastic and devastating message of Mohammed precipitated itself upon an unsuspecting world. Mohammed's mission was not undertaken until the last twenty years of his life, and did not become militant until the last decade of it. Yet within a century of his death in 632, the Empire founded on his evangel stretched in a continuous belt from the Atlantic to the borders of India, and embraced the south-western part of France, the Iberian Peninsula, the whole of North Africa and Egypt, Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Persia.

Mohammed was born in 571 in Mecca, the capital of Arabia and still the ultimate shrine of Islam, to which it is the ambition of all good Moslems to make a pilgrimage before they die. He belonged to the tribe of the Koreishites, local priests who controlled a sanctuary containing the Kaaba, or black stone, an emblem of the polytheism of the Arabs, and an object of veneration throughout Arabia. When he was about twenty-five, Mohammed married a wealthy widow, in whose service he had been employed, and this marriage gave him the leisure to devote himself to meditation. When he was about forty he came down from his mountain determined to rouse his people against the polytheism in which they had been bred, and to preach the gospel that there is one God, Allah, and that Mohammed is his Prophet. This monotheism is implicit in the words *Islam* and *Moslem*, which are different parts of a verb in Arabic signifying the deliverance of oneself to God. In short, the essence of the Moslem faith is that man's duty is to obey God absolutely, and that it is from Mohammed alone that this can be learned. The vehicle of Mohammed's message is the Koran, the bible of the Mohammedans, which is a loose and somewhat crude collection of precepts in religion, social organisation, and government, believed by the faithful to be the direct word of God as revealed through the Prophet. It was communicated verbally by Mohammed to his disciples and did not take written shape until some time after his death.

At first Mohammed made few converts in Mecca, and in 622 he was driven from his native city by the Koreishite priests and fled to the neighbouring city of Medina. This flight (in Arabic, *Hegira*) constitutes the turning-point in Mohammed's career and marks the beginning of the Mohammedan calendar. In Medina he gathered so many adherents that he was able at length to

advance against Mecca, which he captured in 630. During the two years of life that remained to him he completed the conquest of Arabia. Having then issued a manifesto to the world demanding the submission of all mankind to Islam, he died, leaving his successors to carry on the propagation of his gospel, with the Koran in one hand and the sword in the other.

The Arabs and the Moors

Manifestly the Arabs were not sufficiently numerous to have achieved by their own numbers the domination of the many lands which succumbed to Islam. Their success, moreover, is not to be entirely explained by their zealotry. Nor must it be imagined that the Arab horsemen who led the conquest beyond Arabia set out by design to conquer the world and to establish a political dominion in the many countries whose peoples were destined to be converted to Mohammedanism. The Arabs are members of the Semitic race, to which the Jews also belong. There were—and, despite the political differences in modern Palestine, still are—many affinities between the two peoples, and it is evident that Mohammed was largely influenced in his religious outlook by both Judaism and Christianity. He tolerated both religions, and regarded Christ as, equally with himself, a Prophet of the one God. This tolerance and sympathy gave Mohammed's successors a tremendous initial advantage in their contacts with the peoples of neighbouring countries, particularly in Syria and Egypt where the local forms of Christianity, being monophysite, or, as we should now say, unitarian, found themselves readily able to assimilate the Moslem doctrine.

Thus the readiness of the non-Arab peoples to be converted facilitated their political absorption. For the war waged by the successors of Mohammed, called Caliphs in Arabic, was always a holy war, and the rule which they established was a theocracy; that is to say, a government believed to be under the immediate direction of God, in which religion and politics were inextricably interwoven. The Caliph thus held both spiritual and temporal authority, being at once pontiff, head of the state, and judge, and all members of the Mohammedan community had to take an oath of fidelity to him, as the agent of Allah and the Vicar of Mohammed. He maintained a bureaucratic system for the administration of the revenues, known as the *Divan*, which in modern times has become synonymous with the seat of Turkish

government, in the same way as we refer to the Chancellories of western states. But he rendered no account of his treasure, which was amassed from booty and taxes gathered in varying proportions from Moslems and non-believers. The Caliphate at length became hereditary, and with this began internecine struggles between influential families claiming the right of succession. This resulted in about 650 in the establishment for a time of rival Caliphates. Before the end of the century political union was restored among the Arabs, but the religious schism remains to this day.

The diffusion of the Arabs over the surrounding countries was extremely rapid, and as they spread they incorporated the conquered. Thenceforth, the general term Saracens is used by Christian Europe to denote the Moslem population of the lands taken by the Arabs. By 640 the East Roman provinces of Syria, Persia, and Egypt were overwhelmed. So swift and formidable, indeed, was the attack that by the end of the century the Saracens were ready to strike at the very centre of the Roman Empire in the East. In 717 they actually invested Constantinople, but in the following year they were forced to raise the siege, and after further defeat in Phrygia were confined to the east of the Bosphorus. The successful defence of Constantinople was due to the determination and energy of the Emperor, Leo the Isaurian, who thus postponed for more than seven centuries the final capture of the city by the hordes of Islam. That event, in 1453, was a sufficiently shattering blow to the solidarity of Europe, but its effects must have been even more disastrous if it had occurred in the eighth century, when the religious and political development of the peoples of eastern and south-eastern Europe was much more rudimentary and their recuperative power much less resilient than in modern times it has proved to be.

The Arab thrust from Egypt across North Africa and into south-west Europe involved a long and bloody struggle with the Berbers. But when the latter were finally subdued they proved good disciples of Islam and apt pupils of their Arab leaders. The combined force of Arabs and Berbers which crossed the Strait of Gibraltar in 711 are generally henceforth known as the Moors. They drove rapidly north through Spain and into France, and were not halted until they reached the banks of the Loire. Here in 732 they were crushingly defeated by Charles Martel, the grandfather of Charlemagne, at a battle indifferently

named Tours and Poitiers. This was the first serious setback which the Moslems had experienced in their drive to the West, and it was indubitably one of the decisive battles of history, for thereby the Moors were turned back and driven south of the Pyrenees. It thus saved France from infidel domination and left her free for her great mediæval development. In Spain, however, the story was very different. There the kingdom of the West Goths had not the unifying power of the Caroling monarchy in France. Moreover, the Visigothic aristocracy had failed to assimilate the conquered Romanised population and was at war with itself. The Moors knew how to take advantage of these dissensions, and soon fixed their rule on Spain.

For the next seven centuries the history of Spain is filled with the struggles between the slowly expanding Christian communities of the north, which were never completely wiped out, and the Moorish occupiers. From the Christian point of view it was one long crusade, beginning towards the close of the eighth century with Charlemagne's conquest of the Spanish March, and ending in 1492, with the final expulsion of the Moors by Ferdinand and Isabella from their last foothold in Granada, a movement which synchronised with the discovery of America by Columbus in the service of the same monarchs. Thus the crusade ends in a blaze of national and imperial glory for Christian Spain, and yet it is a tale which true Spaniards to-day cannot contemplate without a tinge of regret and some sense of frustration. For, although the Christian Spaniards and the Moslem Moors were condemned by Fate to this age-long war of attrition, there was much that was mutually attractive in their different civilisations, and if they could but have discovered some common ground, they might well, by their reciprocal contributions, together have built a progressive modern state.

The Moors established a Caliphate at Cordova, and from there during this time developed an interesting civilisation in Spain. That city and others were the centres of an advanced and even luxurious life. The government encouraged agriculture, industry, and trade. Engineers irrigated the land, craftsmen worked delicately in glass, ivory, and leather, and scribes wrote on paper instead of parchment. The streets were paved with stone, and architects designed buildings remarkable for their oriental grandeur, many of which may still be seen. The Spaniards left in the conquered areas were tolerated and allowed to increase and multiply. There was even considerable inter

marriage between the two races, so that to-day there is still a Moorish strain in many of the Spanish people. In short, it may fairly be said that the Moors gave Europe an example of the civilising force of an energetic race at a time when most of its peoples were sunk in ignorance and torn by internal dissensions.

But the crusading spirit which, in the eleventh century under the lash of the intolerant Turks in Palestine, fired the chivalry of Europe was too fanatical to see anything but diabolism in the Moorish occupation of Spain, and so from that time the Christian kingdoms of Leon and Castile and Aragon, with the aid of several specially organised Christian Orders, moved steadily towards the final expulsion of the infidels. From the bitter struggle arose the dark intolerance and the inquisitorial zealotry of the Catholicism of Spain, which finally engulfed her pretensions both as a European and as an Imperial power. Through the success of this Crusade, though the Spaniards themselves could not avoid some permanent admixture, Europe at large was denied what might have proved an enriching and diversifying contribution to her present civilisation.

The Seljuk Turks and the Crusades

While the Moors were establishing their dominion in Spain, the Caliphs at Damascus and Baghdad were developing a civilisation which far outshone that of contemporaneous Europe. In these centres, between the eighth and tenth centuries, there grew up a tradition of literature and art such as Europe was not to know until the first Renaissance in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Indeed, between about 780 and 840, during the Caliphate of Haroun-al-Raschid, of whom we get a perhaps idealised picture in the *Arabian Nights*, and of his son Mamoun, Baghdad became the intellectual capital of the world. The scholars, philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists with whom the Caliphs surrounded themselves were mostly Persians and Syrians who brought to the capital the enlightenment of the East, and translated the classics of ancient Greece in every branch of learning. The capital thus became the meeting-ground of the erudition of the East and the ancient West. Indeed, Arabic played the same part in the spread of enlightenment throughout the Arabian Empire as Latin had played in the Roman Empire. It was, in fact, through the far-flung

contacts of the Mohammedan world, the means of introducing many Greek ideas into Europe, which was otherwise shut off from their sources, and thus contributed largely to the first Renaissance.

This benign influence was gradually undermined by internal political dissensions in the Arabian Empire and then overborne by the pitiless onslaughts of the Seljuk Turks. The Turks came out of the steppes of Turkestan, under the leadership of a certain Seljuk, and rode west to seek their fortune in plunder and rapine. On their way they were converted to Islam, which they embraced with fanatical fervour, though few of them were capable of appreciating its civilising influences. In the eleventh century a Turkish chief, grandson of Seljuk, captured Ispahan and Baghdad, and founded the dynasty of Seljuk Sultans, or military chiefs. The victories of the Seljuk Turks continued unbroken, and soon they were masters of most of Syria. This brought them to the frontiers of the Roman Empire in the East, by this time generally known as the Byzantine Empire.

In the eleventh century the Byzantine Empire, in spite of many shocks on both its European and Asiatic sides, still stood firm around the bastion of Constantinople. It was by then much diminished in size from what it had been at the time of the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West. On the west side waves of Slavs had settled in the Balkans and penetrated into Greece itself, where many of them made permanent settlements. But the Empire had had to face the much more formidable attacks of the Bulgarians, a wild Eastern people, related to the Huns and belonging to the same race as the Tartars and the Finns. In the seventh century they established an empire in the eastern steppes between the Caucasus and the Don, and by the end of the eighth century had fought their way into the Empire, settling in the lands between the Danube and the Balkan mountains. Before the end of the ninth century they were converted to Christianity and joined the Greek Church, but this did not tame them, and they remained a terror to their Slav neighbours and to the Imperial power. At one time they threatened to overrun and master the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, but they were checked in 1014 at a terrific battle in which they were defeated with bloody losses by the Emperor Basil, known as the Slayer of the Bulgars. The effect of this was to confine them for nearly two centuries to the area north of the Balkans, where they gradually fused with the Slav peoples around them.

On the Asiatic side the Empire had lost all the territories that once belonged to it, with the exception of Asia Minor. Here on the frontiers towards the end of the eleventh century stood the formidable power of the Seljuk Turks, now masters of Syria, ready for the attack on the Empire itself. To meet such a danger the Empire seemed to possess many advantages. Constantinople, the most impregnable fortress in the world, was still the centre of a well-knit state. It drew to itself the genius and skills of two worlds, its name stood high through two continents, it was still superior in art, learning, and technique to any city in the West, and it remained the bulwark of European culture against the forces of barbarism. The Emperor was the head of an efficient administration whose work was based on the abiding principles of Roman law. The army, made up of mercenaries drawn from the various races within and beyond the Empire, was well organised. Nor was the state torn, as was the West, by conflicts with the Church, for the relations of the secular were so close with the spiritual arm that dissension was avoided.

But in the middle of the eleventh century, as we have already seen, the Greek Church broke away from the Roman Church, and finally established the separate hierarchy from which has grown the modern Orthodox Catholic Church, to which the Balkan and Russian peoples belong. There were many grounds of difference between the two Churches. There was in the first place a mutual contempt. The Greeks regarded themselves as the direct heirs of Hellenic culture and the political power of Rome, and looked upon the Latins as *parvenus* and backsliders because of their dependence on the barbarian strength of the Franks to the point of pretending to restore the Empire in the West under their military cloak. The Latins, for their part, looked upon the Greeks as tainted with orientalism, and affected a permanent superiority over them by virtue of their confidence in the knowledge that the Roman Pope enjoyed his primacy by direct succession from St. Peter. The Greek Church, indeed, at one time recognised this primacy, but much water had flowed under the bridges since the fall of the Empire in the West. The Greek Church had had to bear alone the brunt of spreading Christianity among the many barbarian peoples with whom it came into contact, and this had given it its own strength and standing. Finally, the two Churches were at odds on questions of doctrine and ritual. After much searching for the means of

closing this widening breach the Greek Church decided to declare its independence, and in 1054, as we have explained earlier, this was formally effected.

This was the situation of estrangement between the East and the West just at the time when the solidarity of Christendom was to have its most searching test. In 1071 the Seljuk Turks advanced into Armenia and inflicted a terrible defeat on the Imperial forces at the Battle of Manzikert. This gave the Turks the mastery of one of the fairest provinces of the Eastern Empire, and made plain, even to the West, the crisis for Christianity that it portended. Christianity had now a double grievance against the Turks, for not only was their military advance a physical danger but their intolerance had become insufferable. The Arabs, under the influence of the Founder, had allowed Christians to continue pilgrimages to the Holy Places in Palestine. These the Turks forbade. The combined effect of the military danger to the Byzantine Empire and the Turkish outrage of Christian feelings caused the Roman Church to sink its differences with the Greek Church, and at a great Council held at Clermont in France in 1095 Pope Urban II declared a War of the Cross, or Crusade, for the recovery of the Holy Land from the Infidel and the defence of the Eastern Empire.

Thus began the strange movement known as the Crusades, which went on at intervals for the best part of two centuries. There is little point in attempting to follow the history of the Crusades in any detail. They began in a frenzy of excitement and enthusiasm, and ended in a cloud of failure and frustration. The Pope's first call to arms aroused people of every rank and station in every settled state in Europe to a pitch of religious fervour unprecedented in the annals of Christianity. But what began as a genuine spiritual urge for the salvation of the birth-place of the Christian faith from the grip of infidel hands became a scramble for power and a struggle of warring ambitions. In the crusading movement there were undoubtedly moments of high chivalry and noble self-sacrifice, but the dominant impression which it leaves is one of the loosening of the vices of greed and hate, cruelty and revenge. It encouraged the Turks to greater violence and caused the people of the West to wreak their vengeance on Jewish communities. The Crusade of most interest for us is the Third, in which, at the end of the twelfth century, two great characters, Richard Cœur de Lion and the Seljuk Saladin, confronted each other. The Fourth Crusade,

about 1200, was the most scandalous, for this was diverted from a war with the Turks to a Latin conquest of Constantinople, which was followed by a half-century of Latin rule before the Byzantine Emperors were allowed to return. The Crusading movement virtually ended with the death, in 1270, of the French King, Saint Louis, the last of the genuine Crusaders.

It is surely evident that, if Europe had stood united in pursuit of its original purpose, it could have overwhelmed the Turks and so changed the course of history. But in fact, as things turned out, the Crusades involved a futile waste of life, and in the end left the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor more firmly entrenched than ever. The Crusades actually weakened the defences of the Byzantine Empire by the Latin usurpation of the Imperial Crown, so that the Greek Emperors, when they were restored, could never recover its lost glory. Moreover, the Crusades embittered yet further the relations between the Eastern and Western Churches, so that the breach became complete and final. Yet, if the Crusading movement tended to let loose the lowest passions of men, it showed none the less that Europe was capable of a united impulse in defence of its civilisation. True, it did not stand the test in practice, but it was something that mediæval chivalry was capable of inspiring a movement in its inception so altruistic and in some of its episodes so heroic. It showed that there remained in the heart of Europe a consciousness of the value of her lost unity, and a desire, however blind and groping, to recover it. If it failed of that purpose, it was because the forces of disintegration had penetrated too deeply into the body politic to make its achievement possible.

On the profit side of the balance-sheet the Crusades show some benefits to Europe, both in her economic life and in the realm of the spirit. The cities of Italy gained tremendous commercial advantages, and from this time dated the mercantile greatness of cities like Venice and Genoa. This enrichment of the economic life of the Italian cities made possible their artistic achievements which followed. Eastern commodities, such as fruits, spices, and cloths, were brought for the first time into Europe, and made towns more prosperous and life more luxurious. Though the Crusaders never penetrated to the most cultured elements of the East, they none the less brought back with them ideas which undoubtedly hastened the changes that were soon to take place. They gained, too, something from Arabic science and methods of accountancy. Yet, when all is said, it

cannot be denied that these advantages were too dearly bought at the price of the centuries of Ottoman domination which the failure of the Crusades made possible.

The Ottoman Flood

After the Crusades the Seljuk Empire in Asia Minor entered a period of decline during which there appeared a number of separate principalities set up by Emirs, or local lieutenants, of the Seljuk Sultans. Among these Emirs was one, Othman, who founded the power of the Ottoman Turks and from whom they took their name. This branch of the Turks were shepherds in the province of Bithynia in Anatolia, and when Othman ruled over them, from 1290 to 1326, they engaged in guerilla warfare against Byzantine forces, and on this experience their military strength was first built up. Othman began the conquest of Bithynia, and it was completed by his son, Orchan. Both father and son had visions of a great future Moslem state, for their new religion was deeply held and their ambition unbounded. In 1326 the Ottomans captured the town of Brusa, about twenty miles east of the Sea of Marmora, and this was followed by the capture of other cities in Bithynia. But, instead of proceeding directly to the coast and to the attempted conquest of Europe, Orchan halted for twenty years in Brusa where he slowly and painstakingly built up the nucleus of a powerful state and a formidable army.

Orchan was sufficiently far-seeing to realise that the Ottomans would never be strong enough of themselves to carry out the policy of aggrandisement of which he dreamed. He therefore built up a new kind of army, the like of which has not been seen before or since. It consisted of men who, when children, had been snatched as war captives from their Christian parents. In their most formative years they were concentrated in camps, trained under an iron discipline, and vigorously indoctrinated with the Mohammedan faith. So they grew up with no knowledge of their parents or memory of the religion of their fathers. Thus was produced the extraordinary fighting machine known as the Janissaries. The Janissaries were certainly a success from the point of view of their masters, for they became fanatical defenders of the Moslem faith, and as fighters were the terror of eastern Europe for the next three centuries.

The foundation of the Ottoman power in Europe was laid by the Sultan Suleiman, who in 1353 crossed the Dardanelles and

made the first Turkish settlement on the continent in Gallipoli. Here Suleiman died and was buried, and his tomb became a sort of magnet, for, as a German writer has said, it "continually invited the races of Asia to perform their pilgrimage to it with the sword of conquest." However that may be, during the next century the Ottoman Turks and their satellites poured across the Hellespont and, working northward and northward from their base at Gallipoli, they gradually made themselves masters of the land to the north of the Ægean Sea. In 1365 they captured Adrianople, which they converted into a Moslem city, and having made this their new base they set forth on further conquests north and west.

The forces of the Byzantine Empire were incapable of holding the onrush, and it was left to the Serbs, one of the numerous groups of Slavs by now settled in the Balkans, to lead a crusade against the oncoming Ottomans. Stephen Dushan had founded a Serbian Empire stretching from the Danube to the Ægean and including the areas of Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly. It was his son, Lazarus, who in 1387 formed a Christian Confederacy, made up of Serbs, Bulgars, Bosnians, Albanians, Poles, and Hungarians, to destroy the Moslem power. It is significant that this mixed army contained no representatives of the older Europe, either Greek or Latin. It was not the last time that the mongrel peoples of the Balkans were to make a brave attempt to drive the Turks from Europe, but not for five centuries was success to attend their efforts. At the battle of Kossova in 1389 the Turks were the victors and the Slavs were enslaved as a result.


Everything seemed now ready for the grand attack on Constantinople. In the year 1400 the Sultan sent an ultimatum to the Emperor commanding him to leave the city. But by a curious chance, just as full preparations were made for the assault, the Turks were diverted from Europe by the approach of the Tartar horde under Tamerlane, then already master of India and Persia. His attack on the Asiatic territory of the Turks gave Constantinople a respite for half a century. The Turks hastened to meet Tamerlane on the plain of Ankara, where they were defeated and their Sultan taken prisoner. But Europe failed to improve even this shining hour; instead she gave the Turks time in which to recover from this shattering blow, which they did with some vigour and speed as the Mongol tide receded. The only serious effort that was made by Christian Europe at this auspicious moment was that organised by Hun-

gary under a great soldier named John Hunyadi, who, in 1444, at the head of a confederacy including Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, and Serbs, with some aid from Genoa, Venice, the Pope, and the Byzantine Emperor, forced the Turks for the first time in their career to sue for peace.

It was a golden opportunity, and if Europe as a whole could have roused herself for a supreme effort to grasp it, she might have succeeded in driving the Turks from Europe once and for all. Such a chance was not to occur again until our own day. But it was lost, and in that same year the forces of Christendom were routed at Varna. Four years later the Turks scored another victory over a combined force of Christians, and the Sultan was back on the vantage ground where he had stood fifty years before. In the spring of 1453 the Sultan Mohammed II began the siege of Constantinople. The garrison of the city did not exceed 10,000 men, while the Turkish invading host numbered not less than 150,000. Yet assuredly Christian Europe could have saved the city and five centuries of bedevilment of her struggle for peace and security if she could but have sunk her differences and found the way of united action at that time.

But no obstacle was too trivial and no motive too base to stand in the way of unity. The Greeks themselves even were not united, and regarded the Latins with such odium and contumely that they seemed, as H. A. L. Fisher says, to prefer a Turkish fez to a Cardinal's hat. The Turkish forces, indeed, included some Greeks and other Christians. The Italian cities of Venice and Genoa, whose material resources alone might have turned the scale, looked upon the prospective Moslemisation of the last stronghold of the Roman Empire rather as a commercial opening than as the final outrage to Christian civilisation. They preferred to see in the Ottoman Turks the power that was predestined to control for centuries both the Balkans and Asia Minor. And so, on May 29th, 1453, the Turks took the great city by storm. The last Roman Emperor, named, ironically enough but not unworthily, Constantine, after playing an heroic part in the defence, was slain in the onrush of the Janissaries. Thus fell the great city of Constantine, and thus did its great Cathedral of St. Sophia become a Mohammedan mosque.

The fall of Constantinople, as we have seen, was only the climax of a movement of Turkish expansion in Europe, but the event was, none the less, a shock to the European conscience.



THE MOSLEM INCURSION, 1360-1648.

Yet there was nothing to stem the Turkish tide, which now flowed on until by the end of the fifteenth century it covered the whole of the Balkans from the southernmost tip of Greece and all the lands as far north as Bosnia and Wallachia, and stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. Nor was this the end of the story. Under Mohammed II's grandson, Selim I (1512-1520), the Turkish Empire reached its highest point of prestige, for he was the conqueror of Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. As a result, the Turkish Sultan succeeded to the Mohammedan Caliphate. He was given the keys of the sanctuary of Mecca and recognised as the head of the Mohammedan world. Thus Constantinople, or Istanbul, to give it its Turkish name, after being for eleven centuries the capital of the Roman Empire in the East and the metropolis of Greek Catholicism, had become the centre of Moslem authority in the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Under Selim's son, Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the European advance was resumed. At the great battle of Mohacs in 1526 the Turks defeated the Hungarians and overran most of the country. The Magyar aristocracy lost heart, and had to suffer a Turkish occupation for nearly two centuries. Austria thus became the bulwark against the Moslems. Three years after the battle of Mohacs the Turks besieged Vienna, but the valour of the garrison and bad weather conditions combined to force them to abandon it. From this time war went on periodically, and occasionally efforts were made to form a European coalition against the Turks. It was such a coalition under the ægis of the Pope, known as the Holy League, that inflicted in 1571 a crushing defeat on the Turks at Lepanto in the Gulf of Corinth, the greatest naval battle since Actium. Throughout the next century Vienna held firm, and in 1683 a second siege was relieved. This was followed in 1687 by a second battle of Mohacs, at which the Austrians were victorious, and by the end of the century peace was made on the basis of the abandonment by Turkey to Austria of the whole of Hungary. Though Hungary was thus recovered and Austria relieved of further danger from the infidel, the Turks remained in the rest of south-eastern Europe, but from this time their decline set in.

The "Sick Man of Europe"

Thus the Ottoman Turks established their domination of the lands of the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans, which was

to have such profound effects both in Europe and the world beyond. The Turkish advance in south-eastern Europe had been made possible by the feebleness of the opposition, which was due to the absence of organised states. The flood was stayed when at length the Turks reached the boundaries of politically organised Europe. It was, in fact, the nascent spirit of nationalism which turned back the tide of the Moslem incursion in the south-east no less than in the south-west of Europe.

When at last the advance was held, the inherent weaknesses of the Ottoman régime became rapidly apparent. The degeneracy of the Sultans caused them to abandon the control of their Empire to Viziers, who were generally court favourites. Through the emergence of government cliques, made up mostly of Greeks and Jews, and the growth of harem influence, the government became incorrigibly corrupt. This political enfeeblement was accompanied by a military decline due to the decay of the Janissaries. The Janissaries gradually lost their old fighting spirit as Turks were admitted to their ranks, and at length became a sort of Prætorian Guard, making and unmaking Sultans, most of whom were puppets in their hands. The political debilitation of the Turk was progressive, until in the nineteenth century he reached the condition in which he was to be fairly described as the "Sick Man of Europe." The Turkish hegemony was a dominion purely of the sword, a military despotism of the most uncompromising kind. The Turks remained a Moslem minority in Europe, despising every attribute of Christendom and Western Civilisation. To that civilisation they contributed nothing, and if from it they absorbed anything, the effects of the absorption did not become apparent until, under the guiding genius of Kemal Atatürk after the First World War, they finally abandoned Europe as their centre of gravity and exchanged Constantinople for Ankara in Asia Minor as their political capital.

So the Turks utterly failed to assimilate any of the Christian peoples of the Balkan lands, and the alienation of their subjects grew as their own internal weakness increased. Austria, as the first European power to stem the Turkish tide, gained tremendous prestige and a dominant position in south-eastern Europe. The collapse of Hungary had ended her brief but brilliant existence as an independent state, and when she at last emerged freed from the Turkish incubus it was only to be an appendage

to the House of Hapsburg. As the Turkish régime weakened and receded, so Austria's "Ramshackle Empire" grew. But the spirit of nationalism among the Balkan peoples became more and more militant, and they began to look for aid to Russia, as the big Slav brother, whose power steadily expanded and whose eyes looked jealously towards the Turkish capital at Constantinople. It was all these cross-currents—the declining power of Turkey, the instability of the "Ramshackle Empire" of Austria, the growth of Balkan nationalism, and the expansion of Imperialist Russia—which finally produced that diplomatic maelstrom known in the nineteenth century as the Eastern Question.

But more immediately the squatting of the Turks in the Levant in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had effects of world-wide significance. The old route to the East was thus closed to Europe, and this hastened the search for new ones. So Europe entered upon her great Age of Discovery, which resulted in an Oceanic Revolution whereby the mercantile primacy of the world was shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The maritime changes thus brought about constituted one of the most important aspects of the Renaissance, whose contribution to the evolution of modern Europe we must attempt to assess.

CHAPTER VIII

RENAISSANCE SOVEREIGNTY

THE DIVORCE OF ETHICS AND POLITICS

The Transition to the Modern Age

THE modern age was heralded by the two great movements known as the Renaissance and the Reformation. On the face of things, the first of these merely brought about a revival of interest in antique culture, the second a reformed Church. But their real significance lies for us rather in the field of politics, where they both contributed to the emergence and consolidation of the sovereign state, and so at the same time emphasised the divergence of the modern from the mediæval epoch and set the stage for the great changes which fashioned the European states system of to-day. The Renaissance is usually regarded as belonging to the fifteenth century and the Reformation to the sixteenth. But, in fact, neither of these movements was confined to a single century. To think of them as so restricted is to overlook two important facts which should be remembered in tracing the background of modern European development. The first is that the transition from mediæval to modern times was not sudden but gradual. The second is that the Renaissance and Reformation, though not one movement, none the less overlapped, and that, in fact, the religious Reformation would hardly have been possible without the precedent liberating work of the Renaissance in both the cultural and the political fields.

The term Renaissance is in one sense misleading. The word itself means rebirth or revival, and was first used by historians in the early years of the nineteenth century through the misconception that letters and the arts, which were supposed to have been dead since ancient times, came suddenly to life again in the second half of the fifteenth century. This notion in its most naïve form has pictured Greek scholars in headlong flight from Constantinople, during its investment by the Turks, carrying with them the ancient manuscripts to Italy. Now, while the revived interest in ancient culture in the West was undoubtedly hastened by the arrival of Greek scholars and teachers in Italy, this process was, in fact, spontaneous and was

already going on well before the siege of Constantinople. Nor were the arts in the modern sense then first seen in western Europe, for works of art had been produced in centres like Florence and Bruges from the twelfth century onwards ; indeed, there was a twelfth-century Renaissance which was the harbinger of that of the fifteenth century. Again, the fifteenth-century Renaissance was destined to have its widest repercussions in three fields of change—in government, religion, and exploration—two of which, at least, were as foreign to the Greek spirit as any mutations of human endeavour could well be, while the third led to the discovery and exploitation of lands which had been nothing more than faint and distant, not to say mystical, horizons to the ancient Greeks. In these spheres the Renaissance marked, in a quite supreme sense, the death of something old and the birth of something new. Indeed, in these respects it may be said in more senses than one to have called a new world into being.

The political organisation of Ancient Greece, as we have seen, had been founded on the city state, that of Rome on a world state. Though city states existed in mediæval times, the Middle Ages were characterised politically by their conception of a world state inherited from Rome. It is true that it was more theoretical than practical and that the dynamic facts belied the static theory, but the fact remains that law, literature, and religion were international in the mediæval world, or rather we should perhaps say that the national growths which were to undermine their universal character did not appear until late in the mediæval epoch. Moreover, the organisation of mediæval society was based on feudal conceptions which broadly contemplated only two classes : landowners and landworkers. It was in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that these two essential characteristics of mediæval politics and society—their internationalism and their feudalism—began to change. And what changed them was the growth of strong integrated monarchies with a national emphasis and the growth of a middle class whose wealth was got from trade and which strongly supported the monarch.

These were the two developments which marked the gradual transition from mediæval to modern times. The Renaissance played into the hands of the new monarchy by opening men's minds to new ideas and hastened the growth of the middle class by undermining the retrospective mediæval conceptions

and giving trade a new meaning through the Age of Discovery, which was a further result of the change in outlook. Then came the Reformation to cut the knot which tied Europe to the Mediæval Church, to reinforce the powers of the monarch by giving Renaissance sovereignty a divine sanction, and to support the new lay culture by detaching it from its age-long association with ecclesiasticism. These changes play a vital part in the dynamism of Europe and are worth the closest study.

The Revival of Humanism

As an intellectual and artistic movement the Renaissance is important for the revival of humanism, which, as we have seen, was the most marked characteristic of Greek life and thought. The outlook of the ancient Greeks was summed up in the phrase "man is the measure of all things"; that of the scholars of the humanist revival in their dictum, "the proper study of mankind is man." This human point of view had been almost entirely obscured during the greater part of the Middle Ages through the subjection of scholarship to the service of the Church. From the ninth century some of the ancient Greek writers were known to scholars and thinkers, but only partially and at several removes, for their contact with the ancients was made, as J. A. Symonds says, through "Latin translations made by Jews from Arabic commentaries on Greek texts." And having received the Greek teaching in a form thus remote from its original essence, the men of that age removed it still farther by attempting to reconcile it to the theology of their day.

In the twelfth century the complete works of Aristotle arrived in western Europe by way of Spain, where the Moors had studied them in their universities in Latin translations, and the Crusaders returning from the wars in the East often brought Greek texts with them. The study of these texts led, during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages, to a systematisation of teaching known as Scholasticism, or the learning of the schools, of which the greatest exponent was St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274). Aquinas, though he died so young, produced many books, among them *Commentaries on the Politics of Aristotle*, and was responsible for bringing politics back to its place as a science which it had held in ancient Athens. But if Aristotle was one of his masters, St. Augustine was another, and his greatest original work, the *Summa Theologica*, unfinished at his

death, was an attempt to reconcile the doctrines of these disparate philosophers; in other words, to blend into an harmonious whole "the products of reason and revelation."

Aquinas became, and has remained, the master philosopher of the Roman Church. In his teaching we see the culmination of what may be called the Catholic-feudal spirit, but, though its purpose and content thus belong to the mediæval period, Aquinas's method marks the starting-point of a new age. After him the progress of teaching and learning produced a body of scholars who, no longer confined to the study of glossed and distorted editions of ancient masterpieces, went back to a direct study of the originals, both Latin and Greek, and so cut right through the overgrowth of the Middle Ages and began to see Greek thought and outlook as they truly were and not as they had been viewed by the blinkered eyes of mediæval pedants. The new scholars began to realise that there was a nobler Latin than the debased currency of the Middle Ages, and that Plato and Aristotle, whatever else one might say of them, could not have been Christian apologists.

Aquinas had belonged to the University of Naples, and it was natural and proper that Italy should be the cradle of the humanist revival which followed him. Rome had been the vehicle for the spread of Greek culture in ancient times, and throughout the Middle Ages Italy, under the influence of the Church, had kept the torch of learning alight, flickering and dim though its flame may sometimes have been, amid the encircling gloom. Her people lived among the visible memorials of antiquity, and she had her own great literary traditions which Hellas had largely inspired. Indeed, the very nature of her political organisation in the later Middle Ages recalled that of Greece in her heyday. Italy's lack of political unity, though it was soon to make her the cockpit of Europe, nevertheless gave her a number of separate principalities and republics whose commercial wealth and luxurious courts encouraged the growth of humane studies, even as they had grown in the serene atmosphere of the city states of Greece. In the Italy of that age Florence was, as it were, the mirror of Athens of the fourth century B.C. In such an atmosphere Italian scholars, like Petrarch (1304-1374), took up the study of the original texts of Cicero and Virgil. At the end of the century Greek scholars began to arrive, and under their influence the study of Greek became a passion among humanists in Italy during the fifteenth century. Monastic

libraries were ransacked for long-buried manuscripts, and those brought by the Greek scholars were eagerly studied.

The movement rapidly spread from Italy to other parts of Europe. In the universities of France, Germany, and England the study of ancient language, literature, and philosophy became the pabulum of their curricula. Thus were revealed to the better minds of Europe the beauty of the societies of the ancient world, the purity of a moral code existing before the Christian era, and the virgin grandeur of a philosophy untrammelled by theological tortuosities. And even on the Christian faith itself it induced a new outlook by enabling men to study the Gospels in the language in which they were originally composed, and so paved the way for the changes in the Church which were soon to come. The invention of printing in the middle of the fifteenth century provided the means of a wide and rapid diffusion of the fruits of this New Learning, and before long the famous Aldine Press in Venice was issuing many copies of Greek and Latin classics, which rapidly spread over Europe.

The revival of humanism had a marked effect on native literature, and by opening men's minds to new perspectives led to the production of great literary masterpieces in the vernacular. Every country in the west of Europe felt this urge, and from the beginning of the sixteenth century onwards we see an extraordinary effulgence of the spirit in the writings of men like Ariosto and Tasso in Italy, Rabelais and Montaigne in France, Cervantes and Lope de Vega in Spain, and Spenser and Shakespeare in England, such as had not been known since the heyday of Athens. Not the least of the fruits of the revival of humanism was the growth of great national literatures, which were at the same time the offspring of the new national sentiment and an encouragement to its bolder endeavours.

In art, too, the revival of humanism had a lasting influence on the life of Europe. Inspired by the plastic art of the Greeks, painting rapidly took on new forms. The study of human anatomy, a knowledge of perspective, and the use of oils hastened the flight from the authoritatively imposed woodenness of mediæval art and the adoption of the new technique in every country of western Europe. In Italy it had its first magnificent results in the work of Michelangelo and Raphael, and reached its most glorious heights in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with Titian in Venice, Rubens in Flanders, Velasquez in Spain, and Rembrandt in Holland. The architects of the

Renaissance also went back to classical models, and so produced, as they felt, a less flamboyant type of building than that which had characterised the later Middle Ages, whose style they contemptuously called Gothic, meaning barbarian. But perhaps in architecture alone modern criticism would agree that the achievements of the Renaissance were inferior to those of the mediæval period.

The revival of humanism brought inevitably in its train a new spirit of enquiry which led to the beginnings of modern science. The most original work of this kind was done either by Italians or under Italian influences, by Copernicus, the father of astronomy, and Galileo, the inventor of the telescope, by means of which he proved the truth of the Copernican theory that the earth revolves round the sun. The science of navigation, which was the most practical aspect of the fifteenth-century Renaissance, grew directly out of this spirit of enquiry, which was thus responsible for the Age of Discovery.¹

It is evident, therefore, that the Renaissance was responsible for the introduction of a vast system of new knowledge. It was, it is true, mainly confined to Latin Europe, and there to an aristocratic élite; it is also true that its enjoyment was thus beyond both the means and comprehension of the mass of the people. Nevertheless, it made a great contribution to progress, which lay in the fact that, while it grew out of the intellectual discipline of the later Middle Ages, it liberated Europe from its mediæval blinkers and leading strings. It finally overwhelmed the authoritarianism of the Mediæval Church and substituted for ecclesiastical learning a lay culture from which was to grow the outlook of modern times. The new knowledge led to a new conception of truth as the daughter, in Francis Bacon's cogent phrase, "not of authority but of time." Truth was, in fact, seen to be not something static and embalmed, as it were, in the cloisters of mediæval seminaries, but a dynamic force driving man to the realisation that there were no limits to the potentialities of his mind and spirit. It was this evolutionary conception of the life of man and communities which made possible the mighty changes that followed.

The New Monarchy

The most significant and formative change resulting from the decay of mediæval institutions and hastened by the spirit of

¹ Discussed later, in Chapter X.

the Renaissance was the emergence of a new kind of state, generally based on a process of national integration, which was diametrically opposed to the ideas of the Mediæval Church and Empire. We have seen that national groups in Europe were already recognised in the constitution of the General Councils of the Church during the fifteenth century. We have observed, too, that the success of Christian Spain in its crusade against the Moors was made possible by a dawning sense of nationalism, which drew together in a united movement the several kingdoms in the north of the Peninsula. But it was in France and England during the later Middle Ages that this process of national integration was most marked.

It is strange how the destinies of France and England, in spite of many differences of national character and recurrent outbursts of mutual hostility, have been from their earliest days so closely linked. They shared, by a sort of shuttle operation, the assaults of the Danes in the ninth century, and it was the Danes who, transformed into Norman French, conquered England in the eleventh century, and so at the same time invigorated the English stock, remoulded English institutions, and brought to the English monarchy important French territorial interests. In feudal days there was nothing outrageous about the constant overstepping of state boundaries or in the claim of the English king to the French throne, which was the immediate occasion of the opening of hostilities in that long-drawn-out struggle known as the Hundred Years' War. Yet it was that war which in the end made both nations conscious of their separate destinies, and the struggle which had begun under Edward III as a conflict of feudal rights became, under the fiery spur of Joan of Arc a century later, a conscious battle for the soil of France. In 1453, when the last battle was fought, the only remnant of continental France left to the English was Calais, whose loss a hundred years later did no more harm than that involved in the pain to the English queen on whose heart its name was said to have been engraved, though the Channel Islands, by one of the vagaries of history, have remained British to this day.

So France and England went their several ways, England through the fires of the Wars of the Roses to the strong monarchy of the Tudors; France through the pain and misery of her convalescence after the war with England to the acquisitive monarchy of Louis XI and Charles VIII. These kings in

England and France were typical of the new kind of monarch who now emerged to save the realm from the chaos of declining feudal institutions, which he replaced by his own directive will. He crushed the decadent baronage and built up his own standing army. His government was based on force and stood for efficiency. The power of the monarch was strengthened by the growth of towns and the rise of the merchant class, which wanted order before all things and was thus prepared to give every support to the monarch, who in his turn found the merchants useful allies against the outraged landed classes. In Spain the situation, though reached in a different way, was the same. There the two strong monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, united by marriage the Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile, and so welded the powerful military state of Spain which finally drove the Moors from their last foothold in the Peninsula and sponsored Columbus's voyages of discovery to America.

Thus appeared what may be rightly called the Renaissance state, for its emergence synchronised with the Renaissance movement which saw the close of the Middle Ages. We may fairly say that the course of the Hundred Years' War traversed the change from the twilight of mediæval universalism to the dawn of nationalism, and from the close of the war the new type of state began to appear everywhere in western Europe. Yet the essential quality of the Renaissance state was not a consciousness of nationality in the sense in which it later became a vehicle for the achievement of individual rights. Indeed, the same process of political integration went on in the small states of Italy and Germany, where clearly something very different from nationalism was the operative force. The fact is that the Renaissance state was not concerned with rights but with power, the power of one state to act independently of another; in a word, sovereignty. The Renaissance monarchs thus supplied an evident need in a dissolving situation, but in doing so broke completely with the mediæval conception of unity. This loss of unity was a heavy price to pay for the other benefits which Europe gained from the dynamism of the Renaissance period, for to the new conception of monarchy at that time we may trace the whole tragic tangle of international politics in modern Europe.

The effect was immediately seen in the rivalry that developed between the strong monarchies of France and Spain. Here

were two states with a common linguistic and religious inheritance, which might have co-operated to enrich the civilisation of the West and to spread its benefits overseas. But their kinship counted for nothing in face of their avarice and ambition, their pursuit of glory and their lust for power, which impelled them both to seek an extension of their European territory. Thus in 1494 there began a series of wars between these two royal houses which set the standard for international behaviour from that day to this. Italy was the natural battleground of these antagonists. Because of the wealth of her separate states and her lack of political unity, she was at once the magnet of the warring monarchs and defenceless against them. So Charles VIII of France marched into Italy and Ferdinand allied with the French king's Italian enemies against him.

The war, of which Italy thus became the cockpit, was a new kind of war, a war between kings with a consciousness of national strength, made more vicious by the growing use of gunpowder, an explosive first seriously employed at Crécy in 1346. The Franco-Spanish struggle was the first of a series of wars in Italy which lasted for the next sixty years. These wars were completely futile, yet we may descry in and through them the beginnings of the armed international rivalry which with few breaks has gone on to our own day. War between sovereign states becomes part of their normal existence. As a natural consequence of war, there develop the beginnings of modern diplomacy. The monarchs of Europe and the princes of Italy, in their efforts to restrain one another and neutralise the advantages, enter into leagues and counter-alliances to maintain what comes to be known for the first time as the balance of power. Hitherto ambassadors had been engaged only on special missions, which needed purely temporary sojourns in other states. Now, when it became necessary for states to watch one another's actions very closely, embassies became part of the regular machinery of the intercourse between states, and ambassadors took up permanent residence. In the same way, we find the beginnings of international law in the Renaissance period. This practice of diplomacy and the idea of a code of international law would have been superfluous, if not incomprehensible, while the notion of a universal state prevailed. In fact, such ideas as diplomacy, the balance of power, and international law were the logical consequences of the emergence of sovereign states, and it is the growth of these

ideas and practices more than anything else which marks off the modern from the mediæval world.

Morality and the Renaissance State

In the field of politics, then, it is evident that the statesmen of the Renaissance caught little of the spirit of the antique philosophers, for whereas Greek autonomy was conceived as the only means of securing the good life for the individual, Renaissance sovereignty was concerned with political power; in short, with politics and not with ethics, that couple so indissolubly wedded in the political practice and theory of the ancient world. Nor was this divorce of ethics and politics in the Renaissance age apparent only in its practice: it appeared also in the writings of the most influential political author of the time, Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), who not merely recognised it as a necessity of state action but vindicated it as a political virtue.

Machiavelli was a child of the Renaissance. He was a classical scholar of wide and deep erudition, equally acquainted at first hand with the masterpieces of Roman literature and the political philosophy of Aristotle. Like Aristotle, he regarded politics as a science, but, unlike his classical master, he did not treat politics and ethics as merely two aspects of the social life of man. On the contrary, he deliberately detached them so that considerations of morality should not be permitted to weaken political power. In his historical work, the *Discourses on Livy*, he displays a genuine enthusiasm for the kind of popular government that existed under the Roman Republic, but he realised that it was quite inapplicable to the Italy of his day. For he lived in an age of strong men and his books reflect his sense of their need. He had travelled widely and studied the political situation at first hand in various continental countries. He saw that Italy, like Germany, lacked the unity of the western states, and he sought for his native land a saviour who would provide for her the integrating force enjoyed by France, Spain, and England. This is the true purport of his contemporary study, *The Prince*, which was written in 1513 and by which he is best known. Though it was prepared with the specific object of gaining government employment under the Medicis in Florence, whence he had been expelled on the overthrow of the republic, of which he had been secretary, it had a universal application, and remains the classic statement of unmorality applied to politics.

The Prince is rather a study in the art of government and diplomacy than a theory of the state. In it there is no attempt to enunciate a political philosophy, but only to record the practical tendencies of the age. For Machiavelli the purposes of the state were dominion and expansion. He grasped the essential fact that there is an inescapable dynamism in politics. "All human affairs," he says in the *Discourses*, "are in motion. You cannot stand still. You must go forward or backward, and where reason does not lead necessity may drive you." How true this is and yet how readily it leads to the peace-shattering conclusion that "necessity knows no law," to which, more than to anything else, we owe the international anarchy of our own day! In *The Prince* the guidance Machiavelli gives to the statesman is based on an entirely cynical view of political man. Men, he says, are "ungrateful, fickle, deceitful, cowardly, and avaricious." "He who wishes to deceive," he adds, "will always find someone to be deceived." The prince must take these views into consideration in shaping his polity. Let him, for example, be careful how he alienates support by confiscating property. It is better to execute an opponent than to expropriate his possessions, for "men," he says in a memorable phrase, "more readily forget the death of a father than the loss of a patrimony."

Machiavelli admits that it may be desirable for a prince to be a good man, but adds that he must be ready to lay aside his goodness for political purposes. "How laudable it is," he says, "for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity, everyone knows. Still, the experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's minds, and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty the foundation of their actions." When we compare this brutal statement with the noble peroration of Pericles on Athenian democracy, which we have quoted earlier,¹ we realise how far the political conceptions of the Renaissance period were from those of the antique age which inspired so many of its intellectual and artistic activities. Machiavelli in *The Prince* no doubt states the political theory and practice of his time with an excess of cynicism and ruthlessness. But it cannot be denied that his conscious divorce of politics from ethics was a true reflection of what in fact happened in that epoch.

¹ See pages 50-51.

From the Renaissance Age, then, dates the establishment of two standards of morality, one for private, the other for public affairs. Thus was the Greek ideal of political purpose perverted to that outlook on state affairs which is the foundation of the ideologies of to-day. Machiavelli was not to find the saviour of Italy whom he sought, but it is not without significance that when that saviour, Cavour, who was the most virtuous of statesmen, at last emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century, he said of the conduct of himself and his associates in the crisis of the Italian unifying movement, "If we did for ourselves what we are doing for our country, we should indeed be great rascals."

It is easy for us to condemn Machiavelli's cold inhumanity and the autocratic system of which he was the mouthpiece, but doubtless Renaissance sovereignty was a necessity of the time, filling a transitional stage in the political evolution of Europe from the break-up of mediæval universalism to the integration of modern nationalism. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in establishing sovereign government for what in the mediæval conception had been a mere local community, the king should have been more concerned with the power of the unit than with the rights of the individuals forming the group. It was natural for that age to regard the monarch as supreme and to identify sovereignty with the prince. But the rise of a conscious nationalism and a widening democracy have shown the proper seat of sovereignty to be not the monarch but the people. Yet mere nationalism without true democracy can be as absolutist and aggrandising as Machiavelli's principedom.

The national sovereign state may be a necessity of modern political existence, but it is justified only if it can combine liberty with order and maintain independence without aggression. These aims have manifestly not yet been fully realised by all the states of Europe. Nor are they likely to be realised until contemporary Europe learns the lesson which the Renaissance monarchs failed to learn. Political ideals were not among the many things of the spirit which the men of the Renaissance period recaptured from the Greeks in the great revival of humanism. Nor, despite all the political, social, economic, and spiritual changes since that time, have we yet learned how to remarry ethics and politics as the basis of state and inter-state action. Until we do, the permanent establishment of the good society will elude us.

CHAPTER IX

PROTESTANT REFORMATION

THE ATOMISATION OF GERMANY

Luther's Revolt

IT was upon the scene of intellectual enlightenment and political change brought about by the Renaissance that the Protestant Reformation occurred. Such a challenge to the authority of Rome was no new thing. Indeed, the term Reformation had often appeared during the Middle Ages, to signify not so much reform as restoration, for every effort to reform the Church was actually an attempt on the part of the reformers to restore it to its pristine purity. This was the basic purpose of the Conciliar Movement in Europe generally, of John Wycliffe and the Lollards in England, and of John Huss in Bohemia. These movements of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were the precursors of that of the sixteenth century, and it is in this sense that Wycliffe has been rightly called "the morning star of the Reformation." They had failed because the vested interests of the Papacy and the Church had proved too strong for them. The action which Martin Luther took in 1517 had seemed no more momentous than the initial acts of these earlier reformers. And yet it proved to be the spark that fired a conflagration from the effects of which no Christian country in Europe escaped. Indeed, it is an excellent example of the way in which apparently obscure events can sometimes change the course of history.

The Reformation cannot be said to have been an actual part of the Renaissance movement, and yet it is safe to say that it could not have taken the form that it assumed but for the revival of humanism which preceded and accompanied it. For not only did the Renaissance attitude remove the ancient restraints on the criticism of the old order, but the New Learning sent the humanists among the reformers back to the Hebrew and Greek originals of the Old and New Testaments, where they found little to justify the elaborate ritual of an authoritarian Church or the temporal power of an avaricious Pope. Nor, certainly, would it have had such tremendous political consequences if it

had not synchronised with the emergence of the new type of sovereign state, whose princes saw in the attack on the secular wealth of the Church a golden opportunity to replenish their own coffers. Such was the spiritual and political atmosphere of early sixteenth-century Europe which Luther charged with a new force.

Martin Luther was born in 1483, the son of a Saxon miner. After a childhood and youth of great poverty and hardship, he became a monk of the Augustinian Order and Professor of Theology at the University of Wittenberg, founded by the Elector of Saxony. He was not a great scholar or an original thinker or, by temperament, a revolutionary. Nor had the action which he took in 1517 anything inherently revolutionary about it. What he did then was to protest against the sale of indulgences. The right to grant an indulgence or a remission of the punishment for sins committed was supposed to have been handed down to the Popes by St. Peter, by whom it was believed to have been received from Christ himself. The theory was that there was a treasury of merit, which Christ's goodness had founded and that of outstanding saints had enlarged. This store of spiritual wealth could be called upon by the Pope and dispensed to the faithful through the system of indulgences. Originally a sinner could receive an indulgence only at the price of confession and repentance. But Pope Julius II (1503-1513) instituted the system of selling indulgences in order to create a fund for the rebuilding of St. Peter's. Whatever argument there may be for the original right of indulgence, the general sale of indulgences without reference to particular sins was quite indefensible, and when in 1517 an emissary of Pope Leo X appeared in Wittenberg flagrantly selling indulgences for the sole purpose of raising funds for an impecunious Pope, the old-fashioned piety of Luther was outraged, and he displayed on the door of the church at Wittenberg a notice containing ninety-five theses attacking the sale of indulgences, which, he announced, he was prepared to support by argument.

Such was the first faint rumbling of a storm which was to swell until it had drenched Europe in blood and was not to die down for more than a hundred years. Luther went on to attack the Papacy in a series of treatises in which he voiced, on behalf of the Christian people, his detestation of the See of Rome, which he compared to Babylon and Sodom. Pope Leo thereupon in 1520 issued against Luther a bull of excommunication

which Luther publicly burned. Luther was now in frank rebellion; yet his revolt would not have assumed the proportions of a continental struggle but for two facts. First, the religious controversy which Luther had initiated seemed to be concerned with the question of personal salvation, and in this sense affected the common people. Thus Luther's campaign, whether he wished it or not, struck down to the very roots of society. Secondly, the condition of Germany was such that it was possible for a secular prince to protect Luther, and therefore save him from the fate of Wycliffe and Huss, which he must otherwise inevitably have suffered.

Now, both these truths are of the most vital importance in our comprehension of the effect of the Reformation on the present condition of Europe. The theological attitude of Luther, though he would not admit it, logically implied complete toleration of all religious opinions. For once it was conceded that the Holy Catholic Church was not the sole means by which mankind could approach God, there was no limit to the variety of altars and acolytes that men might create to satisfy that need. From this aspect of Luther's revolt, therefore, sprang the principle of toleration as we know it to-day, and the abhorrence of all liberal-minded people of authoritarian reactions which lead to its suppression. But religious toleration by no means immediately followed. On the contrary, it was impossible to achieve it by a mere revolt from Papal authority. For such a revolt could only succeed through the readiness of an independent prince to establish a Church in opposition to Rome, and such a Church, in sheer self-defence, must tend at first to be as intolerant as the one it had superseded. Nevertheless, the establishment of a state Church was a necessary step in the transition from the comprehensiveness of the Catholic Church to the realisation of complete tolerance.

When the Pope excommunicated Luther and Luther defied him, he had to seek the aid of the secular arm to suppress the rebel. In 1519 there came to the Imperial throne in Germany a new young Emperor, Charles V, who, through the fortunate marriages of his forbears, was also King of Spain and Lord of the Netherlands. It could not be expected that such a monarch would do anything but support the Catholic Church. He, therefore, took up the struggle on behalf of the Pope, and in 1521 summoned Luther to attend at the Diet of Worms. But Luther continued to defy authority, and the Edict of Worms

declared him an outlaw. At this moment the Elector of Saxony took Luther under his protection, and the necessary preliminary step was taken to save the Lutheran movement from destruction. But even so, at this moment it would have been easy to suppress Luther if the Catholic princes had stood together. Charles V, however, was involved in revolts in Spain and wars with France, and was thus distracted from the immediate task in Germany. Several attempts were made to find a settlement, but at a Diet in 1529, which decided that the Edict of Worms was still binding and should be executed, a minority of princes protested. This was the origin of the word Protestant, which has clung to the reforming Churches ever since.

The Spread of the Reformation

Meanwhile Luther had been organising on Saxon soil the Evangelical Church. Luther retained some Catholic practices, but abolished the Mass. His services consisted of prayers and hymns in the vernacular, and a sermon. In Church government he recognised a superintendent priest who corresponded to the bishop of the earlier form. In 1530 Luther's formula was submitted to a Diet at Augsburg as a definite confession of faith. The Emperor denounced the new creed, and the states of Germany divided into two leagues: those who stood for the Catholic Church and those who adopted the Augsburg confession. Thus began the religious wars in Germany. Their first phase ended in 1555, when, at the Peace of Augsburg, the German states adopted the principle that forced the subject to observe the religion of his Prince (*cujus regio ejus religio*).

Here, then, is the origin of a state Church, and this is what Luther achieved. He did not champion the common people whom he at first appeared to represent, and when the German peasants revolted in 1525 he dissociated himself from them in a condemnatory treatise, and left them to be overwhelmed by the punitive action of the state. Of the Lutheran Church in Saxony the Elector became the supreme head and the priest became, in effect, a state official. Nor did Luther succeed in making Germany a Protestant country. Generally speaking, the Lutheran states were confined to the north, while those territories which had originally been within the boundaries of the Roman Empire, as, for example, Bavaria, Austria, and the Rhineland, remained faithful to the Catholic cause. From

northern Germany the Lutheran Church spread to the Scandinavian countries and the northern or Dutch provinces of the Netherlands, which still confess it.

There were other reformers besides Luther, and these found it possible to set up new Churches on independent territory in Switzerland. The first of these was Zwingli (1484-1531), a native of St. Gall, who established a new church in Zürich. He was a humanist who based his teaching on a direct reading of the scriptures and condemned the ritual of the Roman Church as idolatrous. Zwingli's Church did not long retain its separate identity, for the Swiss Catholics successfully made war on it, and it was later absorbed by other Protestant Churches. The other most notable reformer was Calvin (1509-1564), a Frenchman, who established his Reformed Church in Geneva, an independent city then allied with the Swiss, which he made an "evangelical republic." Calvin condemned and abolished all the traditional practices of the Church, and set up in their place the plainest of services. As Calvin himself was an uncompromising ascetic, he condemned all pleasures and amusements and obliged his followers to spend their lives entirely in work and devotional exercises. Calvin recognised no rank corresponding to that of bishop, and all his pastors were equal in status. He placed the government of the Church in the hands of a consistory or assembly only one-third of whose members were pastors, the rest being elders chosen from the principal laymen, who supervised the conduct of the faithful.

The fate of Calvinism was very different from that of Zwinglianism, for Calvin established a seminary for the training of pastors who carried the Calvinist doctrine into most lands in Europe. Spain and Italy were left untouched by it, and most of Protestant Germany and the Scandinavian countries remained loyal to Lutheranism. But Calvinism was widely adopted in France, Scotland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, as well as in Poland and Hungary. In France, where the people could read Calvin's books in the language in which they were written, it became the religion of a considerable minority, including the Bourbon family, which, having married into the French royal House of Valois, led the revolt against the Crown and finally filled the throne in the person of Henry of Navarre, who succeeded as Henry IV in 1589 and thus began the line which was dethroned by the French Revolution, and, having been restored in 1814, finally ceased to reign in 1830. In Scotland Calvinism

was so widely taken up that it became strong enough successfully to carry through the Reformation which finally established the Presbyterian Church as the Church of Scotland.

In England the phases of the Reformation were most clearly marked. Throughout the latter half of the Middle Ages England had adopted an independent policy in regard to Papal control, and the Reformation in Church government as it was carried out by Henry VIII was a logical development of this earlier attitude. But, owing to the influence of the continental reformers, the Reformation in England became also a doctrinal revolution. When Luther first published his theses condemning the Pope, Henry VIII wrote an essay in defence of the Catholic Church, and in gratitude the Pope called him "Defender of the Faith" (*Fidei Defensor*), a title which, despite the Reformation, has clung to the English sovereign ever since. But the material advantages of a change in Church government were too obvious for the second Henry Tudor to neglect, and in 1534 the Act of Supremacy was passed, making the King the Supreme Head of the Church. This was followed by the dissolution of the monasteries and the expropriation of their wealth, which the King shared with a new aristocracy thereby pledged to support the royal policy. Henry spent his last years in a vain endeavour to prevent a doctrinal reformation, which, in the reign of his son, Edward VI (1547-1553), was carried by the publication of the English Prayer Book and the passage of an Act of Uniformity to enforce its universal use. The Catholic reaction which followed Edward's death did not survive the reign of Mary Tudor (1553-1558), and under her half-sister, Elizabeth (1558-1603), the Church of England took final shape.

The Anglican Church was a unique compromise among the reformed Churches. What was new in it was the Liturgy in English and the abolition of the celibacy of priests; from the old Church it retained, in a national form, the clerical hierarchy with the Episcopate at the top, Church lands and tithes, and vestments. But the important thing about it is that it is the perfect example of the revolution in Church government: a national Church characterised by the supremacy of the Crown. In this sense the Reformation added to the prerogatives of the Renaissance sovereign the control of the religious practices of his subjects. But the doctrinal compromise involved in the ecclesiastical settlement of Elizabeth by no means satisfied many of her subjects, and the Puritan movement was to continue to

grow until it succeeded at length in temporarily overthrowing the monarchy and setting up in its place the republic of Cromwell. Nor was the Restoration of the Stuarts sufficient to end the struggle for religious freedom, which triumphed first in the Toleration Act of 1689 and later in the recognition of equality for all religious opinions.

The Counter-Reformation

Even more remarkable, in many ways, than the Protestant Reformation was that of the Catholic Church itself through the movement generally known as the Counter-Reformation. The explanation of this process of restoration in the Roman Church is that there were many ardent spirits in it who, though scandalised by the course of Luther's revolt, were none the less anxious to see the Church reformed or, rather, restored. The revival of humanism was not confined to rebels; indeed, it produced as many scholars who found the objective of reform not inconsistent with their adherence to the Catholic faith, and who wished to revitalise its doctrine without being involved in any breach with authority. Among these was the enlightened Dutchman, Desiderius Erasmus (1467-1536), who used his scholarly influence to rationalise the doctrine of the Church without subverting it. He had all the passion of a reformer with none of the fevers of the revolutionary. He criticised, as strongly as any Protestant, the abuses of the Church, but he believed that it should and could be reformed from within. He moved in the scholarly circles of many countries, and even for a time settled in England, holding the Chair of Divinity and Greek at Cambridge till he finally settled in Basel. There he wrote several books which, though they perhaps did not circulate beyond the Republic of Letters, had a profound influence on international thought in Europe.

If Erasmus was the intellectual herald of the Counter-Reformation, Loyola (1492-1560) was its militant propagandist. Ignatius Loyola was a Basque, born of a noble Spanish family. Having served with distinction as a soldier, he emerged from a long convalescence, after a severe wound, with a new vision of the purpose of life, and he resolved to combine vision and action as a soldier of Christ. In 1554 he founded a new religious order, the Company, or Society, of Jesus, which he placed at the service of the Pope. The members of the Society of Jesus,

known to the world as Jesuits, who had to take vows like monks and to follow the strictest discipline as imposed by the founder, were, nevertheless, anything but ascetics. Loyola's purpose was to school his followers to absolute obedience to the Pope, and to send them out into the world to spread the teaching of the Catholic Church wherever that high purpose might lead them.

In this way the Jesuits became confessors and advisers to royal persons, and teachers to the aristocracy, and so came to exert a tremendous influence on politics, not only in Europe but in America and even in Asia. They founded boarding-schools attended by the sons of the wealthy and highly placed, who received, besides a religious, a humanist education based, in accordance with the fashion of the time, on the study of Latin. The Society of Jesus was in effect an international order, for it recognised no superior but the Pope. It thus spread throughout Europe and in countries far beyond it, and was always at hand to assist with schooling or priestly guidance any movement tending to rehabilitate the Catholic Church. Because the Jesuits founded their work on education, there have been few mightier instruments for the propagation of the Catholic faith, and they remain through their schools a great Catholic influence to this day.

After the gentle intellectual influence of Erasmus and the powerful propaganda of Loyola, came the practical attempt to reform the Church itself. No good Catholic could deny the accumulated abuses of the Roman Church as it had grown from its beginnings through the Middle Ages. Under pressure of the critics among his own flock, the Pope at last consented to summon a Council, which began to meet at Trent in North Italy in 1545. The Council was supposed to be œcumenical, or universal, but was in fact only sparsely attended, mainly by Italian bishops, though in its last session there were present also Spanish, French, and German prelates. Its proceedings were excessively protracted. After two adjournments, one of which lasted not less than ten years, it terminated in 1563. From the Council of Trent the Papacy emerged triumphant. Its decisions were uncompromising. From the point of view of doctrine it retained the Holy Scriptures in the Vulgate or Latin form, and added to it the unwritten traditions considered to be transmitted through the Apostles to the Popes at the dictation of the Holy Spirit, and also all the mediæval practices and ritual. It refused all accommodation or compromise with the Protestants ; indeed,

it deliberately enjoined conflict with them. From the point of view of discipline, the Council bolstered the hierarchy of the Church and declared the Pope, as "Vicar of God and Universal Pastor," to be above the Council, with supreme jurisdiction in appeals and dispensing power.

The Council of Trent, therefore, made no step forward. On the contrary, it reinforced the mediæval forms and practices, which had before been unregulated, by defining them in a rigid body of rules. Moreover, it secured the perpetuation of these decisions by establishing seminaries for the training of priests. Thus, in the words of Lord Acton, the distinguished Catholic historian, the Council of Trent "impressed on the Church the stamp of an intolerant age and perpetuated by its decrees the stamp of an austere immorality." So the "restoration" achieved by the Council of Trent was a reaction of the most authoritarian kind, a result very different from that looked for by Catholic humanists like Erasmus. Far from achieving the reunion of Christendom, it emphasised its divisions by inspiring in its devotees a new spirit of combatancy, and in this sense was much nearer the militant ideal of Loyola. Whereas before the Council of Trent the Catholic clergy had looked on indifferent at the growth of Protestantism, by it they were given a spur to attack it.

The Papacy, with its reasserted pre-eminence and supported by the Jesuits, encouraged the war between the Churches which now took place in those countries where religious allegiance was divided. The Catholic reaction, using every device of cruelty and persecution, was matched by the determination of the Protestant Churches to retain their hard-earned individuality. So there came about civil wars and wars between states, which resulted, among other things, in the establishment of the Dutch Republic, the triumph of Elizabethan England and the political decline of Spain, the crushing of the Huguenots in France and the imposition on that country of the despotism of Louis XIV, which was ultimately responsible for the intolerable conditions against which the French Revolution was an armed protest, and the postponement of German unity for more than two centuries after the internecine horrors of the Thirty Years' War. It is clear, therefore, that the political consequences of the Reformation were of the utmost importance in the background of the Europe of to-day.

Religious Wars and the Rise of the Dutch Republic

The political effect of the Counter-Reformation was seen in its most uncompromising form in the attitude of Philip II of Spain towards the Dutch and English peoples, whose destinies became, by the successive policies of the Spanish Hapsburgs and the French Bourbons, curiously and sympathetically interwoven. The rise of the Dutch Republic and the triumph of Elizabethan England were complementary historical factors, and both are supreme examples of heroism and constancy in the annals of the European peoples. Yet we should not be tempted to overstate either the national character or the religious singleness of the revolt of the Netherlands. It was not, as one might gather from Motley's brilliant but prejudiced pages,¹ a conscious struggle for national unity and independence or a spontaneous rising of a whole people whose religious sentiments were outraged. Nor was there any element of democracy, either social or political, in the struggle. Indeed, as the latest research shows,² it was rather a revolt of small and detached communities, enjoying mediæval privileges, against the attempt of a New Monarch to destroy those privileges, to integrate the provinces, and to impose upon them a uniform system in the manner of the Renaissance sovereign state, which we examined in the last chapter. At no point in the struggle was there anything approaching a national purpose among the Netherlands, and the religious differences between those of the north and those of the south effectively prevented their making more than momentary common cause against the Spaniards. And when independence was finally won, it was the Dutch alone who gained it, thus making a permanent division of the Netherlands.

The seventeen provinces of the Netherlands were in essence so many states with no machinery of union among them. They originally constituted the loosely gathered patrimony of the Dukes of Burgundy, a cadet branch of the French royal house of Valois, and had come to the Hapsburgs by inheritance through intermarriage. They were a rich possession, and their commercial cities and harbours, such as Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Bruges, produced great wealth for their royal masters. The Emperor Charles V, who tried to relate his duties as a monarch to the differing needs of his scattered domains, attempted, without

¹ In *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*.

² See G. J. Renier's *The Dutch Nation*, published in 1944.

much success, to give the Netherlands some sort of common administration. On his abdication in 1556, Charles left the Austrian lands of the Hapsburg patrimony, and with them the candidature to the Imperial title, to his brother, Ferdinand I, and his Spanish and Netherlands dominions to his son, Philip II. Philip was a bigoted Catholic, the ideal political champion, from the Papal point of view, of the revived policy of Catholic uniformity, who did not forbear to use every instrument of repression to this end. At the same time he was a Renaissance sovereign. In seeking, therefore, to impose upon the Netherlands a religious uniformity no less rigid and absolute than that of Spain, he planned to unify the provinces and to destroy their local liberties by means of an external yoke entirely foreign to their traditions.

Abhorrent as such a policy was to all the Netherlanders, it was particularly so to the people of the northern Netherlands, who had meanwhile adopted the Calvinist form of the Protestant faith. So when, in 1567, Philip sent a repressive Spaniard, the Duke of Alva, instead of appointing one of their own number, as Governor of the Netherlands, their resentment ran high. Alva immediately set up a court for the summary punishment of treason and heresy, which, on the Philippic hypothesis, was the same crime, and in 1572 an insurrection broke out in the north. The rebels, known as the "Sea Beggars," captured Breda and Flushing in Zeeland, declared war on Spain, and called on William of Orange, a Dutchman famous in history as William the Silent, to lead them against the tyrant. Thus began the Dutch war of independence which was to last for forty years. It went through many phases, with the fortunes of war constantly changing. For a time William the Silent managed to get all the seventeen provinces together in a united effort against Spain. But the religious differences between them were too strong, and the union soon broke up. Spain took advantage of this by granting special rights to the Catholic provinces, and so it came about that the struggle was upheld alone by the seven northern Protestant states, which in 1579, by the Union of Utrecht, bound themselves together in a loose federation, while the Catholic states returned to their former allegiance to Spain. Of the seven United Provinces the chief was Holland, and this accounts for the habit of referring to the modern Kingdom of The Netherlands as Holland, though, in fact, Holland remained only a Province of the Union.

Philip offered a reward for William the 'Silent, dead or alive, and in 1584 the Dutch leader was assassinated. Meanwhile, the seven United Provinces deliberately renounced their allegiance to Philip, and made an important declaration that it is the right of a people to overthrow a tyrannical prince and put another in his place. This is specially significant as a statement of political principle by which for the first time a revolutionary régime was constitutionally justified, for it was the first of a series of political revolutions which later included the English Revolution of 1688-1689, the American Revolution of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789. On the murder of William the Silent the situation looked black for the Dutch, but they were finally saved by the change in the general European situation, which made possible an alliance between France, England, and the Dutch, and finally forced Spain to acknowledge defeat.

In England the reign of Mary Tudor (1553-1558) had seen a Catholic reaction, with all the horrors of torture and execution, and the marriage of the English queen to Philip himself. Her reign was mercifully brief, but long enough to reduce the country to a deplorable condition when her half-sister Elizabeth succeeded her in 1558. "The queen poor; the realm exhausted; the nobility poor and decayed; good captains and soldiers wanting; the people out of order; justice not executed; all things dear; division among ourselves; war with France; the French king bestriding the realm, having one foot in Calais and the other in Scotland; steadfast enemies, but no steadfast friends." So it was described in a letter to William Cecil, Lord Burghley, to whose great statesmanship it was in no small measure due that the reign of Elizabeth turned out to be among the most glorious in our national annals. For that situation required in its handling political genius of the highest order, and, most fortunately for England and Europe at large, the combined wit of the Queen and her chief minister supplied it.

Philip valued England's friendship sufficiently highly to extend towards Elizabeth the hand of conciliation, and Elizabeth responded at first with a policy of appeasement, which, however, did not exclude a definite Protestant settlement of the Church and aid for the Scottish reformers against Mary, Queen of Scots, supported by a French garrison. Thus in the first years of the reign the Anglican Church was finally settled, and in Scotland the Presbyterian Church triumphed under the leadership of John Knox, as a result both of the folly of the one and the

wisdom of the other of the two queens, whose rule he indiscriminatingly stigmatised as "the monstrous regiment of women." As the country slowly recovered from the wretchedness of the opening years of Elizabeth's reign, it was emboldened to take more definitive action against the Catholic peril. Mary Stuart, driven from her Scottish throne, became a centre of intrigues and plots in England, hatched by Jesuits and supported by Philip, which reached such a point of danger in 1586 that Mary was tried and condemned to death, and in the following year the sentence was carried out. Thereupon the Pope declared a crusade against England, and Philip was thus precipitated into the mobilisation and despatch of the Armada in 1588.

Meanwhile, France had been racked by civil war. This internecine strife was engendered by the factions which the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had created, and with these factions two branches of the French royal family came to be identified. France, as we have seen, had from the earliest days of her statehood been a champion of the Catholic Church, but this did not prevent the rapid spread of a Gallic form of Calvinism, whose adherents came to be known as Huguenots. It was adopted by people of all classes in various parts of the country. Though its strongholds were principally in the towns of the south and west, its settlement was by no means homogeneous, and the religious strife which developed was seen not merely within a region or a town but even within families. There was thus generated an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and conspiracy, which exacerbated the conflict and threatened to reduce France, whose unity had been so laboriously built up by the Valois kings of the Renaissance period, to a state of anarchy and chaos.


In 1559, the year of the Elizabethan Church settlement, peace was made between France and Spain after their forty years' war, and Henry II died, leaving four sons, all of them minors, in the charge of their mother, Catherine de Medici. The policy of the Queen Mother was to prevent ambitious noblemen profiting by this situation to improve their political position. The struggle between them took on the character of a faction fight in which the two sides were identified with the two religions. The chief Protestants were the family of Bourbon, which had married into the House of Valois. In 1562 a Huguenot service was violently interrupted by the royal soldiery and many Huguenots were slain. This was the signal for the outbreak of civil war,

which went on for the next thirty years. Three of the four sons of Catherine reigned in turn, but they were all weaklings and failed to grasp the helm of the ship of state, which continued to flounder in the uncertain seas of internecine strife.

In 1572 Catherine had the idea of a purge of the Huguenots, and so occurred the shameful massacre of St. Bartholomew. This failed of its purpose and merely embittered the struggle. The death of the fourth son of Catherine in 1584, during the reign of the third, made Henry of Navarre, the eldest male of the Bourbon line and the leader of the Huguenots, the heir to the throne. The danger seemed so great to the forces of Catholicism that the Catholic leaders in France joined Philip II of Spain in the Catholic League for the exclusion of Protestants from the succession. So it came about that Europe was clearly divided, with Philip II and the French Catholics on one side, and the Dutch, the Huguenots, and Elizabeth on the other.

In this sense the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was an event equally decisive for the English, the Dutch, and the French. For the English and the Dutch it removed a pressing danger and laid the bogy of Spanish invincibility. For the French it hastened the discomfiture of the Catholic League and paved the way for the reign of Henry of Navarre. In 1589 he encompassed the assassination of the last of his Valois cousins, Henry III, and at once assumed the royal title. But the struggle was not yet over, and to help his victory he formed a Protestant alliance with England and Holland against Spain. In 1593 he shrewdly decided that "Paris was worth a mass" and was converted to the Roman faith. He thus made it possible for Catholic France to accept him as king, and ultimately secured for those of his own erstwhile faith the principle of toleration through the Edict of Nantes. So began the decline of Spain as a European power. From that moment England, freed from the shadow of Spanish domination, went forward to her national and imperial destiny, to the triumph of her parliamentary institutions, which are her peculiar gift to the world, to the colonisation of North America, and to the establishment of her empire in India.

From that moment, too, the Dutch were assured of their independence, which was achieved in 1609, when the Spanish acknowledged defeat, and was finally recognised as part of the public law of Europe by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Even then the Dutch Republic was nothing more than the loosest



RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS IN EUROPE ABOUT 1600.

confederation of the Seven Provinces. Each province retained a distinct local government and administration, but all sent representatives to a common assembly known as the States-General. At the head of the federal government was a Governor-General known as the Stadtholder, an office which became hereditary in the House of Orange. It was a scion of this House, the Stadtholder William III, great-grandson of William the Silent and grandson of the English Charles I, who with his wife Mary, daughter of James II, ascended the English throne in 1689 as a result of the revolution which deposed his father-in-law. Thus the close relations of the Dutch and English peoples were crowned by a union which, brief though it was, ensured the defeat of the territorial ambitions of the French under Louis XIV.

During the seventeenth century, the Protestant Netherlands made important contributions to Western Civilisation; among them the physical science nurtured at the University of Leyden, the foundations of modern international law in the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), and the art of the great Dutch painters, Rembrandt, Hals, and the two generations of Teniers. In the same period the Dutch also established an empire in the East Indies. But domestic politics were embittered by a growing conflict between the States-General and the Stadtholders. The Stadtholders aimed at breaking down the separatism of the individual provinces in order to achieve political unity, which the States-General resisted. Not until the end of the Napoleonic Wars was this conflict resolved. Then the Dutch, at last conscious of their common nationality, united under the constitutional monarchy of the House of Orange, which has remained one of the stabilising and progressive forces of good government in Europe to this day.

The Thirty Years' War and the Dismemberment of Germany

The effect of the religious wars caused by the Reformation on Germany was disastrous. Since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) Germany had been fairly peaceful, though at the price of a religious uniformity in each state far more burdensome than that of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages. At the very time that the Catholic Church was reinspired by the Counter-Reformation, Protestant Germany was divided. The growth of the Reformed Church which Luther had founded led to many

variations of his teaching, and the Lutheran states were in constant conflict. Besides the Reformed Church of Luther, the Evangelical Church of Calvin was adopted in some German states, but, far from a common Protestantism proving a bond between them, the Lutheran and the Calvinist states were mutually suspicious. Meanwhile the Catholic revival, under the incentive of the Counter-Reformation and the missionary Jesuits, who spread rapidly through the land, was flourishing and seemed to be aiming at the suppression of Protestantism in Germany, with the result that some Calvinist states, led by the Palatinate of the Rhine, formed the Evangelical Union in 1608. The reply of the Catholics was to form in the following year the Catholic League.

It only required the kind of situation that arose in 1617 to drive the two sides to arms. In that year Ferdinand of Styria, cousin of the reigning Emperor Matthias and the prospective heir to the Empire, was adopted as heir to Matthias also as King of Bohemia. Now, Ferdinand had been bred in the hard and uncompromising school of the Jesuits, and it was his known intention to bring the whole of Germany back into the Catholic fold. Indignant at the repressive measures of the government, some Bohemian Protestant nobles in the following year revolted and hurled two Imperial emissaries from a window of a palace at Prague. This act of "defenestration" was the signal for the outbreak of war. Imperial troops were sent to Bohemia, and in 1619, when Ferdinand succeeded Matthias as Emperor, the Bohemians deposed him and elected in his place Frederick, the Elector of the Palatinate, a Calvinist who had married Elizabeth, the daughter of James I of England, and who thus became the grandfather of the future George I. The Catholic League immediately armed in support of Ferdinand. The forces of the League marched on Prague and crushed the forces of Frederick at the Battle of the White Hill in 1620. This battle extinguished the independence of Bohemia which was not to be regained until 1918, when the Bohemians, or Czechs, their national spirit miraculously surviving three centuries of repression, formed, in conjunction with the Slovaks, the new state of Czecho-Slovakia, which was to play such a fateful part in the salvation of Western Civilisation in the Second World War.

The Thirty Years' War was a catastrophe of the first order for Germany and Europe at large. Beginning as a war of

religion, it developed into a political struggle in which not only Germany but surrounding states were involved. As a religious war it was completely futile, for it merely perpetuated Germany's religious divisions. As a political contest, it reinforced her political dismemberment. It laid the land waste, destroyed its economic structure, impoverished its peasantry, sealed the doom of the Holy Roman Empire, and left the whole country in a state of anarchy at the very time when the more westerly states of Europe were building empires overseas. Though a war of religion, it had few spiritual features, and indeed was marked by a barbarity and frightfulness quite unprecedented in the history of Europe. The various generals adopted the practice of living on the country, putting its economic life in grave jeopardy, while mercenaries on both sides outraged the decencies of social existence.

The war went through three well-defined phases, according to the entrances and exits of the powers outside Germany which at various times supported the Protestant states. First the King of Denmark, who, as Duke of Holstein, was a German prince, helped them up to 1629, but failed in his purpose. This phase was marked by the emergence on the Imperial side of the great general, Wallenstein. His ruthless discipline, his mercenary armies, and his victories made the Emperor for a time master of Germany. But in 1630 Wallenstein was deposed, and the second phase began with the appearance of Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden (1611-1632). He was a genuine supporter of the Protestant cause, but his main incentive was the desire to make the Baltic a Swedish lake. He soon made himself master of the Rhine principalities, and occupied Bavaria, with its centre at Munich, the headquarters of the Catholic League. It seemed that the tide had turned and Protestantism would triumph. But at this fateful juncture for the Empire and Catholicism, the Emperor turned to Wallenstein once more. He emerged from his retirement, and the two great generals met at the battle of Lutzen in 1632. Gustavus defeated Wallenstein, who was forced to withdraw his forces, but the Swedish king lost his life in the battle and the Swedes were not to find another leader of equal calibre until the emergence of Charles XII at the end of the century. Two years later Wallenstein was assassinated and the war took a new turn.

Meanwhile France had been an interested and even active spectator of the war. At this time the secular affairs of France

were directed by Richelieu, a Roman Catholic cardinal, who saw in the support of Protestantism in Germany a means of heightening the power of France. He allied with the Swedes, took control of the Protestant League, and declared war on Spain, an ally of the Emperor, belonging to another branch of the Hapsburg family. Under such distinguished commanders as the Prince of Condé and Turenne, the French arms prospered both in Germany and the Spanish Netherlands, and at Richelieu's death in 1642 France was virtually arbiter of Europe's destinies. Richelieu was succeeded by Cardinal Mazarin as the chief minister to the Regent, and he brought about the situation in which the Treaty of Westphalia, which at long last ended the war, was negotiated in 1648 after three years of complicated diplomatic discussion.

On the religious side the Peace lamentably failed to achieve anything like unity. Protestantism had been saved by the intervention of Sweden and France, and by the Treaty the conditions of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) were renewed, except that Calvinism as well as Lutheranism was recognised. But the principle of the subject being forced to profess the religion of the prince was fully maintained. On the political side all the protagonists gained something. The Emperor secured the Crown of Bohemia, which remained for nearly three centuries a part of the domain of the Austrian Hapsburgs. Sweden maintained a foothold south of the Baltic by acquiring Western Pomerania, opposite the south-eastern point of her peninsula, as well as the Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden to the south-west of Denmark. Most important of all, France reached the Rhine by the acquisition of Alsace, and thus sowed the seeds of future wars between herself and Germany when Germany, under the impulse of a militant nationalism, should recover from the disintegrating effects of the Peace of Westphalia.

Germany itself was completely dismembered. It seems incredible, but it is a fact, that the Treaty of Westphalia recognised no fewer than 343 sovereign states in Germany, of which 158 were secular states, 123 were ecclesiastical principalities, and 62 were Imperial cities. The Treaty recognised the right of each of these states to make war and conclude alliances. Though after this the Holy Roman Empire continued in name for more than a century and a half, it ceased to have any reality. The larger states of Germany, such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Bavaria, lived completely independent lives, while the

Austrian Hapsburgs concentrated their attention more and more on their "Ramshackle Empire" which was predominantly non-German, and so gradually developed the situation in which Austria was finally to be expelled by Bismarck from the German union. The future of German greatness thus lay, not in the maintenance of the First Reich, but through the power of one of its independent states—the power of Prussia. The end of the religious struggle was also marked politically at Westphalia by the European recognition of the independence of the Dutch Netherlands and Switzerland.

The Significance of Westphalia

Few treaties are of greater importance in the history of Europe than that of Westphalia, for not only did it make a settlement of Germany which, in its broad features, lasted for a century and a half, but was so vast in its scope as to become a recognised statement of the public law of Europe. Indeed, in the Treaty of Westphalia the states-system of Europe, which had gradually developed from the conception and practice of Renaissance sovereignty, was for the first time formally acknowledged in a public document. Moreover, the Treaty was laboriously built up from a series of diplomatic conferences, and such a congress of ambassadors thereafter became the accepted method of treaty-making. So the significance of the Treaty of Westphalia is not that it found a way for the maintenance of peace, for this it did not do, but rather that it accepted the conditions which made the ding-dong of war and peace an acknowledged feature of the international life of Europe. In reflecting the balance of religious and political forces at that time, the Treaty established a diplomatic balance which only had to be disturbed to make further wars inevitable.

So it was that the Renaissance broke Europe up into warring factions and the Reformation atomised it still further. The first series of wars resulting from the emergence of the Renaissance state rendered Italy powerless as a political entity and ruined any prospect she might otherwise have had of achieving unity. The second series of wars, started by the spark fired all unwittingly by Luther's revolt, caused the decline of Spain and with it the disruption of the Netherlands. The third series of wars dismembered Germany. The Thirty Years' War left Germany weak and helpless for a century. Her agricultural

lands were ruined and deserted, her population decimated, and her civilisation reduced to barbarism. It is estimated that, as a result of the war, the population of the whole of Germany dropped by two-thirds, and that of Berlin from 24,000 to 8,000, while that of Bohemia fell to less than a quarter of its pre-war bulk.

While Italy and Germany were thus sunk in the weakness caused by the wars of which they were the cockpits, France, Holland, and Britain moved on to new horizons. France emerged from the wars with markedly increased prestige and a new foreign policy, which carried her, in the Age of Louis XIV, so soon to dawn, to unparalleled heights of brilliance and power. The Dutch found independence, expansion, and prosperity. England, profiting by her isolation from the continental maelstrom, strengthened her own internal constitution. Thus, while the sun of Imperial Spain was already setting, France, Holland, and Britain went forward to new overseas greatness. For the expansion of Europe, in which Germany and Italy played no part, was the third great formative factor of this dynamic period, and to this we must now turn.

CHAPTER X

EXPANSION OF EUROPE

EXPLORATION AND COLONISATION

The Oceanic Revolution

THE most dynamic and startling aspect of the Renaissance was seen in a remarkable outburst of maritime activity which covered the last quarter of the fifteenth and most of the sixteenth century. This period is usually known as the Age of Discovery. The voyages of the great pioneers of this time originated in the simple urge to find new and less costly routes along which to bring to Europe the products of the East. It was a movement, in short, not to discover new lands but to find new ways to old lands. The search was carried out in two directions : the eastward route via Africa and the westward route across the Atlantic. But the latter led, by perhaps the strangest accident in history, to the discovery of a new hemisphere which was destined to revolutionise the development of Europe and the world at large.

The triumphs of navigation which filled this most productive century lay, as it were, in the womb of time. For the ideas which at length materialised in the sea route to the East via Africa, the discovery of America, and the circumnavigation of the globe had been simmering in the scientific minds of Europe for 2,000 years. Ancient Greeks had constantly toyed with the idea of seeking the mysterious lands believed to lie beyond the western outlet of the Mediterranean, which they called the Pillars of Hercules, and the Greek scientist, Pythagoras, as long previously as 500 B.C., had held that the world was round. India had been known to the Greeks and the Romans, and one of the latter, Seneca (4 B.C.—A.D. 65), had ventilated the view that a westward route to India was possible with a good wind at one's back. Like many other fruits of scientific speculation, these views had been obscured during most of the Middle Ages, but towards their close they were revived, and a sort of geographical ferment became a vital aspect of the general intellectual revival of the Renaissance period.

This ferment met and merged with the economic needs of

the time. With the rise of towns and the emergence of a merchant class came an increased demand for the products of the East. These products were mainly pepper and such spices as ginger, cloves, nutmeg, and cinnamon, as well as silks and precious stones. They were brought from Ceylon, Sumatra, India, and China, that fabulous region generally known to Europeans as Cathay, to the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean, either overland or by way of the Red Sea, and it was mainly through the trade in these commodities that the commercial greatness of Italian cities, like Venice and Genoa, grew. The Crusades hastened and enhanced the growth of the trade of the Italian cities, for the Crusades required provisioning, and Venice and Genoa, both geographically and economically, were well placed for this purpose and profited accordingly. Moreover, the Crusaders were struck by the luxury and opulence of the East and brought back with them new standards of living. Thenceforth it became the habit of the wealthy to use Eastern spices to give flavour to the tough and tasteless fare of the mediæval table, and precious stones for adornment and for the magical qualities they were supposed to possess.

Towards the end of the Middle Ages all this trade was disturbed by the spread of the Ottoman Turks throughout the Levant and the Balkans. Although Venice and Genoa managed to maintain trade relations with the Moslem masters of the Near East, they had to pay much heavier dues, and soon the cost became prohibitive. The more westerly states of Europe were bound to accept these conditions while the monopoly was in the hands of the Mediterranean merchants. Their only means of escape from this thralldom was, therefore, to seek new routes to the sources of supply, which would at the same time outflank the Turk and end their dependence on the Italians. But the mere economic urge would not have been sufficient without the scientific and geographical knowledge of the time which encouraged pioneers to venture into new waters. It undoubtedly required great courage to leave the safety of an inland sea and seek new routes east and west on uncharted oceans. But already much was known to the later Middle Ages which had not been known before. In the thirteenth century, Franciscan friars had crossed Central Asia as far as the court of the Mongol Emperor, and the publication of the travels of Marco Polo (1254-1323) to the court of Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China, had given a new incentive to exploring pioneers. The

earth was known by the enlightened to be spherical, and the Indies were thought to border the western extremes of the Atlantic Ocean. The compass was already being used and latitude was broadly determinable. Maps and fairly accurate sailing directions were available, and these enabled seamen to take risks which might otherwise have been beyond their intrepidity.

Much of this progress in the science of navigation was due to the inspiration of that great Prince of Portugal, known, with rather more appropriateness than that which generally attaches to the soubriquets of historical characters, as Henry the Navigator (1394-1460). If, as someone has remarked, Prince Henry was what we should now call a company promoter, that only emphasises the economic urge which was behind this great movement. But at least he was a company promoter of imagination, for he set up a naval training station at Sagres, next to the port of Lagos, where he drew around him a number of geographers and navigators whose researches and records made possible the voyages which he sponsored. Thus Portuguese seamen started their long crawl down the west coast of Africa in the firm faith that they would ultimately find the path which would lead them to the lands of the East. Their determination was at last rewarded when in 1486 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Storms, otherwise known, by a name which more truthfully commemorates the attitude of these indomitable pioneers, as the Cape of Good Hope. The route thus charted was followed by others from the same school of navigation, and twelve years later, in 1498, Vasco da Gama reached the Malabar coast in the south-west of the inverted triangle of India.

It was soon apparent that da Gama had opened a road to tremendous prizes. He returned to Lisbon in 1499 with a cargo from the Indies almost a hundred times as great in value as the cost of the expedition. Thereafter Portuguese fleets constantly rounded the Cape, and during the first two decades of the sixteenth century established highly profitable trading stations on the mainland of India, in Ceylon, on the East Indian islands, such as Sumatra, Java, and Celebes, and even as far east as New Guinea. With the Turkish conquest of Egypt in 1517, the sea passage to and from India became positively cheaper than the caravan route, whose cost was enhanced by the tribute which the Turks imposed. From that time the Cape route became the common one, and it remained the highway to the

East for more than three centuries, until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

The same causes operated in the case of the voyages of Columbus, who travelled in the service of the Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella. The chronicle of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in 1492 constitutes, in the most literal sense of the term, a chapter of accidents. That Columbus, who was a native of Genoa, undertook his voyages into the unknown West under the ægis of Spain resulted from the accident of the rejection of his plan by the King of Portugal and its arrival too late to be accepted by the King of England. Spain was not at that time, as Portugal was, a genuinely maritime power, nor did she in fact ever really become so, though this stroke of fortune gave her a period of imperial greatness before she was pauperised by her riches and sank back into a sort of mediæval mentality. Finally, the discovery of America was itself an accident, for Columbus's intention was to find a westward route to the Indies and the East. When he landed on the Bahamas in October 1492, he imagined, through a colossal error as to the size of the globe, that he had touched the Indies, and this error is commemorated in the name Indians applied to the natives of the American continent and the term Indies applied to the islands of Central America, afterwards, when the error was discovered, called West Indies to distinguish them from the actual Indies, thenceforward called East Indies. In spite of three separate visits to the islands of the Caribbean, and even touching the mainland, Columbus died in ignorance of the fact that he had discovered a new continent.

The voyages of Columbus started a fever of maritime activity and discovery, which proceeded for the next century. In 1497 John Cabot, an Italian in the service of Henry VII, planted the English flag on the coast of Labrador in the area called Newfoundland. In 1500 Cabral, with a Portuguese expedition following the Cape route to India, was blown off his course and so accidentally landed on the mainland of South America and claimed for the King of Portugal the area called Brazil, which the Portuguese colonised and where Portuguese is consequently spoken to this day. In 1499-1500 a Florentine, Amerigo Vespucci, visited Brazil, and on his return wrote a book called *The New World*. History knows few more grave injustices than the snatching from Columbus by Amerigo of the honour of naming the newly discovered continent. Even after Balboa

in 1513 discovered that another ocean lay beyond the Isthmus of Panama, the explorers were still under a profound misconception as to the size of the globe, and persisted in thinking that the original Indies could be no more than a few days' sail beyond the new land.

In this belief explorers tried to get through to the new sea. The chief of these was Magellan, a Portuguese mariner in the service of Spain, whence he sailed westward in 1519. He rounded the southern point of the American continent through the turbulent waters of the straits which still bear his name, and continued into the Pacific Ocean, so called by him from the relief and peace it afforded after the stormy passage through the narrows. He went on westward across this ocean, reaching the islands to the north of Australasia, and though he himself was slain in a brush with the natives of the Philippines, one of his ships succeeded in circumnavigating the globe and arrived at Lisbon in 1522. The significance of the voyage of Magellan and his men was that it proved beyond a peradventure the sphericity of the earth and placed America in the minds of Europeans in its proper relation to the known countries of the world. As a result of it, Europe became aware of the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, which is now known to be the largest sheet of water on the globe, occupying one-third of its marine surface and being as large as the whole land area of the world put together.

But Magellan's westward route to the East was not the only one attempted in the sixteenth century. Other explorers tried to find a north-west route to the north of the American continent, and even a north-east route to the north of Russia. The exploration of the North-West Passage is mainly associated with French explorers, such as Cartier, and English seamen in the great Elizabethan age of exploration, notably Frobisher, Davis, and Hudson, all of whom have left their names on the map of that region. The North-West Passage proved a mirage, but out of the dogged seamanship inspired by the pursuit of it grew the tradition of French and English interests in North America, where the two nations were afterwards to fight out their great colonial struggle. Meanwhile, another Englishman, Drake, following the example of Magellan, succeeded in circumnavigating the globe between the years 1577 and 1580. By the end of the sixteenth century the exploring phase of the expansion of Europe may be said to have been completed. By that time,

though the main island of Australia had still to be discovered, the chief geographical features of the world were known, and exploration then gave way to colonisation.

The Colonisation of America

"For more than a century after Columbus's achievement," says A. F. Pollard, "the New World was a Roman Catholic preserve with a few Protestant wasps buzzing around it."¹ In fact, Pope Alexander VI had, within two years of Columbus's first voyage to America, issued a Bull dividing the world outside Europe between Spain and Portugal by a longitudinal line of demarcation fixed at 370 leagues west of Cape Verde Islands, declaring all lands west of this line to be the property of Spain and all to the east of it that of Portugal. This pronouncement showed that Europe had not then realised the magnitude of the change that was coming upon it through the Age of Discovery. The Catholic powers might seek to monopolise the control of the brave new world which the dynamic spirit of Europe was opening up, but by the very logic of the situation the national states of France and England and the new state of the Dutch Netherlands were bound to claim a share of its fruits, and the succeeding years were to prove that no power on earth, heaven-sent though it might seem, could prevent them.

The Spanish conquest and colonisation of Central and South America followed a natural line of development. Starting from the first settlement on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola (Haiti) as a base, the Spaniards had, by the end of the sixteenth century, made themselves masters of most of the West Indian islands and of the mainland from Florida and Mexico in the north to Chile, Patagonia, and the area of the River Plate in the south; that is to say, in South America most of the littoral except Brazil, which was Portuguese. The conquest was carried out by individual adventurers under royal patents. Most of these *conquistadores* were inspired by motives compounded of religion, glory, and the lust for gold. From the stories of the early colonisation of America by the Spaniards we gain an impression of a mighty gold rush, and this was undoubtedly largely true of Cortez's conquest of Mexico which began in 1519, and even more so of Pizarro's conquest of Peru, effectively opened in 1531. Their conquests were marked by

¹ *Factors in Modern History*, page 39.

utter ruthlessness and cruelty. The natives were mercilessly exploited and their civilisation destroyed, for the greater glory of God and in the name of the Most Catholic King. An abundance of gold, silver, and precious stones rewarded the endeavours of the adventurers and enriched the coffers of Spain, but it fixed upon her a false economy which ultimately destroyed her as a great power.

But this is only a partial picture. Though the production of precious metals was in the minds of most Spaniards the principal *raison d'être* of American colonies, there were areas, such as Yucatan, Chile, and the River Plate, which were mostly pastoral and agricultural. Moreover, in their colonies in Central and South America the Spanish colonists introduced European methods of cultivation and mining, and built cities, cathedrals, and universities. The Catholic Church, under Jesuit influence, played a leading part in the intellectual life of the cities, and generally by its missionary zeal softened the hand of the adventurers against the natives. The cruel oppression which the gold seekers imposed on the natives decimated them, but they were saved from utter extinction by the noble work of such priests as Bartolomeo de las Casas. As a result of the humanitarian mission of the priests, the Spaniards and Indians learned to live in amity, and freely intermarried. So to-day the situation in Latin-America is quite different from that in the United States. Whereas in the United States the Indians were always sparse, have remained largely isolated, and form not more than 0.4 per cent. of the total population, in Latin-America the Indians always outnumbered the Spaniards, and the people are mixed, being still largely Indian in blood, Roman Catholic in faith, and Spanish-speaking, except in Brazil, where Portuguese is spoken.

While the Spaniards claimed as of right the whole of the American continent except Brazil, they were destined to make no permanent settlement north of Mexico and Florida, though from these colonies they made frequent expeditions into the area now covered by the United States. The lands north of those settlements were reserved for the French, the English, and the Dutch, who in the first two decades of the seventeenth century came successfully into the field of American colonisation. The English made no attempt to follow Cabot's example in Newfoundland until the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603), when, as part of the general campaign against Spain, seadogs like

Hawkins, Cavendish, and Drake organised guerilla attacks on the Spanish treasure ships homeward bound from America. If as guerilla warfare this onslaught was immediately a great success, as a sustained exercise in attrition it was ultimately the way of freedom in North America, since, with the Spanish power crippled after the defeat of the Armada in 1588, the oceanic marauding of the second half of the sixteenth century gave place to the beginnings of colonial settlement in the early years of the seventeenth.

After much speculation and planning of settlements which came to nothing under Elizabeth, the first colonies were founded in the reign of James I (1603-1625). Virginia, the first of the southern type of colony, was settled in 1607. The Pilgrim Fathers arrived in 1620 and founded the first of the type of New England colony. After this, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, twelve of what became the original thirteen colonies were settled. The thirteenth was that taken from the Dutch, who in 1614 had settled on the Hudson in the area which afterwards became New York. The acquisition by England of this Dutch colony in 1664 gave the English by the early eighteenth century a continuous line of colonies on the Atlantic seaboard from the St. Lawrence in the north to the northern boundary of Spanish Florida in the south. The number of colonies remained at thirteen until after the War of American Independence (1775-1783).


The civilisation of the thirteen colonies was a littoral civilisation, a civilisation of the coast, and before they could hope for the security on which alone full development could be achieved they had to face and overcome the danger of a French attack from the hinterland. Actually, the claims of the French in North America were older than those of the English, for they had begun to explore the northern continent early in the sixteenth century. The work of exploration and settlement was mainly carried out by three pioneers. The first was Jacques Cartier (1491-1557), who sought a north-west passage along the St. Lawrence, and though he made no permanent settlement he reached the sites of the later French cities of Quebec and Montreal. The next was Samuel de Champlain (1567-1635), known as the Father of New France, who founded the French colony of Quebec, discovered Lake Ontario and explored the Ottawa Valley. It was left to the third of the French pioneers, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle (1643-1687), to complete a

chain of trading-posts from the Great Lakes along the route of the Mississippi to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico. It was this development of French power in the interior of North America which threatened the littoral settlements of the British and led to war between the two peoples in the eighteenth century, while the defeat of the French in the war both secured the future of Canada as a British self-governing Dominion and cleared the way for the revolt of the American colonies and the establishment of the United States.

The expansion of Europe to the east at this stage took rather a different form. The great Portuguese trading settlements in southern Asia had been set up as a result of the expeditions of navigators supported by the Portuguese royal house. But they were soon to lose most of them to the Dutch, whose maritime strength grew in the latter half of the sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth. The temporary union of Spain and Portugal under Philip II and the successful revolt of the Dutch Netherlands made the Portuguese the enemies of the Dutch, and by the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had largely succeeded to the Eastern Empire of Portugal.

Economic Nationalism : the Mercantile System

The commercial revolution and the founding of colonies in the West and of trading-posts in the East had a most marked effect on the internal economy of European states. The term expansion of Europe quite literally explains the attitude of the states on the west of Europe to this process. The expansion was, in fact, regarded as a direct transfer of the state's power to the colony and the colony was looked upon as a community whose business it was to assist in strengthening the mother country. This is commemorated in the names used to designate some of the colonies of European states, such as New Spain, New France, New England, and New Netherland. When trade ceased to be confined to the Mediterranean and became world-wide, the commercial supremacy of the great city states ceased and their powers were transferred to the states of the West. In this way commerce became a national instead of a municipal matter and a new national economy was introduced. Thus the sovereign power which had been the mark of the Renaissance on its political side, and which had been reinforced by the Protestant Reformation, was further strengthened by the new



THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE.
 Exploration and colonisation to the middle of the eighteenth century.

economy induced by the Commercial Revolution and the rise of colonial interests.

The greatness of a state was now to be measured not by its chivalry or devoutness but by its financial resources. And financial resources for that age meant stores of precious metals. How were such stores to be acquired? The answer is: by means of what was called a "favourable balance of trade." If a state could import cheap raw materials and use them for the manufacture and export of costly articles, the favourable balance of trade thus established would bring gold into the country and the state would be to that extent stronger. This was known as the Mercantile Theory, which dominated the economics of European states for the best part of the next two centuries, until the dissolving effects of the Industrial Revolution led to the growth of *laissez-faire*. Under this system of mercantile nationalism, colonies had a definite rôle in the imperial structure of the Western states, which was the production of raw materials and the consumption of manufactured goods. Thus the home government might by strict regulations forbid the manufacture of certain articles in the colonies, which would thus be forced to import them from the mother country, or prohibit the export of colonial products to any other country but the homeland.

The way in which the state generally operated the mercantile system was by delegating its functions in this respect to Chartered Companies. In the seventeenth century, for example, England, Holland, and France each chartered an East India Company. The first English settlements in North America were made by the London and Plymouth Companies chartered by the Crown. And there were other similar companies formed to develop trade with Guiana, Bermuda, and Hudson Bay. Such companies were often given large powers and privileges, with the right to build forts, maintain armed forces, and make war. The most obvious example of this was the British East India Company which, founded in 1600, carried out the conquest of India and remained responsible for its government until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Company was abolished and its powers were finally transferred to the Crown.

The evolution of the Chartered Company laid the foundations of modern methods of finance. First the Regulated Company was a community of merchants each doing his own business and taking the profits, but contributing to a common fund for defence and being subject to certain common rules of conduct.

This was soon found to be too primitive in face of the great expansion of trade, and it gave place to the Joint Stock Company. Under this system each contributor drew profits according to his share in the joint stock. Joint stock companies became very popular for all sorts of enterprises, and were not to change their general form until the introduction of the principle of limited liability in the middle of the nineteenth century. A concomitant development of this evolution was a tremendous increase in the business of banking. This had been banned by the Church in the Middle Ages, and was consequently confined to the Jews. But with the expansion of trade and the breakdown of Catholic feudal sanctions, it became a widespread and profitable occupation among Christians. Thus great banking houses grew up in London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Frankfurt, ready to assist the rapid development of world trade by lending money at interest.

The introduction of all sorts of new commodities into Europe resulted from the expansion of trade and colonisation, and these brought about many changes in domestic and social life. The list of such new commodities includes tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, rice, rum, whale-oil, whalebone, furs, and the potato, which was transplanted from America, especially to Ireland where it became a staple diet. In return Europe exported manufactures and luxuries. But among the most fatally profitable exports to the New World for which Europeans made themselves responsible were African negro slaves. Slavery, as we have seen, had been a fundamental institution in the societies of the ancient world, and had not been unknown in mediæval Europe. Its revival in the modern age was due to two causes : first, the need for cheap labour in America, where the Indians were either insufficient or reduced in numbers, and secondly to the profits of the slave trade, which in itself became a vast and lucrative undertaking. Thus the expansion of Europe was responsible for the introduction of the gravest problem of modern American society. Further, the growth of trade caused changes in Europe in methods both of industry and of agriculture. In industry it introduced new commodities, such as cotton and silk which were outside the mediæval regulations of the guilds, and the domestic system of manufacture gradually replaced the older form of gild organisation and brought in the capitalist, who provided the domestic workers with the raw materials, paid them wages for their work, and marketed the manufactured

goods. In agriculture, too, it introduced new methods to meet the need to feed more workers.

As E. Lipson has pointed out,¹ there is a striking similarity between the mercantile system of the seventeenth century and the economic statecraft of to-day. We see in both the pursuit of the same object: economic nationalism based on the idea of a favourable balance of trade; and the same methods used to achieve it: the discouragement of imports, the prohibition of exports, the promotion of key industries, and the regimentation of economic life. In both, the policy of economic nationalism arises out of and intensifies political independence, although the earlier form of it emerged before nationalism had grown into the militant force it has since become and before the Industrial Revolution had developed to bring in the modern technique. In fact, the wheel has turned full circle, presenting a phenomenon which should serve to drive home the lesson of the living past and the hopelessness of trying to understand the contemporary problem without it.

The Significance of the Revolution

It would be impossible to exaggerate the magnitude of the changes brought about in the life and outlook of Europe by the combined effect of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Oceanic Revolution; for these three movements were complementary to one another. Or perhaps it would be truer to say that in the process of the expansion of Europe the forces of the intellectual, political, and religious revolution wrought by the Renaissance and Reformation were concentrated and discharged. In these movements we see modern Europe escaping from the restrictions of the Middle Ages, and when they had worked themselves out we find a Europe in which new sanctions have replaced the old. From this it is clear that a new order of things did not suddenly replace the ancient ways. The change was, on the contrary, an evolutionary process. If the men of the Renaissance broke away from mediæval traditions of learning by returning to the humanistic outlook of the Greeks, it was the discipline of mediæval scholarship which made this possible. And if the churchmen of the Reformation attempted to restore the Church, they were only following the example set by some of the best minds of the Middle Ages.

¹ In *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, page 486.

Nevertheless, the consequences of the changes that these two movements brought in their train were profound and lasting. And these consequences were seen in their most marked form in the Age of Discovery, in the Oceanic Revolution, and in the expansion of Europe. Up to the fifteenth century the civilised world had centred round the Mediterranean. As we have seen, the great foundations of our civilisation—Greek culture, Roman unity, and the Christian Church—were built in the Mediterranean lands around an inland sea, and long after the imperial greatness of Rome had passed away men still regarded Italy as the hub of their universe. Throughout the Middle Ages the Church, with its centre at Rome, remained the dominant force in society, and the growth of an institution like the Holy Roman Empire demonstrates the magnetic power of Italy. But all this belonged to a feudal society, whose economic structure was based on land as the unit of wealth and whose social organisation was marked by a broad division into two classes: landowners and villeins, or overlords and serfs.

The change brought about in the organisation of society through these movements was due to the growth of towns and of a middle class, made up of merchants, bankers, shopkeepers, and the personnel of the professions, whose interests were mainly commercial. It was the advent of the middle class, more than anything else, which made possible the change from the mediæval to the modern age. The Renaissance was the intellectual aspect of the growth of this class, and the Reformation was essentially the revolt of the middle-class laity against the Catholic Church. Similarly, it was the middle class which encouraged the expansion of Europe and profited most by it. It is not conceivable that such an expansion could have taken place while society was still predominantly feudal in structure. It could not be achieved until the New Monarch of the Renaissance, with the middle class behind him, made trade and intercourse no longer a local and municipal but a national concern. Henceforth not ownership of land but commercial profit was the main criterion of wealth. In those countries of the West, such as Spain, where a middle class did not thrive, we find a tendency to lose grip of the advantages of an expanding world and to drop out of the race; while the continental countries of the Centre and the East were completely out of the track of the new highways. In France, the Netherlands, and Britain it was very different. There the middle class grew in wealth and

influence as commercial interests became predominant. And it was they who at length precipitated revolutions and took control of the political machine.

Through the voyages of discovery of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries world trade was diverted from the Mediterranean to ocean routes. The Atlantic was found to be not a limitless unfriendly ocean but one that joined Europe to a new world of vast potentialities. This knowledge, and the development it implied, meant the end of the Mediterranean as the commercial highway of the world and its replacement by the Atlantic. It meant the decay of Italian cities like Venice and Genoa, and their supersession by such cities as Antwerp and London. As a result of the voyages of discovery, the states on the western edge of Europe—Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and England—took on a new significance. Whereas they had been on the rim of the known world, they now took their place at its centre. With these nations was the future of Empire.

There is no more amazing spectacle in all history than the expansion of Europe which these peoples carried out in the years succeeding the Age of Discovery. They not only went and saw and conquered: they settled. They established white communities all over the world, where they subdued and civilised the natives, and in many cases Christianised them. Where the newly touched lands were not suitable for white colonisation on a large scale, Europeans set up trading centres which afterwards became the nuclei of commercial aggrandisement and imperial power. Thereby European culture was carried to every continent. The most significant aspect of the expansion was the colonisation of North America, for in the fullness of time the New World was to join with the Old to save its civilisation from the vandal hands of its worst enemies at home. Thus the Oceanic Revolution made possible a process of colonisation which ultimately gave to the wide Atlantic a unifying quality for the preservation of Western Civilisation no less potent in the modern age than that enjoyed by the Mediterranean in ancient and mediæval times.

CHAPTER XI

CONTINENTAL DESPOTISM

THE BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Warring Dynasties

THE effects of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Oceanic Revolution, and European expansion overseas combined to create conditions of extreme unrest on the Continent for the next two centuries, which led up to the revolutionary changes of the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. The developments of this long period emphasised the separation of states which the Renaissance had produced and the Reformation had strengthened, and so the political wars of the Renaissance monarchs and the religious wars induced by the Reformation gave place to wars for dynastic aggrandisement and imperial power. Through this long span widespread wars alternated with interludes of precarious peace. In fact, surveying the period of 167 years stretching from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the grand settlement following the Napoleonic Wars made at Vienna in 1815, we find that there were actually more years of war than of peace. In those wars between the years 1688 and 1815 Britain and France were always on opposite sides, and for this reason the period is often known as that of the Second Hundred Years' War. It was the repercussions of imperial expansion which drove Britain into the continental maelstrom, but while she concentrated on the colonial aspect of the struggle, France allowed herself to be mainly preoccupied with the complications of continental politics. The result was that in the eighteenth century Britain established her imperial supremacy at the expense of France.

In the internal politics of European states the developments of the second half of the seventeenth century and most of the eighteenth were of the greatest significance in the evolution of the present states system of Europe and of their principles of political action and social organisation. While France enjoyed the benefits of complete political unity, Germany was the victim of the atomisation which the Peace of Westphalia had not merely reinforced but legalised. The result was that during the reign

of Louis XIV (1643-1715), the longest in history, France enjoyed an unprecedented ascendancy in continental politics; while from the welter of states in Germany Prussia emerged under the Hohenzollerns to contest the supremacy of the Austrian Hapsburgs, who tended to concentrate on their inherited domains at the expense of Imperial unity. At the same time, a new force entered European politics when Peter the Great (1689-1725) brought Russia out of her oriental darkness into the light of Western manners. Surrounded by these three powerful states, Poland struggled unsuccessfully for survival, and, before the end of the eighteenth century, was completely broken up and partitioned among them.

In France Louis XIV established an absolute autocracy, a type of government which was imitated by the Hohenzollerns in Prussia, the Hapsburgs in Austria, and the Romanoffs in Russia. These monarchs were supposed to have at heart the good of their people, and for this reason the period is generally known as the Age of the Enlightened Despot. In Britain a similar despotism, attempted by the Stuarts in collusion with Louis XIV, was frustrated by the combined effect of English Protestantism which feared a Catholic reaction, English foreign policy which saw in the French hegemony of the Continent a danger as grave as that formerly attempted by Spain, and the happy accident which brought Louis's most vigorous opponent, William of Orange, to the English throne on the terms of a constitutional settlement which secured the triumph of Parliament. This "bloodless revolution" in England made inevitable the continuance of the colonial struggle with France, which in the middle of the eighteenth century resulted in the loss of her colonial possessions in North America and the eclipse of her imperial ambitions in India. France's defeat in America in its turn made possible the independence of the United States, which had the most extraordinary repercussions in Europe.

It was in the latter half of the eighteenth century that all these movements met and merged to bring about the violent outbreak of the French Revolution. The French despotism made the Old Régime intolerable, while political philosophers produced the propaganda of revolt in what came to be known as the Age of Reason. This propaganda was picked up by the American colonists who, freed from the danger of the French in America and outraged by the economic nationalism of the Old Colonial System, started their war of independence and backed it by the

Declaration of Independence of 1776, which was largely based on the radical philosophy of the time. The victory of the Americans in the War of Independence was due not alone to their enthusiasm, determination, and valour—great though these were—but also to the fact that the war was part of a struggle of world dimensions in which Britain's enemies went to the aid of the Colonists. The French malcontents, encouraged at the same time by the constitutional example of Britain and the success of the American revolt against her, took the plunge in 1789, and so cast the whole European development in a new mould. Some more detailed study of this background in this and succeeding chapters will therefore repay us in comprehending the conditions of to-day.

The Age of Louis XIV

No continental country enjoyed greater benefits from the effects of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Oceanic Revolution than France, which reached a position of unparalleled ascendancy under Louis XIV. The strong national state built up by the Renaissance kings of France, the religious settlement reached by the Edict of Nantes under Louis's grandfather, Henry IV, the first Bourbon king, and the growth of New France in North America resulting from the daring work of the French pioneers, combined to bring to the young king, when he assumed the full reins of government on the death of Mazarin in 1661, an inheritance such as no French king before him had enjoyed. France was then surrounded mostly by weak states—Spain in decline after the failure of the plans of Philip II and the diplomatic triumph of Mazarin at the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), Germany broken by the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, Italy still in a condition of political dismemberment. Only Britain and the Dutch Republic seemed vigorous enough to stand successfully in his path, and even these, he thought, might be won over by the blandishments of his diplomacy or crushed by the weight of his arms. In all these circumstances it is not surprising that France became under the Grand Monarch the most brilliant state in Europe since the emergence of Renaissance sovereignty.

Louis made of monarchy the serious business of his life. For him it was not merely a profession of which by unflagging devotion to duty he must make himself the absolute master, but

a divine mission, in the execution of which he was the manifest agent of God. This notion of Divine Right led him to identify himself with the state, and the spring of all his political actions is found in his absolutist dictum: "The State, it is I." (*L'Etat c'est moi.*) He was, in fact, the complete autocrat, and under his régime there was no place for the liberty either of the individual or of associations. So determined was he to establish uniformity in the state that he deprived the Protestants of the toleration they had enjoyed for nearly a century by revoking the Edict of Nantes in 1685. This reactionary step brought its proper punishment, for as a result of it large numbers of Huguenots emigrated to the neighbouring countries of England, Holland, and Prussia, and France was thereby deprived of the services of many of her most intelligent and industrious citizens and the communities of her Protestant enemies were correspondingly enriched.

Louis established at Versailles a brilliant court, which at the same time fed his royal vanity and emasculated the nobility. For while the nobles retained their lands and enjoyed all sorts of fiscal immunities, they became absentee landlords. Instead of attending to the affairs of their estates, they were forced to spend their lives in sycophancy and intrigue at the Court, and so lost all contact with and interest in the local communities to which they properly belonged, an abuse of social justice which was destined to bring a terrible nemesis upon them in the French Revolution. To assist him in his administration, Louis chose, with rare shrewdness and sagacity from the professional and mercantile classes, ministers of great ability in various departments of government. They formed an inner council for the working out of the royal policy, which was locally administered by royal officers known as *Intendants*. This direct governance of the King with the aid of selected members of the middle classes, through what was known as the "Rule of the Robe," forms the strongest contrast to the contemporaneous system in Britain, where both the aristocracy and the Third Estate shared in the government through a properly constituted Parliament.

The reign was for the élite one of great splendour in every department of civilised living. In manners and dress Versailles became the model for cultivated Europe and French the language of fashion and diplomacy. Art, science, and letters enjoyed a period of remarkable effulgence. The French Academy, founded by Richelieu in 1635, was given heightened prestige,

the Academy of Sciences, now called the Institute of France, was established, and the astronomical observatory founded in Paris. It was an age of illustrious dramatists, like Corneille, Racine, and Molière; of original philosophers, like Descartes and Pascal; of profound theologians, like Bossuet and Fénelon. The reign was noteworthy, too, for writers of memoirs, such as Saint Simon, who said of Louis towards the end of his reign that he had a "heart which never loved and no one loved," a probably true observation concerning one of Louis's hard and egoistic temperament. Undoubtedly, during this reign France fully earned her right to be called the Mistress of Western Civilisation, a cultural leadership which, in spite of many vicissitudes of fortune, she has never since wholly lost. But the King remained implacable in his relentless pursuit of a policy of territorial expansion and dynastic aggrandisement, which was ultimately responsible for the destruction of his state and the ruin of his house.

Consequently, although Louis was not himself a military commander, his reign was filled with wars. It would be purposeless for us to attempt to follow these in detail. Their importance lies in certain consequences which have the most decisive bearing on the evolution of the present political situation in Europe. Louis aimed at gaining for France her "natural frontiers"—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees—in which aim he followed the foreign policy of his predecessors. This brought him into conflict with the Spaniards, the Austrians, the Dutch, and finally the British. It led first to the triumph of William of Orange, who became King of England in the midst of the struggle. It led next to the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands to the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs, and so paved the way for the ultimate establishment of an independent Belgium in 1831. It led thirdly to the transfer of the Spanish crown from the Hapsburgs to the Bourbons, for Louis's grandson became King of Spain and thus founded a dynasty which was not finally removed until 1932 when Alfonso XIII left the country in the midst of a political upheaval which made possible the rise of Fascism in Spain and brought in its train the civil war and the régime of Franco. Finally, the wars of Louis XIV brought France to the verge of bankruptcy, in spite of which she continued to make war in the eighteenth century, thus aggravating the financial chaos which was largely responsible for the events leading to the French Revolution.

Louis XIV's reign ended in personal misfortune and social disorders, which were carried into that of his successor, his great-grandson, a boy of five for whom a regent had to act. The mortal remains of the Grand Monarch were borne to their final resting-place to the accompaniment of popular execration. Three-quarters of a century later, goaded by the incorrigible arrogance of the Bourbons, of whom it was said that they could "learn nothing and forget nothing," the descendants of the surly crowds that watched Louis XIV's funeral procession applauded the spectacle of Louis XVI and his Hapsburg wife on the guillotine.

The Rise of Prussia

The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 had, as we have seen, left Germany more atomised than ever. The faint spark of nationalism which Luther had touched went out before that civil conflict of particularist interests, religious and political, which was the Thirty Years' War. The Holy Roman Empire still existed, the Electors still faithfully elected the Austrian Hapsburg to the Imperium, and the Diet still met. But all hope of reviving unity through the Empire had departed. The state of Germany was deplorable: its towns in ruins, its industry and commerce paralysed, its once proud merchants impoverished, and its peasantry starved in the desert that was formerly its farmland. In this condition of things the smaller princes were so lost to decency as to spend their time in the tawdry business of establishing courts in minor imitation of Louis XIV's Versailles, which many of them visited, instead of devoting their energies to the rehabilitation of their states; and all this at a time when the peoples of western Europe were being invigorated through maritime enterprise and imperial expansion.

The one dynasty which might have taken the lead in giving Germany a semblance of unity was the Imperial House of Hapsburg. But their dominions were so heterogeneous and scattered that the Emperor tended constantly to be drawn away from German to extra-German interests. His purely German lands were the various hereditary domains of Austria centred round the capital at Vienna. For the rest there had been added to the Hapsburg crown from time to time various non-German lands. First there was the Czech Kingdom of Bohemia, annexed after the battle of the White Hill in 1620, and with it the partly

German province of Silesia and the Slavonic province of Moravia. Next there was the Kingdom of Hungary liberated from the Turks after their expulsion towards the end of the seventeenth century, and with this went the Slavonic dependencies of Croatia and Slavonia and the Rumanian dependency of Transylvania. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the Austrian Hapsburgs acquired also the formerly Spanish Netherlands, which were Belgian, and the Duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily), which were, of course, Italian. All these areas were not only non-German but, with the exception of Bohemia and its dependencies, outside the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire. For the government of these lands the Emperor established an efficient despotism, but, with interests so diverse and preoccupations so scattered, it was difficult for the Hapsburgs to maintain a German prestige, and this left the way free for the growth of the influence of another great family, the Hohenzollerns.


With the mention of this family we touch for the first time one of the vital strands in the modern European story, for thenceforth the name Hohenzollern is one to conjure with, and all that it represents is a dominant and formative factor in dynamic Europe and a fundamental cause of the situation in which we find ourselves to-day. This remarkable family first came into the light of history as feudal lords in the tenth century, but their modern career began in 1415 when the Emperor, as a reward for his aid, invested the head of the house with the position of Elector of Brandenburg. The original Electorate of Brandenburg, with its centre at Berlin, lay on the banks of the Oder in north-east Germany, cut off from the Baltic by Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and bordered on the west by Brunswick and on the south by Magdeburg, Saxony, and Silesia. It was a German Mark, or fortified borderland, against the Slavs on its east, and this explains its historical connection with Prussia.

Prussia was not originally a part of the Hohenzollern dominions at all: it was a land, known earlier as Bo-Russia, settled by Slavs, who were conquered and converted by a Christian Order known as the Teutonic Knights. In the fifteenth century the Teutonic Knights were defeated by the Poles and forced to cede one half of Prussia (West Prussia) to Poland, retaining the other half (East Prussia) as a feudal fief of the Polish Crown. To protect themselves they made Albert of Hohenzollern, a cadet of the Brandenburg Electoral family, Grand Master of the

Order, who at the time of the Reformation declared himself a Protestant. In 1611 the family of Albert died out and East Prussia, though remaining a Polish fief, passed to the Elector of Brandenburg. Meanwhile, in 1609, an important Duchy on the Rhine called Cleves passed also to the Elector through his wife. Thus the Electors of Brandenburg ruled three distinct areas by different titles. Each of these areas had become Protestant through the Reformation. And so we find by the middle of the sixteenth century a Protestant state in the north of Germany which might vie with Austria, the chief Catholic state in the south. Given the necessary courage and political genius, anything was possible for the Hohenzollerns.

These necessary qualities were found in Frederick William, who succeeded in 1640 and became known as the Great Elector. He may be fairly called the founder of modern Prussia. By the Treaty of Westphalia, Brandenburg gained some important territorial accessions, including Magdeburg to the south-west and Eastern Pomerania, which gave her a wide stretch of Baltic coast. Taking advantage of his enhanced prestige, the Great Elector determined to carry out the unification of his scattered and diverse possessions. This he achieved by a combination of militarism and diplomacy. In the course of a war between Sweden and Poland, in which he helped each side in turn, he persuaded the King of Poland to grant him the fief of East Prussia in full sovereignty. In government he was as absolutist as Louis XIV. He suppressed such free institutions as existed in the various parts of his dominions and ruthlessly brought them all into one administration under his direct control in Berlin. It was in this reign also that the greatness of Berlin was founded. The Elector was wise enough to give refuge to many of the Huguenots who fled from France to escape the consequences of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and these immigrants greatly enriched the population. At his accession the population of Berlin was only about 8,000; at his death it had increased to not less than 20,000. In the later part of his reign he accomplished some resounding feats of arms with the highly disciplined army he had so painstakingly built up. At his death in 1688 he handed on to his son a strong and flourishing united state.

It was under this son, Frederick III, that the Elector of Brandenburg became King of Prussia. In 1701, the Emperor Leopold, to enlist his support in the War of the Spanish Succes-



THE GROWTH OF PRUSSIA, 1417-1795.

sion, allowed him to call himself King in Prussia, under the title Frederick I, and the Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the war in 1713, recognised this title. Thus Brandenburg-Prussia became a Kingdom, and because Brandenburg was an Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire the Electors as Kings took the title in respect of the area outside the Empire. So by an accident Brandenburg became Prussia, a name it still bears.

In the same year that the Elector's Kingship was recognised by an international treaty there came to the throne of Prussia a remarkable member of the Hohenzollern family, known as Frederick William I. He had one object: to strengthen his throne so that Prussia might be respected, if not feared, abroad. In politics he was an uncompromising absolutist whose method of government was a paternal despotism. He was a complete martinet who treated his subjects like so many school children. "We," he said, "remain King and master and we do what we like." He was economical to the point of parsimony, so that he might have a larger armed force than his state could reasonably afford. He built up a formidable army, raising it from 38,000 men, which it had numbered on his accession, to 83,000 at the end of his reign. Though, even so, it was smaller than that of either France or Austria, the Prussian army was more efficient because of its iron discipline. This drill-sergeant of a king, besides being the father of Prussian militarism, was the founder also of the Prussian civil service, still the most soulless, if most efficient, bureaucracy in the world. He also introduced compulsory elementary education long before any other state in Europe. Yet he was coarse and brutal in the extreme, and regarded the refinements of higher culture as effeminate.

How strange it is, then, that this should have been the father of such a son as he who was later to be known as Frederick the Great! For Frederick was the most highly cultivated monarch of his day. As Crown Prince he had a most unhappy home life, which was entirely out of sympathy with his literary, musical, and artistic tastes, and he hated his father's propensity to drinking and gluttony. In religion he was a sceptic, being the friend of Voltaire and using French as if it were his native tongue. In short, he was more Latin than Teutonic in his accomplishments and outlook. In his youthful enlightenment he had inveighed against the amorality of Machiavellian politics in an essay called *Anti Machiavel*. Yet he was to live to become Machiavellianism personified. By the time he succeeded his father in 1740 he

had had all the idealism knocked out of him and had become a complete cynic, believing only in the language of force. He proposed to use to the full all the advantages his father had left him to strengthen and enlarge his kingdom, and for this purpose the situation in Germany was most propitious.

In the year of his accession to the Prussian throne, as Frederick II, a woman, Maria Theresa, succeeded to the Hapsburg dominions of Austria. Her father, Charles VI, had persuaded the Powers to respect her claims, in spite of her sex. Among those who agreed to this Pragmatic Sanction was Frederick's father, but no sooner was Maria Theresa set on her difficult throne than Frederick, on a trumped-up claim, marched into Silesia and occupied its capital. Though it was perhaps more forgivable in that age than this, the rape of Silesia was the kind of lawless action which later generations have learned to associate with Prussian aggression. In this case it led to the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), in which Frederick gained the alliance of France, and Austria that of Britain. By the peace, Prussia retained Silesia. But in eight years another European war, the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), broke out, after a diplomatic revolution whereby the two German Powers respectively switched from one attachment to the other, Austria being allied to France and Prussia to Britain. Frederick was highly successful in this war, and at the end of it Prussia's possession of Silesia was finally confirmed. Frederick was then indeed the wonder of the world. Yet how strange it is to reflect that his success in Europe should have played so vital a part in the victory of Britain against France in the imperial field! Pitt encouraged Frederick to keep the French busy on the Continent while British energies were concentrated in America and India, with the result that the French lost their overseas Empire in both continents and Britain became "undisputed mistress of the seas and chief colonial power of the world." Frederick the Great is a hero to the very Germans who to-day find Britain's maritime and colonial power most intolerable, and who do not stop to consider how different it might have been if Frederick had not played Britain's game in the Seven Years' War.

. It was the last war Frederick fought. He devoted the remaining twenty-three years of his reign to consolidating his kingdom. In his later years Frederick's earlier cynicism mellowed, and he found a substitute for the religion which his

spiritual make-up lacked in his devotion to the welfare of the state. His policy of rehabilitation after the war was most constructive, and through his schemes of agriculture and commerce the state rapidly recovered from the ravages of war. Moreover, his tutelage to the liberal philosophers of France was by no means merely academic, for he abolished torture and established complete religious toleration. Yet Frederick remained a Prussian, an autocrat in his marrow and without moral scruple in international relations, truths which were to be proved yet again before he died in his part in the first Partition of Poland. He is rightly regarded as the founder of Prussia as a military state, for to enhance its greatness he did not spare himself. Yet, as H. A. L. Fisher truly says, "the doctrine that the end justifies the means is a necessary part of the Prussian apology for Frederick II."¹

The Emergence of Russia

The Russians and the Poles are both Slavonic peoples, but the early history of the one group is very different from that of the other. They both followed in the wake of the westward-moving Teutons in the days of the great migrations, the Poles finally settling along the Vistula, the Russians along the middle Dnieper, where they founded the city of Kiev, and later to the east of the upper reaches of the river around the settlement that was to become the city of Moscow. The Poles were converted to Roman Christianity, the Russians to the Greek Orthodox form. To the north-west of the Russians and to the north-east of the Poles were the ancient people called Lithuanians, who for a time in the fourteenth century established a wide dominion, pushing southward between the other two Slavonic peoples. It was this movement which created two Russias, Little or Lithuanian Russia, and Great or Muscovite Russia. The Lithuanians at the end of the fourteenth century united with the Poles and were received into the Roman Church. The Little Russians leant westward towards this union, while the Muscovite Russians to the east developed in a different way. The everlasting antagonism between the Poles and the Russians, which has lasted to our own day, is traceable to this division.

What chance there might have been for the Muscovite Russians to have become enlightened by contact with the West

¹ *A History of Europe*, vol. ii, page 750.

was destroyed by the Tartar invasion. From the middle of the thirteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth the Russians paid tribute to the great Mongol Khans whose Empire stretched from Manchuria to the Caucasus. It was the Tsar Ivan III (1462-1505) who freed his people from this yoke and united the various principalities under his sway. But the harm had been done, and the estrangement of Russia from the rest of Europe may be traced to this period of subjection. For the Russians became saturated with the oriental habits of their masters, and when they emerged from the Tartar thralldom they found themselves cut off from the West in manners, customs, and institutions. The one strand of contact was Christianity, but theirs was the Orthodox Greek form, which made them further strangers to their Western neighbours. Ivan III married the daughter of that last Emperor at Constantinople who fell in the fighting when the Turks captured the city in 1453. This gives point to the fact that the head of the Russian state took the title Tsar, a Slavonic form of the word Cæsar. The Russians were thus attached to a form of religion whose heart had been stopped by the Moslem hordes. Finally they were cut off, by the Poles and Swedes in the Baltic and by the Turks in the Black Sea, from the outlets which might have brought them enlightenment through commercial contact with the West.

Thus, while the West was revolutionised by the Renaissance and Reformation, Russia was untouched by these enlightening and liberating movements, and remained stubbornly Asiatic, so that they were regarded by the peoples of central and western Europe as barbarians. If in the West a despotism developed, in Russia the despotism was of a positively oriental type. The Tsar was "the ruler and autocrat of all Russia," "the proprietor of his land and people." Only if Russia could be westernised in her outlook was there any hope of her becoming a true part of Europe. This process was at last initiated by a new line of Tsars, the Romanoff family, which was elected to the throne in 1613 in the person of Michael, at a time when, taking advantage of Russia's dynastic difficulties, the Swedes, the Poles, and the Turks occupied her greatest cities. Michael was thus the first of the long dynasty which ended with the violent dethronement of Nicholas II in 1917. Michael and his son, Alexis, recovered Novgorod from the Swedes, held the Turks by fortified towns, and fixed the line of the Dnieper as the Russo-Polish boundary.

And now emerged the strange and electric figure of Peter the Great, the grandson of the first Romanoff Tsar. In 1696 he became sole ruler of Russia at the age of twenty-four. He was a mercurial character, alternating between exuberance and sullenness. He had all the wild profligate ways of his race, but was capable of extraordinary flights of imagination, as well as possessing an admirable ability to perform with his own hands the most practical tasks. He had a passion for shipbuilding, working as a mechanic in shipyards in Holland and studying methods of industry and commerce in England. From the western countries which he visited he returned with bodies of experts and artificers to instruct the Russian people. He remodelled the army by creating a highly disciplined force in the Prussian manner. He tried to occidentalise Russian society by introducing European clothes, prohibiting the beard, and abolishing the semi-seclusion of women. He promoted the teaching of mathematics and science. He reorganised the government, abolishing the ancient assembly of nobles (*Duma*) and substituting for it a Council of State. He also swept away all traces of local government. In short, he made the state an absolute autocracy to which even the Church was completely subordinated. Most significant of all, he tried to found a middle class by encouraging trade and industry, but in this he did not succeed.

It was, however, in his foreign policy that Peter the Great's work was most constructive. Here his aim was to acquire what he called "windows to the west," on the Black Sea and the Baltic. This meant war with the Turks and with the Swedes. Against the Ottoman power he made little headway. In Sweden he met a leader of his own kind in Charles XII, whose meteoric career is among the most remarkable in the history of the world. Gustavus Adolphus in the early seventeenth century had aimed at making the Baltic a Swedish lake and had largely succeeded. For many years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632 Sweden controlled an empire which included Western Pomerania, directly opposite Sweden across the Baltic, as well as Finland, Estonia, and Livonia. The maintenance of such a congeries of territories was really beyond the capacity of a state so naturally poor as Sweden. She had preserved her hegemony largely by French help, but, with the death of Louis XIV and the rise of Prussia and Russia, her supersession as the paramount power in the Baltic was only a matter of time.

It was this fate that Charles XII, coming to the throne in 1697 as a lad of fifteen, resolved to forestall. Peter, on his side, formed an alliance with Poland and Saxony to dismember the Swedish Empire. At first Charles beat this coalition, but while he was enjoying Pyrrhic victories in the heart of Poland, Peter was re-forming his armies and when, flushed with victory, Charles carried the war into Russia, Peter crushingly defeated him at the decisive battle of Poltava (1709). From this blow Sweden never recovered. Her Empire was dismembered and Prussia gained control of the mouth of the Oder. By the Treaty of Nystadt (1721) Peter got his first "window to the west," for Russia gained complete control of the Gulf of Finland by acquiring Livonia, Estonia, Ingria, and a strip of southern Finland. This was a turning-point in Russian history. Peter built a new capital on the marshes of the Neva, which he called St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). It was a significant act, for from there Russia controlled the East Baltic and so made herself one of the powers of Europe.

Peter the Great has been variously assessed as playboy, dilettante, sensualist, sadist, and national hero. What is not in doubt is that by his genius and devotion he gave Russia a position among the powers of Europe which she has never since lost. He found her sunk in "oriental barbarism and gloom." He left her a powerful, compact state. Much of her westernisation of manners under Peter was doubtless largely superficial and did not long survive him, but the new respectability and prestige which he gave her in western eyes she retained and strengthened with the years. And, most important of all, he bequeathed to his successors a policy of expansion to the north-west and south-west which the more active among them lost no opportunity of carrying into effect.

Among these successors in the eighteenth century was Catherine II, called the Great, one of the most remarkable women in history. She was not by birth a Russian but a German, whose marriage with Peter, Peter the Great's grandson, had been arranged by Frederick the Great to diminish Austrian influence at the Russian court. The result was not quite what was expected, for she abandoned her German connections and became completely Russian in life, manners, and outlook. When in 1762 her husband became Tsar, as Peter III, it was she rather than he who governed, and on his death in the same year she was made Tsarina in name as well as in fact. For the next

thirty-four years she governed Russia with an iron hand which would have won the admiration of Peter the Great, whose work, in fact, she consummated. She further reformed the administration and made the Church even more subservient to the Crown. In short, she became a typical eighteenth-century despot of the type of Frederick the Great. She corresponded with the contemporary philosophers of France and encouraged western scholars to visit and enlighten her adopted country. But she was completely without morals, and in her conduct every consideration of decency and right paled before the ends of power and aggrandisement.

In this spirit of amoral patriotism she approached the problem of her relations with her southern and western neighbours, the Turks and the Poles. We have already seen¹ the causes of the Turkish decline after the Moslem surge reached its high watermark at the gates of Vienna and then began to recede. War between the new Russia and Turkey was inevitable so long as Peter's policy of a "window to the west" on the Black Sea was pursued, but it was precipitated in 1768 when a posse of Russians following some Polish insurgents in flight accidentally crossed into Turkish territory. The Turks knew war with Russia must come sooner or later, and they declared war now. The war lasted six years and showed the rottenness of Turkish organisation and arms. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, which ended the war in 1774, gave the Russians full sovereignty over all lands north of the Black Sea as far west as the Dniester. Russia also gained the right of free navigation in the Black Sea, and was recognised as the Protector of certain Christian Churches in Constantinople. Thus Catherine gained at least the framework of Peter's second window.

The Partition of Poland


While the rulers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were establishing efficient despotisms, Poland was torn by dissensions, arising from geographical, religious, social, and political difficulties, which made her weak in face of them. Poland was a large straggling state without natural boundaries, so that it was hard to defend. The population, though mainly Polish, included Lithuanians, Little Russians, Cossacks, Germans, and Swedes, who found it difficult to coalesce with the Poles and with one another. These racial difficulties were made more complex by

¹ In Chapter VII.

religious differences. The Poles and most of the Lithuanians were, as we have seen, Roman Catholics, but the Germans and Swedes to the west were Lutherans, the more easterly Lithuanians and the Russian elements were Orthodox, and on the south Poland bordered the Moslem Empire of the Turks. When the Poles denied the toleration which the dissenters demanded, the latter appealed to their respective brethren in Prussia and Russia. Moreover, socially the condition of Poland was as lamentable as it could be. Poland had been affected not at all by the Renaissance and only very slightly by the Reformation, and though she looked down on her barbaric eastern neighbours with a western superiority, she was herself, in fact, sunk in the worst social conditions of mediævalism. In short, there was no middle class, the commerce of the country, such as it was, being carried on by aliens. There were only two classes: on the one hand, the grasping land-owning nobles; on the other, a downtrodden and poverty-stricken peasantry still in a state of abject serfdom, the like of which was not to be found anywhere else in contemporaneous Europe.

But if the social condition of Poland was deplorable, her political system was positively farcical. The monarchy had become elective, and when there was a vacancy the electors, who were the nobles, would flagrantly sell their support to the highest bidder among the candidates, who were mostly foreigners. The King was assisted—or perhaps we should say frustrated—by a Diet of the nobles, whose procedure seems to us quite incredible. By a right called the *liberum veto*, any lord who had not approved a law enacted by the Diet could decline to obey it. This was sheer anarchy, and it is not difficult to imagine how such a condition might affront the pride and arouse the cupidity of Poland's efficient neighbours, and particularly of the partially modernised and now western-looking monarchy of Russia. The situation was too chaotically attractive for the opportunist Catherine to miss. In 1764, when the Polish throne again became vacant, she persuaded the nobles to elect one of her own court favourites, Stanislaus Poniatowski, and through the new king Russian influence in Poland became supreme.

It was not to Catherine's interest to reform Polish society and government, and she actually entered into an agreement with Prussia and Austria to maintain the anarchical situation, so that she seemed to be justified when in 1772 she suggested to her



THE THREE PARTITIONS OF POLAND, 1772-1795.

fellow despots that they should divide part of Poland among them. Thus was accomplished the first of the shameful partitions of Poland. The Poles, realising the gravity of the situation, carried out far-reaching reforms in what remained of their state, and promulgated a constitution in imitation of the French. But their strong neighbours, although they had guaranteed the new constitution, in practice made it unworkable, and in 1793 Russia and Prussia used the alleged anarchy resulting from it as a pretext for the second partition. Now in the little of their homeland that was left the Poles tried to reform the government and prepare to defend their country. But it was all in vain. In 1795 the three powers decided on a final carving up of the dismembered trunk, and in that year, in spite of the courageous defence organised by the patriot Kosciusko, the murderers finally disposed of the mutilated body politic of Poland.

In the three partitions the lion's share went to Russia who gained the whole of Poland to the east of the rivers Niemen,

Bug, and Dniester, including most of Lithuania, which thus gave her the control of a stretch of Baltic coast from St. Petersburg westward to just north of Memel. Prussia gained the whole of the lower valley of the Vistula, including Warsaw¹ and West Prussia, which thus joined East Prussia to the main body of her possessions round Brandenburg. Austria gained the upper valley of the Vistula, including Galicia and the city of Cracow. But, although the Imperial Government of Russia tried to pacify them by the grant of a certain amount of autonomy through a very restricted constitution, nothing short of national reunion and sovereign independence would satisfy the Poles, and Russian Poland remained a hotbed of nationalist agitation working for these ends.

The national aims of the Poles were ultimately realised at the end of the First World War when, as part of the general settlement based on the principle of self-determination, the Polish Republic, which reincorporated most of the areas scattered by the three partitions, was proclaimed and recognised. The events attending the eclipse, through military defeat and internal disorder, of the Empires of Russia, Germany, and Austria thus furnished the necessary, if unconscious, midwifery for the rebirth of Poland which these Amazons had earlier conspired to asphyxiate. Reborn in such revolutionary circumstances and growing again in a period of German and Russian rehabilitation, the new state, it is not surprising to find, has had a very chequered career. But recent events have, at least, shown that to regard Poland as a mere buffer between her Slav and Teuton neighbours is no solution of her problem.

¹ In the post-Napoleonic settlement Warsaw was included in Russian Poland.

CHAPTER XII

BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM

THE PATTERN OF PARLIAMENT AND CABINET

The Mother of Parliaments

AT the time when the type of despotism which we have described characterised most of the important states of Europe, a system of government which was its direct antithesis existed in Britain. Whereas on the Continent power was concentrated absolutely in the hands of the monarch, in Britain the seventeenth century saw the definitive triumph of the constitutional principle that the King could only rule through Parliament. Few political movements in the annals of dynamic Europe are of greater moment than this vindication of constitutional government, for it played a triple part in the critical years which we are examining, and from then on to this day. First, in frustrating and finally defeating the attempted despotism of the Stuart kings who were supported by Louis XIV, the English brought to the throne William of Orange, who was the Grand Monarch's most pertinacious and successful enemy. Secondly, the parliamentary monarchy of Britain became the example to which the moderate French reformers appealed and which they used as the basis of their own projected constitutions. Thirdly, the British system of Parliamentary and Cabinet Government became the pattern for all those reformers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who sought to establish Liberal institutions, for which reason the ancient legislative assembly of Britain is known as the Mother of Parliaments.

Political constitutionalism is deeply rooted in our way of life, and its evolution has been a slow and gradual process. Therein lies its strength, and if it has sometimes failed as a model for continental states, it is because they have tried to apply in a revolutionary situation the principles which we have evolved through many ages. Yet the development of our own Constitution has not lacked revolutionary phases, and the movement known as the "Bloodless Revolution," which dethroned James II and put William and Mary in his place, was decidedly one of them. Nor must we be misled by the loose habit of calling the

British Constitution unwritten, as though it were nothing but a mass of mere customs and precedents. It is true that the British Constitution, as we know it, is not documentary, as is, for example, that of Switzerland or the United States, but much of it is in statute form, and it happens that the first vital elements in the statute law of the constitution were enacted by Parliament as part of the settlement of the Revolution of 1688-1689. In order to understand the later growth of the Constitution, with all its importance for ourselves and the rest of the world, it is therefore necessary to grasp the nature of that settlement and of the conditions which brought it about.

The beginnings of Parliament date effectively from the second half of the thirteenth century, when for the first time the King summoned elected knights of the shires and representatives of certain boroughs to join the Lords. Before that time the Council had consisted entirely of the two estates of the nobles and higher clergy. The Commons, or Third Estate, were called for the purpose of voting money to the King. For centuries they declined to legislate for any wider purpose, and to this day taxation remains the prerogative of the Commons. But at no time did the three Estates in England meet as separate Houses of Parliament. From the constitutional pattern gradually woven after Edward I's Model Parliament of 1295 there emerged two Houses only: the Lords, which included bishops or ecclesiastical peers, and the Commons. About the same time similar assemblies were called in two other western European countries: the Cortes in the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the States-General in France. The fact that in France the three Estates met separately became, as we shall show, a vital consideration in the crisis of the Revolution in 1789.

It must not be supposed that Parliament in England had an unchequered career from its beginnings. There is plenty of evidence that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries membership of the House of Commons was regarded as an irksome duty, and both county and borough representatives complained of the costly and burdensome journey to Westminster and frequently had to be forced to serve. Moreover, the Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century decimated the nobility, so that the House of Lords became enfeebled. At the time of the accession of Henry VII in 1485, Parliament had reached a very low ebb. Of the Lords it may be said, in the words of A. F. Pollard, that "when the secular peerage committed political

suicide in the Wars of the Roses, the spiritual peers were left powerless before the throne." As to the Commons, an Act of 1430 had limited the franchise to forty-shilling freeholders. Leaseholders were excluded, so that the county electors were reduced to a narrow oligarchy which spoke for only a very small proportion of the nation. In the boroughs there were the most diverse systems of election, but generally the corporation, or governing body, managed to monopolise the suffrage, and the system was anything but democratic.

Nevertheless the Tudors, despotic in temperament though most of them were, deliberately kept Parliament alive, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, under the conditions of the New Monarchy, Parliament in England would have died of inanition but for the monarch's choice to use it. It is true that it met infrequently and that when it did meet it was generally only to endorse the King's proposals, but the important fact about it is its continuity, and in this respect England shows the strongest contrast to continental states, for everywhere else in Europe similar institutions did not survive the establishment of the New Monarchy of the Renaissance. In Spain the Cortes gradually faded out of existence from the time of the unification of the state by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella and the final expulsion of the Moors, and from that time the monarchy was unchecked. In France the States-General was not summoned between 1614 and 1789, an eclipse of liberal institutions which accounts for the political crisis of the latter year, as we shall see.

In England, meanwhile, the despotism of the Tudors was blended with and modified by the tradition of the deeply rooted principle of self-government. The insularity of the country freed it from the constant need for armed defence and cut it off from those forces which year by year strengthened the continental despotism. The isolation of the state and its growing sense of nationalism were enhanced by two great series of events in the Tudor period: the Reformation and the defeat of the Armada. The first transferred the leadership of the Church to the monarch and laid the foundations of the Anglican Church, and both these changes were duly sanctioned by Parliamentary enactment. The second exorcised for ever the dread of Spain which had filled the minds of Englishmen since her emergence as an imperial power. The effect of this liberation soon showed itself in the attitude of Parliament, which now began freely to criticise government policy.

But Elizabeth generally had her finger on the pulse of the nation and knew when to give way. "I do not so much rejoice," she told the Commons two years before her death, "that God hath made me to be a Queen as to be a Queen over so thankful a people." Still, the spirit and practice of criticism, which could thus be so gracefully met by a wise old English Queen, proved invaluable as a means of resisting the outrageous claims of the tactless Scot who was her successor. In fact, the value of the continuity of Parliament under the Tudors was immediately seen when in 1603 James VI of Scotland became James I of England, for it was thereby able to withstand and finally to defeat the despotic purposes of the new line.

The Attempted Despotism of the Stuarts

The struggle of the Stuart kings with Parliament began directly James arrived in England. His belief in the Divine Right of Kings, which had been maturing in Scotland, where, in fact, he had written a tract about it,¹ was confirmed in his mind by his accession to the English throne. This was a bad start, for it was in effect a declaration that the King was above the law, and he proceeded to quarrel with Parliament on almost every issue of public policy. On finance James took the view that the Commons should vote without question whatever supplies he demanded, whereas the Commons held that taxation should be related to policy, and when he could not bend the Commons to his will he prorogued Parliament and resorted to the arbitrary expedient of impositions.

In religion James was an Erastian: that is to say, he held the opinion that the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Crown meant that every subject must be comprehended within the Church of which the King was the Supreme Governor, and no other religious views or practices could be tolerated. "No bishop, no king," was the dictum by which he summed up this view. But there were in England, besides the Anglicans, two other religious bodies. At one extreme were the Roman Catholics, a minority which had remained faithful, or had returned, to the fold of the original Church, and which the King's foreign policy constantly tended to favour. At the other extreme were the Puritans whom nothing would drive to conformity and who, growing yearly stronger and more vocal, at length brought James's son to the scaffold.

¹ Entitled *The True Law of Free Monarchies*.

James told the Commons that they had "merely a private and local wisdom," and that they were not qualified to play any part in high policy, which was reserved to the King alone. The Commons' answer to this was given in the famous Protestation of 1621, which, because it is the first formal statement of the function of Parliament, is worth quoting. The House resolved :

"That the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birth-right and inheritance of the subjects of England, and that the arduous and urgent affairs concerning the King, state, and defence of the realm, and of the Church of England, and the making and maintenance of laws, and redress of grievances, which daily happen within this realm, are proper subjects and matter of council and debate in Parliament. And that in the handling and proceeding of those businesses every member of the House hath, and of right ought to have, freedom of speech to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclusion the same."

Thus the battle was fairly joined.

Under James I the opposition between King and Parliament did not go beyond the dimensions of a violent quarrel. Under Charles I, who succeeded in 1625, it became an armed conflict. All the issues at stake under the first Stuart were intensified under the second. For the first three years of the reign Charles showed himself as uncompromising a Divine Righter as his father, and from the beginning parliamentary business was done in an atmosphere of acrimony. In 1628 the Commons aired their grievances in the Petition of Right to which Charles agreed only to gain the necessary subsidies. But no sooner was Parliament prorogued than Charles resorted once more to his arbitrary methods, and when Parliament reassembled in 1629 the breach between Crown and Commons was patently complete. Charles therefore decided on dissolution, but before the Commons broke up they held the Speaker down in his chair while they tumultuously passed resolutions stigmatising those who introduced religious innovations or exacted illegal taxation as "betrayers of the liberties of England." After failing to work with his Parliament for the first four years of his reign, Charles ruled without it for the next eleven. He was assisted by two most able Ministers—on the secular side Thomas

Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, whose principal work was as the King's Representative in Ireland, and in the ecclesiastical sphere, William Laud, first Bishop of London and later Archbishop of Canterbury. Yet the policies of these two advisers brought about the crisis of the reign by the situations they respectively induced in Scotland and Ireland.

In Scotland Laud, in his ardent pursuit of uniformity, tried to force upon the Scots a liturgy which they finally resisted with arms. They marched into the north of England, and Charles was forced, in 1640, to call a Parliament to gain money to pay them off. But no sooner did it meet than all the pent-up discontents of the previous eleven years burst forth. The Commons refused to grant a penny until grievances were redressed, and Charles had to give way, even consenting to the Act which said that Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent. Meanwhile in 1641 Parliament executed Wentworth on a Bill of Attainder, and imprisoned Laud, whose execution was only postponed. Wentworth's policy in Ireland led to the revolt of the Irish as soon as his back was turned, and this brought into debate the whole question of sovereignty, whose essence is the control of the armed forces. The Commons refused to entrust the King with the raising of an army to put down the Irish revolt, and both sides began to raise forces. Here indeed was the Great Rebellion. The embattled factions moved against each other and the Civil War began in 1642.

The Civil War was not a social war, a war, that is, of the poor against the rich. It was not even primarily a religious war. It was a war of political principle, and it ended in the triumph of the Parliamentarians and the execution of the King. The Stuart monarchy was for a time overthrown, and the country, for the only period in its history, became a republic, with Cromwell at the helm experimenting with documentary constitutions. In spite of Cromwell's apparent despotism, he strove throughout to find an accommodation with Parliament. It has been said of him that he "could neither rule with Parliaments nor without them," and, consequently, as political experiments the Commonwealth and Protectorate were failures. In 1658 Cromwell died, and in 1660 the Stuarts were restored with the return to England of Charles's elder son, Charles II. In the Restoration nothing was left of the Cromwellian Constitutions. The Republic was a mere interlude in the political history of the country, and the reaction of the people at the

Restoration was generally one rather of relief at the prospect of the return of joy than bitterness in the recollection of the "constraint of compulsory godliness" imposed by the Puritans.

The Restoration of the Stuarts resulted from an alliance between the Crown and the Established Church, and the first Acts of the reign were concerned with the uniformity of the Anglican Church and the exclusion of nonconformists, whether of the right or left. Parliament may have rejoiced at Charles's return, but it would not dumbly accept a revival of autocracy and still less any attempt on its part to grant rights to either Protestant Dissenters or to Roman Catholics. Charles II may have been a "merry monarch," but he was also a king with a serious purpose, which led him to appear to promote the Roman Catholic faith, of which he professed himself an adherent on his deathbed. In the pursuit of this policy he became the ally of Louis XIV, and thereby threw away the splendid opportunity Fate gave him to re-establish the House of Stuart firmly on the throne. By his pro-French and anti-Dutch policy he inevitably aroused against him the mercantilist and imperial interests which were necessarily anti-French, and this was the background of the development of the Country Party, opposed to the Court Party which supported the policy of the Crown. Out of this division grew the two parties which came to be known as Whigs and Tories, and which played an essential part in the later development of Parliament and the system of Cabinet government.

This division of political opinion focused itself on the future of the King's brother James, Duke of York, who, Charles being childless, was heir-apparent. James was a professed Catholic. When, in 1679, the Country Party, determined to keep him off the throne, introduced an Exclusion Bill, the King prorogued Parliament. From that moment the two parties became more and more defined. Those who were opposed to James petitioned the King to convoke Parliament again, and they therefore came to be called Petitioners. Those who were with the King in his obduracy abhorred the idea of bringing pressure to bear on him, and thus came to be called Abhorrrers. Each found an opprobrious name for the other; hence the term Whigs (Scottish freebooters) for the Country Party or Petitioners, and Tories (Irish brigands) for the Court Party or Abhorrrers. When Parliament met in 1680 the Exclusion Bill passed the Commons but was thrown out by the Lords. From the following year to

the end of his reign in 1685 Charles ruled without a Parliament, and James II succeeded him on his death in the latter year.

"The Bloodless Revolution"

James II differed from his brother, not in his aims but in his methods. Unlike Charles, James avowedly professed his membership of the Roman Catholic Church. In 1673 a Test Act had been passed barring non-Anglicans from holding public office. In spite of this, James appointed Catholics to office, and when he failed to persuade Parliament to repeal the Test Act he resorted in 1687 to the expedient of issuing a Declaration of Indulgence suspending the laws against Roman Catholics and Protestant Dissenters. This, apart from the religious question, raised a political issue of the first order; nothing short, in fact, of a battle between Parliamentaryism and Absolutism. In 1688 James made things worse by setting up an armed camp at Hounslow to overawe the capital and issuing a second Declaration of Indulgence which he ordered to be read in all churches. When seven bishops, led by Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, protested, they were brought to trial by the King for seditious libel. On June 30, 1688, they were acquitted, and at that moment was reached the kind of crisis which carries political discontent over to revolutionary action. James's conduct had become intolerable, but might have been borne while there was a prospect of his dying without heirs other than the offspring of his first marriage, his daughters, Mary and Anne, who were Protestants, the first being the wife of William of Orange. But at the very time of the seven bishops crisis it was announced that a son had been born to his second and Catholic wife, and the implications of this intelligence, merging with the public approbation of the acquittal of the bishops, emboldened the Whig leaders to invite William "to intervene in arms for the restoration of English liberty and the protection of the Protestant religion." William agreed to come over in support of these aims and promised to abide by the decisions of a free Parliament. By a strange chance, or perhaps deliberately, hoping that William would thereby be lured to his doom, Louis XIV, with whom the Dutch were then at war, moved his troops in such a way as to enable William to risk his journey to England, and call a Convention, or Provisional Parliament, which was to regularise the position. Meanwhile James was allowed to escape to the Continent.

This movement was a revolution, in the sense that it not only dethroned one king and brought in another but established government on a new foundation definitely enacted by statute. And yet the actual change was so peaceful in its execution that it is known as the "Bloodless Revolution." The revolution was publicly justified by the resolution of the Commons in the Convention Parliament which declared that King James "having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the Kingdom by breaking the original contract between King and People, and by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons having violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of the Kingdom, has abdicated the Government, and that the throne is thereby vacant." In pursuance of this implied principle of government according to agreed conditions, the Convention next proceeded to draw up a Declaration of Right, which, having recited James II's misdeeds, declared the resolve of the Lords and Commons to assert the ancient rights and liberties of Englishmen. It condemned as illegal ecclesiastical courts and the raising of armed forces without Parliamentary sanction, and denied the right of the King to suspend or dispense with laws or raise money without consent of Parliament. It asserted the right of subjects to petition the Crown, to the free election of members to Parliament, and to a pure and merciful administration of justice. It also asserted the right of both Houses of Parliament to liberty of debate, and demanded securities for the free exercise of their religion for all Protestants.

On this basis the crown was accepted equally by William and Mary in 1689. The Convention was then regularised as a true Parliament. The Declaration was presented to Parliament as the Bill of Rights and thence became a statute. Before the end of the year 1689 the new Parliament passed two important Acts as part of the revolutionary settlement. The Toleration Act, while not repealing the Test Act which excluded any but Anglicans from holding public office, relieved all Protestant Dissenters from penalties for worshipping in their own way. The Mutiny Act gave Parliament control of the army by limiting supplies to annual grants and thus obliging the Government to have recourse to Parliament at least once a year. In 1694 the Triennial Act was passed limiting the duration of any one Parliament to three years.

First, then, it is clear that the Revolution of 1688-1689 was a triumph of Parliamentary Government. Henceforth the

sovereignty was recognised as residing not in the King alone but in the "King in Parliament." Secondly, this revolution was enshrined in statutory form. Before this time there was to all intents and purposes no statute law of the Constitution. Magna Carta has been spoken of as the "Palladium of British Liberty," but it was hardly a statute, and in any case most of its provisions became obsolete with the passing of the feudal age which produced it, though the Commons were glad enough to quote it as a precedent. The Petition of Right of 1628, indeed, became a statute when the King gave his assent to it, but its provisions were not kept, and the whole question of the limitation of the Crown passed into the melting-pot of the Puritan Revolution. The fully written constitutions of the Commonwealth and Protectorate passed away with the Restoration. The settlement of 1688-1689, therefore, put in statutory form the triumph of Parliamentary Government. It sometimes happens that customs and conventions, though ancient and strong, require from time to time statutory recognition. This was what happened in the Revolution of 1688-1689. It also happened in the other great statute of the Constitution: the Parliament Act of 1911. In the events leading up to that Act, the convention that the Lords had no power to amend or reject a Money Bill was rudely shaken by the Lords' refusal to pass Lloyd George's Budget of 1909. In those circumstances it required a statute to make the convention good. Both the Bill of Rights and the Parliament Act illustrate the "dependence in the last resort of the conventions upon the law of the Constitution."

The Emergence of the Cabinet System

The Bill of Rights established a general legislative supervision. The executive function of government Parliament was content to leave in the hands of the King. Yet in the course of the eighteenth century the Cabinet system, founded on party, grew up, and by the end of the century had become so firmly fixed as to have become a recognised part of the Constitution. "The Cabinet," says W. Ivor Jennings,¹ "is the core of the British constitutional system. It is the supreme directing authority. It integrates what would otherwise be a hetero-

¹ In *Cabinet Government*, page 1.

geneous collection of authorities exercising a vast variety of functions. It provides unity to the British system of government." This Cabinet system was later imitated and incorporated in the documentary constitutions of most of the principal states of Europe, though many of them were afterwards violently overthrown by the internal revolt or external aggression of authoritarian régimes, in the British self-governing Dominions, and even as far afield as Japan. In fact, the only exceptions among considerable states of the world up to 1920 were the U.S.A., where the Presidential executive system obtains, and the U.S.S.R., with its entirely different Soviet system. And yet in Britain, where it originated, this Cabinet system was, until the passing of the Ministers of the Crown Act in 1937, completely unknown to English law. In that year, Sir John Simon (as he then was), in moving the second reading of the Bill, pointed out that Parliament would thereby be placing on the Statute Book for the first time the terms Cabinet and Cabinet Minister, and giving to the Prime Minister, as such, a legal status.

The essential characteristics of the Cabinet in Britain are that it shall be composed of members of one or other House of Parliament, that they shall hold the same political views and be chosen from the party holding the majority in the House of Commons,¹ that they shall prosecute a concerted policy, that they shall hold a common responsibility to be signified by collective resignation in the event of parliamentary censure, and that they shall acknowledge a common subordination to one chief minister. These characteristics may be summarised as homogeneity, solidarity, and common loyalty to a chief. The emergence of the modern British Cabinet with these characteristics is generally associated with the ascendancy of the Whigs under Walpole, who was Prime Minister 1721-1742; but, though the system assumed at that time the definite features which have since characterised it, we have to look further back than the eighteenth century for its real origin.

Originally in England the King was the law-giver, the executor of the law, and the judge. He thus combined in his office all three departments of state. To assist the King in this triple duty the Great Council was organised by William the Conqueror (1066-1087). From this body of barons sprang our modern institutions: Parliament, Cabinet, and Law Courts.

¹ A war-time Coalition Cabinet is the exception which proves this rule.

The Great Council normally met only three times a year, and when it was not in session the King was assisted by a smaller body, made up of the great officers of state—the Archbishops, Justiciar, Treasurer, Chancellor, and so forth—and known as the Permanent Council. This body tended to swell and become unwieldy, and in the fifteenth century it was superseded by an inner circle of counsellors which came to be called the Privy Council. This again tended to become too large, and under the Tudors yet another inner circle, which Macaulay called an “interior council,” was created, and this met the King not in the usual council chamber but in a smaller room called the cabinet. This was the point of development reached by the time of the Stuarts. From there it went through four main stages of development, which became part of the general constitutional revolution.

The first stage was in the struggle of Parliament against Charles I. Among the attempts to stave off an armed conflict was a petition of the Commons in 1641 known as the Grand Remonstrance, which, among other things, begged that

“Your Majesty will vouchsafe to employ such persons in your great and public affairs, and to take such to be near you in places of trust as *your Parliament may have cause to confide in.*”

Here is the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament clearly enunciated. But this was not one of the principles implemented at the Restoration. Yet during the reign of Charles II the second stage was reached with the definite emergence of two parties: Whigs and Tories. Once the principle of ministerial responsibility should become associated with party divisions, one of the main features of the modern Cabinet would be established. This third stage was reached during the reign of William III. In 1694 William chose his ministers solely from among the Whigs, but they were as yet responsible to the King rather than to Parliament. Though the Cabinet had, in the reigns of William and Anne (1689–1714), become the sole supreme consultative council and executive authority in the state, the monarch was Chairman of this inner Council of Ministers.

It required only one more turn of the wheel to complete the development, and this happened with the accession of George I

in 1714. As George could not speak or understand English, he abstained from attending meetings of the Cabinet, whose direction therefore passed into the hands of the Chief Minister. Though to trace the evolution of the office of Prime Minister is not the same as to follow that of the Cabinet, it was under Walpole, who held office from 1721 to 1742, that the two developments coincided. Walpole became acknowledged Prime Minister, though his salaried office was that of First Lord of the Treasury, and his power was established on the solidarity of the Whig Party, which supported him in Parliament for twenty-one years. By the end of the eighteenth century the Cabinet system, with the basic characteristics which we have already noted, was firmly established.

The essence of this executive system is, then, that the Cabinet is a Committee of Parliament, tending to become, with the advance of democracy, a Committee of the Commons. The Cabinet, as Walter Bagehot pointed out,¹ is thus a creature, though differing from all other creatures in the fact that it can destroy its creator, since the Cabinet can bring about a dissolution of Parliament.

The system of government by Parliament and Cabinet is the peculiar gift of Britain to the world. The triumph of the principle of government, summed up in the phrase: "The King in Parliament," was achieved in Britain in the seventeenth century when Louis XIV was establishing his despotism in France. The Cabinet system emerged and matured in the eighteenth century at a time when, in states like Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the monarch created a despotism which, however enlightened, remained an autocracy. Parliamentary and Cabinet government in Britain in the eighteenth century was indeed far from a democratic system. It was, in fact, oligarchical. But it was a method of government that had evolved by natural stages from a primitive monarchy, and, what is more important, could develop without harsh ruptures into a democratic system, as the constitutional history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries clearly proves. Of the continental type of despotism, the very opposite was true. Because it could not be moulded into something more tolerable to the enlightened sections of the community, it had to be violently overthrown. And violent overthrow was what Fate had in store for it.

It is significant that Britain, the one state which knew how to

¹ In *The English Constitution*.

avert the worst evils of despotism by a triumph of constitutional checks upon it was the one also that stood firmest amid the the turmoil and strife in which the Continent was soon to be engulfed, and which, when the turmoil and strife had died down, proved itself sufficiently malleable to take, without snapping, the strain of a complete democratisation.

CHAPTER XIII

FRENCH REVOLUTION

THE IDEALS OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

The Theory and Practice of Revolution : the American Influence

THE French Revolution, which broke out in 1789, may fairly be regarded as the springboard from which Europe was impelled into the most dynamic period of its history, an epoch of ferment and change which, having filled the nineteenth century, has continued with a growing complexity and intensity into our own time. For the French Revolution was something more than a violent political change, by which men sought the triumph of liberty: it was a social upheaval, by which they hoped also to achieve equality. The political and social conditions of the time made such a revolution very difficult to carry out, and the march of events accompanying and following the outbreak made it even more difficult permanently to secure its fruits. The tactics of the struggle may have been largely improvised, but its strategy was not worked out in a day, nor was its harvest gathered on the morrow of the fight. In fact, the principles of the French Revolution owed much in their gestation to two other precedent revolutions—the Bloodless Revolution in England and the American Revolution—and the ultimate effects of all three movements might well have been very different but for the subsequent spread of the Industrial Revolution which, combined with the growth of a militant nationalism, secured their fulfilment. These four revolutions, then, arising from the conditions we have so far traced, give the key to a proper comprehension of contemporary Europe.

The British Constitution, as it had developed by the eighteenth century, was, as we have seen, a thing of slow and gradual growth, though in its struggle with despotism in the seventeenth century its evolution was hastened to a revolutionary tempo. It was an empirical growth rather than a development founded on ideas. Nevertheless, it was made the starting-point of the political speculation which characterised the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This political speculation was concerned mainly with the conception known as the Social Contract Theory.

Briefly stated, this theory argued that political society originated in a compact among men to end the anarchy of a state of nature. By the compact men abandon certain of their natural rights, but only those necessary to the establishment of a civil condition of society. In other words, civil rights are by the contract substituted for natural rights. The object of political society is, therefore, to secure that the rights not so abandoned continue to be guaranteed to the citizens. Now, if the establishment of government is thus contractual, it follows that when government becomes tyrannical it breaks the contract, and therefore the members of the state have the right to remove and replace such a government. There lies the justification for revolution.

There is not the slightest historical foundation for this theory as it was enunciated by the political philosophers, but it was none the less a potent force in both the theory and practice of revolution. The theory had an ancient and honourable lineage, for a champion of it appears in Plato's *Republic*; it crops up again during the struggle between the Popes and Emperors, and it was used by the Huguenots in France and the people of the Netherlands under the Spanish yoke. One of its most famous exponents was the Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, who, however, in his *Leviathan* (1651), used the argument to justify state absolutism on the ground that the government set up by the contract was no party to it and therefore could not break it. Another Englishman, John Locke, in his *Treatises of Civil Government* (1690), used the theory of the contract as a justification for the Revolution of 1688-1689. Through Locke the Social Contract Theory passed back to the Continent, where Locke had a great vogue as a thinker, and reached its final form in Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762), probably the most epoch-making book ever written. The great difference between Locke and Rousseau is that, whereas Locke's theory followed and justified the practical political changes in England, Rousseau's preceded and inspired them in France. In this sense Rousseau's *Social Contract* has been described, without exaggeration, as the "Bible of the Revolution."

Man, says Rousseau in the *Social Contract*, is born free and yet is everywhere in chains; that is to say, although man is born to be free he is enslaved by the state. How, asks Rousseau in effect, can the state be justified? Only, he replies, by the retention of the sovereign power in the hands of the people who had made the contract which turned a multitude of individuals into

a society. What man loses by the social contract is natural liberty: what he gains is civil liberty. Here Rousseau's thought is in the strongest contrast to Hobbes's. As John Morley said in his essay on Rousseau, "Society in the one case [Hobbes's] is a covenant of subjection, in the other a covenant of social brotherhood." The contract, according to Rousseau, must logically secure equality, since thereby each, in giving himself up to all, gives himself up to no one. This doctrine of popular sovereignty, as enunciated by Rousseau, was a trumpet-blast to the forces gathering for the overthrow of the Old Régime in France. It became the pabulum of the philosophical radicalism of the eighteenth century, and in this form passed to America, where it was a philosophical forerunner of the Declaration of Independence.

But to show the kind of logical morass in which Rousseau landed himself in his frantic efforts to find a philosophical justification for democracy, based on his doctrine of the General Will, it has only to be added that it was taken up by the German philosophers, and particularly Hegel (1770-1831), to whom may be traced the philosophical justification for modern Prussian absolutism. Thus Rousseau's theory of the state, which has no justification in history, was finally lost in the transcendental mists generated by the idealistic philosophy of his German successors. But it matters little that historical research should prove the Social Contract Theory baseless, or that Rousseau's arguments should be ultimately found equally acceptable as a justification by the opponents of democracy. The truth is that, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the theory was translated into fact by the Americans and the French. For no amount of argumentation or research can gainsay that the Americans did form a new body politic and social in 1789, as a result of their War of Independence, and that they enshrined its rights in a document called the Constitution of the United States, which remains the instrument of federal government in that country to this day. Nor can it be denied that the French overthrew the Old Régime with the battle-cry, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity!" under leaders inspired by Rousseau's polemics, and that by the same token they produced political constitutions intended to secure these rights.

The documents of all three revolutions—English, French, and American—assume that government originates in a contract between the government and the governed, which is intended to secure the rights of the latter. We have already quoted

from the resolution of the English Convention of 1688, which declared that James had broken "the original contract between King and people." This was the first reference to the contractual theory in a state paper. It is true that it is only a passing reference and that it refers only to political rights. But Britain was the only constitutional state in existence at that time, and it was natural that men, seeking a way to rid themselves of the despotism under which they lived, should critically examine, and use as a model, this unique instrument of their age. The French and Americans were, however, concerned with something more than political rights, for the mass of the French were still suffering under a feudal system which condemned most of them to serfdom, while the Americans were chafing under what they regarded as an intolerable economic tyranny imposed upon them by Britain.

Note, then, the American Declaration of Independence, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and issued in 1776, whose second paragraph opens with these words :

"We hold these truths to be self-evident : that all men are created equal ; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights ; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ; that, wherever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

The Americans were concerned, that is to say, not merely with the achievement of political liberty but with social rights, summed up in the phrase "the pursuit of happiness." On this battle-cry of Jefferson's the United States won their war of independence and established their republic, with the assistance of Frenchmen, who later returned to France to add to the general agitation for political and social reform. Moreover, the separate colonies, which afterwards formed the United States, had been drafting their own constitutions, which were collected and published in 1781 and soon translated into French.

The French learned their lesson well, and among the first acts of the Constituent Assembly which met in 1789 was the drawing

up of a "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens," which was afterwards prefixed, with but slight revisions, to each of the Constitutions promulgated between 1791 and 1795. The French Declaration, it is obvious, owed much to Rousseau and to the English Bill of Rights, but it was to the American Declaration of Independence, above all, that it was indebted. Indeed, the debt the French owed to the Americans was handsomely acknowledged in the report which introduced the Declaration to the Assembly, in one of the most generous public gestures which history records. "We have thought it advisable," it said, "that the Constitution should be preceded by a declaration of the rights of man and of citizens. . . . Our soil should by right be the first to which this grand idea, conceived in another hemisphere, should be transplanted. We co-operated in the events which gave North America her liberty, and now she shows us on what principles we ought to base the preservation of our own. Formerly we carried fetters into the New World; now it teaches us to protect ourselves from the misfortune of being obliged to wear them."

The French Declaration, in fact, closely followed the American Declaration of Independence and several of the separate American State Declarations in form and even in phraseology. How much it owed to Rousseau and to the American Declaration, to which we have referred, may be gathered from the following paraphrased extracts :

"Men are born free and with equal rights; free and equal they remain. The aim of every political association is the maintenance of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are 'liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.' . . .

"Liberty consists in 'the power to do anything that does not harm another'; accordingly, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has for its only limits those that secure to the other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These limits can be determined by law. . . .

"Law is the expression of the general will. . . .

"Sovereignty resides exclusively in the nation and is 'one, indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible.'¹

"The nation has the imprescriptible right to change its constitution."

¹ This phrase was a direct quotation from Rousseau.

All these aspirations, hammered out on the hard anvil of French logic, assumed the essential goodness of human nature. On the truth or otherwise of that assumption the course of the French Revolution was soon to provide a striking commentary. But, though the constitutionalism of the early years of the Revolution had to give way, first to the anarchy of the Reign of Terror and then to the despotism of the Napoleonic régime, the Revolution had lighted a fire of political liberty which was never again to be permanently smothered. For, as has been well said, the French ideal of self-government became—what it had never been in its English or even in its American form—a challenge to every constituted government which did not recognise and embody the sovereignty of the people.

The Monarchical Phase of the Revolution

The movement usually known as the French Revolution was, in fact, two revolutions. The first, which occurred in 1789, abolished the Old Régime and the abuses of monarchical government while retaining the monarchy; the second, which occurred in 1793, abolished the monarchy and set up a republic in its place. These two movements were not entirely distinct either in time or in the forces behind them, for there were many discontents in France in the eighteenth century, and the interests and purposes of different classes and groups tended to overlap and in some cases to merge. The cult of reason and humanity, fed by the doctrines of the philosophers and the political examples of Britain and America, was generally confined to the middle class, or *bourgeoisie*, of the towns, who desired to end the abuses of the Old Régime—"despotism, intolerance, and inequality"—and whose slogan was Liberty and Equality. By revolution they meant a change of government which they thought could be achieved with the help of the goodwill of the governors. The peasants, who were the victims of the ruins of feudalism, looked also to a change of government to improve their lot, remove the restrictions on the land, and lighten and equalise the burdens of taxation. The monarchy and the privileged aristocracy upheld the Old Régime, which became more and more odious as its existence became less and less justified.

But neither the spread of American sentiments, which had successfully embodied themselves in a new free republic, nor

the discontents of the peasantry, which were by no means communistic, would have sufficed to bring about a political revolution in France, for there was no machinery that the malcontents could improvise or use. The way out was in the event unconsciously supplied by the royal government itself. This arose from the chronic state of bankruptcy into which France had fallen through the combined effect of an unproductive social and economic system and the constant wars which drained her resources. The government was perpetually short of money, and every expedient had failed to raise sufficient funds for the discharge of its functions. At length it was decided to call the States-General, which had not met since 1614. The sole purpose of the government in summoning this archaic body was, through the money it would vote, to balance the budget. What happened in fact was that its convention became a focus of all the discontents and hopes of the unprivileged classes.

The States-General was made up of three Estates: nobles, clergy, and Third Estate (*Tiers Etat*), or Commons. But it had been for so long in desuetude that there was no known practice to follow in its election. It was at length decided that in a total assembly of twelve hundred the representatives of the people should be equal in numbers to the nobles and clergy combined, and that they should be elected by local assemblies. These local assemblies brought together representatives who had never previously played any part in the government of the country, especially parish priests and peasants. The local assemblies drew up instructions or *cabiers* for their delegates, and these *cabiers* circulated freely in the localities. They demanded a constitution and a representative assembly, proposals which, in fact, constituted a political revolution. Yet there was nowhere in these documents a demand for the abolition of the monarchy. The most that was asked for was a constitutional monarchy, and this was seen especially in a *cabier* drafted by a young cleric, named Talleyrand, who was to live to play a leading part in the establishment of such a monarchy in France with the restoration of the Bourbons on the fall of Napoleon. As it was, when the States-General finally met at Versailles in May 1789, the King retained the right to suspend or dissolve it.

Within six weeks of the convention of the States-General, the Third Estate, resolving on definite action, declared itself a National Assembly. and swore not to separate until it had

promulgated a constitution for France. Louis XVI, although he possessed many virtues, was no statesman, and, failing to lead the nation in this critical hour, was persuaded by a court clique to form an armed camp just outside Versailles. On July 14, as a riposte to this reactionary step, the people of the neighbouring *faubourg*, or working-class quarter, of Paris stormed the Bastille, or state prison. The fall of the Bastille, though it had only seven prisoners in it and its capture was no great military achievement, was regarded as the symbol of the overthrow of "secretive tyranny and arbitrary imprisonment," and has since been celebrated as marking the dawn of liberty in continental Europe. From that moment Paris, a very large city with a population even in those days of not less than three-quarters of a million, became the focal point of the revolutionary movement, which was organised in the metropolis and kept alive in the country by means of clubs, for the discussion of political questions, and committees, to keep watch on the opponents of the revolution.

This development was marked by many acts of violence, bloodshed, and arson. The King, incapable on the one hand of comprehending the essence of a constitutional monarchy and too humane on the other to suppress the Assembly and restore order by force of arms, remained at Versailles, the object of suspicion to the hungry mobs of Paris. Then, one day in October, headed by a crowd of women demonstrating against the shortage of bread, the mob marched on Versailles, followed by the newly formed National Guard under Lafayette, and brought the King and Queen to Paris where, in the Tuileries, they remained under constant popular surveillance. Meanwhile, the National Assembly, in which by now the nobility and clergy had joined the Commons in a single chamber, having renamed itself the Constituent Assembly, was proceeding with the business of constitution-making. On the night of August 4 the Assembly proclaimed the abolition of all feudal privileges and seigneurial jurisdiction, and this was shortly followed by the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The new Constitution established a constitutional monarchy largely on the model of the British, though the legislature was to be constituted as a single chamber and the Ministers, while responsible to the Assembly, were not allowed seats in it.

The Constitution initiated a uniform system of direct taxation, related to means, and established the Civil Constitution of the

Clergy, whereby the bishops and priests were to be elected by the people, all Church property was expropriated to the state and became national property, and the stipends of livings were equalised. But the most important reform was the abolition of the ancient provinces of France and the division of the country into Departments controlled from the centre. The effect of this reform was to give a new significance to the word nation in France and to emphasise the high centralism of the French unitary state, a characteristic which it has retained ever since. The new unity was achieved not through obedience to the monarch, who was henceforth called not King of France but King of the French, but through loyalty to the nation. The symbol of this new unity was the tricolour flag. The first Constitution was completed in 1791 and the King accepted it. Thereupon the Constituent Assembly was dissolved and replaced by a newly elected body, called the Legislative Assembly, which was to carry on the business of law-making for the benefit of the nation.

At that moment it looked as though the Revolution was over and that France would settle down as a constitutional monarchy. Events were soon to prove, however, that, on the contrary, this was only the first stage of the Revolution, and that its most violent phase was yet to come. This arose mainly out of the international situation. The Assembly had decreed that "the French nation renounces all war with a view to conquest." But this pacific intention was frustrated by the action of neighbouring monarchs who had taken fright at the course of the Revolution, particularly in its abolition of feudalism and its attack on the Church, and had given asylum to French aristocrats, known as *émigrés*, who had taken refuge in their territories. Louis XVI, the prisoner of the people, was suspected of being in contact with his brother sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, and the most exalted *émigrés* were undoubtedly preparing an expedition to rescue the King. The French, in face of this, ordered the mobilisation of volunteers in all Departments, and the contingent from Marseilles arrived singing the *Marseillaise*, this being the first appearance of the French national anthem. The armies mustered on the frontier, and in April 1792 war was declared against Austria and the German princes. Thereupon the Emperor and the King of Prussia made common cause and invaded France.

The Republican Phase

The invasion of France precipitated a crisis in Paris and led to the second and republican revolution. Under the direction of Danton, a barrister, and other extremists, an attack was made on the Palace, in which the Swiss Guards were massacred and the King and Queen made captive. A new Assembly was summoned, known as the Convention, charged with the duty of drawing up a new constitution. When the Convention met it declared France to be a republic. This synchronised with an extraordinary change of fortune in the war. The invaders fell back and were defeated at Valmy, and soon French troops were occupying neighbouring lands in the Austrian Netherlands, on the west bank of the Rhine, and in Savoy. All this gave the revolutionaries tremendous confidence and caused France completely to reverse her earlier policy of the renouncement of war. The Convention now announced its readiness to grant "fraternity and aid to all people desiring to regain their liberty," ordered the generals in occupied countries to "defend citizens subjected to vexation in the cause of liberty," and commanded them to obtain the election of temporary administrators who would "swear fidelity to the principles of liberty and equality." The French Revolution had ceased to be a movement merely for the internal reform of France : it had become an international armed propaganda.

In France itself Republican extremism was carried a stage further when, in January 1793, the Convention brought the King to trial and executed him. Flushed with victory, the Convention, with French troops in occupation of Belgium, then took the grave step of declaring war on Holland and Britain. William Pitt the Younger, then in the tenth year of his youthful Premiership, was forced hereby, much against his inclination and temperament, to abandon his plans for internal reform and to lead the country into war. Nothing could stop Britain going to war once France threatened a mastery of a continuous line of coast from the English Channel to the North Sea ; for so it must always be in the face of such a threat, whether the aggressor be Spain, France, or Germany, each of whom has made this attempt in turn through the centuries. Moreover, the extremism of the Revolution, culminating in the execution of the King, had outraged and frightened even moderate opinion in Britain which had applauded the Revolution when it first broke out as the

way of liberty and justice for the French people. For all these reasons the solidarity of Britain behind Pitt was assured.

Britain's entry into the war brought an entirely new element into the armed coalition against France. The early victories of the French were due to the preoccupation of Austria, Prussia, and Russia with Poland, the Second Partition of which was effected in 1792. Britain had no such side-shows to withdraw her attention from her main purpose, which was to maintain command of the seas, to keep open the routes to the Empire, and to prevent France from establishing a hegemony of Europe. In these circumstances the tide of war turned against France. Her armies were withdrawn from the Netherlands and the Rhine, and her territory invaded. The effect of this transformation on French internal politics was to discredit the Convention and to throw the fate of the Republic into the hands of the extreme radicals, known as Jacobins, headed first by Danton and then by Robespierre, a lawyer from Arras, who were representative of a mere fraction of the nation. As always in periods of revolution, the direction of affairs was snatched from the leaders of the inert mass of respectable opinion by a fanatical minority who were prepared to devote their ardour and verve to getting things done. The Convention continued to sit, but it was rendered completely impotent when it voted the executive power into the hands of a Committee of Public Safety, in effect a war cabinet of twelve men, whose business was to crush the enemies of the Revolution and to organise victory. They did it with a vengeance. For one dreadful year, from July 1793 to July 1794, while Robespierre was supreme, their policy was, as he described it, "to govern the people by reason and the enemies of the people by terror."

The Reign of Terror, with its mass execution of all political opponents, was a blot on the fair history of France and a strange interlude in the course of a revolution whose avowed purpose was the establishment and diffusion of the ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. But it cannot be denied that Robespierre's brief year of power was one of remarkable triumphs for the French Republic. A royalist revolt at Lyons was suppressed, the soil of France was entirely cleared of the enemy, a British expeditionary force was crushed, the Austrians were hopelessly defeated, Belgium was reconquered, and Holland was invaded. The Committee of Public Safety created a citizen army through the introduction of compulsory service. This

laid the foundations of Napoleon's later military triumphs and introduced into Europe the principle of conscription, which was formally established in France in 1798, when all able-bodied men between twenty and twenty-five were made liable for service.

The new French armies, unhampered by the old aristocratic officer class, most of which had emigrated, were led by officers risen from the ranks who were men of the people accustomed to a hard life, and many of whom rose to be generals. The French armies, thus created on a democratic principle and consequently inspired with a democratic purpose, were much larger than the armies of the older states and moved much faster, with a new form of tactics commensurate with their objectives. This accounts for their extraordinary success. And having cleared their own country of the enemy they set out on the offensive by the invasion of the lands of their opponents. Thus the wheel turned full circle, and the French Republic, which had begun with a renunciation of aggressive war, proceeded to revive the discredited formula of its monarchical predecessors which demanded for France her "natural frontiers," though even these were to prove far less than enough for the insatiable territorial hunger of the military genius now so soon to emerge.

The revolution then reached its final crisis. In July 1794, Robespierre died of his own medicine, when his partisans revolted against his last desperate expedient of capital punishment without even the pretence of trial, which would have swept away even their immunity from the knife, and he fell a victim to the very guillotine with which in Paris alone in the space of a single year he had snapped the lives of more than two thousand French citizens. With his departure a third Constitution was drawn up in 1795. It created a legislature made up of a Council of Ancients and a Council of 500, and an Executive composed of a Directory of five members chosen by the Upper House from a list drawn up by the Lower. When it was realised that this was only ringing the changes on the Convention and Committee of Public Safety, there was a general revolt, and the Directory, paralysed by unrest and lack of money, could maintain itself only by unconstitutional means.

An example of the inability of the Government to maintain order without recourse to violence was given when, in October 1795, an insurrection in Paris was suppressed by a "whiff of grapeshot" directed by a young French gunnery officer from

Corsica named Napoleon Bonaparte. It was a portent of what was to come, for from that moment the course of the Revolution was identified with the meteoric military career of Napoleon. The French became bewitched by the glamour of the "Little Corporal," and the upward anguish of the great constitutional struggle became a fading memory in their vicarious enjoyment of his military triumphs. At home Napoleon's prestige grew in step with the triumphant movement of his armies abroad, and at length his indispensability in the field made possible the success of the *coup d'état* of Brumaire (November 9, 1799). By this act of violence the Constitution of 1795, as modified in 1797, was overthrown and Napoleon became First Consul, assisted by two colleagues. This Triumvirate was to appoint a Senate which was to select a legislative body from lists of popular nominees. But in actuality the powers of the First Consul were absolute.

Thus, to summarise in the words of Charles Seignobos, "the Revolution had produced results very different from what its authors had intended. . . . They had desired to reform the monarchy and had established a republic; to restore the finances and had ended in bankruptcy; to reorganise the Church, and had overthrown it; to preserve the volunteer army and had introduced compulsory service. They had wanted to give France local autonomy and political liberty, and had prepared the way for a centralised and authoritarian government. They had wanted to renounce war and conquest, and involved France in a general war followed by extensive conquests. They had wanted to set up a government which should be a model for other peoples, and had inspired them with an aversion for it."¹ In fact, the transformations of the French state in the course of a single decade provide an interesting variation of the Aristotelian cycle,² for, having changed from an autocracy to a constitutional monarchy and then to a constitutional republic, it emerged, through the corruption of its constitutional machinery, as a military despotism.

The Mission of Napoleon

Napoleon was a child of the Revolution. Doubtless a man of such dynamic character would have been outstanding in any epoch; yet it is difficult to see how one of his origin and

¹ *The Rise of European Civilisation*, pages 331-2.

² See earlier, Chapter II, page 55.

background could have reached his giddy pinnacles of power but for the state of solution into which French society and politics had been cast by the upheavals of the six years preceding his advent on the revolutionary scene. Napoleon was not a mere adventurer—his creative genius was too large for that—but, rather, a constructive opportunist, shaping his conduct to the changing circumstances. This was seen equally, for example, in his decision to renounce his youthful project for a Corsican war of independence against France and to place his services at the disposal of the French Republic as in his abandonment of the Egyptian campaign in 1799 when, by his return to France, he was able to effect the *coup d'état* which made him First Consul and Dictator of France.

Napoleon's greatness lay not so much in his military achievements, which in themselves were quite ephemeral, nor even in his contributions to the material prosperity of France, though these were considerable, or to its good administration, as, for example, in his founding of the University of France and the Bank of France, and his codification of the law (*Code Napoléon*) which fashioned the existing French legal system: it lay rather in the fact that he completed the historical mission of the Revolution, for by his conquests he shattered the foundations of the Old Régime in Europe outside France. The recasting of the map of Europe and the consequent redistribution of political power were alone sufficient to ensure that, whatever should happen to Napoleon's Empire, Europe could never be the same again. But, more than that, as his power spread he inevitably scattered the revolutionary seed among neighbouring peoples, and aroused in them, however unwittingly, a sense of nationalism which finally engulfed his pretensions to world dominion and, after his fall, frustrated the attempt of the victorious powers to refetter Europe with the shackles of the old order. In this sense the importance of Napoleon's contribution to the dynamism of nineteenth century Europe can hardly be overstated.

Napoleon's rise to supreme power was based upon two fundamental conceptions on which he consistently and successfully acted. The first was that the only criterion of promotion was ability, that all careers should be open to talent. He was by temperament a despot, and political liberty was inconsistent with his régime, but he at the same time stood for social equality, which was for him the true democracy. "What the French people want," Napoleon himself declared, "is equality, not

liberty." The principle of equality had opened the road for his own success, and he was determined that it should remain open for everyone else. Thus in the army any of his corporals might, and in fact did, become field marshals, and in his civil tasks he found by the same open road men of outstanding ability to assist him. The second conception was that war was not, as most professional soldiers of the age were inclined to think, an end in itself, but a means of forcing your will upon your enemy when you had destroyed his armies and occupied his country. On the strength of his success in these two directions the Empire was created. In 1802 three and a half million Frenchmen in a plebiscite, organised by Napoleon, voted in favour of his being made Consul for life. It was but a step from this to the title of Emperor, which the Senate bestowed on him in 1804 and which was sanctified by the hollow mockery of a coronation service in Paris at which the Pope was obliged to officiate.

Napoleon's military method was entirely novel. His armies were composed of conscripts, with officers who had risen from the ranks. His soldiers had no regular drill, did not live in barracks, and received no training in the ordinary sense. The recruits picked up hints from the veterans and were expected to find their feet in the campaigns. Speed was the essence of the Napoleonic technique: rapid invasion, surprise, concentration of superior numbers at the weak points of the enemy's front. There was no base as in later warfare, for the lines of communication were too long. Everything was improvised as the army moved, and the generals had to feed their troops from the resources of the land they occupied. This plan became less and less productive as Napoleon moved farther east, and that accounts for his failure in Russia, with its huge unpopulated and sterile regions where the men died in swarms from disease, hunger, and cold. But for a long time it was highly successful. One by one he brought the great Continental Powers under his sway. First Prussia and then Austria fell out of the Coalition. Britain alone stood firm throughout, and Britain and France were continuously at war from 1793 to 1814, except for a brief period of fourteen months following the abortive Treaty of Amiens in 1802.

The Empire of Napoleon spread to its broadest territorial limits as a result of his failure, through lack of sea-power, to conquer Britain. After the decisive British victory at Trafalgar

in 1805, he determined, since he could not break out of the Continent, to close it to the people whom he so completely misunderstood as to stigmatise as "a nation of shopkeepers." He thus instituted his celebrated "Continental System," by which he intended to make Europe a self-sufficing economic unit and to deprive Britain of all intercourse with it. This object involved him in a further series of campaigns in which he gained his most resounding military successes. He forced all the great Continental Powers to make peace on his terms, and by 1812 his Empire reached its greatest extent. In that year the map of Europe presented a very different picture from that of 1789. As the accompanying map shows, the areas outside the original boundaries of France by 1812 directly under French government included the whole of the original Netherlands and an area some way beyond them to the east, then south of this a region whose eastern boundary was marked by the Rhine to its source, and then again south of Switzerland and on through the west of Italy to south of Rome. Besides these he directly governed the Illyrian Province running practically the whole length of the eastern Adriatic coast.

The dependent territories, on whose thrones Napoleon placed his own nominees, mostly members of his own family,¹ included the whole of Germany (except a much-truncated Prussia) where he left only four Kingdoms, which he united in the Confederation of the Rhine. To the east of this was the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (most of the original Poland). The rest of Italy, besides that part directly under French rule, consisted of the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Naples, which Napoleon created and governed through kings selected by himself. Besides this the Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Spain were also governed through his puppets.

¹ Napoleon made his eldest brother, Joseph, at first King of Naples and later King of Spain (1808-1814); his third brother, Louis (the father of the future Emperor Napoleon III), King of Holland (1806-1810); his youngest brother, Jerome, King of Westphalia, a state of his own creation in Germany (1807-1814); his brother-in-law, Marshal Joachim Murat (the husband of his sister Caroline), King of Naples (1808-1815); his eldest sister, Elise, Princess of Lucca; and his stepson, Eugene de Beauharnais (son of his first wife, Josephine), Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy, of which Napoleon proclaimed himself the head. Also, having caused Charles XII of Sweden to abdicate in favour of his aged and childless uncle, Charles XIII, he persuaded the latter to nominate as his successor another of his (Napoleon's) marshals, Jean Bernadotte, who afterwards deserted the Emperor and in 1818 became King of Sweden as Charles XIV, and so founded the present royal Swedish line. (For a complete genealogy of Napoleon's family, see Table 31 in *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XIII.)



In the process of French expansion Austria, Prussia, and Russia were all badly mauled. In 1806 Napoleon ordered the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire as obsolete in face of his policy for a new German unity under French control and in any case inconsistent with his own dignity. The Hapsburg ruler then took the title of Emperor of Austria. Prussia lost her western territories. All three had to abandon most of the Polish territory on whose forceful acquisition they had lavished so much time and energy. For the rest they enjoyed such freedom as their diminished territory, their shrunken majesty, and Napoleon's surveillance might permit.

But the year 1812 proved to be the zenith of Napoleon's career. From that time his star began to fall from its ascendant, for reasons that are not far to seek. It is not difficult to imagine

how, with the insufferable economic restrictions of the Continental System added to outraged national pride and the political discontents at Napoleon's hegemony, non-French Europe sought for ways and means to overthrow the tyrant. In spite of all Napoleon's precautions, Britain had broken into his European fortress, for since 1808 Wellington had been waging that struggle of patience and attrition known as the Peninsular War. In 1812 Napoleon learned—and he was not the last of aggressors to do so—that Russian appearances are deceptive, and he and his Grand Army, repulsed by the flames of Moscow, in which they could find neither nutriment nor glory, reached, if they were lucky, a road back to France. As they retreated, the national forces gathered behind them, and at Leipzig in 1813, not inappropriately called the Battle of the Nations, Napoleon suffered a crushing defeat. Gradually the forces of liberation which he had unleashed fought their way westward, while Wellington, rewarded for his patience at last, moved northward through the Pyrenees to meet the Allies in Paris in 1814. After his abdication the Fates appeared to give Napoleon one more chance. But in fact the Hundred Days and Waterloo were the adventures of a desperate gambler. In them Napoleon followed what somebody has called the strategy of Monte Carlo, but his lucky number failed him. In 1815 the Allies confirmed with only slight modifications the settlement they had made in the previous year.

Napoleon had fallen, but the forces which had made his meteoric career possible were not by his defeat stamped out. The documentary constitutions of the French revolutionary period may have failed to embody the ideals of the Revolution in any immediately practicable form, but the seeds of liberty and equality had been sown in blood, tears, and sweat, and the people must eventually reap the harvest, despite the "scorched earth" policy of the new continental mandarins who replaced the fallen Emperor. The Revolution had done its work, and Europe could never go back to the system against which the Revolution was an armed protest. In vain did the new arbiters of the destinies of Europe seek to restore the old order. The diplomats might conclude Holy Alliances, hold congresses, and establish Concerts of Europe to shore up a dilapidated edifice, but these buttresses could not bolster it for long. "The mission of Napoleon," said Mazzini, "was at an end when the mission of the peoples began." The old and the new thus stood face

to face, and the years following the fall of Napoleon were to see a struggle between an insurgent liberalism and a conscious nationalism on the one side and the forces of reaction on the other, out of which a new Europe was at length to arise.

CHAPTER XIV

REACTIONARY INTERLUDE

METTERNICH VERSUS INSURGENT NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM

The Concert of Europe and the Monroe Doctrine

THE settlement of Europe made at the Congress of Vienna at the end of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon is of tremendous significance in setting the stage for the succeeding epoch. The treaties of 1814-1815 certainly introduced a period of general peace among the states of Europe which lasted for about thirty years, but they were engineered by royal and aristocratic diplomatists who entirely failed to appreciate that the principles enunciated by the Revolution and disseminated through the Napoleonic conquest had had a profound and permanent effect on European society. The main concern of the leaders of the Powers which had encompassed the overthrow of Bonaparte was to create the conditions which would prevent the occurrence of another revolution and the emergence of another Napoleon. They blindly chose, therefore, to treat the events of the previous quarter of a century as though they had never happened and to adopt a policy of restoration, reaction, and repression. But the period was, in fact, one of preparation for the most far-reaching changes in the social and economic structure and the political organisation of Europe. The material conditions of life were changing as the result of those improvements in methods of production and distribution which we call the Industrial Revolution, and the champions of Liberalism and nationalism, driven temporarily underground, were organising for a new conflict with the forces of reaction.

The Vienna settlement may be examined in three aspects: political, territorial, and diplomatic. Politically the reorganisation of Europe was based on the principle of "legitimacy," a phrase coined and exploited by the French Minister, Talleyrand, to save his country from the punitive action of the victorious Powers. By this principle the chief dynasties dispossessed by Napoleon were restored to their thrones in France, Spain, Holland, and Savoy, while those of Austria, Prussia, and Russia regained all—or more than all—of their former prestige.

Territorially the basic plan of royal restoration was varied a good deal by what were called compensations, which outraged the principle of nationality. During the war Britain had made extensive imperial acquisitions at the expense of the French and the Dutch, and these were, not unnaturally, left in her hands. France was fortunate to escape with her boundaries of 1789, but for security reasons a strong state had to be established on her north-eastern frontier. Consequently the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) were joined with Holland to form a united kingdom. Austria was compensated for this loss by being given a commanding position in Italy, where she acquired the provinces of Venetia and Lombardy and dominated the rest of the country, including the restored House of Savoy in Piedmont (Sardinia). Italy was, in fact, left as a congeries of eight separate states, whose hope of unification was by this settlement put off for two generations. Prussia was enlarged by the annexation of Pomerania and part of Saxony and extensions of her territory on the lower Rhine. Finland passed from Sweden to Russia, and Norway from Denmark to Sweden. Poland remained partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, though Russian Poland was made into a kingdom with the Tsar as King and a constitution which failed to work.

Germany came out of the conflict in a very different state from that in which she entered it. Instead of the more than three hundred states of the Westphalia settlement, there were now only thirty-eight. The Holy Roman Empire had gone, but the Emperor of Austria remained dominant. To give Germany a semblance of unity, the German states were joined in what was called the German Confederation, or *Bund*. This was the loosest possible league of states, each of which retained its sovereign powers. The general assembly, or Diet, to which each sent representatives for common purposes, was nothing but a convention of ambassadors presided over by Austria. Thus Germany, like Italy, remained disunited, and this gives the key to the great unifying movements in both countries which came in the latter half of the nineteenth century.


Diplomatically, the treaty-makers sought to make this settlement permanent. The inventor of the plan for carrying this into effect was Prince Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, whose threefold purpose was to maintain the prestige and power of Austria, to perpetuate the *status quo*, and to prevent another revolutionary outbreak. This was to be achieved not

merely by maintaining the Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Britain, which had been formally secured by the Treaty of Paris, but by a series of meetings or congresses of their representatives, who were to come together from time to time to make sure that the conditions of the peace were kept. Metternich took an entirely cynical view of political man, but it was not so with his collaborator, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, whose moods alternated between those of an oriental despot and of a Christian visionary who believed in the perfectibility of the human race.

In this latter mood he persuaded the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to join him in the Holy Alliance, by which they declared their "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections." The collaborators in this unreal attempt at a remarriage of ethics and politics promised to "remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity" and to lend each other aid "on all occasions and in all places," though the Austrian Emperor frankly admitted that he did not understand the Tsar's proposal and Metternich called it "verbiage." Britain naturally declined to join the Holy Alliance, which Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, dismissed as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense."

There were thus in Europe at the close of the Napoleonic Wars three instruments of international order: the Quadruple Alliance, which, having been a mere war coalition, soon ceased, in the peace that followed, to have any military significance; the Holy Alliance, which, because of its lack of vital organs, remained a visionary's dream; and the Congress System, which, under Metternich's dead hand, rapidly became an engine of repression.

Such was the Concert of Europe, whose ostensible object was to maintain the peace. Metternich's Congress System, if conceived in more human terms, might have been made the basis of a creative international order, but Metternich unashamedly prostituted it to the purposes of reaction. After



Vienna there were three Congresses, convened at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), resumed at Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822). At Troppau the Powers issued a circular which frankly declared that any state which underwent a change of government due to revolution thereby ceased to be a member of the European alliance, and if, through such changes, immediate danger threatened, "the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means or, if need be, by arms, to bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the great alliance." This was too much for Castlereagh, who, though he was rightly regarded as a die-hard Tory in Britain, protested that "the [Quadruple] Alliance was not conceived as a union for the government of the world and the superintendence of the affairs of other states." From this

moment Britain drifted away from the Quadruple Alliance, and when George Canning succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office in 1822 the rupture became complete.

Canning sent a message to the Congress of Verona which clearly shows the gulf that divided British policy from that of Metternich and the hopelessness of the prospect of a true international order so long as Metternich retained power. "While England," said Canning, "is no friend to revolution, she does emphatically insist on the right of nations to set up for themselves whatever form of government they think best, and to be left free to manage their own affairs, so long as they leave other nations to manage theirs." Canning's policy of non-intervention was anathema to Metternich, and he persuaded the very Congress to which this message was delivered by the Duke of Wellington to put down a popular uprising in Spain. In the following year Europe beheld the incredible spectacle of a French army marching into Spain to crush the rebels. But an even more intriguing event in the diplomatic history of the year 1823 was the appeal of the King of Spain to the European Powers to assist him to put down the revolt of the Spanish American Colonies, for this *démarche* led to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Despite the decline of Spain as a European power, the Spanish American colonies were still subject, at the opening of the nineteenth century, to the most rigid economic restrictions imposed by the home country under the conceptions of the Old Colonial System. They first revolted in 1808 as a protest against Napoleon's deposition of the King of Spain and the enthronement of Joseph Bonaparte in his place. The Latin Americans thus, like the North Americans thirty years before, rid themselves of the mercantile stranglehold of the mother country, though politically they remained loyal to the Bourbons. But when, on his restoration in 1814, the Bourbon king tried to reimpose the old trade restrictions, the colonies revolted afresh. It was when, with the aid of French troops, the King of Spain triumphed over the Liberal revolt in 1823 that he asked for European aid to bring back the rebel colonies. The United States, watching these events with the closest interest, had already, in 1822, recognised the independence of the Spanish colonies by sending diplomatic missions to each of them, and when there was evident danger of united European action to restore the colonies to Spain, President Monroe, in his famous

Message to Congress in 1823, declared that "the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers." The United States, the Message continued, would consider any attempt on the part of the European Powers to extend their system to any portion of the Western Hemisphere as dangerous to its peace and safety, and that any interposition by any European Power for the purpose of oppressing the new independent Latin American governments could not be viewed "in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The Monroe Doctrine was not a declaration of isolationism, though it is true that from that time the Americans turned their backs more determinedly upon Europe and concentrated all their energies on the opening up of their mighty West, and did not seriously turn east again until their intervention in the First World War. The cry which, in effect, arose from Monroe's message was, quite simply, America for the Americans! But manifestly the full purport of the Monroe Doctrine for the future could not at the time of its utterance have been apparent. At the moment it had the desired effect and Europe did not intervene. In the following year Britain recognised the independence of the Latin American Republics. But when Canning said in this crisis, "We have created a new world to redress the balance of the old," he spoke more truly than he knew. For, just as in 1823 Monroe's pronouncement preserved American civilisation from the dead hand of Metternich's repressive system, so in the fullness of time the Americans were to play a decisive part in the deliverance of European civilisation from the cruel darkness of the Nazi tyranny.

The Independence of Greece and Belgium

The withdrawal of Britain from the Congress System, the successful revolt of Latin America from her Iberian masters, and the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine were the first fruits of Metternich's attempt to fix upon Europe the stranglehold of his reactionary régime. During the decade following the Congress of Troppau, further proofs appeared of the abortiveness of Metternich's anti-national and anti-Liberal aims, and particularly in the establishment of two new independent European

states in defiance of the arrangements made by the Treaties of 1815. These were Greece and Belgium. They were both associated with the Liberal movement, which continued its activities in spite of the machinations of Metternich to suppress it, and their final achievement of independence was due largely to the success of Liberalism in France, notwithstanding the Bourbon restoration and the readiness of that dynasty to purchase its recovery of a place in the councils of Europe at the price of suppressing the constitutionalists in Spain.

Nothing was more calculated to reinforce the policy of Canning, as opposed to that of Metternich, than the events which occurred in Greece in the five years following the Congress of Troppau. Greece was, of course, a part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, but, though the Greeks had suffered much under the Moslem yoke, they were by no means without rights and liberties, from the eighteenth century onwards. They enjoyed religious freedom under their Patriarch, they held political posts under the Turkish government, and they took a large share in the commerce of the Levant. All this only emphasises the more strongly the nationalist urge in their determination to achieve political independence. The Greeks of the nineteenth century were, as a people, something very different from the Greeks of ancient Hellas. As we saw earlier,¹ the only section of the Greeks who could be remotely regarded as descended from the stock to which Pericles, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle belonged were on some parts of the coast and in a few of the islands. The rest were a hopelessly mongrel society of mixed Slav origin. Nor did they speak or write a language derived from classical Greek. They kept the Greek characters, but there the likeness ended. Beyond that it was a mere *patois*, which was only slowly wrought into a modern vehicle of graceful speech and writing. Nevertheless, for many, and particularly for cultured Englishmen, Greece made a romantic appeal based on their knowledge of the greatness of Ancient Greece.

The first attempt of the Greeks at revolt in 1821 was ruthlessly crushed, but this did not stop a further outbreak against the cruel suppression of Mehemet Ali, an Albanian, who founded the present dynasty of Egypt, and to whom the Sultan had given authority to stamp out the Greek uprising. The revolt placed Metternich and his Prussian and Russian allies on the horns of a painful dilemma, and provided the severest possible test of

¹ Page 94.

the solidarity of the Alliance. Here was a people revolting to gain national independence, the very thing Metternich's system had declared itself determined to oppose. But here, too, were Christians revolting from the infidel, and, moreover, members of the Orthodox Church, to which the Russians—in any case the bitterest enemies of the Turks—also belonged. In vain did Metternich profess to regard this as a struggle of no significance, confined to an area beyond the pale of civilisation.

The sufferings of the Greeks under Mehemet Ali outraged the cultural and humanitarian sentiments of Britain and France and the religious and imperial principles of Russia. These were enough to bring the three Powers together in the Treaty of London in 1827, and their combined forces sealed the fate of the Turks in Greece. The war which followed resulted in the recognition of Greek independence. The settlement was made in London in 1830 under the Liberalising direction of Palmerston who in that year began his long and illustrious career at the Foreign Office. The settlement recognised Greek independence and granted Greece a constitution, conferred virtual autonomy on Serbia and on the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (later to be joined as the Kingdom of Rumania), and secured for Russia definite control of the lands of the Caucasus and considerable rights in Turkish territory itself. In 1832 Prince Otto of Bavaria was invited to become King, and the independent constitutional monarchy of Greece was finally established.

Thus nationalism and Liberalism triumphed at once in the very teeth of Metternich's organised campaign for the suppression of both. Certainly the newly created Kingdom of Greece was too small to affect the European balance of power, but its creation was none the less of the utmost significance in the great formative period that Europe was about to enter. As it was in ancient and classical Greece that the foundations of European civilisation were laid, so it was in the very different Greece of the nineteenth century that the first example of the triumph of insurgent nationalism was given to Europe. It struck a mortal blow at Metternich's reactionary system; it brought Britain and France to the side of Liberalism; it damaged the Turkish Empire in a way which was afterwards to be followed by other Balkan peoples; it enticed Russia into an anti-Turkish and pro-Balkan policy which was ultimately to be a decisive factor in the all but complete expulsion of the Turks from Europe; and finally it showed what the spirit of nationalism could do. It was

the spirit which was to bring both the Turkish and the Austrian Empires ultimately tumbling to the ground.

While the Greeks were winning their independence, the French *bourgeoisie* were manifesting a strong Liberal sentiment which was aching to assert itself against the reactionary policy of the restored Bourbons. The outrageous conduct of Charles X, the second in succession of the restored line, gave them their opportunity. Chafing under his absolutist tendencies, opinion began to solidify against him, and when, in July 1830, he issued ordinances dissolving the Chamber, disfranchising the majority of the *bourgeois*, and instituting a press censorship, the discontented middle class, joined by the workmen, flung up the barricades in Paris and, after three days of mild civil war, Charles X abdicated in favour of his ten-year-old grandson. This was not acceptable either to the republicans or to the Liberal monarchists. Led by the journalist Thiers and the banker Laffitte, these two parties joined forces and compromised on the choice of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, a cadet of the Bourbon family, and a son of Philippe Egalité who had supported the Convention against Louis XVI. Louis Philippe accepted the throne from the Chamber on the basis of a constitution which substituted popular sovereignty for a scarcely veiled absolutism, and the Tricolour for the white flag of the Bourbons.

The July monarchy, as the new régime was called, was a triumph for the French middle class, which thus reasserted itself after its period of eclipse, and the July Revolution in France had repercussions in various parts of Europe. The year 1830 was, in fact, a year of revolts against all that Metternich stood for in Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and particularly in the western part of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The Netherlands, it will be remembered, had been enlarged at the Vienna settlement by the addition of the former Austrian Netherlands, or Belgium. This was a most unnatural marriage. The Belgians had no sympathy whatever with the Dutch, whose history, traditions, religion, and language were different from their own. In short, the Belgians claimed to be a distinct nationality, and on this basis, in the year 1830, inspired by the French example, they revolted from the Dutch yoke, which had attempted to impose on them the Dutch language and legal system and to make them subject to Dutch bureaucratic and educational inspectors. Like the Parisians, the people of Brussels threw up barricades, expelled the Dutch garrison, and

set up a provisional government which proclaimed the independence of Belgium and summoned a congress. The congress confirmed the declaration of independence and pronounced in favour of a monarchy. Meanwhile, the King of the Netherlands appealed to the Powers and a conference met in London.

Circumstances could not have been more propitious for Belgium. Metternich was fully occupied with a revolt in Austria and the Tsar with an insurrection of the Poles. The French naturally supported the Belgians, and Palmerston, the new British Foreign Secretary, was in the fullest sympathy with them. In this situation the London Conference in 1831 reached an agreement to establish Belgium as an independent constitutional monarchy under Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as its first king. The Constitution was modelled on that of Britain, with two Houses (a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives) and a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to Parliament. The House of Orange resisted this settlement for some time, but finally, in 1839, Dutch objections were overcome, and the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed by Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. It was this treaty which the German Chancellor called a "scrap of paper" when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium in 1914 and so brought Britain into the war against her.

The independence of Greece and Belgium was the harbinger of a larger storm which was destined to overwhelm Metternich himself, as well as the system for which he stood. The revolts of 1830 were crushed in Germany, Italy, and Poland, and for the moment the reactionary régimes were restored. But Greece and Belgium had proved what could be done, and the forces of Liberalism and nationalism everywhere lived to fight another day.

Europe in Revolt

The revolts of 1830 had failed except in France and Belgium, and this meant that most countries in Europe remained under a ruthlessly illiberal régime, which deprived their citizens of the most elementary civil and political rights. Police surveillance, arbitrary imprisonment, censorship of the press, restrictions on travel: these were some of the burdens which the populations under the control of Austria had to endure. This was particularly burdensome to the enlightened section of the Italian

people, who still felt Metternich's iron hand. In the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia these restrictions were rendered more galling by the conscript system which forced Italians into the ranks to fight in foreign armies and for causes in which they had no interest or which they actively abhorred. There were thus two causes making for revolt: first, the cause of a simple Liberalism which in any given state aimed at the removal of restrictions and the achievement of political and civil liberties, and secondly, the cause of national unity.

The leading rebel spirit in Italy was Joseph Mazzini. He was the very antithesis of Metternich, and stood for everything the Austrian Chancellor most hated and feared. Born in Genoa in 1805, the son of a doctor, he devoted his life to political agitation. He was not merely a Liberal: he was a nationalist. And because he saw no hope for Italian unity but by the sweeping away of the monarchical states of Italy, he was a republican. He had been expelled from Italy for his part in the abortive revolt of 1830, and from 1831 he settled in Marseilles where he organised a secret revolutionary society known as "Young Italy," whose motto was "God and the People." Mazzini's support in Italy was vague and dubious, but in that country there were two other focal points of national aspirations. One was the Papacy and the other the Kingdom of Sardinia. In Rome was a new Pope, Pius IX, who, because of his Liberal opinions, was looked to as a unifying force by all clerically-minded Italians. On the Sardinian throne sat Charles Albert, to whom the rest of Liberal Italy looked as the most hopeful leader. During the 40's Liberal concessions were made by the Pope in his own state, and by Charles Albert who, in March 1848, granted the Sardinians a constitution known as the *Statuto*. All good Italians looked to the liberation of their country and dreamed of a resurrection (*Risorgimento*). Any campaign for unity must inevitably be anti-Austrian, for Austria still dominated Italy, and her expulsion was the necessary precedent step to the achievement of unity. But Austria was still in Metternich's control, and not until Austria was somehow weakened would any Italian leader dare to move.

In most of the states of Germany, too, a strong Liberal sentiment manifested itself. But the problem of unification there seemed almost insoluble with so many states and such heterogeneous interests. Some approach to unity was made in the economic sphere by the establishment in 1833 of a customs

union (*Zollverein*) sponsored by Prussia. The object of this union was to establish a common tariff wall against cheap imports which might retard Germany's industrial development. Neither the King of Prussia nor the Emperor of Austria, however, was ready to lead a campaign for political unification because they feared the triumph of Liberalism in the process. So, while they timidly held off from political leadership, they forcefully resisted any Liberal concessions. Austria herself was still embarrassed by her "Ramshackle Empire," made up as it was of a small block of Germans in Austria proper and a few in Bohemia, the Magyars in Hungary, and for the rest the Slavic peoples north and south in various stages of social development and political consciousness. Any nationalist sentiment in Austria, therefore, must be not unifying but disintegrating, and disintegration was what she must avoid at all costs.

Metternich and those who supported him were resolved to maintain in a heated and dynamic situation a static and immobile system. Consequently, down the whole length of Central Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean there existed the most inflammable material which only required a spark to set it ablaze. True to her tradition and reputation, in February 1848 France supplied the spark. There Louis Philippe had not come up to expectations. France, publicists announced, was bored (*La France s'ennuyait*) with the July Monarchy. The patriots were disgusted at its chicken-hearted foreign policy. The *bourgeoisie*, given new incentives by industrial progress, strove for a fuller voice in the government. The Socialists demanded the right to work under national schemes, to be sponsored by the government. One day in February crowds gathered in the streets, threw up barricades, and cried *Vive la République!* Louis Philippe fled to England and a provisional government was formed. After much squabbling and some bloodshed, in June a constituent assembly, in which the *bourgeois* Republicans predominated, met and declared for a Liberal republic. A presidential election was held in December. And behold, in the confusion of national claims, which neutralised one another, an adventurer named Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Bonaparte, emerging from an ignominious exile and rashly promising to restore the national glories of France, was elected by an overwhelming majority! Such was the fantastic result of the Paris Revolution of 1848, and thus was the Second Republic established.

Within a short time of the overthrow of Louis Philippe, which was at first nothing but a Parisian revolt, all the states of Central Europe were in revolt, and for the same reasons, in varying degrees, as the French, for in all these states nationalism was insurgent, the *bourgeoisie* demanded Liberal institutions, and the working classes grew restive under the influence of the industrial changes. In Germany the Diet of the Confederation appealed to the German nation to stand together in unity, while many of the smaller states received Liberal institutions. In Austria news reached the agitators of the reforms of Charles Albert and of Pope Pius IX. In the Hungarian Assembly Louis Kossuth demanded a separate Ministry for Hungary responsible to the Chamber. And in Vienna itself the Emperor was presented with a petition for reform, and riots broke out in the streets. Metternich saw that his hour had come, and on March 14 he left Vienna for London, where the dethroned Louis Philippe had already sought asylum.

Within a few days of Metternich's flight barricades were thrown up in the streets of Berlin, and the Prussian king appointed a Liberal ministry, a constituent assembly met in Frankfort with the intention of drafting a German constitution, the Emperor of Austria granted the Austrians certain liberties and promulgated a constitution, and the Magyars gained their separate Ministry responsible to an Assembly elected on a middle class franchise. Meanwhile, representatives of the Slavs of the Empire met at Prague with the object of forming a Pan-Slav federation. At the same time a violent nationalist revolution broke out in Lombardy and Venetia. Charles Albert marched to join the rebels, and contingents were sent to their assistance from all over Italy, so that they were able to drive the Austrians out of Lombardy. By the spring of 1848 the prospect for the triumph of nationalism and Liberalism looked rosy everywhere.

Then the reaction set in. The Austrian old guard reasserted itself. They forced Charles Albert, deserted by the apostate Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies, to sue for an armistice. They forcibly dissolved the Pan-Slav Congress. They crushed the rebels in Hungary and dissolved the Hungarian Diet. In December 1848, the young Francis Joseph ascended the Austro-Hungarian throne, on which he was to sit for the next sixty-eight years, until the middle of the First World War. In 1849 the new Minister, Prince Schwarzenberg, in whom the reactionary spirit of Metternich was reincarnate, crushed out the embers of revolt

in Austria and Hungary, reconquered Lombardy, forced Charles Albert to sue for peace after he had denounced the armistice of 1848, and encouraged the abandonment of the Liberal concessions granted by other Italian monarchs. In Rome, in 1849, Mazzini and his followers had driven out the Pope and declared a Republic. But it was short-lived. Just as in 1823 the restored Bourbons in France had marched into Spain to bolster Ferdinand on his reactionary throne, so in 1849 the restored Bonaparte, elected President though he was, marched into Rome to strangle the nascent republic and restore the Pope by means of French bayonets.¹ In Prussia, after a bitter struggle, only a very conservative constitution survived, and so the reaction was triumphant everywhere.

The End of the Age of Metternich

By the year 1850 it appeared that the forces of reaction in Central Europe had completely triumphed over the protagonists of progressive Liberalism and creative nationalism. Metternich, it is true, had been overwhelmed by the first impetus of the revolt and had only saved himself by ignominious flight. But had not the spirit of his policy been successfully recaptured by Schwarzenberg, and was not the revolution lying in ruins about its survivors and the graves of its dead? The Austrian Constitution was abrogated, the Hungarian Republic overthrown, the Slavs of the Empire crushed into submission, and the whole Empire reunited in a single monarchy. The provinces of Lombardy and Venetia were again under Austrian rule, and the rest of Italy, except Sardinia and the Papal States, once more under her influence. The King of Sardinia was forced back within his former boundaries after his brief excursion into the wider Italy, and the Pope was upheld by French bayonets. The Constituent Assembly at Frankfort, whose prospects of hammering out a new federal constitution for Germany seemed once so bright, was submerged in the reactionary tide. Prussia's hope of dominating Germany and of excluding Austria from the union receded before the restored prestige of Austria, under whose influence the German Confederation of 1815 was re-established, so that it now comprehended the whole of the Austrian dominions.

¹ It was in this connection that Lord Palmerston uttered one of his famous epigrams. Once asked to explain the difference between *occupation* and *business*, he replied, "In 1849 the French undertook the *occupation* of Rome, but they had no *business* there."

And yet all these triumphs constituted not the substance but the shadow of victory for Austria. In actuality the fall of Metternich in 1848 marked the end of an epoch, an epoch in which the attempt to reanimate the corpse of the Old Régime merely succeeded in protracting its obsequies. Metternich was in many ways an able politician and a leader, within the narrow limitations of his purposes, of undoubted directive skill. But he was an autocrat who saw no middle way between the extremes of dark reaction and wild revolution. Moreover, he was the chief minister of a state so heterogeneous in its parts that force alone could hold it together, while a triumphant nationalism must inevitably break it up. He was thus uncompromisingly opposed to the slightest concession to either of the two forces—Liberalism and nationalism—through which the dynamism of Europe was struggling to express itself in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic despotism. But these aspirations, as time was to prove, were not to be suppressed by the plans, however ingeniously contrived, of a reactionary and repressive statesmanship.

The result was that the Age of Metternich proved to be a mere interlude, in which every one of Metternich's battles was fought in a losing cause. His system of international surveillance and repression gradually lost its power and direction with the defection of Britain in 1822, the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and the establishment of the July Monarchy in France in 1830. And were not the independent states of Greece and Belgium standing memorials of his failure to maintain the *status quo*? By 1848 the Concert of Europe, based on the Congress System, was not only dying but dead. And what of the Austrian recovery in Italy in 1849 and in Germany in 1850? It occurred in a twilight which momentarily obscured the true outcome of the Age of Metternich, for in both countries Fate had already earmarked the marshalling yards on which the forces were soon to gather for the expulsion of Austria.

In Italy, though Sardinia had to accept the consequences of military defeat in 1849, the Constitution which Charles Albert had granted in 1848, thanks largely to the pacific but vigorous support of Palmerston, survived the wreckage of the Revolution, and this instrument of government was destined to become the constitution of a Liberal united Italy based on the monarchy of the House of Savoy and expanding from the nucleus of Piedmont. Already in 1849 Charles Albert had been succeeded by Victor

Emmanuel, who lived to become the first King of United Italy. Within three years of his accession he chose as his chief minister that great and noble statesman, Cavour, who, before he was betrayed by the second Bonaparte who lorded it in Paris and outstayed his welcome in Rome, led his country in its first practical steps towards unification by organising the fight against Austria, the common enemy.

In Germany, Prussia, though she had to submit to Austrian prestige in 1850, possessed a quality for guiding Germany to unification denied to her rival: most of her lands were homogeneously German and she had everything to gain from an intensification of German nationalism. She had failed to take effective control of the nationalist aspirations in 1848-1849 through lack of leadership. Once let a leader of genius appear and there was nothing that Prussia might not achieve for Germany. The advent of such a leader was not long delayed. Even in 1850 a young squire from Pomerania, already a member of the Parliament at Berlin, was plotting the lines of Prussia's hegemony of Germany, based on national unification, though not on Liberalism. The name of this prophet of "blood and iron" was Bismarck. In a dozen years he was Prussian Chancellor. Four years later he drove Austria clean out of the German Confederation. Within a decade of his assumption of the Chancellorship he crushed France and established the German Empire (1871), based on the hegemony of Prussia. Thus did Bismarck prove Austria's triumph of 1850 to be purely ephemeral, and so began that bedevilment of European international relations from which we still suffer.

But it was not only in the political field that Metternich's policy was frustrated by the pursuit of a dead past. He had not the kind of mind that could remotely glimpse the potential effects on European society of the new industrial technique which was even then slowly spreading eastward. Prussia, on the other hand, much more realist, had used her influence to cause all German states by 1838 to join the *Zollverein*, whose object was, as we have seen, to encourage the growth of home industries by neutralising foreign competition. This economic union proved to be one of the main incentives to Germany's ultimate political unification under Prussia. Indeed, if one thing more were necessary to ensure that the Age of Metternich was dead beyond recall, it was the impact of the Industrial Revolution upon a bankrupt political régime.

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

THE MACHINE AGE AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The Significance of the Industrial Revolution

IN the nineteenth century there was a tremendous increase in the scope, complexity, and pace of social and political change in Europe, which makes the movements of the first three centuries of the modern epoch, dynamic though they were, seem, by comparison, simple and slow. The revival of Humanism, the Protestant Reformation, and the expansion of Europe had vitally affected the life and growth of European communities. The British system of Parliament and Cabinet had provided a model of constitutional government to a continent under despotic rule. The American and French Revolutions had introduced ideas and raised hopes which not all the reactionary force of Metternich and his satellites could permanently suppress. Yet in the Age of Metternich the forces of progress on the Continent seemed to lack the driving power to impel them to permanent achievement. This was the function of the mighty series of changes in economic technique generally known as the Industrial Revolution. For these changes not only in themselves heralded a new era but, by their impact on the older economy, gave a new direction and purpose to the theories and practices introduced by the earlier movements. The functions and powers of the sovereign state, the nature and purpose of government, the urge to expansion overseas, the attitude to education and culture, the place of religion in the community, the ideals of liberty and equality, and the political aims of nationalism—all these were given a new quality by the dynamism of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution cannot be confined within chronological limits. In its narrowest sense it connotes the series of mechanical inventions which, broadly between the years 1770 and 1825, were applied in England to the processes of industrial production and to methods of transport. But this is only one aspect of it, which may more helpfully be called the Mechanical Revolution. Over roughly the same period in England it

includes also a transformation in agricultural methods and rural organisation, characterised by a system of compulsory enclosures which gathered small holdings into large estates, a change generally known as the Agrarian Revolution. But in its broadest and profoundest sense the term Industrial Revolution is properly to be applied to something much less confined in time and space. In this sense it means, in fact, not only the changes in economic technique in England at that time but the progressive improvements since, in Britain and on the Continent and in the rest of the world to which they gradually spread, and not only those technical changes but all their vast and far-reaching social and political consequences. In this sense the Industrial Revolution is still proceeding.

The inventions carried out by Englishmen in the second half of the eighteenth century marked the advent of the Machine Age, which, its momentum increasing with the ever-enlarging application of science, was destined to revolutionise every aspect of modern life. During the period of less than two centuries which has elapsed since that time, the population of Europe has grown from about 170 millions to 550 millions, and that of the United States, fed by immigrants from Europe, from 4 millions to more than 130 millions. This fourfold increase in the number of mouths to be fed and the hands to be occupied has brought in its train all the complexities of modern industrialism and posed new problems of social and political organisation. The Americans and the French, enunciating, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the principles of liberty and equality in declarations of rights and in documentary political constitutions, were helping to shape a future whose potentialities they could not, of course, comprehend; yet, by the irony of fate, in the very year 1789 the first cotton-spinning machine driven by steam was set up in Manchester. The opening of the age of steam, in short, synchronised with the storming of the Bastille and the promulgation of the American Constitution. In that moment, as Henri Bergson has pointed out, tool-making and tool-working man (*homo faber*) manifested his dominance over intellectual man (*homo sapiens*), and has ever since dragged at the wheels of his triumphal chariot all the social evils which have characterised the Machine Age and which it is the business of political man to correct.

If it is true, as Bertrand Russell asserts, that thinking is not one of the natural activities of man but a product of disease, like a

high temperature in illness, we can easily account for the fevered controversies which, in a ceaseless crescendo, have filled the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and for the endless experiments in political organisation which have attempted to settle the claims to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness made by an ever-widening community in an ever more complex industrial epoch. The conflict between revolution and reaction has passed through successive stages with the progress of the Machine Age. The success of the middle class in its struggle for rights against the privileges of the older aristocracy was assured when industry became a vastly greater source of wealth than land. According to the new *bourgeoisie*, private interest was the true source of public good, and this convenient argument soon led to a demand for the removal of the ancient restrictions on industry and trade and to the triumph of the policy of *laissez-faire*. But such a formula concentrated on liberty to the entire exclusion of considerations of equality, and sooner or later the conflict was bound to take a new turn and become a struggle for rights by the wage-earning masses, either through the machinery of democratically constituted government or in the form of a revolution against capitalism.

The Mechanical Revolution

As Britain was the cradle of modern constitutional government, so it was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution. The reasons for this are not far to seek. In the first place, England has a moist climate suited to the manufacture of textiles, an abundant water supply, and a wealth of coal and iron near to each other and well placed for transport. Secondly, Britain had emerged from the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, despite the setback of the loss of the American Colonies, with vast colonial and commercial interests which ensured ready markets for her products and encouraged the speeding-up of their manufacture. Thirdly, while manufactures from wool, which was home-grown, were subject to ancient restrictions, those from cotton, which was imported and to which the new inventions were first applied, were free from them, having developed subsequently to their imposition. Lastly, Britain at this time was fortunate in the possession of a number of men who devoted themselves to ways and means of improving methods of manufacture. The inventive skill of some of these was directly connected with the growth of science in the preceding century,

but others were poor operatives with little education or scientific knowledge, who, from sheer love of mechanics, became inventors.

The revolutionary aspect of the changes in technique which characterised the second half of the eighteenth century must not be over-stated. Rapid and far-reaching though they were, they evolved from methods already growing in the first half of the century in respect both of technique and of finance. British industry was becoming increasingly subject to capitalistic organisation. Though craftsmen still worked in their homes, under what is generally known as the domestic system, they used raw materials supplied to them by "undertakers" or "factors," who also marketed the finished articles. The domestic system, therefore, had the essential qualities of what later developed into the factory system: namely, the owner or capitalist marketing on a large scale, and the operative working for wages. It was under the incentive of the widening market, which the capitalist alone could supply, that the inventions were carried out. The early inventions were applied to the domestic system, but later rendered that system unworkable through the necessity to concentrate the workers at the sources of power. It was thus that the inventions inevitably brought the factory system into being.

As early as 1733 John Kay had invented a flying shuttle which enabled weavers to work twice as fast as before. This caused a demand for twice as much cotton thread, and led to a series of spinning inventions which marked the real beginning of the Mechanical Revolution. James Hargreaves' Spinning Jenny, in which eight spinning wheels were turned by one crank, was patented in 1770, and in a few years 20,000 of them were in use. Richard Arkwright's Water Frame was patented about the same time and, though expensive to set up, saved enormous sums in wages. Samuel Crompton's Mule in 1779 combined features of both the Jenny and the Frame and produced strong thread more rapidly than either. Thirty years later Crompton himself estimated that there were not fewer than five million spindles at work in "mules" all over the country. To redress the balance between spinning and weaving that this succession of spinning inventions had disturbed, Edmund Cartwright in 1785 invented a loom worked by water-power. It was calculated that three of Cartwright's power looms attended by one boy could do the work of four skilled hand weavers. The cotton industry, thus

improved, received a new incentive by the invention by Eli Whitney in 1792 in the United States, the principal home of raw cotton, of the cotton gin, a machine which was capable of separating cotton seed from the fibre at a speed equal to that of the labour of fifty negro slaves.

The use of water-power led to the application of steam-power. For in order to create a reservoir to effect a fall of water on to the water-wheel a powerful pump was necessary. The earliest steam engines were, in fact, pumps and were first used to pump water from mines. James Watt, a scientific Scot, was not the inventor of the steam engine but the improver of Thomas Newcomen's model patented as early as 1705. In 1769 Watt patented a condenser which was destined to revolutionise the steam engine. The novelty in Watt's adaptation of the steam pump lay in the use of steam for the turning of wheels. He thereby crowned the work of the earlier inventors by making possible the application of steam-power to the type of rude machines they had invented. Finding a capitalist to finance his invention, Watt was able to carry out production in a large way, and by the end of the century steam-driven machines were as common in England as windmills in other parts of Europe. Moreover, the application of steam-power brought about a revolution in the mining industries. With an enormous consequent increase in the output of coal came a revival in the iron trade. Thus machinery and mining fed each other. More and bigger machines, made of iron, demanded more coal to run them, and more coal meant greater output in manufacture.

The new machinery, which applied at first to cotton manufacture, was soon extended to include woollen and linen fabrics and many other manufactured articles, such as hardware, armaments, needles, carpets, soap, and candles. And with this development went the rapid growth of factories. Such factories as there were in the early days of the mechanical inventions had perforce to be near the sources of water-power. But with the use of steam it was necessary for factories to be sited near the coal supply, and hence the rapid growth of the Industrial North. To the great urban agglomerations which the factories created workers flocked in an unending stream. Gradually the old handworkers disappeared and became absorbed in the service of machinery. Moreover, since for most of the work no skill was required, women and children began to be employed in factories under incredible conditions of increasing cruelty and horror.

With this vast development of production the problem of transport became acute, and engineers set to work to solve it. James Brindley and Thomas Telford built canals to meet the need, and the roads were vastly improved by John Macadam, a Scottish engineer, who invented a means of hardening the roads by a layer of crushed stones. In the early years of the nineteenth century macadamised roads appeared all over the country, and the *diligence*, or stage-coach, achieved a much higher speed than on the more primitive roads. But these improved methods of transport were soon supplemented, and to a very large extent superseded, by that supreme combination of iron and steam, the railway.

George Stephenson, the son of a miner, took up some earlier ideas and worked so diligently at them that in 1825 he produced a locomotive capable of pulling a load of ninety tons at twelve miles an hour. And in that year his first railway, from Stockton to Darlington, was opened. Others rapidly followed, and by the middle of the century a vast network of railways covered the country. Steam was applied to ships even earlier than to land transport. In 1800 a steam tug had been driven along the Forth and Clyde Canal; in 1820 steamboats began to cross from Liverpool to Ireland; and in 1825 the first steamship crossed the Atlantic.

The Spread of the Revolution and the March of Science

Thus, by the opening of the nineteenth century Britain had become the "workshop of the world," and it was through the new national wealth which resulted from the mechanical inventions that she was able to sustain unfalteringly the long and bitter struggle with the French, and emerge from it, at least as a nation, in a predominant economic position in Europe. That the new machine methods should at length spread to the Continent was inevitable, for there too were sources of natural wealth waiting to be tapped. But it was not until after the Napoleonic Wars that a mechanical revolution on the English model began in western continental countries as a result of imports from Britain. At first English machines were smuggled in and operated by British workmen specially introduced for the purpose. With the removal of the prohibition on the export of British machinery in 1825, spinning machines, power looms, and smelting furnaces were brought into the north-western states of the Continent in large numbers. In Belgium, northern France, Alsace, and the

Rhineland the new technique developed, but it was a slow process at first, and it has been estimated that by 1850, when about 14½ million spindles were in use in England, there were not more than three million in France and as few as one million in Germany.

But once a start had been made the exploitation of industrial areas followed, and the application of steam-power enormously increased the output of coal and iron. Railways were introduced, and soon the Continent, like Britain, was covered with a network connecting the large towns in every country and one country with another. In France, Belgium, and Germany, as the mechanical technique developed, there soon appeared all the phenomena which accompanied the changes in Britain. Factories were established and workers flocked to the new centres of industry at the sources of power. Towns grew up, and the air was filled with the roar of machinery in places which until then had been peaceful agricultural areas. And with the growth of towns came all the social evils associated with urban agglomerations.

Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the mechanical revolution on the Continent was broadly confined to the countries of the north-west. Over that period, both in Britain and on the Continent, the inventions had been a purely empirical process, largely confined to the application of steam-power to industry, to improved methods of extracting coal and iron and of smelting for the making of steel, and to the construction of railways. Science, in the strict sense, had so far scarcely been applied to industrial processes, nor was there anything like the modern conception of the potential mineral resources of the earth. In fact, science, though it was certainly an integral part of European culture and had taken on a new significance since the revival of Humanism, had remained somewhat apart from the practical world in the study and the laboratory. Philosophers like Francis Bacon and Descartes in the first half of the seventeenth century had criticised the blind acceptance of phenomena and urged the importance of mathematical calculation and scientific experimentation. Later in the century Descartes' disciple, Isaac Newton, carried his master's work much farther and discovered the law of universal gravitation and developed astronomy as an exact science. Newton was followed by many experimenters, and there was hardly a field of science—mathematics, physics, chemistry, geography, physiology, biology, and botany—that was not explored during the eighteenth century. All this scientific activity, in fact, was the background of the

criticism of society, politics, and religion, which we find in the writings of the philosophers and encyclopædists in France, such as Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, of Turgot and the Physiocrats, and in Britain of Adam Smith.

In the nineteenth century the trail blazed by the scientists of the eighteenth century was sedulously followed by observers and experimenters. The new situation created by the mechanical inventions gave to these vital enquiries a fresh incentive and direction, and in the second half of the nineteenth century science, based on exact measurement and mathematical calculation, was applied to technique. Soon technical inventions came to be preceded by scientific research. Physics, chemistry, and biology were placed at the service of industry, and further revolutionised it by increasing the available forces, extracting new raw materials from the earth, and even leading to the manufacture of artificial materials by synthetic processes. Thus, instead of being confined to the use of substances such as stone, clay, sand, lime, and iron ore, which hitherto had been obtained locally, industry began to draw on mineral resources which had been accumulating through the ages. In this way there came into use metallic ores, like copper, lead, silver, mercury, nickel, manganese, and aluminium. Fuel was no longer confined to coal but added the immeasurable potentialities of petroleum, while the processes of agriculture were revolutionised by the use of phosphates, nitrate, and potash. Even the forests were put to a new use by the use of wood pulp for paper, and in some areas, such as the steppes of Russia, where agriculture had hitherto been unknown, the rotting vegetation was exploited for wheat production. Meanwhile the advance of cheap and rapid transport made it possible to carry these materials from one district to another, and so gradually all the areas of the Continent were drawn into the vortex of the Industrial Revolution, while the improvements in marine transport made it possible to import still more from overseas.

But applied science was not only utilised for the extraction of more and more raw materials from the earth: it was used also for improving the manufacture of plant for machines, apparatus, and tools, and for lighter articles for direct consumption by the people. The science of metallurgy has profoundly affected the processes of production, and has greatly improved the manufacture of spinning and weaving machinery, locomotives, rails and ships, girders and bridges. It has even brought in a new

kind of building through the process known as ferro-concrete. But perhaps the most remarkable of all the applications of science to industrial processes has resulted from the discovery of electricity and the invention of the internal-combustion engine. Electricity has revolutionised lighting and heating, and produced the telegraph, the telephone, and the wireless. The internal-combustion engine has revolutionised transport, and produced the motor vessel, the automobile, and the aeroplane. Meanwhile, a never-ending series of inventions for the utilisation of waste products—benzine, creosote, dyes, scents, and so forth—has had a revolutionising effect on social life. The invention of the process of refrigeration has made possible the preservation and transportation of perishable goods, such as meat, fish, and fruit, while the making of paper from wood pulp has made possible the mass production and dissemination of the popular newspaper.

Nor was the advance of science confined to the mere mechanisation of life; it was concerned also with the fight against bacteria and the development of aseptic surgery, making possible the triumph of medicine over diseases which had formerly been a social scourge. Yet, while science was thus creating the ways for society to preserve itself through positive health, it provided also the means for its destruction. Chemists, experimenting with explosives, invented dynamite, cordite, Lyddite, trinitrotoluene (T.N.T.), and amatol, while engineers produced the submarine, transformed the civil aeroplane into the bomber, and paved the way for the mechanisation of cavalry by means of the tank. So while science, applied to industrial processes, made life easier and more attractive, improved the health of society, and brought nations nearer to one another, it gave them at the same time the armaments with which they might undo at a blow all the good achieved through decades of technological progress.

So the process begun by the simple inventions of Englishmen in the second half of the eighteenth century grew into the complex technology of the twentieth. The advent of the Machine Age thus marked the dawn of a new Europe immeasurably more intricate and incalculable than anything before known. That growth was due to the genius of European man and the wealth of Europe's resources which he learnt how to exploit and harness. Did not this triumph of mind over matter, then, prove, as the Greeks had said, that man is the measure of all things? Or was it not rather true that man had, through his very inventive genius, created something beyond his control? Would the

realist superstructure of modern science prove too heavy a load for the ancient idealist foundations of European civilisation to bear? In short, would the machine triumph over man? These were the questions posed for modern society by the Industrial Revolution and its consequences. Nor has society yet found the answers.

The Effect of the New Technique on Society

The new industrial technique resulting from the mechanical inventions not only revolutionised the methods of production: it also brought about an intensification of capitalism, a redistribution of the rapidly increasing population, and a complete change in the social structure. Capitalism is that economic system by which the ownership and control of the principal means of production and exchange are concentrated in the hands of a few members of the community, and in the course of its growth in modern times it has passed through three main phases, which may be described as commercial capitalism, industrial capitalism, and finance capitalism. Commercial capitalism had established itself long before the Industrial Revolution. Beginning in the later Middle Ages as an affair of local markets, it soon assumed, under the ægis of the New Monarch of the Renaissance period, a national aspect. This national trend received a tremendous impetus through the expansion of Europe overseas and the rise of the great trading companies founded to exploit the newly discovered lands, for these companies demanded protection for their undertakings. And so developed that type of economic nationalism known as the mercantile system.¹ But, as the effects of the mechanical revolution were felt, commercial capitalism clamoured for the removal of the old restrictions and the establishment of free trade. These demands having been met, capitalism soon passed into the industrial phase, in which the ideas of liberty already realised in connection with commerce came to be applied also to industry.

Under the combined incentive of the vastly increased output of the new technique and the growing volume of industrial capital, the market expanded from national to world dimensions. Europe thus passed to the third phase, that of finance capitalism. In this phase technique continued to improve, the unit of production to enlarge, and the number of countries competing for

¹ See earlier, pages 172-6.

world markets to increase. As finance increasingly dominated the economic system, it became more and more monopolistic. Competitors agreed to come together in national trusts, and in turn these national trusts joined in international combines. But this did not, as one might expect, diminish international rivalry. On the contrary, within the international combinations national groups struggled for mastery, with the support of their respective national governments. So the wheel turned full circle and Europe saw a revival of the economic nationalism of an earlier epoch, but in circumstances much more inimical to social progress. For the financial interests encouraged by technical progress, as they became more and more vested and monopolistic, constantly threatened, through the creation of national plutocracies, to neutralise the benefits which democracy might bestow, and, through the intensification of economic rivalry, to embitter international relations.

While capital was thus becoming more concentrated, the population grew with a constantly increasing momentum. And as it grew in numbers it became more and more depressed in status. In the year 1800 the total population of Europe did not exceed 180 millions, and at that time there were still only forty-two cities in the whole continent with a population of more than a hundred thousand, the combined populations of these cities totalling not more than thirteen millions. In other words, the vast majority of the population at the opening of the nineteenth century depended on agriculture for their means of existence. Most of the people everywhere were manual workers, either peasants or craftsmen. In Britain the Agrarian Revolution, resulting from the enclosures, had destroyed the yeomen, or small freeholders, and created a tripartite division of rural society into landlords, tenant farmers, and day labourers. Meanwhile, the Mechanical Revolution, which had already gone far in England, was depopulating the countryside and driving the landless and the rural unemployed into the cities and the factories. Everywhere else in Europe the country population still consisted mostly of peasant proprietors, living, under certain surviving feudal restrictions, on what their lands produced. In these countries, too, the craftsmen still generally worked in independence at home, though in some parts of north-western Europe the factor system¹ was developing. Thus on the Continent at this time the peasant had the tie of his land to ensure his security,

¹ Described earlier, page 251.

while the craftsman still had the protection of his gild. Between the landowners and the workers was the middle class, or *bourgeoisie*, which had grown up on trade and had gained many privileges as a result of the French Revolution.

In the first half of the nineteenth century remarkable changes began to take place in this economic and social structure, changes which have continued since then with ever-increasing tempo and complexity. During that half century the population of Europe rose from 180 millions to 266 millions, and since then the latter figure has more than doubled itself. As the Mechanical Revolution spread, the same effects began to be felt first in north-western and then in central Europe as in Britain, which was rapidly changing from an agricultural to an industrial state and from an essentially rural to a preponderatingly urban community. In Britain the growth of the factory system in the last part of the eighteenth century produced the most appalling social conditions. The people were huddled together in slums which were thrown together to house the new factory workers, who were badly paid and under-nourished. Not only men but women and children worked in the factories for anything up to sixteen hours a day. The law gave them no protection, nor, generally speaking, could they look for any improvement in their condition through the humanitarianism of the factory owners, most of whom were concerned solely with rapid production and quick returns. In the nineteenth century these conditions were slowly reproduced on the Continent. By the force of these changes, society came to be sharply divided into two classes: the new industrial *bourgeoisie* and the wage earners. The capitalists had behind them the power of their new-found wealth, the support of the government, and the old arguments of liberty made for a society of a very different order. The wage-earners had nothing but their labour to sell. They had lost the protection and security which the older society afforded, and were simply an unorganised mass of men, women, and children generally without roots in the locality in which they were driven to live and work. The Mechanical Revolution gave the employers wealth and power: it gave the employees nothing but dependence, poverty, and degradation. The *bourgeoisie* took on a new strength: the workers became merely a rightless and helpless proletariat.

In Britain, unfortunately, just at the time when the economic and social condition of the people called for a constructive plan

of amelioration, the country was caught up in a life-and-death struggle with the French, and, when it was over, such was the Government's dread of its recurrence that a violent conservative reaction set in. Moreover, the conditions were so entirely without precedent that the legislative body had not the qualifications, even if it had the desire, to take constructive action. Yet, such were the cruelties of the conditions under which children worked that even "an aristocratic debating society" could not view them with complacency, and at the turn of the century an Act was passed restricting the work of children in factories to twelve hours a day. But the statute remained largely a dead letter through lack of proper inspection. Generally, however, the attitude of the Government was that the system should be allowed to work itself out. This the philosophy of the time supported. There were plenty of theorists to argue that no good could come of interfering with "the natural laws" of industry and commerce. Everything, in fact, pointed to the advantage of letting things alone to take their course, an argument on which was founded the policy of *laissez-faire*.

This idea of *laissez-faire* originated in France in the middle of the eighteenth century under the influence of thinkers like Turgot (1727-1781), who had contended that, whatever you do, wages always tend to fall to subsistence level, a thesis developed by the German Socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, in the nineteenth century into what he called "the iron law of wages." In Britain, as early as 1776, Adam Smith, a Scottish professor, had published his learned treatise, *The Wealth of Nations*, in which he took over some of Turgot's arguments to establish the thesis that the true strength of a nation lies in the wealth of its citizens, that restrictions on trade and industry are useless, if not dangerous, and that the true basis of progress is enlightened self-interest. This argument of liberty was, by a curious irony, strongly reinforced by the theories of the American and French Revolutions. If private property is "an inviolable and sacred right," it followed that industrialists and capitalists must be free to do what they like with their property, which was their capital. The labourer was equally free to do what he liked with his property, which was his labour. If he did not like the conditions of his work, he could (could he not?) take his labour elsewhere. What, according to this argument, was foolish to the point of disaster was that he should resist his employer.

The policy of *laissez-faire* was reinforced by the alarming rise

in the population. In 1750 the population of Great Britain (without Ireland) was, it is estimated, not more than seven millions. In 1801, the first census showed it to have risen to eleven millions, and ten years later it reached nearly thirteen millions. This rapid increase only added to the dread of the consequences of improving the condition of the workers, a fear voiced at the turn of the century by Thomas Malthus in his famous *Essay on the Principle of Population*, which Walter Bagehot later described as "an apparatus for destroying cheerfulness." For Malthus argued that, the supply of the means of subsistence being limited, the population could not grow unchecked without disaster. Moral restraint, vice, and misery were the means of keeping it down. But moral restraint could not be expected to be sufficiently widely practised to make any material difference; vice could not be tolerated; so only misery was left. "It is because people die of hunger that the population is not greater than it is." The upshot of this dreary philosophy was that there must always be poverty because there was not enough wealth to go round, that if wages were raised larger families would be encouraged, that the population would thus be in danger of out-running the means of subsistence, and that consequently the workers must be kept in their existing state of misery and poverty.

The owners found further support for their attitude of complacency in Ricardo's theory of rent. In his principal work, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, published in 1817, Ricardo argued that rent had nothing to do with the greed or selfishness of the landlord. It was determined by a natural law which said that rent was the difference between the value of the produce of the worst land under cultivation and that of any given piece of land rented. "Thus the rent of an acre of land is the amount by which the value of the crop that can be raised on it exceeds the value of the crop that can be raised on an acre of the worst land in cultivation." In the towns also Ricardo pictured the ground landlord as helpless to alter the situation because he was in the grip of the law of rent. Ricardo further argued that the value of any article is measured by the amount of work involved in making it.

The theories of Malthus and Ricardo were based on assumptions which the later developments of the Machine Age have not warranted. Malthus' theory assumes that the means of subsistence are, in fact, limited, whereas, as the population has increased, Europe has moved into an age of plenty through the

very growth of technology which the Mechanical Revolution made possible. Ricardo's theory of rent was true so far as it went, but it assumed that only the individual landowner and not society might profit from its operation, while his theory of value only held under conditions of free competition. But though Ricardo's theories were propounded for the benefit of the individual, they may be applied with equal force in favour of society as a whole, and his opponents have not failed to take advantage of these chinks in his armour and to set up the counter-contentions that, if the landlord was helpless then obviously land values should be taxed, and that, if labour were the only criterion of value then, equally obviously, the capitalist should not take all the profits.

In Britain, then, the first reaction of the government to the industrial changes was to leave society to its fate. The Tory statesmen in power at the opening of the nineteenth century had such a profound pride in the British Constitution as it was that it never occurred to them to adapt it, as a constructive policy, to the purposes of social reform. A change in this attitude was brought about by the work of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the father of the Philosophical Radicals, whose theory of Utilitarianism supported the argument for reforming the law and the constitution so as to remove all restrictions on the enjoyment of the greatest happiness by the greatest number. Yet, influential though Bentham's teaching was in breaking through the crust of ancient usage, it remained in practice, as it was in theory, a doctrine of individualism. Bentham and the Philosophical Radicals, therefore, upheld the principle of *laissez-faire*, which, in effect, meant the enfranchisement of the new middle class, the removal by legislative action of all restrictions on trade and industry, the abolition of monopolies, and the prohibition of workers' unions. This done, the business of government should be confined to the keeping of order.

It was in this spirit of finality that the Reform Act of 1832 was passed. The Reform Act enfranchised the middle class, and the Reformed Parliament which resulted from it certainly attempted to remove some dreadful abuses. It abolished slavery in the British Empire with compensation for the owners, regulated to a very mild extent the hours of labour of children in factories, reformed the Poor Law without radically tackling the problem of pauperism, reconstituted municipal corporations in the interests of middle-class local government, and made the first

restricted grants in aid of elementary education. But the general tendency which the Reform Act introduced was to use Parliament negatively for the removal of restraints on individual action rather than positively for the organic improvement of society as a whole. The greatest triumph in this negative direction came in 1846 when the repeal of the Corn Laws marked the effective beginning of free trade for which Adam Smith had argued.

In other words, the immediate outcome of the Industrial Revolution was, apparently, to turn social life into a battle of wits in which the devil took the hindmost. And science and philosophy, encouraged by the technical changes, appeared to support this view of it. Thus Charles Darwin (1809-1882) pictured nature, "red in tooth and claw," as a struggle for "the survival of the fittest," and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) argued that, as the natural world moved from an indefinite mass (homogeneity) to a specialisation of function (heterogeneity), so government must contract its functions, leaving men free to develop their individuality, until at length it would not be wanted at all and society could pass into a blissful state of enlightened anarchism. Yet, in the same century, Hegel, the German philosopher, was arguing that the state, far from being a mere piece of governmental machinery whose area of operation should be progressively reduced to a minimum, was positively "God walking on earth," thus making the state supreme and justifying any coercion it cared to use. In the Spencerian conception society must work out its own salvation without state interference. According to the Hegelian ideal, society counted for nothing except so far as it contributed to the strength of the almighty state. Between these extremes there must be a middle way, and it is this compromising path that European society has, on the whole, been trying to discover ever since the Industrial Revolution transformed its structure.

The Socialist Theory

The arguments of liberty and *laissez-faire*, arising from the Industrial Revolution, were opposed by an entirely different type of doctrine which was at first concerned not with government but with the organisation of society, and was therefore called Socialism. The economists and radical philosophers emphasised the rights of the individual; the Socialists were concerned with the rights of society in all its parts. In the

first half of the nineteenth century Socialism was confined to a few philanthropists in Britain and France, and its adherents did not succeed in establishing the systems they so carefully and painstakingly worked out. Among these early idealists was Robert Owen (1771-1858), who may be regarded as the father of British Socialism. In the mills which he owned and managed in Lanarkshire he organised a model community. Owen's schemes, which, as a local affair, worked quite successfully for a time, were laughed at by contemporary industrialists; yet, in point of fact, he was the first to grasp the essence of the modern problem, which is that, since the Machine Age has arrived, for good or evil, we cannot put the clock back, but that, if the working of the economic system is left to the free play of individuals, there is nothing for labour but impoverishment and enslavement. Only planning, Owen asserted, can ensure to the working classes "adequate means of contending with mechanical power."

In France at about the same time Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Fourier (1772-1837) were fashioning schemes for the improvement of society. Their plans were visionary, but in the next generation Louis Blanc (1811-1882) vigorously pursued a policy of opposition to *laissez-faire* and demanded the establishment of national workshops (*ateliers nationaux*) whereby men might enjoy "the right to work." Such workshops were, in fact, established in France during the Revolution of 1848, though they were afterwards forcibly closed as part of the settlement under the Second Republic.

By 1848, according to Charles Seignobos, these pioneers had already "produced all the criticisms of society, propagandist formulas, and projects of reform on which socialism has since lived." The French promulgated the general ideas: the criticism of society as it was (property, inheritance, the family, and so forth), and of the whole doctrine of economic liberty, competition in trade, which they stigmatised as "anarchy of exchange," and industrial freedom based on the wage contract, which they said was inequitable because the owner could fix wages while the workman could not afford to wait. Also from France at this period came the Socialist formulas which have since become so well-known: the organisation of labour, the right to work, the exploitation of man by man, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the term Communism with its emblem the Red Flag. The British, meanwhile, concentrated on practical procedure.

They strove for full legal recognition of trade unions, including the right to strike and picket, denied to them by the Act of 1824, which had merely allowed workers to combine but not to take any action which could be construed as in restraint of trade. They aimed also at regulation for the protection of labour and a limitation of hours of work. Finally, the agitations produced by these pioneers led to the Chartist Movement, which lasted from 1838 to 1848 and demanded parliamentary rights for the working man.

The importance of these pioneers of Socialism lies, therefore, in the inspiration they gave to the working-class movement in both France and Britain to resist the defeatism which *laissez-faire* would have fixed inexorably upon it. But the early Socialists themselves were generally Utopists, whose schemes were too remote from practical politics to lead to lasting results. On this rather muddled scene there now appeared the father of scientific Socialism, or Marxism. Karl Marx, the son of a Jewish lawyer, who had been converted to Christianity, was born in Prussia in 1818. His education, his love of philosophy, in the study of which he was profoundly influenced by the teaching of Hegel, and his early associations shaped the doctrine that produced the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, of which he was the joint author with Friedrich Engels. Marx was in Paris when the Revolution of 1848 broke out, returned to Germany during its course, and, being expelled thence in 1849, came to England, where he lived until his death in 1883.

The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 contained the germ of Marx's later masterpiece, *Das Kapital* (1867),¹ and includes the appeal which he later used in the convention of the First Workingmen's International. It is the latter-day habit to think of Communism as an extreme form of Socialism, but, in fact, Marx used the word Communism to distinguish his brand of scientific Socialism from that of the earlier Utopians. The *Manifesto* opens with the words: "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism," and ends thus: "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and their aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!"

¹ This was the first volume, the only one published during Marx's lifetime.

Thus the Marxian doctrine was doubly revolutionary: it urged the forcible overthrow of the existing order and it pressed for the international organisation of the proletariat. The body of the *Communist Manifesto* was a kind of philosophy of world history. "The history of all hitherto existing societies," it said, "is of class struggles." This is the germ of the materialistic interpretation of history more fully developed in *Das Kapital*. The argument holds that the struggle between the middle class and the feudal aristocracy which was patently leading to the victory of the *bourgeoisie* in the first half of the nineteenth century will surely give place to a struggle between the *bourgeoisie* and the proletariat. As the course of history, according to Marx, has always been determined by economic factors, the triumph of the proletariat is inevitable, since, while the working class gets larger and larger, the means of production become more and more heavily concentrated in the hands of a body of capitalists becoming relatively smaller and smaller. Consequently there must come a time when the working class will gain a preponderant position which will facilitate the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In this connection, therefore, it is interesting to observe that Marx, necessarily by his reading of history, foreshadowed the occurrence of the inevitable revolution first in a highly industrialised state; whereas, in fact, the only land in which it has been successfully carried into effect, namely Russia, was by far the least industrialised of the large states of Europe.¹

Marx showed how the working men in every country might prepare for the Communist Revolution. They should form trade unions and parliamentary parties and work for the abolition of rent, inheritance, and property, for high direct taxes, centralisation of credit, public ownership of the means of production, and transport—nationalisation, that is to say, of land and factories—the more even distribution of population over town and country to abolish the distinction between urban and rural interests, and free education for all. But none of this was for any other purpose than to place the proletariat in a favourable position to bring the Communist state into existence. The class struggle goes on until the revolution achieves a classless society. That blissful state having been arrived at, political revolutions will give place to social evolutions, but what form the latter are to take Marx does not vouchsafe. Indeed, since he all along

¹ See later, Chapter XVII.

emphasises the class struggle as the motive force of social and political change, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the revolution as foreshadowed by Marx possesses a sort of limited dynamism, which would appear to be a denial of the very evolutionism which lies at the root of the Marxian philosophy.

If the *Communist Manifesto* was, so to speak, a political bomb, it was what we have since learned to know as a delayed-action bomb. It did not go off at the time, but the history of Europe, since Marx wrote the *Manifesto* and enlarged upon it in *Das Kapital*, has shown the force of his influence not only on revolutionary politics but on the steady growth of associations and political parties striving for a better and juster society, as well as on the creative development of social studies generally. Indeed, the tragic picture of Marx struggling against bad health and a chronic impecuniosity and working devotedly, despite all adversity, in the British Museum Reading Room at the completion of *Das Kapital*, seems, in retrospect, to fit more harmoniously with the steady growth of Left politics in the constitutional states of Europe since his day than with the bloody conflicts which that masterpiece has inspired. It is true that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia derived from the Marxian doctrine, though it was precipitated in a society which was far from having passed through the stages of capitalistic concentration which Marx seems to have regarded as necessary for its success. But it is also true that he was the father of social democracy, which, in Germany at least, was a constitutional movement in party politics. Indeed, in a funeral oration at Marx's graveside at Highgate in 1883 Karl Liebknecht said that he "raised social democracy from a sect to a party." Marx even recognised the possibility in certain circumstances—in Britain, for example—of a compromise between the capitalist class and the workers.

Marx's plans for a Workers' International took definite shape, and the first meeting of the International Labour Association was held in London in 1864. But this First International failed to live up to Marx's hope for a union of the proletarians of all countries, and by 1876 it had faded out. When the International was revived in 1889, after Marx's death, it proved to be merely a series of gatherings of representatives of national Socialist parties which frankly made no pretensions to international sentiments. The Second International was, in fact, as H. J.

Laski says,¹ "little more than a negotiating bureau, through which congresses were organised to pass resolutions." The Third, or Communist, International came into being at the end of the First World War for the deliberate purpose of fostering a world Communist Revolution, but in face of the lukewarmth towards it of most Socialists in the rest of the world and the preoccupation of Russian Communism to establish itself firmly at home, it soon lost its edge and was later abandoned, at any rate as an immediate programme.²

Marx was right in his anticipation that capitalism would pass from free competition to monopoly and in his emphasis on the economic motive in politics. But, despite the success of the Russian Revolution—the most remarkable example in the history of the world of the implementation of a doctrine in practical politics—it may fairly be said that his main thesis of the inevitability of the growing exacerbation of the class struggle has not been justified by events, at least in highly industrialised communities. On the contrary, those communities have not achieved the emancipation of the masses by abolishing all other classes. They appear, instead, to have concluded that the antithesis between liberty and equality was not to be resolved while the so-called classes and masses were at one another's throats, but only through a system which should vest the sovereign power in the members of the community as a whole; in short, through the rule of the majority.

Since Marx's time, political and social progress for most states has been achieved rather through the aim of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" than through "the dictatorship of the proletariat." In other words, it has evolved by way of a Collectivist adaptation of the teaching of Philosophic Radicalism than by a slavish adherence to revolutionary Marxism. Thus it was that the Industrial Revolution, having brought about an entirely new economy and with it a social disequilibrium in a greatly increased population, gave a new significance to nationalism and a new meaning to democracy. On these twin foundations the new age was to be built and the great national democratic experiment to be tried.

¹ *Communism*, page 40.

² See later, pages 315-17.

CHAPTER XVI

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT

THE SPREAD OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM BEFORE AND AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The Strength and Weakness of National Democracy

NATIONAL Democracy is a system of political organisation and a method of securing social and economic rights invented by European man. Its roots lie deep in the past and, though its successful establishment in more recent times has often been associated with revolutionary circumstance, its rise and development have been essentially an evolutionary process. It is, in fact, as we have seen earlier, a synthesis of all the strivings after the Good Society which have marked the advance of Western Civilisation. It draws its first inspiration from Greek politics, and particularly from Athenian democracy under Pericles, though its unit of organisation is not the city but the nation and its expression is consequently not direct but through representative institutions. It owes to the Roman genius for organisation the fundamental principle of the Rule of Law, though the disintegration of the Roman Empire through the barbarian invasions was the necessary preliminary to the growth of the modern states system, which constitutes the political framework of national groupings. The principle of political sovereignty, which is fundamental to the national democratic state, is traceable to the Renaissance period. The modern form of the idea of the constitution as an instrument of government which should at once secure the rights of the governed and define the powers of the government derives from the political history of Britain and from the American and French Revolutions.

During the half-century preceding the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, national democracy came to be regarded in the larger part of Europe and in the free communities of Europeans overseas as the most practical and certain way of achieving the maximum of liberty and equality among all citizens and of securing the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Liberal opinion saw no inconsistency in the existence of parliamentary institutions side by side with the capitalist structure of

society. Indeed, it argued that the political freedom belonging to the first and the economic liberty inherent in the second formed the ideal combination. And, in fact, as the franchise was extended to include the mass of the people and as popular education promised to make them more capable of exercising it, the presumption was that the worst evils of the capitalist system would be arrested by constitutional means and its fruits more equitably distributed. As this belief gained ground, the national democratic constitution was more and more widely adopted until, by the eve of the First World War, it existed all but universally in the states of Europe, and immediately after the War it was applied without exception to the states newly formed as a result of it.

Yet, in spite of the antiquity of its background and the widespread faith in its efficacy as the forum of the rights of man, national democracy is still in an experimental stage. The experiment has by no means justified itself in all the countries where it has been tried, and in many cases it has failed so lamentably as to cause violent revulsions and the establishment of revolutionary authoritarian systems which are diametrically opposed to the spirit and practice of democracy. Nothing, therefore, is more necessary to the future of the Good Society in Europe and beyond than that the causes of the failure of the national democratic experiment and the apparent success of opposing systems should be understood. At the outset of such an examination, we must accept two fundamental facts. The first is that nationalism is too deeply rooted in European society to be ignored in any plans for the post-war reconstruction of the world order and that any proposals which disregard it can have no reality. The second is that democracy, as we have known it in practice so far, has distinct shortcomings, and if these are to be corrected we must be prepared to make radical revisions of it so as to adapt it to the needs of contemporary society and to the demands of a changing world.

In tracing the history of this political experiment over the last hundred years we note, in the first place, that the two elements in it—nationalism and democracy—are not always in harmony with each other. Indeed, in the revolutions which troubled the Age of Metternich it was the conflicting urgencies of the two sides of it which doomed most of the revolts to failure. Nationalism might be the basis of the independence of the group, the inspirer of a patriotism which could achieve the victory of a nation as a

whole, and yet within the group the liberty of the individual might not thereby be secured. Or, on the other hand, the concentration on individual rights to the neglect of national independence might frustrate the hope of securing those rights because national unity was the prerequisite condition of their enjoyment. This conflict has to some extent been present throughout the period and accounts for the breakdown of the democratic method in some of the most important states in Europe. In Italy, for example, where the unification was carried out by a nation in arms, the basis of democratic rights was found in the adaptation of the Sardinian Constitution of 1848, which was gradually applied to the whole of Italy as its various parts severally joined the united kingdom under the House of Savoy. But there the system of democratic government became at length so devitalised that it was possible for a determined revolt of its opponents to undermine and then to demolish it.

In Germany, again, the unification grew out of Prussia's success in a series of external wars, and the Constitution of the German Empire always bore the marks of this martial origin. In Germany, that is to say, nationalism was so much the predominant urge that the Imperial Constitution was never a truly democratic instrument. Consequently, when the Germans gave themselves a democratic constitution in 1919¹ as a result of the revolution following the First World War, they were, in fact, experimenting with parliamentary democracy, in any real sense, for the first time, and it was not difficult, while it was still in its infancy in a period of political unrest, social disorder, and economic distress, for it to be discredited to the point of its violent overthrow. The same insecurity of the democratic system characterised the states of eastern and south-eastern Europe which later gained their independence by means of a militant nationalism. But in those countries, such as Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, the Scandinavian states, and Switzerland, where the democratic method was able to grow without the violence associated with a rabid nationalism, it became much more firmly fixed.

Secondly, therefore, we should observe a difference between what we may call the evolutionary and revolutionary types of constitution. Political constitutionalism was for long peculiar to Britain, where it was born and bred. There the constitution

¹ The Constitution of the Weimar Republic. See later, pages 342-3.

was a slow and customary growth, adapted by convention and statute to the changing needs of the times, and though, as we have seen, the constitutional principle of government by the "King in Parliament" had already been statutorily secured before the end of the seventeenth century, it was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the Constitution was democratised by a series of Franchise Acts whose full passage covered a period of almost a hundred years. Indeed, with the exception of those of Great Britain and the United States, none of the existing constitutions is older than the nineteenth century, and most of those which existed in the first half of that century had by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 either disappeared or been drastically amended or revised.¹ Where, then, continental peoples achieved their national independence, as most of them did, by successful revolts or the fortunes of war, they generally adopted, full-fledged and by a sudden implementation, the system which in Britain had evolved through centuries. In fact, most of these later constitutions consciously followed the British model, either directly or indirectly through the French pattern which itself was framed on the British example. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of these nations should find this political repast a little too much to swallow, as it were, at a sitting, and that the digestive troubles which resulted should have led in most cases to its rejection.

Thirdly, in examining this question, we should notice that the national democratic constitution was often found not to live up to the hopes of its founders. Where it worked well, the constitution was the means of achieving not only political stability but social progress and economic harmony. The honest use of the machinery of Parliament and Cabinet for the purpose of collectivist legislation, in order to ensure a developing enjoyment of social security and a reasonable prospect of equality of opportunity, might have reconciled the majority of citizens everywhere to the constitutional régime, or at least have made extremists chary of attacking it with violence. But too often it appeared as a mere façade to cover the continuance of old wrongs and to permit the denial of social liberty and a decent existence, and thus opened the gates to revolutionary floods. The supreme example

¹ The date of the promulgation of the Constitution in each of those states which managed to retain from the nineteenth century and up to 1940 their democratic institutions was as follows: Norway, 1814 (revised 1905); Belgium, 1831; The Netherlands, 1848; Switzerland, 1848 (amended 1874); Sweden, 1863 (revised 1905); Denmark, 1866; France, 1875.

of this was, of course, Russia, where the constitutional experiment broke down before it was properly launched. Here the belief in the achievement of popular rights through the establishment of a Parliament (*Duma*) received so utter a disillusionment that a revolution, based on the Marxian thesis of the class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat, was felt to be the only means of gaining those rights of the people which, in other countries, where the precedent conditions favoured constitutional growth, were gradually being realised through the instrument of national democracy.

National democracy, then, is still on its trial, but because it has been so essential an element in the evolution of European society, it is impossible to picture the future of that society without national democracy as a fundamental factor in the dynamism of its continuing growth and change. How it shall be modified and adapted must thus be among the prime problems of the peace.¹ It is, therefore, important that we should know something more in detail of its development so far and of the nature of the revolts against it.

The Democratisation of the British Constitution

As the British Constitution was the model on which most of the continental constitutions were later established, it is interesting to observe that at the opening of the nineteenth century it was neither national nor democratic. By that time the Scots had resigned themselves to the Union of 1707, because they had come to the conclusion that the balance of advantage was in favour of it. But this could not be said of the Irish, for most of the Southern Irish were then, as they were to remain, strongly opposed to the Union as effected in 1800. By no stretch of words would it be fair to say that the people of the two islands formed a nation in the sense of having common hopes and purposes. And yet they had a common instrument of government. Moreover, the parliamentary system was essentially still what it had been for centuries. Not only that, but, as we have seen, at the opening of the nineteenth century the Tories, still predominant in Parliament, thought the Constitution perfect and in no need of alteration. So the vast majority of the people were excluded from the franchise, which was still reserved to forty-shilling freeholders in the country and to special persons in the

¹ This is discussed later, in Chapter XXIII.

boroughs. Moreover, many of the boroughs which had once been prosperous were now so decayed as to be deservedly stigmatised as "rotten boroughs," while the representation of some of them was in the patronage of certain influential personages in whose pockets they were said to be, and hence were called "pocket boroughs." Again, there were by then many towns which had greatly increased in size and importance as a result of the Industrial Revolution. These were entirely unrepresented in Parliament. Besides this, whole groups of estimable people had the right neither to vote nor to sit in the House of Commons, on the ground that they were Nonconformists or Roman Catholics. For, though the Toleration Act of 1689 granted the Dissenters freedom of worship, the Test and Corporation Acts denying non-Anglicans the right to sit in Parliament or on municipal corporations or to hold any public office were still on the statute book, however loosely they may latterly have been administered.

Whatever hope there might have been for the removal of these disabilities round about the turn of the century was dashed by the war with France, and after the war a strong Tory reaction set in through fear of the possible excesses of the masses. In the later 1820's, after the civil disorders of the immediate post-war period had subsided, the reaction weakened, and even a Tory Ministry, under Wellington, was moved to cause the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 and the passage of the Catholic Emancipation Act in the following year. These were the forerunners of wider reforms which, however, proved to be more than the Tories could bring themselves to introduce in Parliament. But at least now the Nonconformists and Catholics enjoyed equal rights with the Anglicans, though Jews were not given similar freedom until 1858. The principal result of these reforms in a democratic direction was to test the national unity, for it brought to the House of Commons a large body of Irish Catholics whose dissatisfaction with the Union led ultimately to the Home Rule agitation and finally in our own time to the secession of Southern Ireland, first under the constitution of the Irish Free State in 1922 and later under that of Eire in 1937. This move ultimately strengthened the solidarity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which has successfully passed many trials of its national unity.

In 1830 there began a rising agitation for parliamentary reform, and when the Whigs under Earl Grey replaced the

Tories, things moved quickly to the passing of the Reform Act of 1832. This Act disfranchised the "rotten boroughs" and enfranchised the new towns. Towns with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants lost both their members, and those with fewer than 4,000 lost one. Towns like Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, and Sheffield gained representation for the first time. Besides this, some of the seats thus set free were given to the larger counties. In the country the vote was given to men holding land worth not less than £10 a year and those paying rent of not less than £50 a year, and in the towns to owners or tenants of buildings worth not less than £10 a year. Yet the total effect of this enfranchisement was only to raise the number of voters from 450,000 to 653,000, the latter figure representing not more than one-twenty-second of the whole population. The effect of this Act was, therefore, to enfranchise only the new middle class, and it was thus far from a democratic measure. Because of this it was followed by the rise of the Chartists, an association of working men the six points of whose Charter were manhood suffrage, secret ballot, annual parliaments, payment of members, abolition of the property qualification, and equal electoral districts. Though the Chartist movement failed and faded out in 1848, the Reform Acts passed during the next eighty years achieved all, and more than all, that they demanded. Certainly we have not arrived at annually elected parliaments, which would cause an intolerably frequent disturbance of the political life of the country under modern conditions, but in the matter of the suffrage Britain has gone much farther than the demands of the Chartists by establishing not merely universal manhood suffrage but universal adult suffrage, which includes women.

The first of the stages towards the universalisation of the suffrage was reached in 1867 when Disraeli took his famous "leap in the dark" and enfranchised in the rural areas all men holding land worth not less than £5 a year and those paying not less than £12 rent, and in the towns introduced the "lodger vote" by enfranchising those paying rent of not less than £10 a year. This Act increased the electorate to two millions, or about one-twelfth of the total population. The next Act was Gladstone's of 1884, which gave the lodger vote to agricultural labourers and thus doubled the electorate, and thereby increased the proportion of the population enfranchised to about one-tenth. The Act was accompanied in the following session by a Redistribution Act which extinguished 160 seats, merged boroughs

under 15,000 in county districts, and allowed one member to every town under 50,000 and two to towns under 165,000. Meanwhile, in 1872, voting had been made secret by the Ballot Act.

The next great steps forward came in the twentieth century. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 enfranchised all men of twenty-one and for the first time gave women the vote. All women of thirty and over who paid rent or who were wives of voters were enfranchised. This increased the electorate to 18½ millions (men 10½ millions, women 8 millions), equivalent to about two-fifths of the total population. The next Act, in 1928, gave all adult women the vote on the same terms as men, and as a result the register of women was actually larger than that of men (14½ million women, 12½ million men). This aggregate of 27 millions represented more than half the total population. Meanwhile many abuses had been removed, particularly by the Act of 1918. Plural voting was abolished and the procedure of registration simplified. All elections now had to take place on one day. Returning Officer's expenses were paid by the Exchequer. Every candidate had to pay a deposit of £150, which was forfeited if he or she did not poll more than one-eighth of the votes. The redistribution of seats resulted in a division of the country into single-member constituencies of 50,000 voters each. Moreover, by an Act of 1911, Members of Parliament are now paid a salary.

But all these Acts were concerned with the mere machinery of voting and representation, which in itself might achieve nothing. Yet there was, step by step with the successive extensions of the franchise, a steady increase of measures calculated to improve the condition of the people. Starting with the Acts of the Reformed Parliament after 1832, which, as we have seen, abolished slavery, reformed the Poor Law, instituted grants for public education, and passed the first of the Factory Acts, there was placed on the Statute Book a series of laws restricting the hours of work and improving conditions in factories and mines, establishing the rights of trade unions, and extending the system of public education. In fact, *laissez-faire* gradually gave place to Collectivism; in other words, whereas government had been regarded by the early Radicals as an unwarrantable interference with individual rights and a thing to be reduced to an absolute minimum, it slowly came to be recognised as the proper means of spreading social health and happiness.

From two points of view, then, the British Constitution became more and more democratic: by the extension of the franchise until every adult of either sex had the right to vote and sit in Parliament, and by the deliberate use of the parliamentary system to produce a more egalitarian society. In this process two historical developments are of the utmost significance. First, the House of Lords, a relic of the age of feudalism, gradually lost its position as the dominant House in Parliament, until, in 1911, the Parliament Act statutorily declared it to have no power to affect finance legislation¹ and left it with only a suspensive veto on all other types of legislation.² Secondly, the rapid growth from 1906 of a Parliamentary Labour Party at least ensured to the voice of working people a means of constitutional expression and, since the Party was largely based on the strength of trade unionism, saved Britain from the worst features of that type of direct or extra-parliamentary action associated on the Continent with the growth of Syndicalism. For a time the effect of the rise of the Labour Party in Parliament was to replace the traditional two-party system—Government and Opposition—by a triangular struggle, but so rapidly did the Party grow, chiefly at the expense of Liberal representation, that in 1924 and 1929 it actually formed the Government of the day, and finally set the seal on its constitutional position in 1945 when at the General Election it gained an absolute majority over all other parties combined.

Thus has the old aristocratic and oligarchical constitution of the Island Kingdom successfully adapted itself to the changing conditions of an industrial society. No doubt Britain has much farther to go in this respect, but, so far as politics may hope to accomplish a true democracy, she has built as well and truly as any state in Europe, and furnished an example for many a continental community struggling to achieve its liberty and independence on the basis of national democracy.

¹ The non-interference by the Lords with finance Bills had long been accepted as a convention of the Constitution, but their refusal to pass the Budget of 1909 made it necessary to vindicate the convention by giving it statutory force.

² Under the Parliament Act a Bill passed by the Commons in three successive sessions and each time rejected by the Lords (provided that two years have elapsed in the process, but irrespective of the supervision of a General Election within the period) goes straight to the King for signature. A money Bill, passed once by the Commons, whatever the Lords may do, becomes law after the passage of one month. (The Speaker of the House of Commons decides what is a money Bill.) The Act also fixed the maximum life of a Parliament at five years, a restriction circumvented in wartime by the device of annual laws passed by Parliament to extend its own life.

The Third Republic

The democratisation of the British Constitution during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought about a gradual transformation of the system of government from what may be called an aristocratic monarchy to what is in effect a crowned republic. Compared with this steady evolution the changes in the French constitutional system over the same period were positively kaleidoscopic. During that time France passed through a series of political phases each of which was initiated in an atmosphere of revolution. First, a partially constitutional monarchy under the restored Bourbons in 1814, tending to become autocratic, gave place, after the revolution in 1830, to the middle-class constitutional régime of the July Monarchy. Next, this monarchy was overthrown in the revolution of 1848, to be replaced by the Second Republic. This was violently changed by the President's own revolutionary *coup d'état* in 1851 as a preliminary to the establishment of the Second Empire in 1852, Louis Napoleon taking the title Napoleon III, thus implying the continuity of the Napoleonic line, the second Napoleon having been the first Emperor's son, who, of course, had never reigned and had died young. The next phase came with the disastrous war with Germany, which caused the dethronement of the Emperor in 1870, the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, and its final constitution in 1875.

These violent shiftings of régimes may be regarded as the blind groping of the French after the best means of expressing the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity through political organisation. The national democracy of France was a very real force, but during the Second Empire emphasis was thrown almost entirely on to the nationalist aspect of this twin impulse. De-luded by a belief in the essential disunion of Germany and prompted by his own hunger for prestige, the Emperor permitted himself to be outwitted by Bismarck, beside whom he was a mere undergraduate in the black arts of political opportunism and diplomatic chicanery. In 1870 Bismarck, by conspiring to insult the French Ambassador, manœuvred Napoleon into a position in which he appeared as the aggressor, for France there-upon became the victim of that most feverish of all national maladies, outraged *amour propre*, and declared war on Germany. France was rapidly overwhelmed and the captive Emperor dethroned. Not for the last time in French history, a nation

without a government had to see its country overrun by its aggressive neighbour.

But the blow to the national pride in 1870 was such as to cause the French to determine at once to seek the means of a democratic life, and so to organise themselves as to be able one day to wipe out the ignominy of their defeat at the hands of the hated Germans. Yet this was not an easy thing to do in the circumstances of a war already lost and a capital invested and soon occupied by the enemy. There were at the time three progressive groups in whose united action lay the only hope of recovery for the wounded body politic of France. First, there were the Republicans under Gambetta, who believed in a restoration of something like the pristine glories of the First Republic under the Jacobins. Secondly, there were the Liberal Monarchists under Thiers who wanted a régime modelled on the British system under a constitutionally minded king, if only he could be found. Thirdly, there were the Socialists, the more extreme of whom vaguely looked forward to the establishment of some such classless society as Karl Marx had foreshadowed.

In January 1871 Paris surrendered to the Germans and a truce was made so that the French might form a government to make peace with Germany. Next month a general election, based on manhood suffrage, brought into existence a National Assembly of 700 members, of whom five-sevenths were monarchists and the rest republicans. This Assembly met at Bordeaux and chose Thiers as head of the government, and then, having moved to Versailles, ratified the Treaty of Frankfurt, by which the French ceded Alsace and Lorraine, agreed to a huge indemnity, and meanwhile had to suffer a German occupation until it should be paid. But during the German occupation of Paris up to that time, the city, cut off as it was from the rest of the country, had been governed locally by a committee of extremists made up of Radicals, Marxist Communists, and Anarchists, known as the Commune, from the fact that it held power in the Commune of Paris, the term commune signifying a unit of French local government. The Commune objected to what they regarded as the reactionary Assembly at Versailles and broke out into a bloody revolt. So Paris underwent a second siege more terrible than the first, while the distracted government of Thiers slowly and painfully put down the rebellion as the prisoners of war came home from Germany. The rising of the Commune made the majority of Frenchman ready to support a moderate

government, while its crushing defeat embittered its defenders and left a nucleus round which regrew an extreme Radical group in French politics.

The National Assembly, under the direction of Thiers, though elected solely for the purpose of making peace, remained to make a new constitution, that of the Third Republic. Before the end of 1871 they elected Thiers the first President, making him responsible to the Assembly. By the end of 1873 the huge indemnity had been paid off by the thrifty French and the Germans had withdrawn. The finances were restored, Paris and the new frontiers refortified, and the nation rearmed under a new and rigorous conscription law. Then the Assembly turned to the work of making a definitive constitution. It first reformed local government, retaining the system of Departments and Prefects, appointed by the central government, as instituted by Napoleon, and dividing each Department into *arrondissements* and each *arrondissement* into *communes*. The essential feature of this system of French local government was, and has remained, its dependence upon the central authority, and as a consequence French local government has been much less vigorous and creative than, for example, the English system.

We find this high centralism reflected in the Constitution of the Third Republic as finally promulgated in 1875. The Constitution was not a complete document. It was, in fact, distinctly fragmentary, and the reason for this was that the large majority of the Assembly were monarchists, who accepted the Republic because, as Thiers said, whereas there was only one throne there were three claimants to it (Bourbon, Orleanist, and Bonapartist), and because they hoped it would not last. They, therefore, wished to keep the way open for the return of the monarchy when times were more propitious. The Third Republic was, in fact, a compromise. The more advanced Republicans, says Lord Bryce, agreed to a Republic because they hoped to change it in a radical direction. The Monarchists agreed to a Presidency, called a Republic, because they hoped to turn the President later into a king or an emperor. And yet this Republic was destined to last longer than any régime since the first revolution of 1789, and when it fell in 1940, under the pressure of the German invasion and occupation, its eclipse proved to be only temporary, for it was destined soon to be reforged in the fires of patriotism which had hastened the expulsion of the Germans by the forces of the United Nations.

The Constitution was created by the passage of three fundamental laws in February and July 1875. They established the supremacy of the legislature, made up of the Senate, indirectly elected, and the Chamber of Deputies, popularly elected by manhood suffrage for a fixed period of four years. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies, sitting together as a National Assembly, elected the President, who held office for seven years. The President, however, was only the nominal executive. He was precisely in the position of the British monarch; in fact, a constitutional king for seven years. The real executive was a Premier with a Cabinet of Ministers responsible not to the President but to the Chambers. Here we see again the influence of the British Constitution, though created in very different circumstances, as a model of government by Parliament and Cabinet. The French Constitution, however, unlike the British, laid down the method of amendment. This French Constitution could be amended, not by the ordinary methods of legislation, but only by the two Chambers sitting together as a National Assembly, in the same way as for the election of the President. The first President was Thiers, a natural choice, and the Third Republic set out on its formal if chequered career.

From the moment of its definitive establishment in 1875 to its failure to hold the German onslaught in 1940, the Third Republic had always in the minds of the politically conscious French—and most Frenchmen have a strong political sense—an interim quality, an air of provisionality, of being about to be superseded by something more defined, courageous, and colourful. And yet it weathered all the storms that blew up round it through almost seventy years. During that time it undoubtedly achieved great things for France. It frankly used Parliament to foster and improve agriculture, industry, and commerce, and thereby enormously increased the wealth of the nation; making a remarkable recovery from defeat, it opened up a vigorous and far-flung Empire in Africa, in Indo-China, and in the Pacific; by means of social legislation it protected women and children, and regulated hours and instituted minimum wages in industry, introduced industrial insurance, old age pensions, and workmen's compensation, developed a highly controlled system of public education, both primary and secondary, recognised trade unions and the unqualified right of association, and passed the most liberal press laws in the world. And when the social conscience

seemed to demand it, the Government took the bold step of disestablishing the Church.

It cannot be denied, therefore, that the national democracy of France, as embodied in the Third Republic, largely succeeded as a constitutional vehicle for the realisation of the ideals of the Revolution. Yet the Revolution was by no means dead in the hearts of many Frenchmen. The progress of the state seemed to some merely illusory and its stability highly precarious, while the health of the society of which the state was the political expression appeared to others to depend on a species of charity dispensed by the wealthy middle class to the workers, to whom alone, according to them, the country owed its wealth and prosperity. These unconstitutional views produced groups of both political and social malcontents, the one demanding a more realistic, vital, and active state organisation, the other seeking a way to achieve the influence of the workers through direct action.

The first of these opponents of the Third Republic were prompted by the working of the French parliamentary system, which is based, not on large opposing parties which alternate in the control of the government, as in Britain, but on groups which, with the progress of the Republic, increased in number. The average life of a cabinet during the existence of the Third Republic was about ten months, a fact which would seem to us to indicate a complete lack of governmental stability. But the instability was more apparent than real, because it was founded on a fragile group system. What actually happened when a ministry resigned was a regrouping of ministers so that often the same men appeared in the new ministry as in its predecessor. Moreover, it was not considered constitutional in France under the Third Republic, as it is in Britain in certain circumstances, for a Cabinet to advise the dissolution of the Chambers before they had run their full term. Consequently, although there were frequent changes of Ministry during the four years of the life of a French Parliament, the Chambers themselves remained unaffected in their composition.

It is, however, true that the Cabinet could be maintained only by the distribution of favours, and the Premier was constantly preoccupied with the recruitment of friends to avert the crisis which hovered over him like the boulder in Virgil's Hades. Thus the critics of the régime could, with apparent justice, complain that the system was both corrupt and unstable, and they

turned to other methods of political organisation. The second group of opponents favoured extra-parliamentary action of another kind, through the organisation of trade unions, or *syndicats*. Indeed, Syndicalism originated in France, where it was supported by the philosophy of Georges Sorel, who, in his book *Reflections on Violence*, published in 1905, argued that the workers were justified in using the device of the general strike in order to paralyse the political machine, which denied them the rights to which they were entitled.

So the Third Republic, torn within itself and attacked from Right and Left, had by the early years of the present century reached a point where it seemed ripe, if not for supersession, at least for radical revision. The national democracy of France was saved by the uprush of unifying patriotic fervour aroused by the outbreak of the First World War. But no sooner was peace restored than the pre-war fissures again manifested themselves. Moreover, the opponents of constitutionalism, at opposite poles, found comfort and support for their disruptive intentions in the success of the Fascist revolt in Italy, on the one hand, and that of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, on the other. Nor were these breaches in the national unity to be healed in time to save the Republic from violent overthrow in the Second World War.

The Unification of Italy

The political unification of Italy was achieved through a combination of talents in a number of striking personalities who, fortunately for the Italian nation, appeared together on the political scene at the crisis of its history. These were Victor Emmanuel II, King of Sardinia, or Piedmont¹; Count Cavour, his Prime Minister; and Garibaldi, the patriot guerilla. The deeds of these three national heroes were made easier by the pioneering work of Mazzini, who, though a republican who failed to realise his hopes in the Revolution of 1848-1849, had impregnated the Italians with a deep consciousness of national purpose and laid the foundations of the *Risorgimento*. In the reaction which followed the triumph of Austria in 1849, the only solid thing salvaged from the ruins of the revolution was the

¹ It was called Piedmont from its original home on the Italian mainland. The acquisition of the island of Sardinia by the Piedmontese dynasty, known as the House of Savoy, led to the name of this comparatively large island being used as an alternative title for the State of Piedmont.

Sardinian Constitution which Charles Albert had granted in 1848. Charles Albert's successor, Victor Emmanuel II, not only upheld the constitution, in spite of Austrian protests, but made it work. In this he had the enthusiastic aid of Count Cavour, a Liberal statesman who had closely studied English writers and during a stay in England had imbibed the idea of a constitutional monarchy supported by a middle-class Parliament to which the King's ministers should be responsible.

Cavour entered the Sardinian Cabinet in 1850 and became Prime Minister in 1852. His Premiership was noteworthy for the firm establishment of a working parliamentary system and for the material progress of the state which he was thereby able to encourage. Free trade was introduced, shipping subsidised, waste land cultivated, public education aided, and taxation more equitably distributed. At the same time factories sprang up and railways were constructed as the new industrial technique rapidly spread under the stimulus of bourgeois security. These advances were all the more remarkable at a time when every other Italian state was in the grip of a reactionary régime. It is not surprising, therefore, that Liberal Italians looked to Piedmont as the nucleus of national unity and to Cavour as the man most likely to lead a successful campaign for its achievement. And, indeed, Cavour's policy of progress and reform aimed at making Piedmont strong not only in herself but so that she might become a more worthy champion of Italian unification. He, therefore, encouraged the King in the reform of the army, kept in close touch with every Italian organisation, overt or clandestine, devoted to the *Risorgimento*, and used every device of diplomacy to give his little state standing among the European Powers most likely to sympathise with it in the struggle for Italian unity which, he knew, could be achieved only on the basis of the expulsion of Austria.

In pursuit of this policy Cavour caused Sardinia to march with France and Britain against Russia in the Crimean War (1854-1856), and two years later he persuaded Napoleon III to join Piedmont in war against Austria. The prize for Piedmont was to be the annexation of the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and the price of French aid the cession to France by Piedmont of Savoy and Nice. While the Austrians were being expelled from Lombardy and withdrawing their garrisons from other parts of Italy, there occurred an extraordinary outburst of national feeling in the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena,

and in the northern parts of the Papal States, which led to the expulsion of their Hapsburg rulers. These moves so surprised and frightened Napoleon, who saw in them the danger of a too powerful Italian neighbour, that he made peace with Austria on the basis of the cession to Piedmont of Lombardy alone and the restoration of the deposed rulers. Cavour resigned in disgust, but soon recovered his sanity and returned to office in order to prevent the restorations. He agreed to the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, and so persuaded her to recognise the annexation of the Duchies whose people had voted in a plebiscite for incorporation with Piedmont. Thus by 1860 Piedmont had extended her boundaries to include the northern half of Italy except Venetia.

Meanwhile, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour sympathetically watched the victory of Garibaldi and his Red-shirts in the south. Leaving Genoa in May 1860, Garibaldi landed in Sicily and in three months was master of the island. Crossing the straits to the mainland in September, he entered the city of Naples in triumph. Garibaldi was the idol of the people, but he overcame his republican tendencies and voluntarily handed over to the King the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, from which the unspeakable Bourbon dynasty had been expelled and whose people had voted by a plebiscite for annexation to the northern Kingdom. Meanwhile, Cavour, who had secretly encouraged Garibaldi in his expedition, secured a corridor between the north and the south by the conquest and occupation of the Adriatic districts of the Papal States. In February 1861, a Parliament met in Turin representing twenty-two million people who constituted the enlarged state. Cavour died shortly after, but not before he had shown the way of acquiring for the new United Kingdom the unredeemed portions of Italy, namely the rest of the Papal States and the province of Venetia.

The process was completed by taking advantage of the struggles among the larger Powers. When Prussia made war on Austria in 1866 Italy allied with her and, though beaten in the field, received at the hands of Bismarck the promised price of her help, and thus Venetia, whose people voted by an overwhelming majority in favour of incorporation with the Kingdom of Italy, was ceded as part of the settlement following Prussia's lightning victory. It was Bismarck again who made possible the last stage in Italian unification. The French were forced, as a direct result of the rapid German incursion into France, to

withdraw their troops from Rome in 1870, and the Italian forces occupied it. Again the people voted for union with the Italian state, and in July 1871 Rome was proclaimed the capital of United Italy.

Thus the *Risorgimento* had achieved its purpose, and Italy was at last united and free under the constitutional monarchy of the House of Savoy. There were, it is true, groups of Italians still outside the Italian state. In the north-east these bodies of Italians were mainly concentrated in Trieste and the Trentino, lands under Austrian sovereignty and called by Italian patriots *Italia Irredenta* (Unredeemed Italy), while in the north-west were the predominantly Italian provinces of Savoy and Nice which Italy had sacrificed as the price of French aid. The Kingdom of Italy acquired Trieste and the Trentino as a result of the First World War, and the hope of regaining Savoy and Nice was one of the reasons for the abortive entry of Italy into the Second World War against France. But the state as it emerged in 1871 was sufficiently homogeneous to take its place among the Powers of Europe.

Italy, like Britain and France but unlike Germany, was integrated into a unitary and not a federal state. That is to say, a central government had to adapt itself to the varying and sometimes conflicting requirements of what had recently been eight separate sovereign states. This was no easy task, for the economic and social conditions in the north and in the south differed widely, while the political problem was complicated by the peculiar position of the Church in Italy. The north became rapidly industrialised and enlightened, while the south remained in a state of backward agrarianism, lawlessness, and illiteracy. At the same time, the royal and papal courts glared at each other from their respective headquarters in Rome. The Pope let the Catholic world regard him as a prisoner in the Vatican and forbade his flock to take any part in Italian politics. The monarchy, nevertheless, survived this unpromising start, and found the difficult business of assimilation eased by the flexibility of the constitution, which, like the British, could be amended by the normal procedure of legislative enactment. Thus, as the state enlarged from the nucleus of Piedmont and as the original Constitution of 1848 was gradually applied to the whole, the institutions which Charles Albert had founded and the conventions which Victor Emmanuel and Cavour had practised in Piedmont became those of the whole of Italy.



STAGES IN THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY, 1859-1871.

Based though it was on the British model, the Italian Constitution had to operate not through a stable party system, which it could not suddenly create, but through a variety of political groups like those in France. In the first years of the union the ministry alternated over lengthy periods between the Right and the Left. The suffrage was gradually extended, and the parliamentary machine used to improve the condition of the people as the Industrial Revolution spread through the country and created the conditions, at least in the north, that we have found everywhere to follow in the wake of economic and technical changes. But the government of the day was faced at every turn by the determined opposition of the Clericals, who entered the political field with the removal of the papal ban on Catholic participation in politics in 1905, the Republicans who refused to accept the monarchical settlement, the Socialists who slowly grew into a formidable group in the Chamber, and the

Syndicalists who were frank revolutionaries. The coming of the First World War caused patriotic solidarity to overcome internal dissensions. But the Italians were profoundly disillusioned by their failure to achieve in the war what they regarded as their just national aims, and post-war disorders seemed to justify the opposition of Fascism to constitutional government and paved the way for its triumph over democracy.

Bismarck's German Empire : the Second Reich

The political unification of Germany under Bismarck is one of the most remarkable examples of militant nationalism in the modern epoch. The broken history of Germany had shown that she would never take her place among the foremost states of the world until she had overcome her incorrigible tendency to disunion. And particularly the revolution of 1848 had demonstrated that the insistence on Liberalism was positively giving the victory to the forces of disunion. The Prussian Constitution which King Frederick William IV had granted in 1850, though allowing very limited popular powers, had produced a fairly strong body of middle-class progressives who pressed the claims of Liberalism in the Lower House of the Legislature and looked longingly at the British Constitution as the ideal. This did not suit the King, who in 1862 summoned Bismarck to tame his Parliament. Bismarck was well suited to this task, for his object was national unity, and anything that stood in the way of it must be mown down. "Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities," he said, "are the great questions of the day decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron." Bismarck was a realist who believed that German unity would only be achieved through the hegemony of Prussia, saw that this meant the expulsion of Austria from the German union, and accepted the logical consequence that this involved war. Money supplies were necessary for this, and if Parliament was not prepared to vote them, then it was Parliament and not the supplies which must go.

Ruthlessly pursuing his policy to expel Austria, he found a cause of quarrel in the Schleswig-Holstein question, of which Palmerston, in his later life, said that there were only two men in England who understood it, the Prince Consort and himself—and the Prince was dead and he (Palmerston) had forgotten it. For Bismarck, however, it was a very simple issue, because he

was concerned not with right but with might, and his actions now were the most complete proof of that divorce of ethics and politics which characterises the aim of political power as opposed to social good. Schleswig and Holstein were Duchies, with a predominantly German population, which were controlled by the King of Denmark but were not incorporated in the Danish state. When, in 1863, a new King of Denmark attempted to incorporate them in his realm, both Prussia and Austria led a national German campaign against him. In 1864 war broke out. The Danes were soon overwhelmed and deprived of the Duchies, which were then administered by Austria (Schleswig) and Prussia (Holstein). The war is only of interest because of the use made of it in Bismarck's real-politics.

Having arranged for Austria to occupy the more northern of the Duchies, he was soon able to pick a quarrel with her, which by 1866 brought about a state of war between them. Profiting by the highly developed Prussian war machine organised by von Roon and commanded by von Moltke, allying himself with Sardinia who caused a large Austrian diversion for the defence of Venetia, and using the electric telegraph as a means of communication for the first time in the history of warfare, he encompassed the utter defeat of the Austrians in the astonishingly brief space of seven weeks. But he used his advantage leniently for the sake of the great prize of Austrian expulsion. Austria thus left the Germanic Confederation, which was then dissolved, renounced her claims to Schleswig-Holstein, which Prussia annexed, and ceded Venetia to Italy, who thus achieved the penultimate step in her unification. But if he was lenient to Austria Bismarck was iron-handed with some other German states. Prussia annexed the Kingdom of Hanover and other states, thus adding 27,000 square miles of territory and five million subjects to her population. The enlarged Prussia, now that Austria had retired, comprised, from the point of view both of territory and of population, no less than two-thirds of Germany.

Bismarck now proceeded to exploit the success he had achieved in the two wars. The twenty-one states north of the River Main, i.e. all the German states except Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, were persuaded to join Prussia in the North German Confederation, which, in spite of its name, was a much more compact and unified league of states, under the hereditary Presidency of Prussia, than the *Bund* had ever been

under that of Austria. The Prussian Chancellor became the Federal Chancellor. The legislature consisted of a Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), composed of representatives of the Princes of the states, and a lower house or diet (*Reichstag*), elected by universal manhood suffrage. Thus the principle of democracy was admitted into the franchise, though the fact that the Ministry was responsible to the President and not to the *Reichstag* left the principle of autocracy essentially intact. The states retained a good many sovereign rights except, of course, the main one—namely, control of the armed forces and the power to make war—which was absolutely in the hands of the Federal Authority. Moreover, the *Zollverein*, or customs union, applied to the whole Confederation, which was thus an economic as well as a political federation.

The importance of this constitution, which went into force in 1867, was that it was the foundation of the German Empire which was so soon to be established. What Bismarck had to do to complete the work of unification was to make the four South German states dependent on Prussia. His prestige was then so high that he could afford to affect a magnanimity which was fundamentally foreign to his nature. After his martial successes for the Fatherland his patriotism was no longer questioned by the Liberals, to whom he in his turn, for this same reason, was able to make concessions. Hence the introduction of manhood suffrage in the Constitution of the North German Confederation, and hence, too, his readiness to restore the full working of the Prussian Constitution. The National Liberal Party which now grew up, not only in the north but also in the south of Germany, pledged itself to support Bismarck in his national policy and for the time being to subordinate their political claims to their patriotism. This gave him standing, too, in the four southern states, with which he was thereby able to conclude treaties of alliance whereby each side agreed to come to the other's aid if attacked. It then only remained for Bismarck to arrange the attack in order to make his dream come true.

The French Emperor, Napoleon III, bemused by the belief that he could depend on the support of the South German states, allowed himself, as we have seen earlier, to be jockeyed by Bismarck into a false position, and in 1870 France declared war on Germany. Immediately the German alliances became operative, and Bismarck led a united Germany into a war which

was to make France bite the dust, to overthrow the Second Empire, to add to Germany the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and finally to establish the German Empire. The Franco-Prussian War was not so brief as the Austro-Prussian War, but the Prussian military machine displayed the same perfection of organisation and clockwork precision in attack and advance in the war with France as in that with Austria. And it was not less decisive in its results. By it Bismarck crowned his work for German unification, and gave Germany a period of unquestioned prestige during which she prepared for the international holocausts that were to engulf her pretensions to European and world dominance.

Bismarck used his triumph over France to exploit the success of Prussia as the centripetal force of German nationalism, and in 1871 the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles, in that very Hall of Mirrors where less than fifty years later a republican Germany was forced to sign the treaty which ended the First World War. The Empire was, in fact, a more majestic and universal form of the North German Confederation. It was a federal union of the twenty-six states of Germany, of which the King of Prussia became the hereditary head, with the title of German Emperor (*Deutscher Kaiser*). The Constitution of the Empire stated the Imperial powers and left the rest to the states. But, in fact, the powers of the Imperial Authority were very wide in their scope—much wider, for example, than those of the Federal Authority in the Swiss Confederation or in the United States of America—including as they did not only the control of the armed forces, international relations, the making of peace and war, and foreign trade, but the regulation of interstate commerce, coinage, communications, postage, banking, and criminal and civil law.


The legislature consisted of two Houses: the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) and the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*). The first was, in fact, an oligarchical assembly of ambassadors from the various states which were very unequally represented, Prussia having seventeen seats out of the total of sixty-one, Bavaria (the next highest) having six, and seventeen others having only one each. The *Reichstag* was elected by all males over twenty-five throughout Germany, and the membership was distributed according to population. Here again, therefore, Prussia naturally had the preponderance, holding 236 seats out of the total of 397. The executive department was in the hands of the Imperial

Chancellor who was chosen by the Emperor, to whom he was responsible, and who was also President of the Upper House.

The two chief characteristics of the Constitution of Imperial Germany, therefore, were the preponderance of Prussia and the lack of responsibility of the executive to the legislature. Though the Reichstag was democratically elected, everything conspired to deprive it of an effective voice in affairs. By the constitution fourteen adverse votes in the upper chamber were sufficient to veto any substantial proposal of the lower. And it was in the upper house that the Imperial Chancellor was all-powerful, for he was its president, while his own state, Prussia, commanded seventeen votes. Thus, although, according to the constitution, the small states could, by acting together, prevent the passage into law of any measure to which they all took exception, Prussia could equally block in the Federal Council, against no matter what combination of forces, any bill which she might not have succeeded in defeating in the Reichstag.

The Reichstag was in effect, therefore, little more than a national debating society and entirely lacked the force of, for example, the British House of Commons or the Chamber of Deputies in France or Italy. Moreover, throughout its history from 1871 to 1919 the Reichstag under the Empire never enjoyed a redistribution of seats. Consequently, as industry advanced and new towns grew up, the situation became more and more disproportionate; for example, by 1914 there were 350,000 voters in an electoral district in Berlin, as compared with only 120,000 in one in East Prussia. At the same time the twelve most populous electoral districts in the Empire had two million voters, while the twelve least populous had only 170,000.

Such was the Second Reich. It was Bismarck's creation and it bore all the marks of his aristocratic authoritarianism. In it the Germans sacrificed democracy to nationalism and humanity to efficiency. Bismarck's Empire gave Germany many things she had never before possessed, and on its basis she made tremendous industrial and technical progress. All the states allowed themselves to be cowed by Prussian arrogance, and while the western and northern states of Europe were practising political democracy and working out the means of using it for social progress, the Germans received their social legislation from above, the gifts of a condescending Chancellor. Bismarck remained at the Imperial Chancellory for twenty years and the German



Empire never lost the impress of his personality. The young Kaiser, William II, "dropped the pilot" in 1890, only to steer the ship to wreck. And when the War of 1914-1918 sent the Kaiser into exile and replaced the Imperium by a Republic, the Germans for the first time began to practise political democracy. But democracy had no roots in Germany, and that is why the Germans so easily relapsed into submission to autocracy. At no time did Prussia really cease to be dominant. Under the Weimar Republic, it is true, the Constitution attempted to destroy the identity of Prussia with the federal executive, but it only partially succeeded, and the old Prussian Adam soon re-emerged, with dire consequences for Europe and the world. In Germany, at least, the democratic experiment was a failure, but nationalism succeeded with a vengeance.

Austria, Turkey, Russia, and the Balkans

From the second half of the nineteenth century onwards the dynamic principle of nationalism became the platform of political aspiration and action in south-eastern Europe no less than in the centre. But whereas in Italy and Germany this principle had brought about a political integration, in Austria, to the extent that it should succeed in practice, it was bound to work in the opposite direction. For the Austrian dominions comprehended several different non-German groups, and, once these peoples were persuaded that their liberty and independence were to be achieved only through national organisation, they could only look forward with fervour to the disintegration of the Ramshackle Empire and must snatch every occasion of Austrian embarrassment to hasten its occurrence. A similar situation existed in European Turkey, where a number of peoples, mostly Slavonic, aimed at gaining for themselves the same national independence that Greece had already accomplished through a successful revolt from Turkish overlordship. The interesting thing about these insurgent groups in the Balkans is that they had never experienced the urge of political nationalism in the past, for they had been overwhelmed by the Turks and absorbed in their European Empire before the principle of nationalism became a conscious state-making impetus. Their deliberate adoption of the nationalist argument as the means of achieving their freedom and independence, therefore, only emphasises its strength as a unifying force.

The Balkan situation made Austria realise that her future was bound up with the fate of Turkey, for her non-German dominions to the east and south had been acquired at the expense of Turkey as the Moslem tide rolled back from the gates of Vienna and across the plains of Hungary. Moreover, her non-German subjects who inhabited her southern lands, though divided by custom and dialect, were beginning to find bonds of sympathy and hope with the neighbouring peoples under the Turkish yoke. Hence, if the Turkish tide were to recede still farther, Austria might have to face not only a powerful grouping of liberated Balkan states but the loss of many of her own subjects, who would seek to join their brethren in neighbouring lands. These considerations were complicated by the position of Russia, who was still seeking to widen her second "window to the west," which Peter the Great had first envisaged. In fact, the danger of

Russia, as the "big Slav brother," leading a Balkan campaign for the final expulsion of the Turks from Europe was so menacing in Austrian eyes that she gradually adopted the policy of supporting her traditional enemy, the Moslem Turk, against her former ally, the Christian Muscovite. Thus did the conflicting policies of the Great Powers provide artificial respiration to the "sick man of Europe" and postpone the day when he should succumb to his chronic malady and leave the Balkan peoples free to divide his effects. It was this delaying action which in the nineteenth century complicated that Balkan tangle known as the Eastern Question.

This south-eastward trend was forced upon Austria by the events of the years 1859 to 1871, which caused her to drop for ever the decaying mantle of Metternich to which she had till then desperately clung in her efforts to continue to control the destinies of Germany and Italy. Such hopes ended with her loss of Lombardy and Venetia and the making of the Kingdom of Italy, and with her violent expulsion from the German *Bund* and the creation of Bismarck's *Reich*. She thereupon determined to set her own house in order and to fortify it against the Balkan danger. A Liberal constitution of 1861, which established a united Parliament for the whole Austrian Empire, failed to satisfy the Hungarians, who demanded national independence. After the disastrous German war of 1866 a compromise was reached, and in 1867 the Dual Monarchy of the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary was established. Under the constitution of the Dual Monarchy each people was to manage its own affairs with a separate Parliament, but under a common crown and common ministries for war, finance, and foreign affairs. Each Parliament had two chambers—a House of Lords and a Chamber of Deputies—to which the Ministry was responsible.

Both sections of the Dual Monarchy tried honestly to work according to the principles of parliamentary government. Thereby reforms were introduced, social legislation was carried out, and religious toleration achieved. But in practice the working of the Austrian half was much more Liberal, if not democratic, than the Hungarian. This was largely due to the fact that Austria became rapidly industrialised, while Hungary remained predominantly agrarian. There was thus constant friction between the two, though their interests proved broadly complementary, and they usually contrived to present a united

front to the world, particularly in their determination to take a hand in unravelling the Balkan tangle and to exploit for their mutual safety and advantage the decline of Turkey.

The constitution of the Dual Monarchy gave equality of rights and power to the two predominant peoples of the Ramshackle Empire—the Germans and the Magyars—but each had in its own area groups of Slavs who far outnumbered them both. The Austrian portion included Bohemia, Galicia, and Dalmatia; the Kingdom of Hungary included Croatia and Slavonia, as well as Transylvania, in which Rumanians numerically preponderated. The subject Slavs were, on the whole, more liberally treated by the Austrians than by the Hungarians, whose attitude was epitomised in the remark of the Hungarian Minister to his Austrian opposite number at the time of the Compromise of 1867: “You look after your barbarians and we’ll look after ours.” To the Poles and Ruthenians in Galicia, to the Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia and northern Hungary, and to the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in southern Hungary, it was little satisfaction that a nice political balance should be established between the Germans and the Magyars. Nor could their hunger for rights be effectively assuaged by the few constitutional crumbs that might fall from their masters’ table. Their dissatisfaction remained a standing threat to the stability of the Dual Monarchy, and there would come a day when they, too, would try the experiment of national democracy. But before this could happen Fate decreed that the Balkans must become an arena of battle and diplomatic rivalry among the Powers and a World War be fought.

What the Great Powers feared in the Balkans in the second half of the nineteenth century, then, was not Turkish strength but Turkish weakness, not the possibility of her expanding farther but the danger of her disintegration. Instead, therefore, of combining their resources to effect the expulsion of the Turks, they fought one another to prevent it. By Austria and the Western Powers Russia was regarded as the villain of the piece. Austria saw in the Russian advance the danger of a great Slav Empire which would decimate her, while Britain feared for her eastern Empire if Russia should dominate the vital routes to it. Thus the Crimean War (1854–1856) saw France and Britain allied with Turkey against Russia, while a revolt of the Turkish province of Herzegovina, on the Adriatic, in 1875 led to war between Russia and Turkey in 1877 and a major diplomatic struggle to deprive Russia of the fruits of her victory, culminating

in the Congress and Treaty of Berlin in 1878. The compromise settlement of the Eastern Question by the Treaty of Berlin is a landmark in Balkan history. By this treaty Russia kept most of her territorial gains, but had to see the "Big Bulgaria" that she had sponsored broken up into three parts: the autonomous principality of Bulgaria, the tributary provinces of Rumelia, and Macedonia which returned to the full sovereignty of the Sultan. Serbia was recognised as an independent kingdom, and Rumania and Montenegro as independent principalities, though each was burdened with a portion of the Ottoman public debt. The Kingdom of Greece was enlarged by the addition of Thessaly, and Austria was allowed to occupy and administer the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.


The position in 1878, therefore, was that four of the national groups in the Balkans were independent, and a fifth (Bulgaria) had been deprived of her unity and complete independence by a cruel stroke of fortune which she was determined at the earliest possible moment to reverse. The Turks, however, still held a wide band of territory running across the Balkans from Constantinople to the Adriatic and dividing Greece from the rest of the Christian states. This constituted a standing outrage to Balkan nationalism. But none of these national groups was satisfied either with the extent of its territory or with the rights it had gained. During the years that followed, a series of dynastic and constitutional revolutions brought about considerable changes. Greece was unable to work her democratic constitution of 1864 until the great statesman Venizelos appeared, in the early years of the nineteenth century, to free her from anarchy and to establish constitutional rule. The Principality of Rumania was proclaimed a kingdom in 1881, and the parliamentary constitution of 1866 was amended for a second time in 1884, with a still restricted franchise. Serbia was torn by a dynastic feud which was not settled until the opening years of the nineteenth century, when the very liberal constitution of 1889 was restored. The Prince of Montenegro granted a constitution in 1905, with a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and in 1910 the Prince assumed the title of King. The autonomous principality of Bulgaria was joined by Rumelia which forcibly threw off the Turkish yoke in 1885, and in 1908 it became an independent kingdom, the head of the state taking the title of the Tsar of the Bulgars.

Here, then, was a remarkable example of the trial of the national

democratic experiment. In spite of the efforts of their big neighbours to prevent it, these small Balkan peoples had, in conscious imitation of those very neighbours, deliberately adopted nationalism as the basis of their independence and paper constitutions as the means of achieving their liberty, and so had in a few brief years thrown off the dark Oriental despotism of the Ottoman and emerged into the light of Western Civilisation. But what was even more remarkable was that the Turks themselves, under the same influences, attempted to put their own house in order on a similar model. As early as 1876 a parliamentary constitution had been promulgated, but after that no Turkish parliament met for more than thirty years. In that year the autocratic but cowardly Abdul Hamid II ascended the Turkish throne. He was the personification of the "Sick Man of Europe," and during his reign Turkey in Europe showed every sign of imminent dissolution.

Then arose an extraordinarily spontaneous movement, organised by a party known as the Young Turks, bent on the rejuvenation of Turkey. Many adherents of this movement had studied at European universities and had returned to Turkey determined to make it a progressive state on Western models. Their programme included the introduction of parliamentary government, technical improvements, educational reform, and religious liberty. The Young Turks formed a central organising Committee of Union and Progress and found an able leader in Enver Bey, afterwards notorious for his pro-German policy in the First World War. They were careful to avoid any provocative action until they were sure of the support of the army. With this secured, they took a decisive step. In July 1908 at Salonika they proclaimed the constitution of 1876 and called upon the Sultan to give his official sanction to it. Terrified, Abdul Hamid gave way, and Turkey became, to all appearances, a constitutional monarchy.

The *coup d'état* of the Young Turks had some remarkable consequences. Taking advantage of the Turkish civil disturbances, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria declared her independence. The Austrian move dejected Serbia, because of the definite incorporation of her brethren in the annexed provinces into the Austrian Empire; while Bulgaria was obviously reviving her dream of a greater Bulgaria, which could only lead to more embittered embroilments among the Balkan nations. But it was the progress of the



Young Turk revolution which made the Balkan peoples forget their differences and close their ranks. The fact was that the Young Turk Movement was more militantly nationalist than liberally democratic. Their aim, in short, was nothing less than to "Ottomanise" the Christian lands which they still held in the Balkans. This became more evident when Abdul Hamid tried to organise a counter-revolution and was consequently dethroned in 1909. After that the Young Turk party pressed forward with their policy of "Ottomanisation," and the Balkan nations formed the Balkan League with the intention of com-

bining to drive the Turks completely and for ever out of Europe.

This led to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. At first the Balkan allies were highly successful, and after much haggling a conference held in London finally agreed to an arrangement which all but expelled the Turks from Europe. But no sooner was this agreed upon than the Balkan nations quarrelled over the spoils. All the others allied against Bulgaria, who was hopelessly defeated in the Second Balkan War and sued for peace. The result of this Second Balkan War was that the Turks regained Adrianople and, despite all sorts of protests and pressure, refused to yield it. The upshot was that Turkey lost four-fifths of the European territory she had held before the wars, but continued to hold a triangle of European soil which included Adrianople. The lost Turkish territory was carved up among the Balkan states to the advantage of all of them but Bulgaria. Thus it may be fairly said that nationalism had gained a notable triumph in the Balkans, if democracy was but a secondary consideration in the process. And nationalism was to remain the chief concern of all of them, for they all had a grievance on this score. These grievances were to continue to poison the wells of action. This was particularly true of Serbia, who had won so much in the recent fights for independence. She watched with increasing rancour the continued subjection of her brethren, the Croats and Slovenes, under the Austro-Hungarian yoke, and the Dual Monarchy, for its part, felt the prick of this thorn in its flesh all the more sickeningly because Russia in the background was ready to press it farther in.

But in the first decade of the twentieth century Russia was so preoccupied with her imperial interests in the Far East and the domestic complications to which they gave rise, that she had little time or energy to spare for the national rivalries of the Balkans, which became more and more embittered in those years. The humiliations and disasters of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) led to the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the establishment of a Parliament (*Duma*) which, however, proved so ineffective that the government of Russia could officially describe itself as "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic Tsar." Before this contradiction in terms could be resolved, the First World War supervened, and the hopes of the constitutionalists for the achievement of responsible government were shattered by the violent revolutionary forces which the war released. Yet Russia remained through these pre-war years the

powerful friend of the Balkan peoples, and it was no mere accident of history that the immediate occasion of a world war, which was to demolish so many of the traditional ramparts of Europe, should have been provided by the tangle of Balkan politics.

The First World War and National Democracy

Thus by the eve of the First World War national democracy was on trial everywhere in Europe except in Russia, where it had frankly broken down.¹ Yet in 1914 in hardly one of the European states could the claims of democracy be said to have been anything like fully satisfied, and few of them were free from acute social, economic, and political problems originating in the discontent of national groups which could not reconcile themselves to the governments under which they were forced to live. Such discontented minorities lived in the hope either of establishing an independent state of their own or of being incorporated in a neighbouring state to which they by nationality felt themselves to belong. By the same token, the neighbouring states which suffered from a corresponding truncation or sense of incompleteness were ready to absorb their separated kinsmen whenever a suitable opportunity for doing so might present itself.

The chief multi-national states were, as we have seen, the great continental Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, and that part of the Turkish Empire which still occupied the European hinterland of Constantinople. Germany included the frustrated French of the raped provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in the west, the unhappy Danes of Schleswig-Holstein in the north, and the disgruntled Poles in the east, mainly pressed between Prussia proper and East Prussia in the area served by the vital port of Danzig. Within the Empire of Austria-Hungary, German Austria was almost completely encircled by non-German groups: Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, South Slavs, and Rumanians. Russia on her western borders incorporated a mass of discontented minorities: Finns, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, and Rumanians. In what remained of European Turkey the vast majority of the people were non-Moslems with Greek or Bulgarian affiliations. Nor did the picture of national democracy seem any more harmoni-

¹ See later, Chapter XVII.

ously composed when regarded from the opposite angle. Thus France ached to regain her lost provinces, Italy longed to complete her unity with Trieste and the Trentino (*Italia Irredenta*), Serbia looked forward to the incorporation of the Croats and Slovenes, Rumania awaited the time when she would welcome into her political fold her detached brethren of Transylvania (then under Hungary) and of Bessarabia (then under Russia), while Greece was ready to attach to herself the Greeks still under the Turkish yoke both in Europe and in Asia Minor, and, for the rest, the Baltic peoples and the Poles and Czechs felt themselves fully capable each of constituting a new national independent state if given the opportunity.

But so firm was the grip of the Powers on what they held that nothing short of an international cataclysm of a world-shattering order seemed likely to loosen it. Whether such a catastrophe was necessary or not, it undoubtedly occurred, and the First World War was to prove the means of violently breaking down the hard crust of traditional boundaries and so making possible a complete recasting of the political map of Europe. The causes of the war which broke out in 1914¹ were varied and complex, but it cannot be doubted that the tangled political scene which we have sketched made it impossible to localise the struggle once it had begun. The whole established order was thereby thrown into a state of solution which permitted the national democratic experiment to be tried on an unprecedented scale. The doctrine of self-determination, of which Woodrow Wilson, the leader of the least damaged of the victors, was the instigator and the champion, implied a settlement on national democratic lines. The defection of Russia from the Western Alliance at the end of 1917 and the crushing defeat of the Central Powers—Germany, Austria, and Turkey—in 1918 opened the way to such a settlement by weakening the very states which contained the discontented national minorities to the point where they were forced to accept changes calculated to satisfy the nationalist demands.

Under the arrangements made by the various treaties, the number of states of which Europe was composed rose from twenty-seven to thirty-three. East-central Europe became a mass of small states in the lands hitherto belonging to three large Empires. The treaties created the new sovereign states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia. They enlarged Serbia by the addition of Bosnia, Croatia, and

¹ They are discussed later in Chapter XX.

Slovenia, as well as of the former sovereign state of Montenegro, to form the state of Yugo-Slavia ; added to Rumania the provinces of Transylvania and Bessarabia ; and extended Greece by the inclusion of a part of Thrace. They restored to France the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, granted to Italy Trieste and the Trentino, and ceded to Denmark the northern part of Schleswig. All these changes were carried out at the expense of Russia, Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria (who had been allied with the Central Powers). Russia completely lost her territorial contiguity with western Europe by the establishment of the independent Baltic States and Poland. Germany was cut off from East Prussia by the creation of the Polish Corridor southward from Danzig (which was declared a Free City). Austria-Hungary was completely dismembered, for not only did she lose her Slavonic and Rumanian provinces to north, south, and east, but Austria and Hungary were made separate states, the one purely German and the other almost entirely Magyar.

Each of the new states instituted a republican régime, as did also Germany and Austria, though in Hungary a Regent was appointed to sustain the throne in case the monarchy might some day be restored, and the enlarged states of Yugo-Slavia and Rumania retained their monarchical form. But without exception they each promulgated a full-fledged documentary constitution, broadly modelled on the British or the French. There were, of course, variations in detail to suit local needs and circumstances. Most of the new constitutions, for example, granted women the right to vote and sit in Parliament on equal terms with men, a democratic reform which Britain did not fully achieve for another decade and France did not introduce until the end of the Second World War.¹ Some, again, adopted the electoral plan known as Proportional Representation (P.R.), with which France has only intermittently toyed and which Britain has discussed only to reject. But the essential constitutional features, and especially parliamentary control of the executive, were consciously framed on the British and French patterns. In that critical hour of Europe's destiny it seemed that nationalism and representative democracy had joined to achieve a signal victory for the rights of man.

It is true that there were still non-national minorities within

¹ In Britain the first election in which the equal franchise was exercised was that held in 1929, following the Act of 1928 (see earlier, page 276). In France the elections held in 1945 were the first in which women voted.

the new political boundaries—Germans in western Poland and in the Sudetenland of Czecho-Slovakia, Austrian Germans in Italy, Hungarians in Rumania, and so forth—but surely, after four years of unprecedented slaughter and devastation, political Europe could be trusted to find an amicable settlement of these problems which appeared so much less formidable than those of the pre-war epoch! It is true also that the principles of popular sovereignty and personal liberty were so far merely embodied in charters, but surely in the brave new world that was then dawning the liberated peoples would soon learn how to carry them into political practice! It is true, further, that the vast community of Russia remained outside this happy settlement, but surely the Bolshevik Revolution would soon consume itself in its own fires and the Russians see the advantage of establishing a régime modelled, like the rest, on the political constitutionalism of the West! Moreover, had not the peacemakers founded the League of Nations¹ and would not this soon establish itself as the constitutional means of settling peacefully all outstanding questions and disputes?

So, at least, it seemed to Liberal-minded Europeans in the optimistic atmosphere of the days immediately following the war. And so it might have been if it were possible to organise the modern world on the basis of pure politics. But there were psychological factors which could not fail to have a bearing on the working of the new order, and which, if unregarded, might tend to vitiate it, as, for example, the outraged pride of nations deprived of territory, kindred, and power, and human pugnacity which might refuse to lie dormant under such grievances. And even more calculated to disturb the new arrangements was the fact that the political disintegration of a large part of Europe caused by the war was accompanied by social and economic upheavals of no less violence. These were by no means so easily assessed as the political problems, nor could they be so tidily composed. The dynamism of Europe, indeed, had found a fresh spur in the political idealism of national democracy, especially in its latest form of self-determination, but that dynamism was also profoundly affected by the social and economic results of the Industrial Revolution. And these in their turn, if neglected, might well react on the political settlement to the point of wrecking it.

The optimists of the immediate post-war period failed to take

¹ Discussed later, in Chapter XXI.

account of these less calculable factors. Through their rose-coloured spectacles they could not distinguish even the essential form of the Russian Revolution, which was in the immediate foreground of the scene, much less descry the outline of the revolts from the constitutional order which were already faintly shaping themselves in the farther distance. Yet they could hardly be blamed for this purblindness, since, after all, the principal fields of Europe were visibly rich with the corn of national democratic constitutionalism, and only a gleaner gifted with the powers of a visionary could have foreseen that the harvest was to have so tragic an aftermath.

CHAPTER XVII

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

COMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM

The Breakdown of the Duma Experiment

THE Russians were the first European people to repudiate all affiliation with the methods of Western constitutionalism, and in doing so they carried through a unique political, social, and economic experiment. Indeed, in all history there have been few, if any, more dynamic movements than the Russian Revolution which began in 1917. In its scope, its fundamentalism, and its immediate repercussions it compares with the American and French Revolutions, but in its speed and iconoclasm it was much more shattering than either of these earlier examples. Like those, it was, in effect, the application of a doctrine ; for, as the American and French Revolutions derived in general from the natural philosophy of the eighteenth century and in particular from the Contract Theory of Rousseau, so the Russian Revolution was founded in general on the Communist teaching of Karl Marx and in particular on his theory of the class war. Like the Americans and French, too, the Russians appealed to all the other peoples and governments of the world for their goodwill and support, but whereas the Americans and French, in their Declarations, were concerned for the rights of all men, the Russians, in theirs, confined themselves to the "Rights of the Labouring and Exploited Peoples." Seen in this light, the lessons of the Russian Revolution do not perhaps on their face appear to be so universal and eternal as those which Europe and the world have learned from the American and French Revolutions, but he would be a bold prophet who would dare, at this time so close to its tumultuous occurrence and in the midst of affairs so manifestly affected by its prevailing influence, to say that the Russian Revolution is destined to have consequences any less world-wide and lasting.

To understand the extremism and violence of the Russian revolt from Western political methods, one must keep in mind the fact that Russia, in its history, in its interests, and in its existing expanse, is as much Asiatic as European. We must

think of it in continental rather than national terms, for it covers about one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, and though it stretches westward from the eastern European boundary over almost half the total area of Europe, four-fifths of it lie in Asia, where in its far north-eastern tip it is divided from the American continent by a strait only thirty-six miles wide. Nevertheless, three-quarters of the whole population, which now approaches two hundred millions, are concentrated in European Russia.

The Russians of Europe are mostly Slavs and therefore belong to the same Aryan race as the large majority of European peoples, while those of Asia manifest as many differences of race, language, and custom as we find, for example, in the British Empire. Russia's history has made her the victim of the differing, and often conflicting, pulls of East and West. On the one hand, her Asiatic background and preoccupations gave her a different outlook from that of the rest of Europe and tended to cut her off from its life and progress. Her prolonged subjection to the Tartar yoke stunted her growth and left her at the end of the struggle, in which she at length succeeded in throwing it off, in a semi-barbaric condition at a time when most of the peoples of Europe were passing through a highly formative phase. On the other hand, difficult though it would have been to draw a precise line of demarcation between Russia's cultural outlook in Europe and in Asia, the fact remained that the large majority of her people belonged to Europe, and, after her escape from the Tartar thralldom, her more enlightened leaders cherished the hope that the state might develop according to the Western pattern.

By the opening of the twentieth century, however, such efforts at Westernisation had made little progress, and Russia remained by far the most backward of the larger states of Europe. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the mass of the Russians had been serfs, which no Englishman, for example, had been for more than four centuries. In 1861 the Russian serfs were freed by an Imperial edict and became peasant proprietors. But even so, in the nineteenth century 80 per cent. of the total population were still tillers of the soil, and most of them remained poor, underfed, and servile, while wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of the landed aristocracy, whose estates remained large in spite of the emancipation. Only about 15 per cent. of the population lived in towns. Some of the larger cities, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, it is true, were well developed, functionally and æsthetically,

and enjoyed a cultural life which compared favourably with any in Europe. But such a life was confined to a social *élite*, and, in fact, 80 per cent. of Russians were illiterate. Most of the towns, indeed, were little more than enlarged villages with the most primitive buildings and entirely lacking in the type of amenities which were by that day becoming common in western Europe.

The government of this vast but backward society was in the hands of an all but absolute despot, the Tsar. There had, indeed, been some attempt at reform, particularly in the administration of the law and in local government through the establishment of district councils (*Zemstva*) in 1865. Certain of the *Zemstva*, as for example that of the province of Moscow, had done some most noble spade work in social reform, especially in connection with the beginnings of elementary education. But this only brought upon the local reformers the suspicion of the Tsarist bureaucracy, and the *Zemstva* were frustrated at every turn. The government of the Tsar thus remained essentially what it had always been, an autocracy of the Oriental type. There was no outlet for the growing sense of Liberalism and the desire for Western constitutional reform, and the more Liberal ideas grew the more repressive the government became. Men made desperate by lack of a forum or prospect of a charter were driven to the wildest courses, and autocracy fed on the revolutionary Nihilism which it engendered, equally refusing to meet the reasonable demands of Liberal reformers and crushing with every instrument of force and degradation the supporters of more revolutionary programmes.

When Nicholas II succeeded to the Imperial throne in 1894, the hopes of the Liberals were dashed by his stigmatisation of reform as a senseless dream, and his proclaimed determination to "preserve the principles of autocracy as firmly and unswervingly" as his father, Alexander III. Yet the events of his reign were to belie his intentions. First, the turn of the century was marked by an industrial development which, though only touching the fringe of Russia's vast natural resources, profoundly disturbed the traditional balance of political forces. This industrial revolution had, though in a milder form, many of the characteristics of Western changes of the same kind and did more than anything else to bring Russia into vital contact with the West. The emancipation of the serfs had furnished a large reservoir of cheap labour waiting to flock to the towns for

employment. Railways were built to ease the problem of transport and communication. And the capital necessary to exploit the industrial potentialities of the country was furnished by the wealthier communities of western Europe, particularly by France.

The effect of this change was soon felt. It was responsible for the beginnings of a capitalist middle class (*bourgeoisie*), which, like its earlier exemplars in western Europe, soon became clamant for political reform. It at the same time created a class of industrial workers (*proletariat*) who, formerly scattered and out of touch with one another, were now concentrated in factories where they rapidly developed a sense of solidarity. As they lived in the most appalling conditions of overcrowding and insanitation, they added to their nascent political consciousness a growing sense of social grievance. Yet, in spite of these changes, Russia remained an overwhelmingly agrarian society, for up to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, its unlimited natural resources remained essentially unexplored, while the number of industrial workers at no time exceeded three millions. In other words, while the Industrial Revolution in Russia at that time went far enough to create conditions of unrest, it was not sufficiently potent and widespread of itself to bring social and political reform in its wake.

It was a series of external events which brought about a crisis. In 1904 Russia found herself at war with Japan, a situation which soon revealed the utter hollowness and incapacity of the Tsarist administration. The war was unpopular in Russia and from the beginning it was hopelessly mismanaged. As the news of successive defeats came through, the people became profoundly disillusioned and the government gravely discredited. The political leaders of the middle class feverishly prepared memoranda of constitutional reform, while the workers' representatives met to discuss proposals in improvised councils, or *Soviets* (the Russian word for council). In this situation the Tsar was unable to resist the pressure for reform, but while the Liberal proposals of the *bourgeoisie* were being considered, the proletariat stepped in. After a series of strikes, a great demonstration of workers was staged in St. Petersburg on Sunday, January 22, 1905, known in Russian history, because of the blood that was spilt, as Red Sunday. The workers were moving in a perfectly orderly procession to the Winter Palace, with the intention of presenting to the Tsar a petition ventilating their

social and political grievances, when they were fired on by the police. In spite of this display of force, the government lost control of the situation throughout the country, while the hands of the reformers were strengthened in May when the Russian Baltic Fleet was destroyed in the Far East. In face of disasters abroad and widespread unrest at home, the Tsar finally gave way, and in October issued a Manifesto establishing a *Duma*, or Parliament, based on a wide suffrage. The first *Duma* met in May 1906, and the Russian parliamentary experiment began.

From its inception the work of the *Duma* was hampered by the fears of the Tsar and the intrigues of his myrmidons, and its constitution undermined by a reactionary movement organised by the aristocracy and bureaucracy who were determined to fight for the retention of their powers and privileges. The conditions of the October Manifesto were not observed, and it was soon evident that, as the revolutionary surge subsided and the Government regained full control, the Tsar and his advisers did not intend the Assembly to enjoy any real powers. The reformers lost the struggle over the fundamental issue of ministerial responsibility, and the *Duma* from the first was denied control over the armed forces and foreign policy and even over the budget. The first *Duma* lasted only two months and was then dissolved. The election of the second *Duma* was marked by every kind of chicanery and intimidation to prevent free returns, and when it met, in March 1907, an attempt was made to exclude the Social Democrats on the ground that they were disloyal to the throne. After three months' shaky existence it was dissolved, and the third *Duma* was elected on the basis of a new electoral law, passed without the *Duma's* consent, which disfranchised those sections of the community known to be opposed to the government, and gave a preponderating vote to the landed nobility.

The third *Duma* went its full length of five years and was not dissolved until 1912. But it existed only on sufferance, and it shrank to little more than a consultative and advisory body. The fourth *Duma*, which first met in 1912, saw the outbreak of war in 1914 and remained in existence through the disasters which led to the débâcle of 1917. It was a distinctly reactionary body, neither able nor willing to prevent the government's denial of most of the civil rights guaranteed by the October Manifesto of 1905. While the organised opposition was suppressed, the popular leaders, whether standing for trade union rights or

championing the peasants' demand for land reform, were imprisoned or exiled. At the same time, the Court continued to be riddled with corruption and remained impervious to change.

Thus the *Duma* did nothing to satisfy the just aspirations of the bulk of the Russian people. It alienated enlightened middle-class Liberal opinion, which had hoped gradually to mould it into the shape of Western political constitutionalism. It made no move towards the improvement of the lot of the industrial proletariat and drove the organisation of the workers underground. Nor did it take any effective steps to assuage the land hunger of the peasants who constituted four-fifths of the population. It was in this unhappy condition of social and political backwardness and internal discord that Russia had to face the ordeal of a world war, and it is not surprising that, despite the bravery of her soldiers, ill-equipped and feebly supported as they were, she failed to stand up to this gruelling test and that the flood gates were thereby opened to a tidal wave of revolution.

Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution

It was the entire absence of constitutional machinery for the redress of popular grievances in Russia and the successive failures of Russian arms in the Japanese War that had caused the Revolution of 1905 and led to the inception of the *Duma* experiment. Similarly, it was the complete breakdown of that political experiment and the cumulative effect of strain, defeats, and losses in the First World War which created the conditions for the Revolution of 1917. The Revolution of 1917 passed through two phases: first, the political revolution in March which destroyed the Tsarist autocracy, and secondly, the social, or Bolshevik, revolution in November ¹ which created the Workers' Republic. In the first weeks of 1917 discontent was rampant. In Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been renamed in the early days of the war), Moscow and other cities, bread riots, strikes, and demonstrations against the war and the autocracy grew in number and bitterness. Troops called out to quell the demonstrators refused to fire on them. By March 15 the situation had become so ugly that the Tsar was persuaded to abdicate and a Provisional Government was set up by the opposition leaders in the *Duma*.

¹ Russian references to the "October" Revolution are explained by the fact that it was not until after the Revolution that Russia changed from the Julian to the Gregorian Calendar, adopted in England in 1752.

But now a curious dual system of control emerged. While the *bourgeois* Liberals took over authority, they could not maintain it without the support of the workers. The workers, however, began to organise themselves in soviets as they had done in 1905. But this time they were much more effective. The soviets were made up of delegates, rather than representatives, of the industrial workers, peasants, and soldiers, who were elected not, like the *Duma*, in territorial constituencies but by their fellows in occupational or vocational units. The soviets thus stood for the rights of the proletariat as such. The movement spread rapidly to every town and village and through the army and navy. An important new step was taken when the soviet in Petrograd decided to summon representatives from soviets all over the country to a Congress of Soviets. This body rapidly gained tremendous prestige. Some of the more moderate Socialists in the soviets, it is true, joined the Ministry, but the Congress of Soviets, in effect, wielded the real power while the Provisional Government merely held the offices of state.

It was upon this scene of indeterminate sovereignty that there now appeared the magnetic and dominant personality of Vladimir Lenin. If ever a revolutionary leader, by his courage, faith, and lifelong devotion to a cause, earned the support and success that he gained, it was Lenin. Born in a provincial town in 1870, the son of a schoolmaster, Lenin, originally named Ulianov, had a chequered career. As a young man he became a barrister in St. Petersburg, but spent most of his time politically educating the factory workers there and building up the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. For his subversive activities he was exiled to Siberia, whence he escaped, living for a time in London. He returned to Russia during the Revolution of 1905, but had to flee again on its suppression. Meanwhile, there had been a vital split in the Social Democratic Labour Party. The followers of Lenin were in the majority and were henceforth known as Bolsheviks, who later, in 1912, formed the Communist Party; the others being called Mensheviks.¹ It was members of the latter party who in 1917, when actually holding a majority in the Petrograd Soviet, joined the Provisional Government.

The outbreak of the March Revolution found Lenin in Switzerland, where he remained while the Social Revolutionary, Kerensky, Minister for War in the Provisional Government, made frantic but fruitless efforts to keep Russia in the war. In April,

¹ The Russian word for majority is *Bolshestvo*, for minority *Menshestvo*.

however, the Germans, snatching the occasion to complete the Russian débâcle, gave Lenin a safe-conduct to Russia in a "sealed train," and thus ultimately sealed their own fate by helping, however unwittingly, to establish the very power which they later came to dread as the "Bolshevik menace." For it is difficult to believe that the Communist revolution in Russia would ever have been carried without the creative genius and authoritative leadership of Lenin. During the next four months Lenin's directive influence on the revolution, in both its agrarian and political aspects, rapidly increased. He soon realised the vital importance of gaining the support of the peasants, who were already, on their own initiative, taking possession of the land, and at length came to the decision that the Provisional Government and the *Duma* must be abolished in favour of the Bolsheviks and the soviets.

In thus determining on the establishment of the Communist State in Russia as it then was, Lenin would appear to have been flying in the face of the historical teaching of Marx, who was his prophet. For Marx had taught that there are several inescapable stages in economic and social growth, and that not until a certain phase of concentrated industrial development and capitalistic organisation had been reached would the proletariat, in its struggle with the *bourgeoisie*, be able to wrest power from it and establish its own dictatorship. Yet here was the greatest of his disciples proposing to jump these intermediate stages of growth and to initiate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one fell swoop. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the Mensheviks and even some members of his own party, who were all good Marxists, feared that nothing but disaster could come of this flouting of the master. The Industrial Revolution, which in the Marxian theory was a necessary prerequisite of the social revolution, had, as we have seen, been only partial in Russia, and consequently the industrial proletariat there was relatively small. By the same token, the capitalist *bourgeoisie* was small and weak. In point of fact, it was precisely the absence of a powerful middle class which at once caused the breakdown of the *Duma* experiment and opened the way to the social revolution. Moreover, by unequivocally championing the cause of the peasants and coming boldly out for the expropriation of the landlords, Lenin secured a bulwark for the revolution which he now proposed. And so the event justified Lenin, not in spite but because of the absence of a highly concentrated condition of capitalism.

Thus, while the war situation for Russia rapidly deteriorated, Lenin laid his plans for the forcible overthrow of the government. Gradually the Bolsheviks built up a majority in the Soviets at Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, and other important centres. The Petrograd Soviet, by this time presided over by Leon Trotsky, who had recently returned from America and joined the Bolsheviks, set up a Military Revolutionary Committee and began to recruit and drill a Red Army. On November 7, 1917, in the middle of the night, Red Guards occupied key-points in Petrograd and surrounded the Winter Palace. The Provisional Government yielded without a blow to this show of force, and its leaders fled. This left the way clear for Lenin, who thereupon set up a Soviet Government and proclaimed it the Government of all Russia. The soviets of other towns rapidly followed Petrograd's example, and Lenin was soon able to justify his claim that "Russia is a Republic of Soviets." In the rural areas the support of the peasants was secured by a government decree expropriating the land without compensation and arranging for local committees to be elected to distribute it among the peasants. This was followed by further decrees placing the control of the factories in the hands of elected committees of workpeople and nationalising the banks, the railways, and the larger industrial undertakings. Thus in the space of a few months there was an almost complete transition from a feudal to a socialist society.

Lenin's *coup d'état* of 1917 was practically bloodless, though it could hardly have been so if it had not had a mass revolution behind it. But this was by no means the end of the story. In November the Soviet Government issued an appeal to all nations at war to negotiate a "just and democratic peace" based on the principles of no annexations and no indemnities. This bringing no response, Lenin entered into peace negotiations with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, where in 1918 he had to bow to superior force and accept a peace which involved the surrender of Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and a large part of Russian Poland, all of which were soon to become independent states. So the Soviet Republic was out of the world war, but, having got rid of one armed incubus, it was soon burdened with another. For Russia now became a prey to civil war when the dispossessed classes, supported by the Western Powers, attempted to regain their lost status by force of arms.

For two years Russia was the cockpit of the opposing forces of

the Red Terror and the White Terror. But at length the counter-revolution failed before the revolutionary armies, rapidly improvised by the energy and fanaticism of Trotsky and the dogged brilliance of such a leader as Joseph Stalin, who became famous in the civil war for his defence of the town since renowned as the great industrial city of Stalingrad. By 1920 the Soviet power stood supreme, but the civil war had shattered the economic life of the country to such an extent that the struggle to rebuild it was to test to the utmost the organising ability of the new régime and to challenge the solidarity of the Communist Party.

"Socialism in One Country" : a Planned Economy

While Lenin lived he remained the unquestioned leader of the Revolution and the acknowledged head of the Communist Party. But on his death in 1924 there ensued a struggle for leadership which, while to some extent a matter of personal rivalries, was fundamentally a conflict of ideologies in both the international and economic spheres. The two chief protagonists were Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky. The two men were very different in background, training, and temperament. Stalin, the son of a peasant shoemaker, was born in Georgia. Originally destined for the Church, he had been educated at a theological college, but soon dropped this predilection in favour of revolutionary propaganda. Trotsky was the son of a Jewish chemist of Kherson, in the Southern Ukraine, who as early as the age of 22 had been exiled to Siberia for revolutionary activities. Both men appeared vigorously on the scene in the Revolution of 1917.

In the struggle for power which followed Lenin's death, Stalin led the majority and Trotsky the minority. In the early days of the Revolution Lenin, in common with the other Communist leaders, had assumed that there would be a Socialist revolution on the Russian model in every country in Europe, and to this end had always strongly supported the Comintern, or Communist International,¹ which had been founded in Moscow in 1919, as a "general staff of world revolution," with the object, according to its constitution, of "establishing the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the International Soviet Republic for the destruction of class society and the introduction of Socialism,

¹ Otherwise known as the Third International. The First International had been founded by Marx in 1864 and the Second International after his death in 1889. See earlier, pages 267-8.

the first stage of Communist society." But the peculiar conditions of Russia were not present in other states, and the official Socialist parties in other countries, far from joining the Comintern, repudiated it and all its works.

Despite the evident impotence of Soviet Russia at this time to do more than concentrate on her own economic problems and the manifest hostility of the rest of Europe to the idea of world revolution, Trotsky persisted in his advocacy of it. He believed that the Communist Revolution could not survive in a single state, especially in an industrially backward country like Russia, and that its only hope of success was for all countries to abolish capitalist control of the world's markets. He thus conceived of a series of Socialist uprisings spreading throughout the world. This idea of "permanent revolution" was opposed by Stalin, who was, before all things, then as he has since remained, to our great advantage in the present age, a realist. He knew that a world revolution was, at least at that time, a dream, but he knew also that Soviet Russia could not live except by industrial development, and that this required the machinery and technical aid which other countries alone could provide. To gain these advantages it was necessary to cultivate friendly relations with other states. He therefore proposed to demonstrate that "Socialism in one country" was practical politics, and proceeded with utter ruthlessness to remove Trotsky and his adherents, who held the opposite view. As Secretary of the Communist Party he controlled the party machine, and by using it uncompromisingly to purge the party of "malignants," he had managed in 1929 to drive Trotsky into exile and to "liquidate" all unrepentant Trotskyists. From that moment Trotskyism was publicly declared to be incompatible with Bolshevism.

During the Civil War in Russia the process of nationalisation had been tightened up, so that all industries were taken over by the state and private retail trade prohibited. At the same time, the things of everyday life were completely communalised. Thus there were no money wages, necessities being guaranteed by the use of commodity cards. Agriculture, it is true, was not included in this nationalising process, but the peasants were forced by compulsory requisitions to yield up whatever was needed in the way of foodstuffs by the armed forces and the towns. After the war Lenin realised that some relaxation of this complete Communism was necessary if the country was to recover. He, therefore, decided, as a temporary measure, to

put the machine of the national economy to a large extent in reverse by the adoption in 1921 of what was called the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.). Retail trade was again permitted and the peasants allowed once more to sell their produce in the open market, private enterprise in the smaller industries was revived, banking and credit were restored, and payment in wages replaced token payments. At the same time, however, the state retained ownership of the banks, mines, forests, railways, and heavy industry, while it continued to control absolutely all foreign trade.

Lenin was determined to develop a new industrial economy, and his fifteen-year scheme of electrification was the first of the great plans to this end. This plan was first mooted as early as 1920, and, though it was generally regarded at the time as far too grandiose and impractical, in fact the power-stations in being at the end of the period were producing more than twice as much power as the plan had foreshadowed. This scheme of electrification by utilising water-power, with its mighty dams on the Dnieper, the Volga, and other great rivers, was only a foretaste of what the Soviet Government was to do in the exploitation of the enormous resources of Russia. In 1928 Stalin launched the first Five Year Plan for the development of heavy industry, transport, and further electrification. New factories, railways, and roads were built, new mines opened, and new furnaces and engineering plants set up. On the success of the Plan all the national energies were concentrated, and life was lived with Spartan rigour on the barest necessities in order to free exports to pay for the necessary imports of vital machinery which Russia could not herself produce.

In 1932 the First Five Year Plan was followed by the Second. This Second Five Year Plan was proclaimed to be complete at the end of April 1937, nine months ahead of schedule. By these first two Five Year Plans the industrial life of Russia had been completely revolutionised. By 1937 the Russians were producing three or four times as much coal, iron, steel, cement, oil, and paper as they had produced in later Tsarist days. They had, moreover, created industries for the production of articles and goods unknown in Russia before, such as motor cars, tractors, aeroplanes, bicycles, and gramophones, not to mention copper, aluminium, and synthetic rubber. In fact, by then the U.S.S.R. was producing over 200,000 motor-cars annually and more tractors and locomotives than any other country in the world.

With this development went the growth of new towns which sprang up round the great centres of industry to accommodate the plant and house the industrial workers. In 1937 no fewer than twenty-five million people were engaged in industry where fifteen years before there had been only eight millions so employed. In fact, in 1937 over a third of the population were dependent on industry.

The details of the Third Five Year Plan, drafted by Molotov, were not announced until the opening of 1939. In the preamble to the Plan it was complained that the U.S.S.R. was still well behind many capitalist countries in the output of heavy industries and of most consumption goods. The new Plan, therefore, aimed at rectifying these shortcomings and was to concentrate first on the maximum output of the "means of production"—that is to say, machinery, metallurgy, electric power, and fuel—and, though a poor second, on consumers' goods. Its object, in fact, was stated to be nothing short of making the U.S.S.R. "independent economically and technically, and its defences invulnerable." The most interesting feature of the Plan was the shift of industrial development eastwards, to the region of the Volga and the Urals and even beyond to Siberia and the Far East. In the pursuit of this object it went so far as to prohibit new industrial plant in such centres of the west as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Kharkov. The Third Five Year Plan was, of course, not complete when the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, but was afterwards adapted, more intensively, to war purposes.

This planned industrialisation could not have been carried into effect without a corresponding development of agriculture. If Russian industry was backward before the Revolution, agriculture was even more so. Methods and implements were of the most primitive kind and quite unsuited to the needs of a vast population, more and more of whom were being rapidly drawn away into the growing industrial machine, quite apart from the fact that a surplus was urgently required for export in exchange for vital imports to help to carry through the industrial policy. Neither the original plan of expropriation of landed estates, combined with government requisitioning, nor the later freedom to peasant proprietors to sell in the open market could meet the requirements of the new situation. Moreover, the policy of expropriation and redistribution, left to itself, tended to create a number of wealthy peasant farmers, known as *Kulaks*,

who threatened to emerge as a new *bourgeoisie*. In short, Russia would become a truly Socialist State only when private ownership in land, as well as in the means of industrial production, distribution, and exchange, had been completely replaced by state ownership.

From both the economic and the social points of view, therefore, Stalin saw the necessity for vigorous action, and, having realised it, he carried out his plans with the same ruthless efficiency which he had displayed in his handling of the Trotskyite opposition and the industrial policy. Only the most drastic system of intensification of agricultural production would do, and this could not be achieved except by the entire abolition of the small-holding and the hand methods with wooden implements. In 1929, therefore, Stalin introduced the policy of Collectivisation, which meant combining peasant holdings into large farms under a system of collective ownership and production. Under this plan the collective farm had three objects: to feed all members of the collective group, to deliver up a quota of its produce to the government, and to produce a surplus which it might sell in the open market. This agrarian revolution was not easily carried, but the difficulties were determinedly overcome, and by the end of the Second Five Year Plan no fewer than 90 per cent. of the peasants were under the collective farming system. There are three types of collective farms. First there is an association of members for the communal production of grain. In this case the animals are individually owned. Secondly there is an association whose members communally own the animals and implements, as well as jointly cultivating the soil. This is the commonest type and is called the *artel*. Thirdly there is an extreme communistic form of collective farm in which everything, including houses, is communally owned.

Thus the industrial and agrarian revolutions were complementary. Agriculture was planned to intensify food production in order to meet the needs of the industrial population and to help to pay for certain industrial machinery which had to be imported. Industry, in its turn, produced the machinery to intensify agricultural production as it slowly improved under Collectivisation. By the end of the First Five Year Plan a sufficient number of tractors were in use to plough not less than one-third of the total arable area of the Soviet Union. At the end of the Third Five Year Plan there were nearly half a million tractors at work, and there remained only a negligible amount

of farmland not cultivated by mechanised methods. As to the benefits which these remarkable changes have bestowed upon Russia and the world, let the course and results of the Second World War testify.

The Political Organisation of Soviet Russia

Stalin did not confine his planning to the economic field, for in 1936 he produced a new blue print of political organisation generally known as the Stalin Constitution. The original Constitution of the Soviet Republic, promulgated in 1918, was prefaced by a "Declaration of the Rights of the Labouring and Exploited Peoples," drafted by Lenin himself. In this Declaration Russia was proclaimed to be "a republic of soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies." The soviet, according to this constitution, is "a council of delegates or deputies, chosen by the workers employed in the several factories and other establishments in an industrial city or district; or by the soldiers in the various units of an army; or by the peasants of a village or agricultural district or community; or by any combination of these constituent groups."¹ The soviet, as we have seen earlier, was a spontaneous growth, arising originally from the revolutionary ferment of 1905 to meet the need of the workers to get together to discuss plans. It emerged again, with the same urge but with fuller strength, in 1917. Lenin made this primary, and even primitive, assembly the basis of a new kind of pyramidal democracy. At the base of the pyramid were the local soviets of village or town, above them the higher soviet, elected by them, of the district, then the soviet of the region, and at the apex the highest body in the soviet hierarchy, known at first as the All-Union Congress of Soviets and now called the Supreme Soviet.

Such a political system differs from what we have described as Western constitutionalism in four principal ways. In the first place, it was an improvisation. There was no deliberation in a constituent assembly, no hammering out of ideas or fundamental principles, no guidance by jurists on the formulation of the constitution as a whole or the relationship of its parts: only the adoption and expansion on an empirical basis of conventions fortuitously emerging from a revolutionary situation. Secondly, one class alone, the workers, enjoyed the franchise. Starting

¹ See Sidney and Beatrice Webb: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* Vol. I, page 11.

from an arbitrary interpretation of the slogan, "He who does not work shall not eat," the first Soviet Constitution deliberately disfranchised all persons employing hired labour for profit or living on an income not derived from their own labour, as well as all those engaged in private business. In short, the only citizens were the proletarians. Thirdly, the election of members of the central legislature was indirect; that is to say, delegates to the next higher soviet were elected by the soviet immediately below, until the apex of the pyramid was reached. Fourthly, the basic constituency for the election of deputies was occupational or functional and not territorial.

Now, this elaboration of the original simplicity of the soviets could not save the community from the necessity to establish coercive organs of government. Russian society, however communistic its form and purpose, had to be politically organised. Indeed, Lenin himself asserted¹ that "what the revolution establishes is not socialism or democracy but a transitional state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which all the powers of the state are used to dispossess and hold down the old exploiting class. In it the party, the fully-conscious minority who are the natural leaders of the whole working class and the guides and teachers of all the exploited but non-proletarian classes, directs and organises the new social order. It is this dictatorship which is to wither away as the purposes of the revolution are gradually accomplished. Ultimately it is to end in a completely classless society, in which the absence of all exploitation and perfected education will have rendered any form of state unnecessary."² The dictatorship of the proletariat is, therefore, a state and its essence is force. Stalin elaborates this theme in his book *Leninism*, where he says that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is substantially the dictatorship of the Communist Party as the force which guides the proletariat" and adds that "no important political or organisational problem is ever decided by our soviets and other mass organisations without directives from the party."³

The central organs of government were thus from the first remote from the original soviet essence in the localities. In Lenin's time even the Central Soviet did not often meet in full session, and its functions were mostly discharged by a small

¹ In his pamphlet, *State and Revolution*.

² Quoted from G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, page 739.

³ Quoted in E. Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, page 372.

committee known as the Presidium, while the executive departments were in the hands of important members of the Communist Party called People's Commissars. The Constitution of 1918 originally applied to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), which covered most of Russia proper in Europe. In 1923 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) was established. The Union was created in the first place by the voluntary federation with the original Soviet State of three other republics, each of which had already constituted itself closely on the model of the R.S.F.S.R. The new union was a true federation with the powers divided very much as they are, for example, in the Constitution of the United States of America. The powers of the federal authority were specifically stated, and included, besides the inescapable functions of defence and diplomacy, such matters as rail and river transport, communications, and the control of the heavier industries. The residue of powers was left in the hands of the federating units. Such was the original Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which has since grown by the incorporation of further Soviet Republics until it now covers the whole of European and Asiatic Russia.

The Stalin Constitution of 1936,¹ while maintaining the fundamental nature of the Soviet State, as created and expanded under Lenin and further enlarged after his time, introduces some new features which would seem to be borrowed from Western models ; in fact, it appears to abandon the Dictatorship of the Proletariat for something which, on paper at least, looks in some respects very much like Western democracy.

Chapter I of the new Constitution concerns Social Organisation and states that the U.S.S.R. is a Socialist State of Workers and Peasants (Art. 1), that the Union's "political foundation is formed by the Soviets of Toilers' Deputies" (Art. 2), and that all power belongs to "the toilers of the town and village in the form of Soviets of Toilers' Deputies" (Art. 3).² Article 4 says that "the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R. consists of a socialist economic system and social ownership of the tools and means of production." Articles 9 and 10 state that, alongside the Socialist system of economy, "the law allows small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen, based on individual labour and excluding the exploitation of the labour of

¹ The text is given in full among the Public Documents included in *The Annual Register* for 1936.

² In a speech in December 1936, Stalin defined toilers as "workers, peasants, and intelligentsia."

others," and that "the personal ownership by citizens of their income from work and savings, home and auxiliary household economy, of objects of domestic and household economy, as well as objects of personal use and comfort, is protected by law." Article 12, after referring to the basic principle of Communism, states: "He who does not work shall not eat," and adds that the U.S.S.R. is realising the principle of Socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II of the Constitution covers the State Organisation, and on paper it bears an extraordinary resemblance to some other existing federal constitutions.¹ Article 13 states that the U.S.S.R. is a federal state formed on the basis of the voluntary association of eleven Soviet Socialist Republics,² some of which include, besides the main state, autonomous republics and autonomous provinces. The powers belonging to the Federal Authority are stated categorically in Article 14; Article 15 states that "outside of these limits each Union republic exercises independently its state power"; while further Articles state that "every Union republic has its own constitution" (Art. 16); "each Union retains its right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R." (Art. 17); and that "the territory of the Union republics may not be changed without their consent" (Art. 18).

Chapter III refers to the Supreme Organs of State Power in the Union. The supreme organ is the Supreme Council, which replaces the old Congress of Soviets of the Union. The Supreme Council (or Soviet) consists of two Chambers, namely, the Council (or Soviet) of the Union and the Council (or Soviet) of Nationalities, the first elected by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of one deputy for 300,000 of the population, and consisting of 569 members, the second consisting of deputies appointed by the Supreme Council of the Union on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union, eleven from each autonomous republic, and five from each autonomous territory, making a total of 574 members. Both Councils are elected for four years. They have equal legislative power and a simple majority in each is enough to give approval to a law. Sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Council normally twice a year, though extraordinary sessions may be called.

¹ See earlier, page 16, and later, pages 430-1.

² The eleven included, among the principal units, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia, Armenia. The number of federated Soviet Republics is now sixteen since the inclusion, in 1940, of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Besides these sixteen Union Republics, there are twenty-two autonomous Republics.

Article 47 establishes a supreme court, or conciliation commission, whose function is to try to settle any disagreement between the Chambers : if no agreement is reached by this court and there is still no agreement of the Chambers, then new elections are held. The Presidium, an executive committee of the Supreme Council, consists of a Chairman, four Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary, and thirty-one members elected by the Supreme Council at a joint session of both Chambers (Art. 48). The Presidium has wide powers, especially between sessions, including the power to declare war in the event of an armed attack.

Chapter V describes the organs of administration. Under this head the Constitution sets up what appears to be in effect a Cabinet system. The supreme executive and administrative organ is the Council of People's Commissars, responsible to the Supreme Council (Parliament) which creates it. But Commissars are made and unmade by the Presidium for later confirmation by the Supreme Council. Indeed, by Article 49 the ultimate executive authority is still vested in the Presidium, where, in practice, the continuing dictatorship of the Communist Party is thus secured.

The Electoral System is laid down in Chapter XI. Under it all citizens, men and women, of 18 and over, except those disqualified by the courts, have the right to vote, and accordingly a new electoral law, to give this clause statutory effect, was passed in July 1937. The later articles of the Constitution set out the "basic rights and duties of citizens." The rights include the right to education, work and leisure, to free medical service, to maintenance in sickness and incapacity, and to security in old age ; equal rights for all citizens irrespective of nationality or race ; freedom of conscience, religious worship, and anti-religious propaganda, of speech and of assembly ; while "the inviolability of the homes of citizens and secrecy of correspondence are protected by law." Of the duties of every citizen stated categorically in the Constitution these are the chief : to carry out the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, to safeguard and strengthen public property, and to undertake the defence of the Fatherland.

This Constitution is undoubtedly a great charter of a new political society. Unlike Lenin's original Constitution of 1918, it was not a mere improvisation, for it was painstakingly drafted by a special commission under the chairmanship of Stalin. No

sooner had the new Union Constitution been promulgated than each of the Union Republics adopted a new constitution following the same lines as that for the Union as a whole. The most significant thing about the Stalin Constitution is that it indicates a sense of stability and security on the part of the Soviet régime after nearly twenty years of existence, so that its leaders dare to think in terms of a relaxation of proletarian dictatorship. This is chiefly evident in the new electoral system which establishes "universal, equal, and direct suffrage" in place of election on a special class basis. The classes hitherto excluded from citizenship are no longer proscribed. In practice, voting is by a simple yes or no against the name of a candidate from an official list built up by special electoral commissions from names put forward by the people at election meetings held in the localities. The candidates are, of course, carefully pruned, but at the first general election under the new constitution for the Supreme Council, held in December 1937, they were by no means all members of the Communist Party. In fact, as a result of that election no less than a fifth of the membership of the Council of the Union and nearly a third of that of the Council of Nationalities were non-party. It is true, however, that almost all candidates, whatever their party, were, in general, supporters of Stalin and his policies. At the election, no fewer than 90,000,000 people out of a total register of 93,000,000 voted and of the votes cast about 98 per cent. were in favour of Stalin.

The Triumph of Soviet Russia under Stalin

There is no doubt that Russia has made remarkable strides under the leadership of Stalin. The boldness and sweep of his economic planning have been matched by the imaginativeness of his genius for political organisation. And to these achievements he added an infinite capacity for adapting his talents to the purposes of war. In consummating the Bolshevik revolution, he has indubitably succeeded triumphantly in his purpose of establishing "Socialism in one country." In completing his colossal task he has applied at least three lessons from the West. First, he has adapted to the special needs of Russia the technique of Western countries in carrying through the gigantic industrial revolution involved in the Five Year Plans, and so built up in the wake of the proletarian revolution the necessary industrial predominance in the national economy. Secondly, he has

abandoned the disruptive tendencies of the Comintern and concentrated on national organisation. And thirdly, he has promulgated a most liberal and democratic constitution, which, in establishing a *proletarian* rather than a *bourgeois* democracy, aims at securing "a constantly increasing participation of the masses in the government of the country."

It cannot be denied that the Soviet state has accomplished great things for Russia. It has abolished "exploiter and exploited," while maintaining an adequate recruitment of technical experts and skilled craftsmen. It has put an end to profit-making, without loss of output on the part of wage-earners. And it has granted to the Russian masses the civil liberties which they had never previously enjoyed, even if it is true that freedom of speech and press is not permitted to go so far as criticising the Communist régime. Merely to catalogue its achievements in the establishment of social services—education, cultural activities, amenities for leisure, social security, and so forth—is to leave one almost speechless with amazement that so much could have been done in raising the level of human existence and social life in so short a time and from such unpromising beginnings.

The Communist Party, which at a superficial glance seems so tyrannical and all-pervading, on a maturer view is seen to hold a place quite different from that held by what we know as a political party. Its function is to organise and lead opinion among a politically backward people and to encourage an active citizenship among those who have so recently been raised from a position of utter rightlessness. Certainly its leadership is composed of an *élite*, but it is one that is being constantly recruited from below, owing to its democratic structure through which the rank and file of the party elects the officials. This leadership undoubtedly justifies itself, for in Russia the democracy is much more alive than it is in most Western countries. Factory workers and peasants are encouraged to play an active part in social and political life, and the contemporary Russian scene seems to show that this object is largely achieved.

If any proof were required that the Revolution has wrought a fundamental change in the spirit of the Russian people, it is surely to be found in a comparison between the fortitude, endurance, and patriotism that they displayed in the Second World War and the indifference and defeatism which overwhelmed them in the First. Here the leadership of Stalin has surely been among the greatest triumphs of personality in the

history of the world. Up to the time when war was approaching he had been satisfied to remain in the unspectacular though highly influential position of Secretary of the Communist Party. With the coming of the war he assumed the office of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which has led to the current habit of referring to him as Premier Stalin, and after the German invasion he became Chairman of the State Defence Council, a sort of War Cabinet then specially set up. It was in this position that he was ultimately responsible for all matters affecting the conduct of the war. It was in the crisis caused by the unheralded and perfidious German assault on Russia that Stalin showed his highest powers, just as it was the industrialisation which he had carried out, and particularly the eastern development projected in the Third Five Year Plan, which made the heroic resistance of the Russians and their ultimate victory possible, though in the process the stoicism of the Russians in defence and the "frightfulness" of the Germans in retreat devastated most of the physical memorials of the Five Year Plans in the west of the country.

In view of the predominant place that Russia must take in the peace settlement and all that may come of it, it is vitally necessary that we should try to understand, without prejudice or shallow thinking, what she is and stands for. The Russians are very different from ourselves in their history, their temperament, and their attitude to world affairs. Their capacity for sacrifice and suffering is something which perhaps the Western mind cannot comprehend. Their economic resources, when fully developed, can make them almost entirely self-supporting, so that they can afford to take an independent view of the rest of the world such as is necessarily denied to us. But if anything is certain in this uncertain world, it is that, as the English-speaking peoples would, assuredly, not have won the war without their Russian allies, so only by the maintenance of that alliance in the years ahead can we hope to secure the peace.

CHAPTER XVIII

FASCIST OUTBREAK

DEMOCRACY AND THE CORPORATE STATE

Mussolini's Political Revolution

ITALIAN Fascism was the first manifestation of an authoritarian reaction against that democratic constitutionalism which, as we have seen,¹ reached its widest, if not its highest, stage of growth in the years immediately following the First World War. The reaction arose from a dissatisfaction with the working of the parliamentary system and was reinforced by a dread, real or affected, of the dissemination of Communism, which had carried the revolution in Russia. Playing on these popular anxieties, the leaders of the reaction succeeded in discrediting and scrapping the constitution and replacing it by a dictatorship. From Italy Fascism spread, in various guises, through the states of central, eastern, and southern Europe, in some of which national independence was a novel experience and in most of which democratic methods of government had barely had time to establish, much less justify, themselves. Italy's first and most apt pupil in the new school of violence was Germany, who, adapting Fascism to the creed of National Socialism, soon outstripped her teacher and carried the reaction to its most repulsive limits. Others followed the example of Italy and Germany, and before long a dictatorship, in one form or another, was established in the new Baltic States and in Poland, in all the Balkan countries, and in Spain and Portugal.

The Fascist outbreak in Italy was, in its origins, its philosophy, and its results, very different from the Communist Revolution in Russia. Lenin and the Bolsheviks completed the destruction of an absolute autocracy and erected on its ruins a new social and political order which enfranchised vast masses of the people formerly in a state of abject suppression; Mussolini and the Fascists made a gangster attack on an established parliamentary system and replaced it by a black tyranny which deprived millions of their fellow-countrymen of the rights they had previously enjoyed. The Communist revolution was founded on an econo-

¹ In Chapter XVI.

mic and social philosophy which, whatever else may be said of it, was at least a coherent body of doctrine, built up through more than half a century of creative study and critical scholarship ; the Fascist revolution was a purely empirical and opportunist operation which attempted to justify itself, after the event, by a verbose conglomeration of disjointed, and often self-contradictory, ideas drawn from various sources and masquerading as a considered theory of society and the state. Soviet Russia produced a new national spirit which magnificently stood the cruel test of Hitler's undeclared war that it had done nothing to precipitate : Fascist Italy devoted its main energies to arming a pirate ship which, having made a dastardly attack on France while she was falling before the German onslaught, failed to weather the storm into which it had deliberately sailed.

The condition of Italy immediately after the First World War was such that, failing the emergence of a statesman of the highest order to guide the nation through its difficulties, the road was open to a political adventurer. The peace treaties did not satisfy what the nation regarded as its just claims, and the prevailing mood of Italians was one of war-weariness and disillusion. They had, it was felt, worked so hard and gained so little. The war left behind large national problems, but the parliamentary leaders, instead of tackling them, spent their energies in attempting to create working coalitions out of the many political groups produced by the system of proportional representation under which they were elected. The Italian Socialist Party, which had grown up during a period of rapid industrialisation from about 1890, might have helped the nation to maintain its constitutional sanity, for they gained 156 seats in the general election of 1919 ; but their political strength, like that of other parties, was neutralised by the group system in Parliament, and they could not prevent the growth of a strong syndicalist movement in the industrial north, where the workers demanded control of the factories. In 1920, the Liberal Prime Minister, Giolitti, succumbed to this demand and granted a measure of factory control.

Now, it was the enfeeblement of Parliament and this partial triumph of syndicalism, necessarily an extra-constitutional movement, which Mussolini and the Fascists used as an argument for their own unconstitutional methods and gave colour to Mussolini's claim that Italy was in a state of anarchy, from which it could be rescued only by a movement which expressed the "desire for order and stability felt by all classes," and which

stood for "a spiritual revolt against old ideas which had corrupted the sacred principles of religion, of faith, of country." But to say, as Hitler did some years later, that Fascism had saved Italy from Bolshevism is hardly tenable in face of the fact that the Communists gained only 16 out of 535 seats in the general election of 1921.

Benito Mussolini, the founder of the Fascist Movement, was born in the Romagna in 1883, the son of a working man who was an ardent Socialist. Mussolini was proud, when he had reached a position immune from the necessity of earning a livelihood, to recall that in his younger days he had been everything by turns : teacher, mason, blacksmith, and peasant. He certainly worked hard to gain his education, and became a rabid Socialist and Syndicalist, editing a journal called *Avanti*. The outbreak of war in 1914, when Italy was neutral, caused a violent modification of his views, and he became a fiery advocate of Italy's intervention, pleading his cause in a new journal, which he founded, called *Popolo d'Italia*. But, though he thus abandoned his enthusiasm for syndicalism in favour of an ardent nationalism, he never wholly shed the effects of his youthful experiences in the politics of the Left, and this conflict of loyalties gives the key to his later advocacy of what he called National Syndicalism as the basis of the Corporate State. Italy entered the war in 1915 and Mussolini fought in it. He returned to his journalism, after being invalided out of the army, and watched with a growing disgust what he regarded as the betrayal of Italy's rights at the Peace Conference and the inability of the Government to cope with the post-war situation.

He determined on personal action, and in 1919 he founded what he called the Fascist fighting groups (*fasci di combattimento*). His adoption of the term *fasci* typified his grandiose purpose, which was to fire the national spirit with a sense of the imperial greatness of its Roman past, for the Latin word *fascies*, from which the Italian *fascio* is derived, signified the bundle of twigs fastened round an axe which the old Roman *lictors* carried when they accompanied the consuls, symbolising the right to inflict corporal and capital punishment. But whereas the Roman *fascies* were an emblem of constitutional law and order, the *fasci* formed an unofficial and illegal militia created for the set purpose of forcefully opposing the constituted government of the day and intimidating the conservative sluggards of the Right and the Communists, Bolsheviks, and Syndicalists (they were indifferently

dubbed all three) of the Left. The Fascist militia had its own uniform (blackshirts), was supplied with arms, and was commanded by its founder, who gave himself the military title of *Duce* (or leader, from the Latin *dux*). Its members were drawn from all sections of the community, but chiefly from ex-service men and students, and belonged to no party. It was the organising genius of Mussolini which turned this scattered body of local groups into a national party of action.

The movement spread rapidly through the towns and villages of Italy. At the first Fascist Congress in 1919 it counted twenty-two groups with a total membership of 22,000, but at the third Congress, in 1921, there were representatives of over 2,000 groups with a total membership approaching half a million. This rapid rise emboldened Mussolini to challenge the Government, and in October 1922 he mobilised the Fascist militia and ordered the famous March on Rome. Arrived at the gates of the city, Mussolini demanded control of the state. To avoid a civil war the King invited Mussolini to form a Cabinet, and to save itself from dissolution the Chamber of Deputies granted the Cabinet full powers. Mussolini, having thus momentarily cloaked the triumph of his gangster attack in a constitutional form, proceeded to use his new power to destroy the democratic constitutional state. The fifty-year-old system of responsible government in the Kingdom of Italy was replaced by government vested in the *Duce*, who was officially referred to as the "Head of the Government," and anyone who by word or deed disparaged him was liable to imprisonment. He was independent of any parliamentary vote of confidence or censure, and the Cabinet was responsible to him and not to Parliament.

All this was made possible by the Fascist militia, which remained the *Duce's* coercive instrument. The new régime, working through the Fascist Party, forced its attentions on every activity of the national life and ruthlessly destroyed every kind of civil and political liberty. Only those associations, whether social, political, or cultural, which subscribed to the theory and practice of Fascism were allowed to continue: the rest were abolished. The electoral law was modified in order artificially to produce a Fascist majority in Parliament; not that it mattered how the Chambers were constituted, since the real governing body was the Fascist Grand Council, through which the *Duce* always worked. By a law of 1926 it was definitely established as "the supreme organ co-ordinating all the activities of the régime

which arose out of the Revolution of 1922." The law stated, moreover, that the Council of Ministers (i.e. the Cabinet) were, *ex-officio*, members of the Grand Council, thus identifying the Executive with the Party. Meanwhile, local government was superseded by officials appointed by the central government, and the jury system was abolished. The system of public education was deprived of all freedom, and the new régime forced upon the schools the compulsory use of a textbook on the origin, aims, and institutions of Fascism.

Mussolini had thus achieved his first purpose, which was to gain control of the government and to destroy the political Liberalism on which Parliamentary democracy in Italy had been built up. In doing so he had pretended to respect the monarchy, though a law of 1925 said that the King must maintain him in power indefinitely. He had pretended also to respect Parliament to the extent of keeping it in being, though his irresponsible executive machinery and his electoral jugglery had reduced it to impotence. In all this he had openly declared himself to be opposed to the rights of man as expressed in a reasonable doctrine of individualism ; to political democracy as understood by those who believe in the limitation of rights and powers secured by constitutionalism ; to Socialism which he identified with Marxist Communism ; to freedom of contract in the economic sphere which for him meant nothing but *laissez-faire* economics, a creed in any case by then outmoded ; to pacifism which he deliberately pretended was the view of those who upheld the principles of collective security ; in short, a bundle of negatives. His one concern was to glorify the state : " Everything in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state," as he himself declared. This is what is meant by the Totalitarian State, which Mussolini himself defined as " the state which absorbs in itself, to transform and make them effective, all the energy, all the interests, and all the hopes of a people." The application of these ideas was soon seen in Mussolini's plan for his Corporate State.

The Economic Revolution and the Corporate State

In a speech in 1933 Mussolini declared that, as Fascism had already buried " political Liberalism," it was then about to bury " economic Liberalism " also. This indicates the nature of the second phase of the Fascist revolution : the building of a new

economic structure, based on National Syndicalism, with the object of creating what the *Duce* called the Corporate State. The basic ideas of this plan were by no means new, for the conception of self-government in industry by the collective control of workers, employers, and technical experts had long been ventilated by Syndicalists and Guild Socialists. And there is no doubt that Mussolini's earlier association with syndicalism—and, indeed, his later desire to cajole its adherents into supporting his plan—played a large part in his proposals, though Mussolini was too far gone with his second love, nationalism, for his first love, syndicalism, to have any chance of recapturing his heart. Indeed, what he was resolved to establish was national control of industry rather than self-government in industry. Syndicalists, not bemused by an electric personality or intimidated by a dictator's myrmidons, would no doubt call this combination a contradiction in terms, for under this plan the state, far from being abolished, was to remain supreme, and the new industrial organs were to be completely subordinated to it.

The practical origins of the scheme went back to 1924, when a special Commission was appointed to explore its possibilities. In its report the Commission reviewed the methods used in other states for dealing with the industrial problem: trade unionism in Britain, the trusts in the United States, the Marxist theory as applied in Russian Communism, the Economic Councils established in Germany under the constitution of the Weimar Republic,¹ and Liberal Democracy. The defect common to all of them, according to this report, was that they tended to weaken the supremacy of the state, a tendency which the new Corporate State must at all costs avoid. The old Italian Syndicalists, the argument ran, aimed exclusively at safeguarding and advancing the interests of the proletariat, while capital, manual labour, and intellectual labour had always regarded themselves as separate and mutually antagonistic entities, outside, if not indeed above, the state. National Fascist Syndicalism would end this opposition by subordinating all three sections equally to the national interest. But it was not pretended that the state was capable of taking over production. Capitalism and private initiative were to remain, as necessary to the economic progress of society, but its rights and liberties must be made consistent with the supremacy of the state.

¹ See next chapter, pages 342-3.

On the basis of the report a new Syndical or Trades Union Law was passed and came into force in April 1926. This was followed by a decree of July 1926, which filled in the details of the new Act. Finally, in April 1927, a Labour Charter was published. The law was divided into three parts. The first arranged for the constitution and control of syndicates or unions of three sorts: of the employers, of the manual workers, and of the intellectual workers. Six national confederations of employers, six of employees, and one of the professional classes were to be set up, each of the thirteen under a general council and all three collateral structures under the control of a new Ministry of Corporations. No citizen was forced to join a syndicate, but he had to pay the annual contribution—one day's pay—whether a member or not, and, as no worker would have any protection except through his appropriate official guild, it followed that all non-official unions would die of inanition. The second part of the Act established special courts, known as the Magistracy of Labour, to which recourse in the case of all disputes was obligatory. The third part of the Act prohibited all strikes and lock-outs, under pain of the most rigorous penalties for its breach.

The Decree of July 1926 stated that any person over the age of 18 might join a syndicate "if of good moral and political conduct": a plain indication of the intention of the authorities to secure that all young workers were good Fascists. On the day after the publication of the Decree the new Ministry of Corporations was set up. The Charter of Labour was published in April 1927,¹ and was to be the very bible of the Fascist Corporate State. The purpose of labour it said, "may be summed up as the well-being of the producers and the development of the national strength." "Professional or syndical organisation," it added, "is free, but the recognised syndicate alone, under the control of the state, has the right of legally representing the employers and employed, of stipulating for collective labour contracts for all belonging to its category, and of imposing contributions on them."

By 1927, then, the foundations of the new economic structure seemed well and truly laid. It remained to build the superstructure. For the moment the Chamber of Deputies was permitted to remain but in a yet more emasculated form than that to which it had already been reduced by the electoral law of

¹ The full text of the Charter is given in *The Annual Register* for 1927.

1924, which had made the whole country one vast constituency and had laid down that any party gaining a majority in the election, however small, should take two-thirds of the seats. By a new law of 1928, designed to bring the Chamber into line with the new economic set-up, deputies were to be drawn exclusively from the syndicates. Under the procedure laid down in this law the general councils of the thirteen National Syndicates met in Rome and nominated a list of 800, which was reduced to 400 by the Fascist Grand Council. Then the whole list of 400 was submitted to the country for a simple yes or no to the question on the ballot paper: "Do you approve the list of deputies designated by the National Grand Council of Fascism?" In view of the art and craft employed to secure it, one is not surprised that in the election of 1929 the official list received an overwhelming majority. But how truly Mussolini spoke when he said that Fascism had buried political Liberalism!

Things remained in this state for the next four years while the syndicates were being established and tried out. Then in 1933 Mussolini announced that, the syndical phase having been accomplished, the corporate phase might now be entered upon. This meant that the time had come for the establishment of the national connecting-links between the syndicates of employers and the syndicates of employees set up under the law of 1926. These were called Corporations, and were to be composed of an equal number of employers and employees in twenty-two nation-wide economic activities: eight for agriculture, eight for industry and commerce, and six for various services, such as transport, and the professions. The Corporation was to cover all concerned in the cycle of production in any given undertaking: employing and employed, producers of raw materials, masters and workers in the processing industries, traders in the finished product, and technical and scientific experts. The Councils of the twenty-two Corporations were solemnly installed by Mussolini in November 1934.

The final step in the process of creating the Corporate State was taken in 1939, when the Chamber of Deputies was abolished and replaced by the Chamber of Fascios and Corporations, which was opened by the King. It had 682 members, called National Counsellors. Rather more than two-thirds of the members were delegates of the Corporations, generally leading officials of the syndicates. The remainder were officials of the Fascist Party. There was no sort of election to the Chamber,

most of the members being there *ex-officio*, though they all had to be approved by the *Duce*. The Chamber of Fascios and Corporations bore the same relation to the Senate as the former Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was still, as under the original constitution, made up of nominees of the Crown, but the King had "obligingly swamped it with Fascists." There was no longer any pretence of legislative power left to the Chambers. The function of the new Chamber was purely advisory, and whether any measure to which it gave consideration should go to the King for signature was a matter entirely for the decision of the *Duce*, whose powers were not in the least diminished, for he was in no way responsible to the new Chamber.¹ So the dictatorship went on unabated.

There was little chance to judge of the success or failure of Mussolini's Corporate State, for in the very year which saw its final establishment Europe was caught in the toils of Hitler's war, and Mussolini prepared and waited for his friend's nod, on the understanding that it would not come until victory for the Axis seemed certain. But at least it can be said with certainty that the new plan did nothing to save Italy from a complete débâcle as soon as the United Nations had had time to build up their strength to resist this cowardly attack and overwhelm its perpetrator. The war, which Mussolini imagined would set the seal on his greatness, brought out the very worst in him, and even in the moment of national disgrace and disaster he was incapable of either an honourable surrender or a graceful disappearance, but must needs, after his fall in 1943, turn the knife in his country's wounds, by accepting and assisting the hand of his confederate in Italy's assassination. But his prestige had gone beyond recovery, and the pretensions of both Dictators were finally engulfed in the triumph of the forces of the United Nations which their overweening ambition had brought into the field against them.

The Lesson of Italian Fascism

There was a certain slick efficiency about Fascist methods, under the inspiration of the *Duce's* ceaseless energy, which was in such strong contrast to the easy-going administration it ousted that its many admirers failed to appreciate that Mussolini's

¹ For a more detailed treatment of the Corporate State, see the author's *Modern Political Constitutions*, Chapter XV and the Introduction to the new and revised edition (1939).

architectural genius was limited to an ability to build façades. The benefits which the Fascist régime bestowed on Italy were almost exclusively functional and material: stringing up the civil service and making trains, at least on the main lines, run to time, building roads and bridges, reclaiming hitherto unproductive land, and arming the nation for imperialist ventures which it was not strong or wealthy enough to support. Advantageous though some of these improvements undoubtedly were, the price paid for them by the Italians in terms of human values was, in the most literal sense of the word, extortionate. The ease with which the Italians seemed to reject the Fascist virus, as soon as it showed itself incapable of resisting the anti-toxin of first-class democratic Powers like Britain and America, suggests that it was utterly foreign to the Italian body politic and had not radically affected the national blood-stream. Yet, superficial though Fascism was and ephemeral though its régime proved to be, the fact remains that Mussolini was undisputed Dictator of Italy for more than twenty years, and it would be idle to pretend that the Italian people do not share the responsibility for the incalculable harm it did to themselves and to the cause of good neighbourliness in Europe.

Fascism is the grossest of modern ideologies, yet it lured a great nation into abandoning its finest traditions and betraying its highest ideals. Here was a people whose history for the previous century had been an almost unbroken chronicle of conscious striving after independence and liberty, and whose democratic constitution, in its making and its practice, was an example of free institutions to all the world. And yet it allowed itself to be first bemused and then enslaved by a demagogue whose one ambition was personal power. Seduced by catchwords and an all-pervading propaganda, and intimidated by the perpetual surveillance of a political police, the nation sacrificed its liberties one by one, until no citizen dared to speak on any public issue, even to his friends, except in fawning adulation of the régime. And in return for the sacrifice of these precious, hard-earned social and political rights the people gained certain dubious and intangible blessings, vaguely called "Living dangerously," "The will to power," "The organic totality of nation and state," and "The fusion of all classes in a single ethical and economic reality."

"We are solvers of problems," said Mussolini on one occasion, but mostly his solutions did not get far beyond wordy

denigrations of democracy. "Fascism denies," he wrote,¹ "that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of periodical consultation; and it affirms the immutable, beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently levelled through the mere operation of a mechanical process, such as universal suffrage." Now, it must be admitted that there is a good deal of truth in this statement. Mussolini's solution, however, was not a better educated democracy but its complete strangulation by a dark and deadly tyranny. And he justified this by a claim that "never before have the nations thirsted for authority, direction, order, as they do now." The outrageous egotism of this lordly assertion was matched by his self-assurance in prophesying that "Fascism is bound to become the standard type of civilisation of our century for Europe, the forerunner of a European renaissance." Nothing about Fascism could justify its elevation to the status of a "civilisation"; nor was it capable of heralding a renaissance of anything but what was most disreputable in Europe's past. But it might well have become the standard type of tyrannical régime if every democratic nation in Europe had been as indifferent to the preservation of its inheritance as the Italians showed themselves to be.

National Syndicalism was the one Fascist experiment which is worthy of close study. The Corporate State was hailed as an original panacea for correcting the disorders of an effete democracy and vaunted as an inspiration to the democratic states of the world for the remodelling of their institutions. These trumpetings were far from justified, for as a nostrum it had too much of quackery about it to be a true remedy for the maladies of democracy, and, in any case, it left the Dictatorship intact. Still, the plan had some constructive features, from which, conceivably, parliamentary democracy, in adapting itself to a changing world, has something to learn. The weakness of political democracy, as we have known it, is that it leaves the economic structure of society very largely to its own devices. Mussolini's scheme did at least bring the representation of economic interests into the national assembly. It is true that the Chamber of Fascios and Corporations was denied any real legislative power. But such a denial of authority to a Chamber elected on the basis of vocational or occupational interests rather

¹ In his essay in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, published in 1932.

than in territorial constituencies is not essential to it. In fact, there seems to be the possibility here of some sort of compromise for Western Democracy between the Russian Soviet Constitution, with its almost purely economic emphasis, and the Fascist Corporate State which brought a new type of legislature into being only to turn it into a debating society.

Mussolini was certainly a dynamic personality, and the ferment which he caused indubitably marks an epoch in the more recent story of Dynamic Europe. But surely the final lesson which emerges from the twenty-one years of his dictatorship is a reinforcement of the old truth that "the price of liberty is an eternal vigilance"! The victorious arms of the United Nations offer to the Italian people the unusual gift of a second chance. If they would turn this piece of good fortune to their advantage, let them look back upon their immediate past and then yet farther back to the time when their forefathers struggled heroically for freedom, and let them appraise each of these contributions to their progress at its true value! The mere restoration of the pre-Fascist constitution will not, of course, be enough. Italian democracy, if it is to come alive again, will require constructive statesmanship of the first order from its new leaders and an active citizenship on the part of all adult members of the community. Conditions similar to those in which the Italians betrayed their great past may well recur in Italy, as indeed they may in other countries, but only by revitalising their democratic institutions and making them work for the benefit of the whole community will the Italians, or any other nation, assist in the realisation of the Good Society and preserve themselves from tyranny.

CHAPTER XIX

NAZI UPHEAVAL

HITLER'S "REVOLUTION OF DESTRUCTION"

The Weimar Republic

THE authoritarian reaction in Germany, which matured about a decade later than that in Italy, bore many likenesses to it and in some respects consciously imitated it. There was, for example, the same intolerance of any but a single party, with its uniformed militia, its flamboyant banners, its aggressive salute, and its unquestioning devotion to the Leader. There was the same, and indeed even more, uncompromising disrespect for traditions, rights, and institutions; the same ruthless drive and the same terrorisation of all opponents. Yet there were also many vital differences in the background and growth of the two movements. Though the National Socialist Party was the German counterpart of the Italian Fascist Party, and though its organisation and methods of propaganda were largely based on the Italian model, what might be called its philosophical antecedents in the national outlook were not at all the same. For, while the modern history of Italy, up to the time of the Fascist revolution, had been a record of a successful struggle for liberty and individual rights, that of Germany over the same period had been filled with a theoretical and practical advocacy of the all-powerful state as the sole object of social and political organisation, with the result that those who had tried to maintain a tradition of Liberalism were overawed by the champions of autocracy. This fact gave the Nazis a rich and well-prepared soil in which to sow their neo-absolutist seed, and secured for their propaganda a much deeper hold on the minds and hearts of the German people than the Fascists ever gained over those of the Italians.

In both countries the reaction arose from the failure of the parliamentary system to cope with a highly abnormal situation, but, whereas in Italy the revolt was against a national democratic constitution which had been in force for half a century and under which the nation had come through on the victorious side in the First World War, in Germany it was against a new con-

stitution which had been promulgated in the revolutionary conditions created by defeat and national frustration. The Italians, therefore, had had long practice in the working of liberal institutions : the Germans, despite the wide franchise on which the Lower House (*Reichstag*) of their national parliament under the Empire had been elected,¹ had had very little such experience. In Italy there was a constitutional monarchy which, tied though it was to the chariot wheels of the triumphant Fascists, was at least retained under the new régime, and the danger of outraging the traditional popular respect for the throne was thus avoided : in Germany no such scruples had to be observed, since the monarchy had already been destroyed in the revolution of 1918, and the republic, set up in its place, had done little or nothing to gain or retain popular esteem.

In order to understand how National Socialism emerged and grew in Germany, it is necessary first, therefore, to grasp the significance of the revolution of 1918 and the circumstances in which the republic was established in 1919. When, in November 1918, the Germans were forced to ask for an armistice, the whole edifice of Bismarck's *Reich* appeared to collapse. The Kaiser abdicated, the Imperial Chancellor and his Ministry resigned, and a republic was proclaimed. A stop-gap government, formed to see the Armistice through, found itself faced with a revolutionary outbreak of considerable violence. This was engineered by extremists of the Left, such as Kautsky and Bernstein, and the so-called *Spartacus* group, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, which had affiliations with the Bolsheviks in Russia, and was, like them, preparing for the world revolution. Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors sprang up all over the country, and the workers were supplied with arms and drilled as shock troops. These doings were strangely reminiscent of what had happened in Russia in the previous year, and for a time it looked as though Germany would be overwhelmed by a similar Red revolution.

But, as it turned out, this Communist outbreak, for reasons which are not far to seek, proved but an interlude. The movement had no leaders of the calibre of Lenin, or even of Trotsky, and, though there was undoubtedly a considerable body of Left Wing opinion ready to uphold the Socialist Revolution, it failed to attract the mass of Majority Socialists, who feared that such an upheaval would be disastrous for a country so industrially

¹ See earlier, page 291.

advanced as Germany, while the extremists merely alienated the general public by their excesses. In these circumstances the revolution was crushed, and in January 1919 an election took place for a Constituent Assembly, which, in order to avoid clashes in the capital, met at Weimar, the capital city of Thuringia. The republic founded as a result of the constitution which this assembly formulated and which came into force in August 1919 was, therefore, known as the Weimar Republic. Thus, though the establishment of the Weimar Republic marked a profound revolution in German political life, the promulgation of the new constitution was, from the point of view of the revolutionary outbreak of November 1918-January 1919, in the nature of a counter-revolution. Nevertheless, it produced two radical results. First, by constitutionally establishing a republic it gave legal force to the abolition of the monarchy. Secondly, in order to appease the extremists and weaken their appeal, it introduced some very advanced democratic devices, so that the German people under it enjoyed many social and political privileges which were even in advance of some of the most democratic states in the world and of which, therefore, the Germans could scarcely have dreamed. These two facts played a large part in creating the conditions in which the later violent changes were carried out.

The Weimar Constitution replaced the hereditary Kaiser by a President elected for seven years through direct universal adult suffrage, every man and woman of twenty years or more being given the vote. The same franchise was exercised for *Reichstag* elections, and both elections were carried out under a system of proportional representation. But it made an even more radical change by laying down that the executive power was to be exercised by a Prime Minister (Federal Chancellor) and Cabinet responsible to the *Reichstag*, whereas under the Empire the Imperial Chancellor had been responsible to the Emperor. So the Weimar Constitution established in Germany a Cabinet and Parliamentary system broadly on the British and French models. Moreover, the new Constitution, by following this Western pattern, obscured the identity of Prussia with the executive, since, as was explained earlier,¹ the Kaiser had been also King of Prussia and the Imperial Chancellor also Prussian Prime Minister. Furthermore, the *Reichstag* now had powers which it had never before possessed, for now the Ministry depended on it for its existence.

¹ See pages 291-2.

The new constitution retained the federal character of the German state; that is to say, the states which had formed the Empire remained, though by then all the royalties had disappeared and these new republican units, or lands (*Länder*), as the Constitution called them, bore little resemblance to the historic states which had for so long held the allegiance of the average German. The constitution enumerated the powers belonging to the Federal Authority, and certain others shared by it and the states; the remaining powers were left to the states. The upper house (*Reichsrat*) under the new constitution was still representative of the states, but it lost its former dominance, partly as a result of the new powers of the *Reichstag* and partly through the establishment of a new Supreme Court which was to settle questions in dispute between the federal authority and the states, a function formerly discharged by the upper house sitting specially as a court.

One of the most interesting features of the Weimar Constitution was the plan for the establishment of economic councils. Article 165 of the Constitution laid down that there should be formed, for the protection of social and economic interests, District Workers' Councils and a Workers' Council of the Reich. These were to combine with representatives of the employers and other classes of the population, both locally and nationally, "for the discharge of their joint economic functions and for co-operation in the carrying-out of laws relating to socialisation." It was also laid down that any bills concerned with social and economic legislation must be submitted to the Economic Council of the Reich for its opinion before being introduced in the *Reichstag*, and that the Economic Council might itself propose such legislation.¹ The Economic Council of the Reich was described by some observers as a "Parliament of Industry," and, though it clearly could not exercise the sovereign powers of the political Parliament, there is no doubt that it foreshadowed a democratic experiment of the greatest interest. But, like the rest of the Weimar Constitution, before it had time to be seriously tried in practice, it was destroyed in the Nazi holocaust which consumed every vestige of German democracy.

From the beginning the Weimar Republic battled against tremendous odds. It had to set an entirely new régime on its feet at

¹ For the full text of this interesting Article, see the author's *Modern Political Constitutions*, pages 312-313.

a time when the burdens imposed on the nation by the social and economic consequences of the war and of the peace were almost unbearable, and it failed to produce men and parties capable of controlling the situation. The Social Democrats, to whom the first President, Friedrich Ebert, a saddler by trade, belonged, and who formed the largest single party in the *Reichstag*, failed to rise to the full responsibilities of government. Nor were the other political groups more successful; they coalesced only to fall apart again as soon as their solidarity was seriously tested. On Ebert's death in 1925, a more colourful choice was made in Marshal Hindenburg, some of whose war glamour still hung about him. But he was already 78 and quite incapable of constructive statesmanship, though he was to live to take a hand in digging the grave of the Republic eight years later. But, indeed, it made little difference to the political vitality of the Republic whether the President was an erstwhile saddler or a former war-lord.

Whoever attempted to govern Germany according to the principles of the Weimar Constitution, in those difficult post-war years, had to face the bitter antagonism of those political groups, compendiously called Nationalists, who never wearied of reproaching the Republican régime for its passivity and colourlessness. They developed an aching nostalgia for the glorious Imperial past of Germany which, in their view, the makers and upholders of the Republic had betrayed, and condemned all those who stood for the honourable fulfilment of Germany's obligations under the Peace Treaty. This attitude of the Nationalists was a double trial for the Government, because not only did it cause dissension at home but it bred mistrust in the minds of the victorious Allies, and especially of the French, who questioned whether there had been any real change of heart in the Germans. In fact, they began to see the democratic revolution as a mere pretence and the Weimar Republic as nothing but a screen behind which the Nationalists' forces were preparing to recover Germany's lost prestige. It is not surprising, therefore, that a kind of paralysis gripped all those who set out to pilot the German ship of state between the Scylla of internal discord and the Charybdis of external suspicion.

The lack of confidence on the part of the Allies in Germany's sincerity was reinforced by her equivocal conduct over the payment of Reparations under the Peace Treaty, which led in 1923

to the occupation of the Ruhr by the French and Belgians, who thereby intended to take by force what Germany would not voluntarily disgorge. To counter this violent movement the Germans of the Ruhr, with the connivance of the Government, adopted a policy of passive resistance, which, in fact, led the French to abandon the occupation before the end of the year. A new Government in France, with Aristide Briand at the Foreign Office, and a new Cabinet in Germany with Gustav Stresemann as Chancellor and Foreign Minister, seemed to promise the dawn of a new period of conciliation and *rapprochement*, for it led in 1924 to a revision of the Reparations clauses of the Treaty, in 1925 to the tripartite agreement between France, Britain, and Germany known as the Locarno Pact, and in 1926 to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, on whose Council she was found a seat.

Stresemann was in politics a National Liberal and at heart an Imperialist, who was yet prepared to lay aside his own convictions in order to gain a period of calm in which the national fortunes might have some chance of recovery. But his policy of appeasement was very far from bringing Germany the advantages for which he had hoped, and the ambiguity of his position brought down on him at the same time the anathemas of the Nationalists at home and the suspicions of the Allies abroad. Nevertheless, he was the only statesman of any stature that those years in Germany produced, and when, frustrated and broken, he died in 1929, there was no man of sufficient substance to bar the way to the triumph of Hitler.

The Rise of National Socialism

In the whole changing scene of Dynamic Europe there is no stranger spectacle than the rise to supreme power of Adolf Hitler. No national leader ever had origins more obscure or a childhood and youth less calculated to assist in shaping the proportions of a popular hero. He did not even belong to the nation he afterwards captivated or to the state he later overawed, for he was originally a citizen not of Germany but of Austria. Nor, by 1918 at the age of 29, had he done more in the First World War, which might reasonably have been expected to bring out any potentialities for leadership which he possessed, than reach the somewhat unimpressive rank of lance-corporal. Yet within a few short years of the Armistice, which found him

wounded in hospital, and after a rising in 1923 so abortive as to cause his new movement to be proscribed and himself to be imprisoned in a Bavarian fortress, he had created a political party of such strength and dimensions as to crush all others out of existence, had become undisputed Dictator of a nation of sixty-six million souls, had unopposedly repudiated every condition of the Treaty accepted by that same nation in its utter defeat and humiliation, and had dared to force upon the world a second war much more universal and devastating than the first. Decidedly Hitler was what the psychologists would call a "late developer," but that did not make the movement he inspired and led any the less what one of his own renegade followers¹ described as a "revolution of destruction." And certainly it does not make it less incumbent on all good Europeans to try to understand the nature of that canker in the body politic of Europe miscalled National Socialism, and to weigh the means by which it may be permanently eradicated.

Adolf Hitler was born in the little Austro-German frontier town of Braunau-on-the-Inn, the son of a petty Austrian government official, who had formerly been a peasant cobbler, by his third wife, a maid-servant. When Hitler was thirteen his father died, and for the rest of his youth he was strongly under the influence of his mother, a neurotic woman, who transferred to her son a good many of her own repressions and induced in him a general attitude of resentment towards society. Hitler thus grew up an egoistic malcontent, and the poverty and hardship of his life, after he came to Vienna on the death of his father, did nothing to make him less so. His experiences as an artisan and his contact with working men only inflamed his egoism and drove him to a profound contempt for trade unionism and socialism, as trade unionists understood it. His observations of political life in the Austrian capital, moreover, merely confirmed his scepticism of the efficacy equally of parliamentary government and the rule of a dynastic autocratic monarch. His constant encounters with Jews in the streets of Vienna maddened him and engendered in his warped soul a bitter hatred of the Jewish race. Meanwhile, a superficial acquaintance with Marxism caused him to attribute to that cult all the evils by which society and government were beset and to see in its disruptive teaching a complete justification alike for his anti-democracy,

¹ Hermann Rauschning. See the terrible indictment of Nazism as a "doctrineless nihilism" in his remarkable book: *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*.

his anti-socialism, and his anti-Semitism. And so there was conceived in his mind the germ of the idea that only through a leader, whom the people would choose and, having chosen, to whom they would surrender all their rights and powers, could Germany hope to move to that future for which her greatness fitted her.

In 1912, at the age of 23, Hitler left Vienna to settle in Munich, the capital of Bavaria. In the atmosphere of this purely German town he became convinced that the German people should be politically one and that sooner or later Austria must be reincorporated in a larger Germany. He thus shed his Austrian nationality, and when the war broke out in 1914 he joined not the Austrian but the German army. He saw the war as a cleansing fire through which the greater Germany should arise, and he was correspondingly dejected at Germany's defeat. As he lay, nearly blinded, in a Pomeranian hospital the news of the Armistice came through. "The more I tried to glean some definite information of the terrible events that had happened," he wrote, "the more my head became afire with rage and shame." Through the highly coloured and biased version of the events leading up to the Armistice which he worked out in his fevered brain, Hitler convinced himself that the German army (*Wehrmacht*) not only had not been beaten but was invincible, so that he easily fathered the myth, already current in Right circles in Germany, that it was only the home front which had given way, while the fighting front had been the victim of a "stab in the back."

With this conviction Hitler left hospital, determined, as he said, "to take up political work." Wandering about the streets of Munich, where he was employed for a pittance as a spy in the service of the army, and living aimlessly, Hitler made contact with an insignificant group of agitators who seemed to share some of his views and who called themselves the German Workers' Party (*Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*). This group Hitler undertook to organise, and within a few months he had considerably increased its membership and provided himself with the four essentials on which his ultimate success was to be based: a party programme, the beginnings of a private army, a party newspaper, and a high-sounding party name. In February 1920, the Party hired a beer cellar (*Hofbrauhaus*) in Munich and at an enthusiastic gathering Hitler submitted the Party's Twenty-five Point Programme, which was carried with acclamation. The meeting then agreed to the

organisation of a uniformed body, called the Black Guards (S.S.),¹ whose original function was to keep order at public meetings and to act as "throwers-out" of opponents, but which later became a formidable and fully equipped force of party fanatics pledged to secure the home front for the Leader and the Party against the possibility of another "stab in the back," and even, if necessary, to save the Party from being overwhelmed by the Army.

Later in the year 1920 the Party gave itself the fuller title of National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, popularly shortened to *Nazi*). Before the end of the year 1920 the Nazis bought a paper called the *Völkischer Beobachter* (the People's Observer, or Guardian), which was to remain the organ of the Party for the rest of its days and to become infamous as a vehicle of Goebbels' propaganda. Meanwhile, Hitler had presented the Party with its famous emblem, the *Swastika*. By the beginning of 1921 the Party boasted a membership of 3,000, with an office, a secretariat, and a paper of its own, and even one or two branches outside Munich.

During the next two years the membership increased rapidly and the Nazi armed bands grew larger and more daring. When the French occupied the Ruhr in 1923 the Nazis made contact with other disaffected groups in South Germany, and together they organised a grand attack on the Government, which had allowed this national outrage to occur and which, when it happened, did nothing more than connive at a mere passive resistance movement. The plan was first to surprise and overthrow the Bavarian Government and then to attack the centre of the national government at Berlin. Hitler and the Nazis, who were now joined by Ludendorff, the supreme German Commander in the second half of the First World War, were, with certain Bavarian leaders, to overawe Munich. In November all was ready, but at the last moment the Bavarian leaders recoiled, and Hitler and his men, left alone to carry the *coup d'état*, were

¹ The initials S.S. are contained in the word *Schutzstaffel*, which means defence formations. The other uniformed body of Nazis were the Brownshirts, otherwise known as the S.A. (*Sturmabteilung*), or Storm Troopers. The original purpose of the S.A. was street fighting, and they played a vital part in establishing the Dictatorship by forcibly suppressing the armed bands of all opposition parties. But later on, as Hitler's position became more secure, the Brownshirts as a civil fighting force became less and less necessary to him, and, while the S.S. grew in strength and prestige, especially under Himmler, the S.A. gradually lost caste and at length sank to little more than a sort of Old Comrades' Association living on its memories of bloody encounters in the early days of the Nazi movement. All such Nazi organisations were, of course, suppressed by the occupying forces after the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945.

mown down in the streets by the state forces. Sixteen Nazis were killed ¹ and most of the rest, including Hitler himself, were imprisoned. Such was the famous *Putsch* of 1923. Its failure was so absolute that it seemed to betoken the utter collapse of the Nazi movement. The Party was dissolved and the movement prohibited; its members were killed or imprisoned or otherwise scattered; and its leader was incarcerated in the fortress of Landsberg on the Lech, cut off from contact with his fellows. How, then, could it ever rise again? We shall see.

Hitler now had plenty of leisure to consider his position, and he came to the conclusion that he had been guilty of a mistake in tactics in attempting to achieve power by means of a *coup d'état*. Henceforth, he decided, he would proceed by strictly constitutional means, concealing his ultimate purpose by a veil of legality and secretly building up his armed reserves. While he was in prison he wrote the first part of *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle),² surely one of the strangest autobiographies ever written. It was composed under the stress of deep emotion engendered by the combined effect of the French occupation of the Ruhr and the failure of his first bid for power. It was doubtless the work of a man of neurotic temperament and even of an unbalanced mind, and that description of it may be correct which calls it "a romanticised autobiography created to meet the political needs of the Nazi movement." But if it showed its author to have been a visionary and a romantic who tended to reach his conclusions by intuition rather than by logic, it also revealed a man who knew what he wanted and how he intended to get it. It, in fact, contained a remarkably clear, if biased, retrospect of the origin and growth of the Nazi movement up to that time, given by the man best qualified to give it, and an equally firm outline of a programme for the future. In short, if *Mein Kampf* was bad, because partial, history, it was uncommonly good prophecy, for, as things turned out, there were few points in the programme there sketched which Hitler did not later carry into effect, as an indiscriminating Fate bestowed upon him an increasingly bountiful share of opportunity and good fortune.

Although he received a five-year sentence, Hitler was, in fact, released at the end of 1924, and immediately took up the task of reviving and reconstituting the Nazi Party and working

¹ *Mein Kampf* is dedicated to these Nazi heroes, whose names appear in a black frame at the beginning of the book.

² It was not completed until 1926.

towards the constitutional victory which, he had decided, was the necessary prelude to the establishment of his dictatorship. His platform was based on certain half-baked ideas which he had picked up through his personal contacts and in his desultory reading. Most of them appear in embryo in the Twenty-five Point Programme of 1923, and they are to be found scattered through the pages of *Mein Kampf*. These ideas were essentially nothing more than material for propaganda, but after Hitler had achieved political supremacy an attempt was made to formulate them, as a retrospective justification of Nazism, into that sort of system or organic unity which the German philosophers call *Weltanschauung*, a word meaning "outlook on the world," or world philosophy. Such a world philosophy, according to Hitler and the Nazi propagandists, was National Socialism, and it was so officially sponsored by Hitler at the Party Congress of 1935. The three main postulates of this pseudo-philosophy may be stated as follows: that race or blood (*Blut*) is the sole criterion of membership of political society; that the whole people or folk (*Volk*), without distinction of class, is the basis of the state; and that the principle of leadership (*Führerprinzip*) is the only true means of national cohesion.

Most of these ideas lay deep in the German tradition. The theory of a superior Teutonic race had been adumbrated by several earlier writers, and especially by an Englishman who became a naturalised German, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in a book called *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, published in 1899. The argument ran that the Aryan race had been responsible for all Europe's great achievements and that it had the special duty of preserving the world from the subverting and disruptive tendencies of non-Aryan races, and particularly the Jews. As it was clearly impossible to talk of the Aryan race except in terms of the vast majority of European peoples,¹ the upholders of the race theory conveniently identified the Aryans with the Teutons, who were supposed to be the purest Aryan type, having, according to these protagonists, been least defiled by admixture. In short, the Germans were a race apart, a people of lords and masters (*Herrenvolk*). This race theory was, of course, sheer myth, but it exactly suited Hitler's programme, for had he not written in the Epilogue to *Mein Kampf*: "A state which in an epoch of racial adulteration devotes itself to the duty of preserving the best elements of its racial stock must one

¹ See earlier, page 10.

day become ruler of the earth" ? The theory thus gave a kind of sanctity to his anti-Semitism. It strengthened his case for unifying the German people in one folk-state, free from the limitations of traditional political machinery. It fortified his argument for reaching what he called the "frontiers of eternal justice," which meant the extension of the German *Reich* beyond the boundaries of political Germany, in order that the German people might acquire additional "living space" at the expense of their neighbours.

Moreover, the reverence of the state as power was to be found in the practice and theory of the most honoured figures in the political and cultural history of Germany, or at least of Prussia : in the work of a great king like Frederick the Great and of a great statesman like Bismarck ; and in the writings of men like the philosophers Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831), and the historian Treitschke (1834-1896). And, above all, there was the philosophy of Nietzsche (1844-1900), which belauded strength as the only virtue, foresaw vast European cataclysms, in which devastating war would be followed by violent social upheavals, and contended that society would alone be saved by the emergence and triumph of the superman. How pertinently this background—the traditional autocracy, the anti-democratic theory, the all-powerful state, the racial myth, and the philosophy of ruthlessness and nihilism—marched with Hitler's purposes ! How helpfully it could all be modified and adapted to Nazi propaganda by the pseudo-philosophisings of Alfred Rosenberg, the mendacious publicism of Josef Goebbels, the mock-genial armament-mongering of Hermann Göring, and the coldly cruel efficiency of Heinrich Himmler ! And how readily it explains the surrender of the Germans to Hitler's demagogic blandishments, of which this background was the ill-fabricated stuff, and to his pitiless arrogance, which fed their national vanity !

Between 1925 and 1929 Hitler devoted himself to the regeneration and extension of the National Socialist Party on the basis of these ideas and with a view to establishing his constitutional position. At this stage he realised that he must not risk another armed fiasco on the one hand or be involved in any sort of plot for the revival of the monarchy on the other. He had to be in absolute control of the Party by means of his armed bands and yet avoid a clash with the military. He had to maintain both the nationalism and the socialism of his Party's programme, without arousing the suspicions of the Socialists by giving too

much away to the Nationalists or alienating the Nationalists by laying too much stress on its socialism. Indeed, as the Party gained in size and strength Hitler cleverly played off one policy against the other, until he was more secure, when its nationalism was more and more emphasised while its socialism came to have less and less meaning.

The situation in Germany during this period greatly favoured the spread of Hitler's power. The Nationalists, drawn mainly from the higher sections of the community, were with him in his opposition to the imposed peace (the *Diktat*, as they called it) of Versailles and to the policy of any sort of appeasement of or *rapprochement* towards the enemy. The middle classes, overwhelmed by the economic catastrophe which began in 1922-1923, when the mark fell to the fantastic figure of nineteen billions to the pound, never recovered from their collapse when later the mark was stabilised. They were, in fact, "proletarianised" socially and economically, and "radicalised" politically. Yet they would not join the Socialists, whom they regarded as responsible for their woes, or the Communists, whose "red" extremism they feared. What more natural, then, than that they should swell the ranks of the Nazis, who stood for national recovery and appeared sympathetic to all those living by daily work and antipathetic to the privileged classes, whether aristocrats or industrial and financial magnates?

Through all this time, while Hitler used the support of the Nationalist groups, he had the great advantage over them of not having yet taken part in the government, so that he was able in detachment to fire his criticism at all those who, because they were in positions of responsibility, could be saddled with the blame for everything that went wrong. In 1929 began the world economic crisis, which was to prove a great boon to the Nazi Party. In 1927 there had been not more than half-a-million unemployed in Germany; early in 1929 it approached a million; but by the opening of 1933 it had reached six millions. This army of unemployed, in their desperation, largely drifted into the Nazi ranks. The financial arrangements made in 1929 for the payment of reparations, under what was called the Young Plan, were so distasteful to the Nationalist malcontents that they were impelled to close their ranks in opposition to it. But during the next three years it was Hitler who "cashed in" on this trend, though he and his followers were very different in both background and outlook from most of the Nationalists.

The Nationalists were mostly drawn from the landed, military, and higher professional classes, and from industrialists and high financiers. They, as we have seen, mourned the lost glories of Imperial Germany and looked forward to the reinstatement of the monarchy and the restoration of the old order. The National Socialists, on the other hand, generally belonged to the lower and middle classes. They had no intention of restoring the old order. On the contrary, while they were equally authoritarian, their policy was not reactionary but revolutionary. They did not want a restored Emperor. They wanted a New Order under the absolute powers of their *Führer*.

In spite of these differences, the two parties—the Nationalists, led by Hugenberg, one of the most powerful leaders in heavy industry, and the National Socialists under Hitler—found it to their mutual advantage to enter into an understanding. Hugenberg thought of Hitler as a tool to protect him and his class from the extremer forms of Socialism and Communism, without putting himself in Hitler's power. Hitler realised the advantage to be gained for his Party by an alliance with such powerful interests, which could supply him with much-needed funds and the right sort of publicity. From that moment Hitler dropped his preponderatingly Socialist adherents and went steadily forward, in alliance with Hugenberg and the Nationalists, to his first great step to absolute power, his constitutional victory. In the general election of 1928 the Nazis gained twelve seats in the *Reichstag*; in that of 1930 the number was increased to 107. They thus became the second largest party, the Social Democrats alone leading them with 143 seats. This was a great triumph for Hitler in the constitutional phase of his advance to political supremacy, and he lost no time acclaiming it as such. The day of reckoning, he said, was at hand, and he prophesied, with what bitter and devastating truth Germany and the world were soon to know to their cost, that, when that day arrived, "heads would roll" in the conflict with those who had betrayed the Fatherland.

In 1932 Hitler made a further test of his position when he stood as a candidate in the Presidential election. Hitler secured nearly fifteen million votes against Hindenburg's nineteen millions. Thus, though Hindenburg continued for a second term, Hitler had run him very close and so proved his growing popularity. In the *Reichstag* elections of the same year the National Socialists won 196 seats against the Social Democrats'

121 and the Communists' 100. For the first time the National Socialists had become the chief party in the state, and Hitler was accordingly invited by the President to form a Cabinet. He demanded all sorts of absolute powers, but, when the aged President refused to grant them, took office all the same, at the head of a Coalition Cabinet. So, in January 1933, the erstwhile house decorator and lance-corporal became Chancellor of the *Reich*. He was now on the top rung of a ladder of a very different sort from those he had climbed in his days as an artisan, and proved that there had, after all, been something even more formidable than a field-marshal's baton in his knapsack. Hitler had reached the end of his constitutional journey, and the stage was now set for his revolution of destruction.

The Dictatorship and the Totalitarian State

Hitler's Chancellorship had been sponsored by the great landowners (*Junkers*), of whom President Hindenburg was the most illustrious representative, and by industrial magnates like Hugenberg, who fondly imagined that this vile corporal and his gang would be sobered by the responsibilities of office and by the influence of their politically experienced colleagues of the Right in the Coalition Cabinet. But in supposing that they had thus secured a "Chancellor in chains," they entirely miscalculated the man and the movement, and showed themselves to be completely out of touch with the trend of the mass of German opinion which seemed ready to greet Hitler as the "People's Chancellor." At all events, Hitler banked on this popular appeal, and if he was indeed in chains he displayed the dexterity of a Houdini in the ease with which he effected his escape from them. For no sooner had he taken up the office of Chancellor than he proceeded, by a series of deliberate and ruthless steps, to destroy the foundations of the constitution and to erect on its ruins his own dictatorship of a totalitarian state.

As he could make no headway against the opposition in the *Reichstag*, Hitler persuaded the President to agree to new elections so that the people might have an opportunity of expressing their attitude to his Ministry. While preparations for the new election were going on, the *Reichstag* buildings were opportunely set on fire. There can be little doubt that the Nazis were responsible for this outrage, but it was made to appear that the Communists were its perpetrators. Frightened by the spectre

of a Communist insurrection, which the Nazis had thus deliberately raised, the President approved an emergency decree permitting the government to impose restraints on personal liberty, and on freedom of speech, of the press, of association and of assembly, to search private houses, and to confiscate property. As a result, the government immediately banned the Communist Party as an illegal organisation, and the "electoral bomb," which was the *Reichstag* fire, went off with a bang. In the panic which followed, the Nazis were returned with nearly half the seats. With threats of civil war, Hitler intimidated the *Reichstag* into passing a law conferring on him, for a period of four years, the power to promulgate and enforce new laws, even though they might not conform to the constitution.

Hitler was thus fully authorised to exercise uncontrolled power without recourse to Parliament, and from that moment the Constitution of the Weimar Republic was, in fact, abrogated. But at no time did he announce any specific intention of abolishing the constitution, and certainly he studiously refrained from promulgating a new one. Indeed, the whole essence of his dictatorship was his complete freedom from any constitutional restraints whatsoever, and he preferred to proceed by the issue of laconic decrees, which were nothing more than personal pronouncements. Thus, while he maintained the *Reichstag*, it became completely emasculated. This was accomplished first by the suppression of all other parties. The Communists, the Catholics of the Centre, even the Nationalists under Hugenberg, were all dissolved, while their private forces were "liquidated" by Hitler's Brownshirts. In July 1933, a decree went forth declaring that the only legally constituted political organisation in Germany was the National Socialist Party. Thenceforward only National Socialists were allowed to stand as candidates for the *Reichstag*. The whole country, as in Fascist Italy, became, in effect, one vast constituency, with a single list of candidates requiring from the voter a simple yes or no for the whole national "ticket." But, again as in Italy, it mattered little how the Assembly was composed, since the *Reichstag*, in any case, became something even less than a registry of government decisions; nothing more, in fact, than an occasional audience for the *Führer's* rhetorical outbursts. In view of the Wagnerian inspiration of Hitler's performances, there was perhaps a touch of irony in the fact that, after the burning of its original home, the *Reichstag* generally met in the Kroll Opera House.

If the lower House of the German Parliament thus suffered a fate worse than death, the upper House (*Reichsrat*) was rendered frankly superfluous by the simple device of abolishing the states which formed the federal union of the Weimar Republic and of which that House was the representative assembly. In February 1933, Hitler, in a speech to the *Reichsrat*, had promised to respect the states, which he then described as "the historical corner-stones of the Germanic Empire." Seven months later in a speech to the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg in September 1933, he set forth an entirely different view, in the following unmistakable terms: "A people who speak one language, who possess the same culture, and whose destinies were worked out in the course of a common history, can do nothing else but strive towards a united political leadership. *The new German Reich*¹ ought not to be erected on the foundation of the states any more than on the basis of the German tribes, but rather on the entire nation and on the National Socialist Party, which comprises and unites within itself the entire German nation." And within four months of the delivery of that speech, on January 30, 1934, the anniversary of his becoming Chancellor, Hitler issued a "Law for the Reorganisation of the Reich," which, in less than a hundred words, cut out from the heart of the German state the federalism which had characterised it for a thousand years. "We are *one* people," he said, "and we wish to live in *one Reich*." To achieve this end the new law transferred the powers of the states to the Reich, and soon there were Nazi Commissioners in the provinces, all under the direct control of the *Führer*. In this way Hitler made of Germany a unitary and absolutely centralised state.

It was on the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934 that Hitler demolished the last tottering rampart of the Weimar Republic. Instead of proceeding to the election of a new President, he calmly announced that the two offices of *Führer* and President would be combined in his own person. By a clever piece of strategy he sought the nation's consent to this move by holding a plebiscite, or mass popular vote. This device,

¹ The Nazis styled Hitlerite Germany the Third *Reich* to give it the added glamour of association with the glories of the Second *Reich*, which Bismarck had founded in 1871 on the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire that was the First *Reich*.

The word *Reich* is not easy to translate. It is clearly not confined in its meaning to Empire, since it is used also of a régime without an Emperor. It signifies, in a general way, what we understand by realm. See James Murphy's Introduction to his excellent translation of *Mein Kampf*.

in the adoption of which Hitler emulated Napoleon,¹ had already been employed in the previous November to secure popular approval, after the event, of Hitler's action in withdrawing Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference,² when no fewer than 98 per cent. of the votes were given in favour of the withdrawal. It was not unnatural that this should happen on such an issue, for Hitler seemed thereby to be giving the Germans a chance to regain their national self-respect, and he snatched the first opportunity to exploit his success in this case by submitting the Presidency question, a very different matter, to the same tribunal. His prestige in the eyes of the people, however, was high enough to secure over thirty-eight million (nearly 90 per cent.) affirmative votes, and on this evidence he was able to say that his régime had received an overwhelming vote of confidence from the people themselves.

Meanwhile, Hitler felt himself sufficiently firmly fixed in power to deal with the intransigent persons and bodies remaining in the state. They were indifferently condemned as Marxists, Bolsheviks, and Jews, but they included certain of Hitler's earlier associates who for various reasons were dissatisfied with his leadership, some of them because, as he rose step by step to absolute power, he discreetly shelved most of the Socialist elements in the original National Socialist programme. Hitler apparently became convinced that his position was threatened by these recalcitrants and their collaborators, and he decided on a purge. So occurred on June 30, 1934, the terrible "blood bath," in which probably no fewer than a hundred eminent Nazis and other persons of high standing in Germany were murdered in cold blood. These murders were officially declared by the *Reichstag* to be "legitimate acts in defence of the state."

But this purge was only one instance of Nazi sadism, whose most repellent features came out in the organised massacres of the Jews, which Hitler himself inspired by his diatribes against them. Those Jews who escaped slaughter in these official pogroms were deprived of all rights of citizenship and excluded entirely from the economic and cultural life of the community. And even this did not save thousands of them from the horrors of the concentration camps, which they shared with all those who ventured to question the omnipotence of the

¹ See earlier, page 227.

² See later, Chapter XXI.

Führer or failed to acknowledge the superior qualities of his swashbuckling myrmidons.

During the four years of absolutism originally granted to him by the *Reichstag*, Hitler by no means confined himself to revolutionary changes in politics. He also revolutionised German social and economic life. As early as February 1933, he began to organise what he called the "subsistence battle" (*Ernährungsschlacht*) and the "employment battle" (*Arbeitschlacht*). The subsistence battle involved a complete reorganisation of the agrarian system in order to secure a sound basis of existence for the peasants. This was part of his plan to assure food supplies to all Germans in any eventualities to which his foreign policy might lead him; in short, an endeavour to give Germany a self-sufficient economy (*Autarky*) which should free her from dependence on foreign imports. The purpose of the employment battle was to abolish unemployment. The means of achieving this end was a fundamental reorganisation of the labour system. Hitler replaced the many different employers' associations and workers' unions by a common "labour front," in which all employers and workers were brought together to administer the vast industrial system of Germany. At the same time he launched ingenious schemes of "credit expansion," which enabled this agricultural and industrial programme to develop free from the encumbrances of orthodox finance.

Hitler had the good fortune to come into power just as the tide of the world economic crisis, which had started to flow in 1929, was beginning to turn. Indeed, if he had delayed his decisive action a little longer, he might well have missed his opportunity of taking advantage of the slump. As it was, he no doubt gained a good deal of personal credit for the success of his economic policy, which was due certainly as much to world causes as to his own "intuition" and the undoubted skill of his advisers. Moreover, as we have seen, Hitler immediately placed German economy on a war-footing, a situation which notoriously assists the imposition of state controls and the realisation of full employment. "Guns before butter!" bellowed Göring, and so the factories reopened and the furnaces roared again. From the purely material point of view, Hitler's four-year plan, in its three aspects—agrarian, industrial, and financial—indubitably achieved much for Germany, at least in German eyes. And because it meant for most of the people some improvement in

material conditions on anything they had enjoyed since 1918, it gained the favour and support of the masses.

In 1933 Hitler had been granted four years of personal rule, but long before that period had expired he had carried his dictatorship to a point far beyond the necessity to seek anybody's sanction for its perpetuation. Well within that period he had effected a political, social, and economic revolution, in its daring and ruthlessness unsurpassed in the history of the modern world. In that brief space the very nature of society and the state in Germany had been completely metamorphosed, in accordance with the principles of race, people, and leadership, which had germinated in Hitler's mind at a time when the prospects of effecting such changes were remote in the extreme. But all the luck had been with him, and now in place of the traditional principles of social and political organisation, and the recognised instruments of government, an entirely new basis of national allegiance and state power had been instituted. The former rights of the individual and of association had gone completely. The legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, as reformed by the Constitution of 1919, had been entirely scrapped. In their place was the *Führer*, who, as head of a Party made out to be synonymous and coterminous with the nation, claimed and achieved an absoluteness of power to which no previous ruler of a civilised state had ever aspired. A federal democracy was thus violently transformed into a centralised autocracy, in which the autocrat dispensed with every accepted device of government and ruled by his own whims, which were translated into action by his minions through the Party hierarchy.

Under this régime, so utter was the surrender of every right of the governed and so unrestrained the interference of the government in every activity of the people—political, social, economic, cultural, and religious—that their very lives lay at the mercy of the Nazi octopus, whose envenoming arms stretched out to the most obscure recesses of German society. The Secret State Police (*Geheime Staatspolizei*), or *Gestapo*,¹ had unchecked authority to invade any home and to violate the innermost sanctities of family life. Every child was claimed for the state, every youth forcibly enrolled in the Hitler-*Jugend*, and, by an unprecedented abuse of political authority and an un-

¹ First created by Göring, as Nazi Commissioner in Prussia, in 1933, and so called from the first letters of each element in the German term *Geheime Staatspolizei*.

speakeable travesty of civic education, indoctrinated with the pitiless philosophy of Nazism.

From all this we may gather what is really meant by a totalitarian state. It is one which claims a totality of rights and powers exercised and enforced through an all-pervading political party which totally excludes all others ; one into whose hands all rights are surrendered and all powers gathered ; one which demands only duties from the people who receive back no corresponding rights ; one which is controlled by a dictator whose area of activities is unrestricted in scope and whose tenure of office is unlimited in time. Such a state pretends that the individual can fully realise himself and find his true happiness only in blind service to it, without reference to any standards of judgment which he himself assists in creating. The state, in this conception, does not recognise society as having any but a political existence, and therefore does not regard itself as a means to social good but only as an end, the end of political power. A state so absolutist was without precedent in the conditions of modern Europe. Having been initiated in Italy by Mussolini and the Fascists, it was carried to much greater extremes in Germany by Hitler and the Nazis.

German totalitarianism is regarded by some recent writers as having had a certain kinship with the political ideas of Plato, to whom, through Rousseau, Hegel may be found to have traced his philosophical theory of the state. But the contention that there was any real likeness between Plato's *Republic* and Hitler's *Reich* will not bear more than the most superficial examination. Both systems were, if you will, authoritarian, but, whereas in Plato's conception the true inspiration of government was wisdom, in Nazi practice it was power. For Plato the state was the means of developing the good life and its essence the harmonising of philosophy and politics : for Hitler it existed solely to achieve the ascendancy of a ruthless group within its boundaries and an hegemony over others without. In ancient Athens the state was society itself, composed of politically conscious members who lived by their individual contributions to the social whole and a corresponding enjoyment of benefits proportionately drawn from it. In Hitlerite Germany, on the contrary, society had no such meaning, for the state was nothing more than a governmental machine which bludgeoned out of the individual all political intelligence and consequently all sense of the interplay of rights and duties. Thus did Hitler and his National Socialism

reduce the civilised society of the Germans to a condition of barbarism by perverting the high ideal of the Good Society to the gross ideology of the Totalitarian State.

The World Menace of Nazism

It is doubtless true, in a criminal-legal sense, that, as Burke said long ago, you cannot indict a nation. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the whole German people were made at Hitler's bidding as cruel and bestial as the fanatical element in the Nazi Party. Nevertheless, the contention that the Germans were the helpless victims of a fate that they could not control simply will not stand in face of the historical facts. That a nation gets the government it deserves was more palpably true of the Germans under Nazism than of some other peoples in modern times. The claim the Nazis made that Hitler's triumph was the result not of a *coup d'état* but of a legal vote of the people was by no means without foundation ; indeed, all the evidence supports the view that the German people were responsible for their own misery under Hitler. The nation, in fact, freely delivered itself up to the Nazi tyranny, first through the facile assent of its representatives in the *Reichstag* and next by its direct votes in the plebiscites. Certainly the Germans paid a heavy price for their acquiescence and beguilement, for, as time passed, the régime was not less but more harshly fixed upon them, and what had begun as a legal delegation by the people, with a time limit, became an unqualified absolutism, seeking neither sanction nor period. But that the people concurred in it is irrefutable.

Nor can the German people be relieved of responsibility for the agony the Nazis caused to the rest of the world, since Hitler's foreign policy was directly approved by their all-but unanimous vote. If Nazism could have confined itself to Germany, the rest of Europe and the world might have been content to tolerate it. But it could not, of its very nature, keep within the German frontiers. At least three of Hitler's immediate aims were bound to affect other states and at length bring them into conflict with Germany. They were, first, his resolve to undo the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles ; secondly, his determination to incorporate Austria with Germany ; and thirdly, his intention to annex Czecho-Slovakia. But, indeed, the seeds of international strife were sown deep in the whole Nazi ideology, and if allowed to ripen unchecked were bound to result in a bloody

harvest. The race theory implied an eventual breaking-down of recognised political frontiers, for clearly if all the nations of Teutonic origin were to form what Hitler called "one people and one *Reich*," this could only be achieved by ruthless aggression. Again, the argument that the Germans were a superior people (*Herrenvolk*) demanded that their superiority be exercised not only over non-Aryans—that is to say, Jews—in their midst, but also over what they regarded as the inferior nations around them. A similar violation of political boundaries was implicit in the cry for "living space" (*Lebensraum*), which meant the subjugation of neighbouring peoples, whose economic policy would be consequently controlled and directed by the Germans.

Hitler devoted a good many pages of *Mein Kampf* to this question of "living space," and everything that happened later proved that his view had not substantially changed when he was in supreme control of affairs from what it had been when he was the struggling leader of a proscribed political movement. For Hitler then and for Hitler later it meant an undying antagonism to Russia. Russia was a country the contemplation of which aroused all Hitler's cupidity, venom and dread, for it epitomised all that he most craved, loathed and feared. It was a land of illimitable agricultural and industrial resources, which, in his view, the Russians were too ignorant to exploit and which, therefore, ought to be exploited by the Germans. Besides, it was a land where the Jews, whom he wished to destroy, had, according to him, inspired the triumph of Bolshevism, which he regarded as a deadly danger to Germany and the world. He was sure in 1936, when he addressed the Nazi Conference at Nuremberg on the subject, as he was sure in 1941, when he made undeclared war on her, that "Russia was ripe for collapse." Nor did he look westward with less acquisitive gaze, for France, too, he regarded, to quote his own words in *Mein Kampf*, as "the eternal and mortal enemy of the German nation."

Thus Hitler's immediate policy of reversing the *Diktat* of Versailles and his ultimate policy of expansion equally involved heated preparations for war. But it also led him to seek allies among his smaller and more tractable neighbours, and to interfere in the internal politics of any country where Fascism might be usefully supported or encouraged to grow. Thus he wooed Mussolini into the Axis alliance, supported Franco in the Civil War in Spain, and later on made Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland his satellites. He realised, of course, that these

policies would involve him eventually in a conflict with Britain, France, and Russia, and perhaps with the United States. But far from this prospect deterring him, he made his plans deliberately on the assumption that that eventuality was inevitable. For Hitler aspired to be something more than a mere German *Führer*: he was infatuated enough to believe that he could conquer Europe and so establish the universal hegemony of Germany, as he said, "for a thousand years."

So Nazism, having strangled the life out of every creative impulse in Germany itself, then turned to subject the rest of Europe to similar treatment, and thus involved the whole world in its insensate upheaval. The worst crime of Nazism was that, in its ruthless rise to supremacy, it annihilated among the German people all sense of decency in social and international conduct, but in the days of its eclipse it aggravated this moral offence against the nation, and so revealed the true character of its self-styled political philosophy. For when, after more than five years of total war, it was evident to all the world that nothing could save the Hitler régime from engulfment in its final catastrophe, the Nazis, by delaying their inevitable capitulation, condemned the country whose welfare they professed to have so much at heart to a physical desolation and a political dissolution more terrible than that which they had inflicted on others. Thus when, in May 1945, the Germans were driven at last to the unconditional surrender of their scattered forces to the triumphant armies of the United Nations, the wheel had turned full circle and Germany's revolution of destruction was complete.

Good Europeans must properly assess this violation of all that we know and cherish as Western Civilisation and not remain satisfied merely to have worsted the armed doctrine of Hitlerism in war. In order to understand how such an outrage was possible and to ensure that it shall never be made again, it is necessary to realise that the world menace of Nazism was born of, and fed upon, the international anarchy which preceded and followed the First World War, and this we must now examine.

CHAPTER XX

BALANCE OF POWER

THE ARMED PEACE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The Drift to International Anarchy

THE outbreak of the First World War in 1914 resulted from a situation of international anarchy into which Europe had gradually drifted during the preceding hundred years. That comparatively short period was marked by more dynamic changes than had taken place in any previous phase of European development. The origins of those changes, of course, were to be found in the past, but the momentum of the changes themselves gathered in such a bewildering progression and the novelty of their impact on traditional habits of life was so shattering in its effects that the peoples of Europe at length found themselves in the grip of forces which they could not comprehend or their leaders control. Nationalism, under the impetus of the industrial and technological advances, added to the political ideal of independence the economic expedient of protection, and thus became at once more self-conscious and more combative. On the one hand, the urge to exploit to the full the national resources led to the defensive tactics of tariff walls; on the other, the search for world markets resulted in the offensive strategy of imperial aggrandisement. The consequent intensification of national rivalries, aided by the growing invention of the engines of war, brought about a competition in armaments which made of Europe a powder magazine of such monstrous proportions that it became a question not whether, but only how soon, it would explode of its own enormity.

A century had passed since the close of the Napoleonic War, and during that period there had been no war of similar dimensions. The Treaty of Vienna had ushered in forty years of peace, broken only by the isolated Greek War of Independence in the eighteen-twenties and the essentially civil conflicts connected with the revolutionary movements of 1830 and 1848. But then the peace was rudely shattered by a series of wars, occurring in rapid succession, which, though local in a geographical sense, had the most widespread and far-reaching

consequences for Europe and the world. The first of these struggles, the Crimean War (1854-1856), though the most futile of all wars, involved four great states in a bloody conflict and showed only too clearly that the problem of the Balkans was not local but continental in its significance and would never be solved in isolation from the general question of the relations of the Powers. The second of the series was the Austro-Italian War (1859), a necessary prelude to the unification of Italy, which profoundly affected the future not only of Italy herself but also of Austria-Hungary. The third was the Austro-Prussian War (1866),¹ which secured the hegemony of Prussia in Germany and resulted in the expulsion of Austria from the German Union. The fourth of the series, the Franco-German War (1870-1871), brought about the establishment of the German Empire, thenceforward the dominant force in continental diplomacy, and isolated France who, to recover and retain her prestige, was drawn into an alliance with Russia.

When the Crimean War broke out in 1854 Metternich's Congress System had long since broken down, and such tattered remnants as remained of the Concert of Europe were effectively destroyed by the series of wars which filled the next seventeen years. Important though each of these wars was in the diplomacy of Europe, the treaty made at the end of each was confined to the settlement of problems between the belligerents, and no attempt was made to establish any sort of international order such as had followed the Napoleonic Wars. The result was that each state went in search of its own security, seeking allies and building up its armaments. The alliances thus made were supposed to neutralise each other and so a balance of power was thought to be achieved. On the face of things, the balance seemed successful enough, for between the close of the last of Bismarck's wars in 1871 and the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Europe was free from hostilities, except in the everlasting cockpit of the Balkans, but even there no fighting of any magnitude took place between the brief Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and the two wars of 1912-1913.² It was, in fact, the longest peace that Europe had known since the dawn of modern

¹ The war made by Prussia and Austria on Denmark in 1863-1864 was only a prelude to the Austro-Prussian struggle.

² Besides these, there were wars outside Europe in which European Powers were involved; e.g. Britain with the Boers in South Africa (1881 and 1899-1902); Italy with Abyssinia in Africa (1896) and with Turkey in Tripoli (1911); Russia with Japan in the Far East (1904-1905).

times, though it offered the nations an entirely false security. The period, indeed, was not so much one in which peace was maintained as one in which war was averted only by a series of lucky chances. War clouds, becoming yearly blacker and blacker, hovered over Europe, ever threatening to burst and drench the continent in blood. It was peace certainly, but it was an armed peace.

Only one serious attempt was made to hold this anarchical drift. After the fall of Bismarck in 1890 and the transfer of the direction of German affairs to the febrile hands of the Kaiser, William II, the international situation, bad as it was already, rapidly deteriorated. Appalled by the prospect of general war in Europe, the Tsar, Nicholas II, of Russia, in 1898 issued a rescript to the sovereign states of Europe and America, inviting them to send representatives to a conference to promote international peace. "In proportion as the armaments of each Power increase," stated this rescript, "do they less and less fulfil the objects which the governments have set before themselves. Economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments *à outrance* and the continual danger which lies in this accumulation of war material, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then," it went on, "that if this state of things continues, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking being shudder in anticipation."

The result of the Tsar's appeal was that a conference was held at The Hague in 1899, and this was followed by another in 1907, when the Conference resolved to meet again but never did. The Hague Conferences helped to create a public sense of the danger and actually set up arbitration machinery, known as The Hague Tribunal, which did useful work, over the next few years, in settling minor international disputes. But this could do no more than touch the fringe of the fundamental problem of peace, for it entirely lacked the means of tackling at its roots the canker that was eating at the heart of Europe. The forces of political and economic nationalism, of capitalistic imperialism, and of militarism supported by armament interests, were too firmly entrenched in the soil of twentieth-century Europe to be dispersed by resolutions carried at international congresses, and the armed camp of Europe was not to be struck before it had fulfilled its

deadly purpose. And so the anarchy proceeded, and Europe continued to sit on the edge of its volcano, waiting helplessly for the eruption to overwhelm it.

National Imperialism and Opposing Alliances

Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron" had created a new Germany, but it had also done irreparable harm to Europe. The German Chancellor had deliberately used war as an instrument of diplomacy and vindicated militarism as the mainspring of state action. In other words, he had introduced a policy of power (*Machtpolitik*) which habituated the governments of Europe to the arbitrament of the sword before the nations were given a chance to adjust themselves to the new conditions induced by the Industrial Revolution or to try more pacific methods of settling the international disputes of an unprecedentedly complex kind which those conditions brought in their train. It is true that, after 1871, he ardently desired to maintain peace so that he might exploit the success of his foreign policy in domestic progress. But by then the harm had been done, for the victories of Prussia and Germany between 1864 and 1871 had left behind them rancours among their enemies, who saw no way of rehabilitating themselves and regaining their lost prestige except by Bismarck's own methods. Moreover, they had engendered in the minds and hearts of the younger generation of Germans a sentiment that war was a noble adventure which it would one day be their destiny joyfully to experience for the greater glory of the Fatherland.

Bismarck fully realised these consequences of his own bellicose tactics. He was, in fact, haunted by the spectre of a hostile coalition against the military might of Germany, and all his efforts were devoted to creating and maintaining an alliance strong enough to neutralise it. Thus immediately after the close of the French war he engineered an understanding between Germany, Austria, and Russia, known as the League of the Three Emperors, and when Russia's ardour cooled through the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878,¹ he made the definitive Dual Alliance with Austria in 1879 and persuaded Italy to join it in 1882. The conditions of this Triple Alliance were kept secret until 1887, so that, in spite of them, Bismarck contrived to maintain friendly relations with Russia, even going so far as to persuade the three

¹ See earlier, pages 296-7.

Emperors to renew their personal pact in 1884. When William II, who had succeeded to the Prussian and Imperial thrones in 1888, decided in 1890 to "drop the pilot," Bismarck, and take the helm of the German ship of state himself, the comparative calm of the surrounding seas gave place to violent squalls. Bismarck had had little interest in extra-European affairs; indeed, his anxiety did not extend even as far as the Balkans, which, he said, were not worth the "bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." The Kaiser, on the contrary, was greatly concerned not merely with the Balkans but with the world beyond Europe; so much so that he initiated what, for Germany, was an entirely novel outlook on affairs. This new outlook went by the name of world politics (*Weltpolitik*). From this new policy, emerging at the turn of the century from the solid background of Bismarck's less grandiose continental programme, developed in an inexorable chain of events the cumulative crisis which finally broke in the First World War.

As we have seen earlier,¹ Germany and Italy were late in the field of imperial expansion; indeed, too late to share in the spoils except in the one continent which was not substantially opened up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This was Africa, which remained a "Dark Continent" until the mundane explorations of Stanley, following the missionary journeys of Livingstone, led, by steps which must have made the embalmed body of that heroic saint turn in its grave in Westminster Abbey, to its latter-day exploitation. Leopold II of Belgium was the first to respond to Stanley's urgent championship of the commercial potentialities of the Congo, and in 1876 formed an "International Association for the Exploration and Civilisation of Africa." So was initiated the "Scramble for Africa," in which Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal all took part, and which culminated in an international conference held in Berlin in 1884-1885. Bismarck was no more deeply stirred by this colonial activity than he had been over Balkan affairs at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. None the less, Germany did well, at any rate quantitatively, out of the scramble, acquiring Togoland, the Cameroons, South-West Africa, and East Africa. Meanwhile, Italy had been deeply wounded in her pride and prestige by France's seizure of Tunis in 1881, and this, combined with her general jealousy and fear of France, had been responsible for her otherwise inexplicable attraction towards the Central

¹ See page 31.

Powers, which led to the formation of the Triple Alliance in the following year. But from the general carving-up of Africa Italy gained only Eritrea and Somaliland to the north and south of Abyssinia, and it was not until 1911 that she acquired Tripoli as a result of a war with Turkey.

A few scattered, and, as they proved, not very profitable, possessions in remote Africa meant little to Bismarck. For William II they took on an entirely new significance as tokens of Germany's bid for world power. Germany must, the Kaiser said, have a "place in the sun" commensurate with her military greatness and her economic power. Her military prowess had been clearly proved. The justice of her claim to a world position in the economic sphere was no less demonstrable. In the second half of the nineteenth century the population of Germany rose by 50 per cent., her foreign trade trebled itself, and her mercantile marine increased at a remarkable pace. Henceforth her policies must be conditioned by the facts of her economic situation. Kaiser or no Kaiser, Germany must find world markets for the disposal of the ever-increasing bulk of manufactures which the resources of her earth provided and the industry and skill of her people produced. And having found world markets, she must protect them and their lines of communication.

This double urge gives the key to the three aspects of German *Weltpolitik* as it developed in the early years of the present century. First, it aimed at establishing a sphere of influence in the Levant, which implied an advance through the Balkans to the East (*Drang nach Osten*) with the ultimate object of building up a continuous chain of power, linked by a railway from Berlin to Bagdad. Secondly, it determined to play a more decisive rôle in colonial affairs, and particularly in Africa. Thirdly, it involved the decision to build a powerful navy. The first objective brought the purposes of Germany and Austria into closer accord, for, since her expulsion from Germany and Italy, Austria had been forced to turn her gaze in a south-easterly direction to the only effective outlet to the sea, and she dreamed of a Balkan domination which would at length give her control of the port of Salonika. It meant, therefore, a strengthening of the diplomatic *bloc* of Central Europe, and so Germany's policy in this field came to be known as *Mittleuropa*. The second objective caused a number of demonstrations of German power in Africa, particularly over the Morocco question in 1905 and

the Agadir Incident in 1911. The third objective inevitably led to Anglo-German rivalry.

The new policy, in its Turkish aspects, naturally alarmed Russia, who was thereby driven, in search of the means of counterbalancing the Balkan danger, into the arms of France. France, since the war of 1870-1871, could not but regard Germany as her irreconcilable enemy. Chafing at the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and rebuilding her economic strength through her colonial expansion in Africa, she felt her isolation acutely. In the last decade of the nineteenth century Russian loans, to the tune of £160,000,000, had been floated in France to capitalise the nascent industries of Russia. Thus reciprocal economic interests joined with mutual considerations of defence to bring about a diplomatic *rapprochement* between these two states, so different in their ideas, their background, and their institutions. Only the autocratic doubts of the Tsar, Alexander III, stood in the way of formal agreement with the western republic, but with his death and the succession of Nicholas II in 1894 this obstacle was removed, and after some ceremonial exchanges a definitive alliance was made in 1895. So, by the end of the nineteenth century the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy was confronted by the Dual Alliance of France and Russia.

How far would these opposing alliances create such a balance of power as to secure Europe from war? The answer to this question might have been different if Russia had not been involved in the disastrous war with Japan in 1904-1905. William II had deliberately encouraged his cousin, Nicholas II, to pursue an imperial policy in the Far East, which was largely responsible for the Russo-Japanese War, and he was the first to learn and apply the lesson of the fall of the Russian Goliath before the Japanese David, who but half a century before, if he had not actually fought with a sling, had certainly practised the art of war with nothing less archaic than a bow and arrow. Russia's weakness stood revealed, and this knowledge caused the German Emperor to throw off such restraints as till then he had borne with ill-concealed impatience. The balance was emphatically disturbed, and the Kaiser now began a series of provocative gestures calculated to upset it still further. He designed his fiery antics chiefly for the discomfiture of Great Britain, towards whom, in spite, or perhaps because, of his being half-English by blood, his animosity was now laid bare. Doubtless, in such an age and given the relative political and economic situations of the

two countries, the growth of Anglo-German rivalry was inevitable, but the personal policy of William II certainly had the effect of exacerbating it.

Britain had already begun to realise the mortal danger in which she was placed by the naval policy of a land power with whose military strength she could not hope to compete. This knowledge was driving her at the same time to an exaggerated programme of naval construction, which placed an entirely disproportionate strain on her domestic finances and intensified the general competition in armaments, and to a search for a way of escape from the isolation which was her traditional policy. Fortunately, at this moment France was also isolated again as a result of the weakening of Russia. Thus the two peoples, who, in spite of their ancient enmities, had so many common ties, now drew together in face of the common Teutonic danger. With the aid of the bonhomous diplomacy of Edward VII the long-standing differences between the two nations were composed, and, though Britain could not at that juncture commit herself to a formal alliance, she readily agreed to a cordial understanding (*Entente Cordiale*). This took place in 1904, and three years later the two Powers were joined by Russia to form the Triple Entente.

Thus the balance appeared to be restored. But it did not stop the race in armaments or divert Europe from her pre-occupation with the threatening war-clouds. The Kaiser continued to strut and to encourage his people to look forward to "The Day" (*Der Tag*) which should reveal them as God's chosen instruments to humble the proud and perfidious Albion to the dust. In this tense atmosphere Europe entered the second decade of the twentieth century. So, just when the nations were entitled to look forward to entering on an age of happiness and plenty after the growing-pains of the Industrial Revolution, they found themselves facing, instead, an epoch of conflict and desolation. The path they trod, whithersoever it might lead, was strewn with dynamite. It only required a spark, however minute, to set the Continent ablaze. The unhappy peoples of Europe were not to be kept long in suspense for the shattering roar of the detonation. And when it came it sounded in that luckless Balkan Peninsula which was the fateful meeting-ground of the acrimonies of frustrated nationalism and the exigencies of power politics.

The Balkan Imbroglia

The Balkan problem, whose complexity from the point of view of national democratic politics we have already observed,¹ was no less complicated in its international aspects. Indeed, as we have seen, only the artificial respiration provided by the friction of the Powers enabled the "Sick Man of Europe" to come through the repeated crises of his malady in the nineteenth century and to survive as a European Power into the twentieth. His retention of a band of European territory stretching from the Black Sea to the Adriatic was, therefore, entirely fortuitous, and it was at once a menace and a desideratum to the Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The largest part of it was Macedonia, an area containing such a confusion of peoples that it was impossible to decide to whom it should belong if the Turks should be driven from Europe. But once let the Balkan states agree upon some division of it and no obstacle remained to their uniting for the expulsion of the Turk.

The position became much more dangerous after 1908 than it had ever been before. In that year, as we have seen, Austria, profiting by the disorders occasioned by the Young Turk Revolution, had annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, over which she had acquired a protectorate under the settlement made by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. She thus took a decisive step in her plan to find an outlet to the Aegean Sea, and in this aim she was strongly supported by Germany, who, since 1898, had been carrying out a so-called "peaceful penetration" of Asiatic Turkey. In that year the Kaiser had assured the three hundred million Moslems scattered over the globe that he would be "their friend at all times." No available area could have been more suited to Germany's needs and aims than the potentially wealthy but thinly peopled region stretching from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf. Here might Germany settle her superfluous population and exploit the resources of the land with the aid of her economic and technical experts. Here, too, might she recruit from its warlike inhabitants useful mercenaries who, under German tuition, could be moulded into first-class soldiers for the furtherance of Germany's imperial schemes.

The risks which Germany took in all this were great, and it is not surprising, therefore, that she should see in an Austrian hegemony of the Balkans an excellent insurance policy on which

¹ See earlier, Chapter XVI.

the premiums would be low and the endowment high, and she did all she could to encourage her Teutonic ally to realise this purpose. But to reach Salonika Austria must cross Macedonia, and here she must inevitably arouse the opposition of the Balkan states and particularly of Serbia, who ardently looked forward to the day when she would join hands with her brethren, the South Slavs, still under the Austro-Hungarian yoke. Moreover, the Young Turk Movement had as one of its objectives the strengthening of the Turkish hold on Macedonia. In face of these dangers, and in response to the creative statesmanship of the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, the Balkan States decided to sink their many differences and to form the Balkan League against Turkey in 1912. The die was cast and the Balkan Wars followed in 1912 and 1913.

It would be purposeless to attempt to follow in any detail the story of these wars, but it is impossible to overstate the fatefulness of their consequences for Europe at large. The first war was settled, in May 1913, by the Treaty of London, under which Turkey gave up practically the whole of the European territory remaining to her. All might now have been well if Austria and Italy had not combined in their determination to prevent the enlarged Serbia from reaching the Adriatic coast. In pursuit of this policy they, with the concurrence of the other great Powers, made Albania an independent state, a condition which, as events proved, she was entirely unqualified to bear. Serbia, yielding to *force majeure*, sought compensation in Macedonia and was consequently, at the end of June 1913, set upon by Bulgaria. This treacherous assault immediately brought the Greeks and Rumanians in arms to the side of Serbia, and the Second Balkan War began. It lasted only a few, but bloody, weeks, and ended in August with the Treaty of Bucharest, by which Bulgaria was despoiled of most of her Macedonian conquests. Rumania acquired a strip to the north-east of Bulgaria and Greece most of southern Macedonia. Serbia, however, was the principal beneficiary, gaining most of northern and central Macedonia. In this way Bulgaria lost in the second war about a million of the nationals she had gained in the first. Thus the treaty proved anything but a settlement of the Balkan imbroglio, and it is not surprising that out of this turmoil should soon arise issues of yet more fateful portent.

Nothing could have been less propitious for Austria's dream of expansion to the Aegean than the Treaty of Bucharest, since

it planted the Greeks in Salonika, and set in her southern path a Serbia greatly increased in size, strength, and prestige. From the moment of the making of the Treaty, therefore, she set to work to undo it; in fact, on the day before it was signed she actually invited Italy to join her in a war against Serbia, but Italy refused. Serbia, for her part, chafing at the frustration of her hopes for an outlet to the Adriatic and at the continued subjection of her fellow Slavs to Austria-Hungary, scarcely concealed her ambition, in her new-found strength, to join them one day in an enlarged kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In this situation the slightest provocation on the part of the Serbs was bound to lead to vigorous action by Austria. She had not long to wait for the occasion, and when it arrived the provocation was anything but slight and the action vigorous to the point of catastrophe.

There is no evidence that the public aim of a larger Serbia at the expense of Austria was in 1914 anything more than an ultimate hope, and certainly none that the Serbian Government had any official cognisance of the machinations of the wilder malcontents, who in secret societies plotted to remove by conspiratorial short-cuts anybody who stood in the way of the accomplishment of the national purpose. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, was believed to favour a policy of conciliation towards the Slavs of the Empire and of replacing the Dual Monarchy by a triple monarchy in which the Germans, Magyars, and Slavs should be on an equality. The success of such a policy would destroy the hope of creating a union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and its instigator must, therefore, be violently removed. Accordingly, when Francis Ferdinand was on an official visit to Serajevo, the Bosnian capital, on June 28, 1914, he was, with his wife, assassinated.

This dastardly crime sent a thrill of horror through Europe, and was naturally condemned by every government. But in Austria and Germany the outburst of indignation was carried to the point of holding the Serbian Government responsible for the outrage, and on July 23, 1914, Austria, backed by Germany, presented an ultimatum to Serbia, making demands so peremptory and fundamental that no sovereign state could be expected to comply with them without loss of honour and even of independence. Serbia was given forty-eight hours in which to reply, and when she accepted all the conditions except those which would have impaired her sovereignty and her liberty,

offering to submit these to The Hague Tribunal, Austria declared her answer evasive, broke off diplomatic relations, and began to mobilise. Serbia made the only possible reply and similarly mobilised, removing the seat of government from Belgrade, on the Austrian border, to the ancient city of Nish in the interior.

From this juncture events moved with breath-taking swiftness and with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy. The millions scattered, in those lovely summer days, about the resorts of Europe might, as the unprecedented news persisted in invading the wonted calm of their annual holidays, delude themselves that the murder of an archduke in an obscure Balkan town, of which most of them had never heard, could not possibly implicate them in its consequences. But the nations were about to pay for the luxury of permitting themselves to drift into international anarchy, and to learn that a balance of power based on opposing alliances, competing with each other in a fever of armament-building, far from securing peace, was the surest road to a general conflagration. Little time was lost between cause and effect. The winged messenger of Mars hovered for a brief moment over the lifeless body of a Hapsburg Prince in a street in Serajevo, and then sped on a longer and more deadly errand than even he, in his crowded and age-long experience, had ever undertaken. Nor did he cease his flight until he had summoned to the fell service of his master almost every nation in the world.

A New Kind of War

It would not be true, on the evidence, to say that Germany deliberately engineered a European war out of a Balkan quarrel, but what can be incontrovertibly asserted is that, by her attitude during the week following the issue of the Austrian ultimatum, she made a general war certain. The truth is that Germany saw in this Austro-Serbian conflict a golden opportunity to secure the future of her eastward drive, not, indeed, through a general war, which she thought the rest of Europe was not ready to fight, but, on the contrary, by a local war with all the odds in favour of her ally. So, while most of the Powers supported Serbia in her demand that the outstanding points of difference should be submitted to The Hague Tribunal, Germany insisted that Austria and Serbia be left to fight the matter out between them, which was, as she well knew, tantamount to demanding that Austria be permitted to annihilate Serbia. But

in her expectation that the other Powers would allow this to happen, Germany completely misread the signs. She persuaded herself that the three Entente Governments were so preoccupied with domestic difficulties—the Russians coping with a violent strike in St. Petersburg, the French resisting popular opposition to the new three-year military service law, and the British facing the prospect of civil war in Ireland over Home Rule—that they would be forced to abstain from interfering with her nicely worked-out scheme. Here, not for the last time in the long titanic struggle, German psychology was hopelessly at fault, and bitterly did she and Europe pay for this incorrigible weakness in her national character.

So events took their blind course. On July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia, and Russia immediately mobilised in Serbia's defence. Germany demanded Russia's demobilisation, and when she refused declared war on her on August 1. This involved France under the terms of the alliance, and when she began to mobilise, Germany, on August 3, declared war on her also. Germany's strategy was to make a rapid and overwhelming assault on France before the Russian giant could get into his stride, and then to turn her whole might east and crush Russia in detail. To ensure the necessary speed in the attack on France, Germany brought into play her long-designed plan, made for just such an eventuality, and invaded Belgium, in defiance of the Treaty of Neutrality to which she herself was a signatory. Britain must have entered the war sooner or later in self-defence, which demanded the pursuit of her traditional policy of preventing the control by one Power of a continuous line of continental coast facing her island. But the German breach of Belgian neutrality gave this defensive necessity an immediate moral sanction, and, though the German Chancellor could not believe that she would go to war for the sake of what he called a mere "scrap of paper," by August 4 Britain had entered the fray.

Before long the war involved other states besides the Central Powers on the one side, and Serbia, Belgium, and the Triple Entente on the other. At the opening of the war Italy had declared her neutrality, on the ground that her allies had started an offensive and not a defensive war, and in 1915 she finally withdrew from the Triple Alliance and joined the Entente Powers. Germany and Austria secured the adhesion of Turkey and Bulgaria, but the Entente was gradually enlarged by the

alliance of Japan and China, and the association of the United States and some Latin American states, while from the beginning all the British Self-governing Dominions decided to fight by Britain's side.

This was, indeed, a new kind of war. There had been nothing like it in the history of the world. It was a war of nations in a sense more absolute than any previous armed conflict. In its universality and intensity, in the man-power and armament involved, in the scale of its casualties, and in the engrossment of every national interest and the absorption of every class of subjects in its service, it was quite without precedent. The course of the war confounded all the prophets. It was confidently anticipated that the war would be short. Strategists held that the great progress made in the invention and manufacture of the engines of war must ensure a series of rapid, irresistible, and decisive offensives to which there would be no effective reply. Economists contended that the cost would be so enormous that no nation would be able for long to bear the financial strain. All these forecasts were belied. The war, far from being short, lasted for more than four years, and the cost, astronomical though the figures were, was met by improvisations of war finance of which pre-war economic science had not conceived. The offensive was met by the defensive device of deep trenches protected by aprons of barbed wire, and what was expected to be a war of rapid manœuvre became a war of fixed positions, a war not of dashing open movements but of attrition or wearing-down, in which the victory finally went to the side whose reserves of man-power and resources in material and supplies held out longest.

Germany, profiting by her unbroken military tradition, her high state of preparedness, and her central position, which gave her the great advantage of working on interior lines, very nearly brought off her western *coup* "before Christmas." The German time-table, however, was put out by the courageous delaying actions of the Belgians, and the onrush was finally held by the "miracle of the Marne." For the next three-and-a-half years the Western Front remained fixed from the North Sea to the Alps. Many attempts were made by both sides to break through, but all failed after an unprecedented sacrifice of life. On the Eastern Front, too, after the ding-dong of the opening battles, the same static situation prevailed, and even the attempt of British Imperial forces at the Dardanelles in 1915 to turn a flank

against the Turks, so as to make contact with the Russians, met the same type of stone-wall resistance and had to be abandoned after the most appalling losses. By the end of 1917 Germany thought she had gained an overwhelming advantage by the detachment of Russia from her Western Allies, which ended for her the terror of war on two fronts. But she had already neutralised this advantage by driving the United States to come in against her through the effects of her declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare, and this mighty accession to Allied strength made certain the ultimate defeat of Germany in the war of attrition.¹

The part played by sea-power in the war was decisive, not by virtue of any spectacular naval engagements but through the blockade of Central Europe. Germany, Austria, and the territories they occupied became a beleaguered fortress from which all attempts of the besieged to break out failed. The only way Germany saw of loosening this stranglehold was through a concentration on submarines, by means of which she instituted a counter-blockade of Britain. At one time Germany came very near to success with this terrible weapon, but it was finally overcome by the device of convoys, and Germany's hope of starving Britain into submission before the full weight of American men and arms could be felt in Europe was frustrated. And as the bastions of the fortress gradually cracked under the hammer blows of the victorious Allied armies, the full effect of the blockade of Germany was seen in the breakdown of civilian morale. Defeated in the field and starved on the home front, the Germans surrendered in the autumn of 1918. So this new kind of war ended no less unprecedentedly than it had begun, for the losers' territory went unscathed while that of the victors had been laid waste, and the Armistice was signed while the victors' lands were still occupied by the forces of the vanquished.

Such was the First World War, precipitated by a local quarrel and leading to the three decades of universal catastrophe which our tortured age has experienced. In it were concentrated all the bitter fruits of the Industrial Revolution, all the horrors of misdirected and unco-ordinated scientific progress, and all the vileness of "man's inhumanity to man." It came upon a world in travail from the difficult marriage of the idealism of the

¹ For an account of the circumstances in which the United States entered the war, see the author's *The Story of the American People*, Chapter XIII.

pre-industrial epoch with the realism of the Machine Age, and hastened the birth of a monster which has defied every liberal effort to educate it into the shape of a rational being. The end of the First World War presented an opportunity to resume that process of education, and an honest attempt was made to do so. Let us see why the teachers failed.

CHAPTER XXI

UNFINISHED VICTORY

THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE EXPERIMENT

The Peace Treaties

HOSTILITIES in the First World War were brought to an end in 1918 by a series of armistices concluded in turn with Bulgaria (September 29), Turkey (October 30), Austria-Hungary (November 3), and Germany (November 11). The armistices were, of course, purely military conventions, whose conditions were laid down by the victorious commanders, and once these conditions had been carried out the politicians had to take charge and proceed to the business of treaty-making. But it was one thing to give orders to cease fire, and quite another to find the bases of a lasting settlement. Europe had been taken unawares when called upon to wage a universal war in 1914. She was scarcely less unprepared to take the steps necessary to establish a universal peace in 1918. The Armistice might end what the Americans called the "shooting war"; it was for the treaty-makers to seek a way to end the many other kinds of international strife which had brought the shooting war about and, if they did not cease, might well one day renew it. In short, the Armistice must eventually be abortive unless a true peace should follow it. How, then, were the victors to set about this Herculean task?

Just as the war of 1914-1918 brought with it unheard-of strains on the improvising powers of governments to meet its demands and unprecedented tests of the solidarity of nations to face its progressive horrors, so it left behind it political, economic, and social problems of such magnitude and complexity as the world had never before been called upon to solve. The traditional governance of the largest states on the Continent had collapsed, vast areas were completely devastated, the normal economic life of Europe, after being in suspense for more than four years, was shattered, large sections of the population were sick with diseases resulting from years of under-nourishment or positively dying of starvation, and no fewer than eight million young men, the flower of every nation, lay dead upon the in-

carnadined battlefields. These facts generated an atmosphere of bitterness and hate which complicated the task of peace-making, already difficult enough in all conscience, and it was in this situation that the representatives of the victorious nations met in Conference at Paris in 1919 to attempt to make a settlement which should simultaneously administer retributive justice to the vanquished, rectify political frontiers according to the dictates of nationalism, meet the demands of the victims for reparations for the damage done, disarm the defeated nations, and lay the foundations of a durable peace.

The main difficulty of the Peace Conference was to find a middle way between the immediate requirements of national security and the ultimate aims of international idealism. The chief protagonist of the first of these needs was Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier; the leading champion of the second was Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States. Clemenceau had twice experienced the desolation of his country under the iron heel of Prussia and was determined to secure its eastern frontier against further ravishment. Wilson had carried his country into the war on a wave of great moral enthusiasm, and as early as January 1918 had laid before Congress at Washington his famous Fourteen Points as a programme of world peace, on the basis of which Germany had, in fact, put out her first feelers for an armistice. The Fourteen Points constituted a sort of pharmacopœia of panaceas for ending the international anarchy, and included, among other proposed remedies, open diplomacy, the freedom of the seas, the breaking-down of economic barriers between nations, reduction of armaments, reparations (but not indemnities), and self-determination as a principle of political organisation. But most important of all for Wilson was the fourteenth point, which demanded the creation of a League of Nations.

With this programme in his pocket, Wilson, the first American President ever to visit Europe while in office, came personally to Paris, resolved to implement it. His reception in Europe was an extraordinary demonstration of popular belief in the power of academic ideas to heal the world's wounds and to bring in a new heaven and a new earth. In this crucial hour in history the prestige of the United States was enormous. The war had left her land unscarred and her resources undiminished. At that very moment there were in France not fewer than two million Americans under arms, and economically the United



EUROPE AS IT WAS ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

States was the only creditor state in the world. How, then, could failure attend the efforts of this disinterested representative of the greatest democracy on earth?

Wilson became, in the eyes of many, the leader of a crusade for the salvation of mankind; nor was this ascription of a Messianic quality to his advent in Europe out of harmony with his own mood. But Wilson's moral authority was not enough, and, confronted with the competing claims of the various victors, with the realism of the French and the intransigence of Clemenceau, with the resentful nationalism of the Italians and the perplexed diplomacy of Orlando, with the naval and imperial interests of the British and the compromising common-sense of Lloyd George, Wilson had to watch the whittling down of his Fourteen Points until nothing remained but self-determination as a working principle, and the League of Nations, reduced to what might well be little more than "the affirmation of a moral purpose" in the form of a preamble to a treaty. And to complete his disillusionment, when he returned to America with the Treaty he had signed and the Covenant of the League of Nations which he had created,



EUROPE AS ARRANGED BY THE TREATIES ENDING THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

he found his people under the influence of a violent revulsion from European entanglements, and the Senate in revolt against both the Treaty and the League.

As there were four defeated members of the Central Alliance and four armistices, so there were four treaties: the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, of St. Germain with Austria, of Neuilly with Bulgaria in 1919, and of Sèvres with Turkey in 1920. These treaties were not negotiated between the belligerents but imposed by the victors on the vanquished. This imposition was necessitated by the universal character of the war, the completeness of the victory, and the radical nature of the peace conditions involved. The treaties dealt mainly with the redistribution of territory, with guarantees for the execution of the peace terms, with reparations for the damage caused, and with the creation of the League of Nations. Territorially, as we have already seen,¹ the treaties increased the number of states in Europe from twenty-seven to thirty-three, creating at

¹ Page 302.

the expense of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia six new states, namely, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia; dividing Austria and Hungary into separate states; enlarging Serbia at their expense by the addition of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, as well as Montenegro which thus ceased to be an independent state, to form the new state of Yugo-Slavia; adding to Rumania Transylvania (from Austria-Hungary) and Bessarabia (from Russia), and to Greece a part of Thrace (from Bulgaria) and parts of Asia Minor (from Turkey); and transferring from Germany Alsace and Lorraine to France, Malmédy and Eupen to Belgium, and North Schleswig to Denmark.

The creation of an independent Poland, by which the Polish Corridor cut the German province of East Prussia off from Germany proper, raised the question of a suitable outlet for the new state to the Baltic. The only port was Danzig, a city of predominantly German population, and in order to make this accessible to the Poles it was declared a Free City, to be administered by a special Commission under the League of Nations. Danzig thus reverted to something like the status it had held for many centuries in the original Germany.¹ Germany acknowledged the independence of Austria and agreed to regard it as "inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations." She also undertook to recognise the complete independence of Czecho-Slovakia and to respect its frontiers as settled by the Treaty. Outside Europe, Germany was deprived of all her colonies in Africa and the Pacific. The various colonies in Africa were distributed among France, Belgium, Britain, and the Union of South Africa, and those in the Pacific among Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, by whom they were to be administered under mandates on behalf of the League of Nations.

It is evident that this territorial settlement involved a complete redrawing of a large part of the map of Europe. Austria and Hungary, out of whose former territories so many lands had come to some of the enlarged or new states, were now comparatively minute political units and were likely to remain impotent to affect the course of events. With Germany it was different. Although she had lost much, she remained a homo-

¹ Between the two wars the Poles, with extraordinary energy and devotion, built, to the north of Danzig, and beyond the boundary of the Free City, the new port of Gdynia, which in a few years they developed from an insignificant seaside village to one of the most important harbours of the Baltic.

geneous and integrated state, still with great potentialities for harm. The new states to her east had been largely constituted from the territories she had extorted from Russia by the terms of the dictated Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. To the west there were all sorts of possibilities of threats to the settlement. It was necessary, therefore, for the Allies to secure guarantees for Germany's good behaviour. Thus by the Treaty of Versailles the whole of the region to the west of the Rhine and east of it to a distance of thirty miles was demilitarised. The Treaty further obliged Germany to limit her armed forces to 100,000 men, to abolish conscription, and to abandon the building of warships and submarines. Finally, the whole of the area to the west of the Rhine and the three bridgeheads to its east, occupied under the terms of the Armistice, were to remain in Allied occupation for fifteen years.

Germany accepted responsibility for causing all the loss and damage suffered by the Allied nations, though this admission of "war guilt" she afterwards violently repudiated. Nor did the admission make it any the more simple to calculate how much she should pay by way of reparations. It was easy enough to arrange that France should occupy the Saar Valley, under a Commission appointed by the League of Nations, as compensation for the destruction of her coal mines, and this was agreed to, subject to a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years.¹ But there was the profoundest disagreement as to the limit of Germany's capacity to pay. It was no more than bare justice that the continental victors should expect Germany to foot the bill, for, after all, it was their lands and not Germany's which had been ravaged. Yet, however high the charge was pitched, it could barely begin to cover the total costs of reconstruction. In the heat and excitement of the immediate aftermath of the war the amount was seriously assessed, by at least one expert committee, as high as 270 milliard gold marks, or nearly £14,000,000,000, but in the cool of the later enquiries this fantastic figure² was reduced to something nearer to £2,000,000,000. Even so, agreement was never reached on this most controversial of all the questions of the settlement.

The fact is that the whole question of Reparations impaled

¹ The plebiscite was duly held in 1935, and as a result Germany regained the Saar.

² See the indictment of the whole absurdity of these calculations by the most enlightened of the expert economists on the original Commission, J. M. (afterwards Lord) Keynes, in his masterly and absorbing book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

the victors on the horns of this inescapable and recurrent dilemma : if Germany was to pay she must be assisted to recover her full economic stature, but if she so recovered, then she must necessarily again become a danger to the peace of the world. The naïve notion that the wealth of a nation consists, as it were, in bars of gold instead of in its potentiality to produce, led in 1918 to the demand of certain irresponsible publicists that we should march to Berlin and, in effect, ransack the cellars of Potsdam for the necessary cash to rebuild a devastated continent. It is now only too clear to us, after the passage of a quarter of a century from those days of disenchantment, that the whole of Germany must be occupied, but let us not delude ourselves that we shall find it a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground, where we may pick up gold and silver with which to meet the cost of the war. The permanent exorcising of the spirit of German militarism was not then, and is not now, to be so easily secured.

The draft Treaty of Versailles was submitted to the German delegation in Paris for their observations. They recognised that the German people had to make sacrifices but complained that it was not the kind of peace they had been led to hope for from the Fourteen Points. They protested strongly against the redistribution of territory, especially in the east ; they invoked what they called the new fundamental law contained in the right of self-determination as a principle that should apply equally to the defeated as to the victorious nations ; they declared that the proposed reparations bill was of such monstrous proportions as to condemn them to perpetual slavery ; and finally they declaimed against their exclusion from the League of Nations. The Allies replied that what they were proposing was a peace of justice, justice for the peoples spoliated and impoverished by German savagery. But the Germans gained something from their protests. There was some modification of the eastern frontiers, and a plebiscite was ordered in Upper Silesia, which resulted in a distinct gain for Germany. No reparations figure was actually put into the Treaty, but was left to the decision of a Reparations Commission, which in fact gradually scaled the payments down, until in 1932 they were reduced to a point so low as to be virtually cancelled. As to the League of Nations, the Allies said that the Germans could not expect the nations which they had so grievously wronged to sit down immediately in amity with them, though, when the asperities had died down,

Germany might be—and, as we have already seen, in due time was—admitted to the League.

The other Treaties, in the same way, imposed severe conditions on Germany's allies. The territorial readjustments here were much more involved and even more likely to breed future strife, though they had to be accepted at the time. The Turks alone refused to accept the conditions without a fight, and, under the inspired leadership of Mustapha Kemal (afterwards honoured with the title *Ataturk*), so successfully rehabilitated themselves politically and militarily that the Greeks had to accept defeat at their hands in Asia Minor, and the Allies were forced to meet them as equals. The result was the negotiated Treaty of Lausanne which in 1923 replaced the imposed Treaty of Sèvres. The "Sick Man of Europe" had indeed made a remarkable recovery, and the new Turkey, revitalised by Ataturk's policy of Westernisation, was to play a much more constructive part in the affairs of south-eastern Europe in the future than ever it had played in the past.

Here, then, was a resettlement of Europe of vast and immeasurable potentiality for good or harm. The Germans might protest that the settlement was harsh and unjust, but the fact remains that it was founded on a recognisable principle of political evolution, the principle of national self-determination, which had been the slowly strengthening motive-force in the dynamism of European politics for four centuries. The Germans might complain that the Treaty of Versailles offered no hope of permanent pacification, but, in fact, it instituted machinery designed to extend to international affairs the constitutional principle already recognised as the only true means of securing the Rule of Law in national politics, which was to be accomplished by incorporating in the text of the Treaty of Versailles the Covenant of the League of Nations. Thereby the authors of the Treaty hoped to secure for the League a special sanctity and to ensure that, as time allayed the animosities and acrimonies of the immediate post-war period, there should remain a way of permanent amity among the nations.

The Constitution of the League of Nations

The establishment of the League of Nations was a reflection of the revulsion of the larger part of Europe from the horrors of the First World War. It was inevitable that the leaders of

the victorious but peace-loving peoples, having made a settlement of the war in the Treaties, should seek to secure it by means of some permanent machinery of pacification and conciliation. But just as the war had been unprecedented in the suffering and devastation that it caused, so it would require, to prevent its recurrence, an international organisation much more soundly based and workable than any previous plan had been. Throughout the modern period, in which Europe had learned to turn to the use of force as the natural means of settling international disputes, she had been, nevertheless, haunted by the spirit of the unity she had lost with the fall of the Roman Empire. This sense of loss had been evident in the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, and reflected in the writings and plans of idealists and intellectuals, such as Pierre Dubois in the fourteenth century, Erasmus in the sixteenth, Henry of Navarre in the seventeenth, and the Abbé de Saint Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant in the eighteenth. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars internationalism passed from the stage of Utopianism to that of practical politics, with the establishment of the Congress System, which might have achieved something more permanent for the peace of Europe if it had not been prostituted by Metternich to the purposes of reaction. As it was, it defeated its own purpose, and the Concert of Europe, tinkling and uninspiring as its music had become, was finally played out by the discordant trumpets of Bismarck's power-politics. Nor could the honest efforts of the supporters of the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century prevent the onset of universal war in 1914, which was essentially the apotheosis of the Bismarckian technique.

It was thus necessary to seek a new principle, and it was found in the idea that, instead of an occasional meeting of a few powerful individuals, there should be established a permanent forum in which matters of international concern should be publicly debated, just as national affairs were openly ventilated in parliament. It was essentially an Anglo-Saxon idea, and was accordingly received at first with a certain amount of scepticism, or at best shoulder-shrugging tolerance, by continental politicians. The plan had been largely worked out in Britain during the war by Lord Phillimore and General Smuts. It was President Wilson who, by insisting that the Covenant of the League should be an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles, translated the plan into terms of practical politics, since he thus ensured that every signatory to the Treaty should recognise the League and all the

victor signatories should be original members of it. The Covenant of the League, thus made a part of the Treaty, was a document containing twenty-six articles, setting forth its purposes and laying down its constitution. Its fundamental purpose was the maintenance of peace, first by securing, in the event of an international dispute, a period of delay during which passions might cool off, and secondly by setting up the means to settle such a dispute by conciliation or arbitration, according to whether the dispute was political or juridical in its nature. The machinery of the League was such as to ensure that these aims should have the fullest possible chance of being realised.

Article 1 of the Covenant stated the rules of membership. Any fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony might be admitted, subject to the approval of the Assembly and provided that it gave the necessary guarantees as prescribed by the League. Articles 2 to 7, and 14 dealt with the organs of the League; namely, the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat, and the Permanent International Court of Justice. These organs corresponded, but only very broadly, with what we have earlier described¹ as the three necessary departments of government: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The Assembly was a sort of international Parliament, though it normally had only one brief session a year. The Council could hardly be compared with a Cabinet, though it had certain executive functions: it was rather a deliberative body, more easily convened than the Assembly. The Secretariat closely resembled the Civil Service of an individual state and was a permanent body of officers. The Permanent Court was as near an approximation to a state judiciary, at least on the side of civil law, as international law, actual or potential, allowed.

The Assembly consisted of not more than three representatives of every member state, though only one could vote on behalf of his state on any issue. It met at least once a year, for about three weeks (or more often as occasion might require). It could debate any matter within the sphere of the League affecting the peace of the world. The Council was made up of five permanent and nine non-permanent members (both numbers varied with the changing membership of the League), representing respectively the Great Powers and the smaller nations, the non-permanent members being elected for three years. The Council was to meet as occasion required, and in practice generally

¹ See page 15.

met four times a year. Its powers were similar to those of the Assembly, but actually, because it met more often and was more easily convened, it tended to debate in detail matters afterwards submitted to the Assembly.

The Secretariat was an entirely non-political body of salaried officers permanently employed at the seat of the League at Geneva. The members of the Secretariat, from the Secretary-General downwards, were not representatives of the state from which they came, but servants of the League. The Secretariat was divided into three main branches for purposes of administration: the General-Secretariat, which included several Under-Secretaries-General for special missions; the Technical Sections, which dealt with such matters as information, transport, and communications; the Administrative Departments, including finance, library, and registry. The main functions of the Secretariat were to carry out investigations into matters of common interest to all civilised states, to build up records of a permanent character, and to prepare reports for submission to the Council and the Assembly.

The Permanent International Court of Justice was constituted in accordance with a direction given in Article 14 of the Covenant. Its constitution was laid down in a lengthy protocol to the Covenant, and it came finally into being in 1921. It consisted of a bench of eleven judges, five representing the Latin group of states, three representing the Germanic and Scandinavian group, two the Common Law group (Britain, the British Dominions, and—if she joined—the United States), and one for Asia. By Article 13 of the Covenant the Court was competent only to determine disputes submitted to it, though it might arbitrate at the request of the parties. The Court had its permanent home, not at the headquarters of the League itself at Geneva, but at The Hague, the traditional seat of the Permanent Court set up by the old Hague Conference.

One other institution established by the League was the International Labour Office, which worked side by side with its other organs permanently at Geneva. The plan of such an international organisation grew out of the Labour Charter of Rights, which, like the Covenant of the League, had been made a corporate part of the Treaty of Versailles. For the first time in history a conference of envoys of national governments thus recognised the claims of labour throughout the world and the importance of the part it must play in any durable peace. As

in the case of the Assembly of the League, the International Labour Conference met annually to frame proposals, which were afterwards submitted for consideration and approval by the states in membership of the League. Remote though it may have seemed from contact with the day-to-day problems of labour and industry within the various states, the I.L.O. did most valuable work in collating and distributing information on the economic side of the international problem. So alive, indeed, did it become that it survived the outbreak of the Second World War, during the course of which the International Labour Conference met in America.

The great promise of the constitution of the League of Nations, as compared with any other practical plan for the maintenance of the peace of the world since the fall of the Roman Empire, lay in the fact that its organs were permanently established. For its makers realised that peace is not a mere negation, which exists between outbursts of international strife, but a positive attitude which has to be slowly and painstakingly built up among the nations of the world. The constitution of the League provided the machinery; it was for the nations to make it work.

The Prestige and Influence of the League

The first Assembly of the League met at Geneva in 1920, when it had a membership of forty-two states. By the following year there were forty-eight states in membership, a number which rose to fifty-five in 1929, fifty-seven in 1932, and sixty in 1933. After that there was a falling away, and by the eve of the Second World War the membership had dropped to forty-six. From the beginning the League suffered under the handicap of the refusal of the United States to join it, so that the Power that had created it and was in the most effective position to give it strength and sustenance denied its help. Wilson struggled heroically on behalf of his own child, but the Senate refused to adopt it. In the Presidential Election of 1920 the Republican Party triumphed, and Wilson, whose health had broken down under the strain, watched from his sick-bed the shattering of his hopes that the American people might be permanently led away from their isolationism for the sake of the peace of the world. On the other hand, Germany was admitted a member in 1926, though Russia did not join until 1934.

In the first decade of its existence the League of Nations did

invaluable work and reached a position of great prestige as an instrument of international conciliation and aid. In 1923 it settled a dispute between Italy and Greece, which otherwise might easily have led to war. In the same year it materially assisted in the financial restoration of Austria and of Hungary whose detachment from the rest of the old "Ramshackle Empire" and from each other the Treaties had enforced. Besides, in 1923 the League supervised the complicated task of settling in Greece refugees from Asia Minor under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. In 1925 it composed a frontier quarrel between Greece and Bulgaria. Over the same period also it carried out other obligations under the Treaties, such as the allotment and oversight of mandated territories which had formerly been German colonies, and the organisation and maintenance of international régimes, like that of the Free City of Danzig. Meanwhile, the Secretariat went rapidly forward with its work of collecting and collating information connected with the international aspects of such questions as labour and health, and the drafting of rules for the suppression or regulation of world-wide evils, like the White Slave Traffic and the marketing of pernicious drugs. The League, in short, became a storehouse of facts and a clearing-house of ideas about truly international affairs, and on this side of its work promised to be of the greatest benefit to Europe and the world at large.

There can be no sort of doubt that, during the first post-war years, the League encouraged a pacific outlook on the international scene. The occupation of the Ruhr by the French and the Belgians in 1923 was, it is true, an unfortunate episode in the opposite direction, but Europe temporarily recovered from this apostasy, and the Treaty of Locarno of 1925, to which France, Belgium, Italy, Britain, and Germany were signatories, restored the conciliatory trend. By it Germany freely pledged herself to maintain the Rhineland as a demilitarised zone, a condition which she had been *forced* to accept by the Treaty of Versailles. Under the terms of the Treaty, also, France and Germany solemnly promised never to go to war again with each other. The outcome of these moves was the admission of Germany to the League in 1926, the withdrawal of all Allied troops occupying Germany in 1930, five years earlier than the time fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, and the virtual conclusion of the Reparations controversy in 1932.

Soon after the Treaty of Locarno and the admission of Ger-

many to the League, there came, in 1928, the Pact of Paris, otherwise known as the Kellogg Pact, so called after the American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, who, in association with Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister, was responsible for its inception. By the Kellogg Pact the leading Powers of the world, including the United States, though not a member of the League, condemned recourse to war as a means of solving international controversies and agreed that they would settle them only by pacific means : they undertook, in short, to outlaw war and to confine it in future to purely defensive purposes. So rosy, indeed, appeared the prospect for peace and amity among the nations in 1928 that Briand began to dream of a European federation, and spent the few years that remained to him in working out a constitution for the United States of Europe. But his death in 1932 coincided with the lengthening of the Nazi shadow of coming events in Germany, and Europe soon had a rude awakening from its dream of peace. These movements were certainly the results of diplomatic activities outside the League, yet the Treaty of Locarno and the Kellogg Pact were, in fact, particular applications of general League principles, and but for the example set by the League and the spadework it had by then carried out, it is hard to see how they could have been envisaged.

The treaty-makers of 1919 had acknowledged that one of the fundamental causes of the war had been the uncontrolled growth of armaments. Among the most vital functions of the League, therefore, as laid upon it by Article 8 of the Covenant, was to formulate plans for the progressive reduction of armaments. When Germany was disarmed by the Treaty of Versailles it was never intended that her disarmament should remain unilateral ; it was rather to be a prelude to a universal limitation of armaments. But to translate this lofty aim into action, in face of Germany's resentment and France's fears of the future, was not easy. The League appointed a special technical commission to go into the whole question, but for several years it made little headway. With the new spirit of conciliation evident in the Treaty of Locarno and the Kellogg Pact, the auspices seemed brighter, but it was not until 1932 that any definite action was taken. In that year a Disarmament Conference was called at Geneva and was attended by the representatives of no fewer than sixty-four states, including the United States and Russia, though neither of them was a member of the League.

The Disarmament Conference turned out to be the first of the League's great failures and marked the beginning of its decline in prestige and influence. The whole problem of armaments involved the Powers in a vicious circle, for disarmament was practicable only with security, and security could not be accomplished except with arms. Consequently, the Conference soon became bogged in a morass of conflicting proposals, mostly unrelated to the realities of the time. The French proposal for the formation of an international armed force was soon set aside in favour of one for the abolition of the more aggressive weapons, and then the United States boldly suggested an all-round reduction of one-third in armaments then existing. The only solid outcome of the interminable discussions was the recognition of Germany's claim to equality of status with other nations. On this vital issue it was agreed that Germany should re-arm by stages until she reached parity with other Great Powers.

Thus the ultimate effect of the Conference was the very antithesis of that intended, for the grant of equality to Germany, instead of limiting armaments, simply led to a revival of the race in their production. Could there, indeed, be a sadder commentary on the whole business of the Disarmament Conference than the reflection that within two years of its close the mass of armaments in Europe was actually greater than it had been in 1914? The hope of the Conference that German arms production might be controlled with that of other nations was dashed by events in Germany. For scarcely had this question of German equality been settled than Hitler came into power, and among his first acts in 1933 was the withdrawal of Germany from both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. The bottom was thus knocked out of the Conference, and it broke up in an atmosphere of frustration and futility. So the sky which had been bright with the promise of peace and amity was suddenly overcast by dark clouds full of the thunder of coming storms.

The Decline and Eclipse of the League

The main purpose of the League was the prevention of war, a question which was dealt with in no fewer than nine separate articles of the Covenant and embraced one-third of the whole of its text. The most disputed device suggested for the pre-

vention of war was contained in Article 16, the opening paragraph of which read as follows :

“ Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between persons residing in their territory and persons residing in the territory of the Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between persons residing in the territory of the Covenant-breaking state and persons residing in the territory of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.”

The acid test of the League's sincerity of purpose and reality of power was bound to come as soon as it was called upon to protect one of its members against aggressive action by another. The first of such tests came in 1931 when the Japanese seized the Chinese province of Manchuria, declared its independence under the name Manchukuo, and set up a puppet government under the ex-Emperor of China. Both China and Japan were members of the League, and China appealed for its help against the aggressor. The League called upon Japan to evacuate Manchuria and sent out a commission of enquiry. Japan's reply was to declare that the establishment of Manchukuo as a state independent of China was an accomplished fact, and she withdrew from the League. The League felt that, in the circumstances, it dared not risk a resort to sanctions, and, to save its face, it argued that Article 16 had not been specifically invoked ; so the aggressor escaped with his ill-gotten spoils.

If this Sino-Japanese incident, occurring in territories and under conditions remote from normal European interests, did no more than tarnish the reputation of the League, it was not long before its authority was submitted to a more searching test much nearer home. In 1935, Italy, hungering after imperial prestige and taking advantage of her superior position and equipment in Africa, invaded Abyssinia, an assault which she attempted to justify by the most hollow special pleading and carried out with every circumstance of brutality. Both states were members of the League. Italy, in fact, had actually

sponsored Abyssinia's admission to it, and she was, moreover, a permanent member of the Council and a co-signatory with the other Powers of the Kellogg Pact for the outlawry of war. No more obvious case of unprovoked aggression, no more flagrant flouting of every purpose of peace and civilisation for which the League stood, could possibly be conceived, and the conscience of all decent Europeans was proportionately stirred. When, therefore, Abyssinia appealed, in strict conformity with Article 16, for the help of the League, it was manifest that the League must succeed against the aggressor or perish.

The Council of the League exhausted every expedient for the peaceful settlement of the dispute, but Mussolini was adamant. Nothing short of the utter annihilation of Abyssinia's independence would satisfy him. There could, he said, be no turning back, for the Italian Government and people were resolved to carry on to the bitter end. Thereupon the Council declared Italy the aggressor and called on members of the League, in accordance with Article 16, to impose economic sanctions. About fifty members, in fact, agreed to impose an embargo on the sale of arms and oil to Italy, to boycott Italian goods, and to withhold loans and credits. This economic phalanx, however, turned out to be more apparent than real, and Italy succeeded in her diabolical plan in spite of it. Her conquest of Abyssinia was unexpectedly swift, for there were large chinks in the economic wall around Italy, and she actually succeeded in persuading certain Powers to support a plan for the partition of Abyssinia. This last conspiracy, however, did not succeed, and Italy went forward to complete the conquest. By the middle of 1936 Italian troops occupied the capital, Addis Ababa, Abyssinia was annexed to Italy, and the King of Italy added to his titles that of Emperor of Abyssinia. Shortly afterwards, the League officially announced that sanctions would not be further imposed, and in the course of the next two years all the important states of Europe recognised Italy's annexation of Abyssinia.

The League never recovered from the loss of prestige which it suffered through Italy's unpunished rape of Ethiopia, carried out in defiance of the Covenant and despite the application of economic sanctions under Article 16. As a result of this breakdown of the League's machinery some attempt was made to reform the Covenant. There were Committees of Enquiry, reports to the Council and Assembly, and solemn resolutions, but they could have little more than an academic interest in

face of the stark realities of the international situation. For nothing could alter the facts that Japan, Germany, and Italy had left the League, that Germany and Italy had come together in a new alliance known as the Rome-Berlin Axis, and that all three renegade Powers were by 1937 united in the Anti-Comintern Pact. The League was powerless to prevent Japan's proceeding with what she lightly called the "Chinese Incident" and continuing to annex large portions of Chinese territory southward of Manchukuo. The League was equally unable to take effective action against National Socialist Germany as it cynically carried out its succession of violent abrogations of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, culminating in the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia and the invasion of Poland in 1939. Again, it could do nothing to stop Mussolini's bellicose declamations which were once more translated into aggressive action in the invasion of Albania in that same fateful year. Nor could it play anything more than the part of an anxious spectator of the Spanish Civil War, which began in 1936, while Hitler and Mussolini quite deliberately, if clandestinely, used it as an occasion to try out new weapons and to give their technicians practical experience of their use in conditions of actual warfare in Europe.

The system of collective security which the League had worked so painstakingly to build up was shattered by these outrages upon it, and Europe was back in the conditions of international anarchy which had preceded the outbreak of universal war in 1914, a situation of which Hitler, in his determination to revive Germany's claim to a hegemony of Europe, and ultimately of the world, was not slow to take advantage. The reasons for the decline and eclipse of the League are not far to seek. From its foundation it suffered the insuperable handicap of the absence from its membership of the United States, without whose contribution it could never be truly effective. With the defection of the three Great Powers of Japan, Germany, and Italy, notwithstanding the entry of Russia meanwhile, the League became a mere truncation of its original self; in fact, an association of nations standing for peace against an alliance of nations determined on war. The League had no money-raising power and had to live on the contributions of its state members. It disposed of no armed forces, but depended on the will of its members to carry out their solemn undertakings. Its law, in the last analysis, had only moral authority to back it, and as soon as important states were determined and ready to risk flouting that authority,

the plan broke down. In other words, the League lacked sovereign power, which remained undiminished in the hands of each state member of it.

If the League did not institute effective world government, it was because the world was not ready for it. What the League attempted was the most difficult of all political tasks : to create a peace mentality which should gradually replace the centuries-old habit of resorting to war. It failed in that object because the nations were not capable of settling by peaceful means the outstanding causes of conflict, which was the necessary condition for so profound a psychological revolution. Thus the settlement made at the end of the war of 1914-1918 proved premature, and the armistice of 1918 was denounced twenty-one years later by the nation on which it had been imposed. So were the champions of right forced to gird themselves again in order to complete the unfinished victory of the First World War.

CHAPTER XXII
SECOND WORLD WAR

HITLER OVER EUROPE

The Rearmament of Germany

WITH the decline of the League of Nations there gradually faded the prospect of maintaining the decencies of international conduct so slowly and painfully built up after the First World War. The governments which broke away from the League did so, not merely in contempt of the Rule of Law on which its hopes were based, but with the positive purpose of transferring to the field of international relations the methods of political gangsterism which they had already so successfully employed in establishing within their national boundaries the totalitarian state. They were not content to ridicule the ideal of collective security and international conciliation: they actually proclaimed as a higher law the policy of unilateral action and undeclared war. These forces were seen most markedly at work in Germany, where Hitler's domestic and foreign policies from the first were so inextricably interwoven that one was meaningless without the other.

Hitler's rise to power was based on three complementary assumptions. The first was that the German people could only reach their full stature by exchanging the sterile democracy of the Weimar Republic for the fertilising force of his personal dictatorship. The second was that the Germans were a superior people, whose superiority over other peoples could only be demonstrated if they became once more a nation in arms. The third was that such a nation was above the law and could therefore take what it wanted from other nations without considerations of right or humanity. To prove the truth of these assumptions it was first necessary that Germany should recover her internal prosperity, which meant the full employment of her people, and that she should regain, in the eyes of the world, her pre-war prestige as a first-class Power, which meant wiping out the ignominy of the dictated Treaty of Versailles. These two ends were, according to Hitler, to be accomplished by the same means: rearmament, and this meant that the nation must be

placed immediately on the footing of a war economy. For the establishment of such a war economy in Germany the auspices could not have been more favourable, for if the Disarmament Conference had freely granted her the right to eventual parity with other Powers, how, Hitler might ask with every show of reason, could this be achieved without setting the nation feverishly to work on the manufacture of armaments? Rearmament was obviously for Hitler the way at the same time to end the unemployment crisis in Germany and to cover with a cloak of public right his ultimate aggressive purposes.

It is common knowledge that in a modern war a tremendous initial advantage lies with any Power which consciously prepares for it against opponents who are not so prepared. That was broadly true of the position of Germany in 1914, but during the succeeding twenty years enormous strides had been made in industrial and technical processes and in the scientific methods of mass production, which gave a much more exact and sinister meaning to the word preparedness as applied to war. By then the mass production of the engines of war had become a very intricate and complex business, involving a long preparatory period during which designers and highly skilled engineers had to work at the creation of machinery in order to make possible the production, by the use of machine tools and automatic processes, of an endless flow of mass-produced copies of the original complicated models built up by hand-and-brain methods. That preparatory period might last as long as two years, and while it continued there was very little actual production, which could not reach its peak until the mechanical processes were in full swing.¹

Now, it is obvious that the nation which, at the threat of attack, has to begin this preparatory process is under a severe, and possibly fatal, handicap against the nation which has already passed through it to the stage of mass production. And in order to appreciate the diabolism of the outrage which the Nazis and their sponsors perpetrated on Western Civilisation, one must realise that, by utilising the vast resources of Germany and the high technical skill of the Germans, they deliberately prepared this advantage for themselves from 1933, when the policy of rearmament was made the key to Germany's internal and external rehabilitation. By this means they were able to

¹ For a very lucid statement of this highly technical question, see R. C. K. Ensor's excellent little book, *A Miniature History of the War* (1944), pages 9-13.

foretell exactly when they would be ready to strike with overwhelming force against their unprepared and unsuspecting neighbours. For the essence of the coming warfare was that it should be undeclared and that its victims should meanwhile have been lulled into a sense of safety by pacts of peace and friendship which the Germans freely offered them but had not the slightest intention of honouring.

Every step in aggression which Hitler took towards the final crisis of 1939 was coldly calculated from this ground of a prostituted technology and a cajoling treachery. But much as his success at each step owed to his own ruthlessness and to the Nazi-inspired revival of German energy, it owed even more to the paralysis of the great democratic Powers in face of them. Indeed, the ease with which France and Britain showed themselves ready to allow the Treaty of Versailles to be abrogated clause by clause must have surprised even the arrogance of Hitler, and the policy of "appeasement" which they fondly hoped would make him reasonable only encouraged him to yet bolder steps which he thus realised he could take with impunity. There is clear evidence that he timed his original programme in anticipation of a collision in 1938, but the policy of appeasement which gave him more than he expected without a fight, and the Allies' realisation in 1938 that they must seriously face the prospect of war, which meant that they must gain time, caused the final clash to be postponed until the late summer of 1939.

Steps in Aggression

Hitler's first actions, after the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the League in 1933, were a combination of bluff and intimidation. In 1934 he made a peace pact with Poland promising to respect her boundaries for a period of ten years, and in 1935 a naval agreement with Britain whereby he undertook to keep the German navy down to 35 per cent. of the British. But in 1935 he reintroduced conscription in Germany in defiance of her engagements under the Treaty of Versailles. There had, in fact, already been some indeterminate attempts at this during Papen's Chancellorship before Hitler succeeded to that office, but Hitler made it formal and official, and accompanied its restoration by a declaration to the world that it was intended exclusively for defence and in

the interests of peace. To this defiant action there were only paper protests from the Western Powers, but it led Russia to sign a pact of mutual assistance and support with France and a similar agreement with Czecho-Slovakia.

These diplomatic moves, however, far from preventing further German assaults on the Treaty, merely gave Hitler a pretext for a renewed cry of "encirclement." Consequently in 1936 he took the bold step of marching his troops into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland. It transpired that Hitler had given orders that if this move should be met by armed resistance the troops were to march back without returning fire. But no such opposition occurred. France and Britain, apart from their dread of starting another general war, were at this time involved in the complications arising from Italy's Abyssinian venture, and so Hitler's gamble came off without a shot being fired. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland was of the utmost assistance to Hitler's plans. It brought the armed power of Germany once more up against the French frontier, at the same time liberating such great industrial centres as Cologne, Dusseldorf, and Friedrichshafen for munitions production and making possible the armed protection of the great Ruhr industries.

In the same year Germany joined Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact against Russia and, even more significantly, made an alliance with Italy. Up to that time Italy had considered herself the protectress of Austria, and this had effectively prevented any diplomatic *rapprochement* between the two Fascist Powers, despite the mutual sympathy of their political purposes. But the attempt of the League of Nations to impose sanctions on Italy after her invasion of Abyssinia changed the situation. The result was that Italy was thrown into the arms of Germany, and, the bugbear of Austria notwithstanding, the Rome-Berlin Axis was formed. It was now apparent that the hope of collective security, for which the League stood, was shattered, and the nations of Europe reverted to the search for a balance of power. Nothing could have been more calculated to assist Hitler's aims, for he had no longer to fear a united Europe and could now safely proceed to the execution of his plans in detail. The programme was exactly designed for the successive overthrow of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland, but before proceeding to violence he first lulled Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, as he had already lulled Poland, into a sense of false security by announcing his intention to respect their frontiers and their independence.

It had always been a plank in Hitler's platform to join Austria to Germany. To him, as an Austrian by birth and a pan-German by conviction, this union was an indispensable prerequisite of the expansion of the Reich. He had made an attempt at it as early as 1934, when he had engineered the murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, but he had been prevented from gathering the spoils of that abominable crime by the opposition of Mussolini. Now, however, that the two Dictators were in criminal league, Hitler tried again. In the spring of 1938, on the pretence of restoring order, he moved men and motorised units of the German army into Austria. They occupied the country without opposition, and Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, was spirited away. So Austria, which the Treaty of Versailles had declared should never be joined to Germany, was proclaimed "a land of the German *Reich*," and Hitler thus added, without a shot fired, seven million Germans to the *Reich* and a territory of incalculable importance to his plans.


A glance at the map will show in what a parlous position the German occupation of Austria placed Czecho-Slovakia. The precious provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, projecting like a tongue into the heart of Germany, were caught helplessly in the grip of Teutonic forces. The independence of the state, re-created at the end of the First World War after three centuries of suppression and as the result of the undying heroism of the Czech nation, hung by a thread, which it took Hitler only a few months to snap. Hitler adopted his by now customary preliminary tactics of stirring up strife. It was easy in this case, because in the Sudetenland, which formed the borderland marching with Germany, were some three million Germans eagerly awaiting liberation. The situation for the Czechs was made more critical by the fact that the Sudetenland included Czecho-Slovakia's natural defences on the west.

Hitler realised that he was playing with fire, but his original time-table had allowed for a general conflagration in this year and he went ahead. But whereas Germany was ready for war, France and Britain were not. That is the explanation of their fateful capitulation at Munich in September 1938, as a result of which the Sudetenland was annexed to Germany, and Czecho-Slovakia was deprived of three millions of her inhabitants and her natural defences. Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain mutually agreed to respect the new frontiers, and Neville Chamberlain returned with a "scrap of paper"

containing a worthless undertaking on the part of Germany never to go to war on any outstanding issue of European, or, for that matter, imperial, politics. Russia, despite her pact with France, took no part in these parleys, a fact which only emphasised the essential weakness of the opposition to Germany. The stage was thus set for Hitler's next step in aggression, which he was preparing to take, in spite of his insistence at Munich that he had no further territorial claims to make, and within six months of this disarming declaration Czecho-Slovakia had been completely overrun and her independence entirely destroyed.

By way of preliminary, Hitler encouraged a separatist movement in Slovakia, which, according to the Republican Constitution, had a separate parliament, or diet, and ministry for local affairs, and when, in March 1939, the central government at Prague dismissed the Slovak Ministry, the Slovak Prime Minister appealed to Hitler for help. It was, of course, immediately forthcoming, with the result that Slovakia declared its independence. Dr. Benes, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, thereupon visited Hitler in the hope of finding some sort of compromise. But Hitler made it clear that he had a thousand bombers ready to reduce Prague to rubble at a moment's notice, and so Benes had no alternative but to surrender into German keeping the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, which were thereupon occupied by German troops without resistance and proclaimed a Protectorate of the *Reich*. Within a day or two the independent Slovakia was also taken over by Hitler, and the remaining section of the Republic, Ruthenia, in the east, was, with German connivance, overrun by Hungarian troops. So closed the twenty years of independence of Czecho-Slovakia. Before the end of March, the Germans snatched the vital Baltic port of Memel from Lithuania. The lightest comprehension of the significance of these events and the most superficial glance at the map must have convinced even the most unregenerate "appeaser" that Poland was marked out as the next victim of the aggressor.

Such were Germany's first steps in aggression, but she was not the only aggressor. Her Axis partner was also permitted a share in the spoils of international gangsterism. In April 1939, within three weeks of Hitler's entry into Prague and little more than a fortnight of his seizure of Memel, Mussolini ordered Italian troops to cross into Albania and coolly declared it annexed to Italy. The years 1938 and 1939 were certainly profitable



HITLER'S STEPS IN AGGRESSION, 1936-1939.

Leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Each step is shown by an arrow from Berlin.

times for aggressors. Up to the Easter of 1939 the Democratic Powers had been impotent to prevent or avenge these depredations, but they were to be the last that the honour and intelligence of the Western nations were prepared to endure without a fight. Munich had given Hitler a bloodless conquest; it had given France and Britain something even more vital—time. The outrageous events of March 1939 came too soon for the time factor to be yet of use, but, whatever the consequences, the next attempt must be resisted with all the armed resources that outraged nationalism and the cause of Western Civilisation could command.

The Germans lost no time in exploiting the advantage they had gained against Poland by their virtual annexation of Czecho-Slovakia and the seizure of Memel. In March and April 1939, Hitler pressed the Poles to agree to the incorporation of Danzig in Germany and to the concession of land for a road and railway across the corridor between Prussia and East Prussia. When

the Poles refused, he declared the ten-year German-Polish pact null and void, worked up a German agitation in Danzig, and poured forces by sea into East Prussia. Meanwhile, Britain joined France in belated precautionary measures in the diplomatic field. They gave guarantees to Poland, Rumania, and Greece, and opened negotiations with Turkey, who later joined them in a defensive alliance. But by these arrangements the Western Powers only increased their commitments without gaining any compensating assistance, since they could find no common ground with Russia. In the summer of 1939 they opened negotiations with the Soviet Government. Stalin's object was to conclude an Anglo-French-Russian treaty which should guarantee the Baltic States against a German assault, but to this the Western Democracies could not bring themselves to agree. In August, while the conversations were pursuing their indeterminate and disheartening course, there suddenly flashed across the world the staggering intelligence that Germany and Russia had signed a non-aggression pact, which sent the British and French diplomatists in Moscow disconsolately home.

Hitler's sweeping conceptions and quick-firing actions had thus again left the Democracies standing. By this brilliant diplomatic manœuvre, he had at a stroke neutralised Russia and dispelled the nightmare of a war on two fronts, which had been the undoing of Germany in the previous world war. He realised that he had taken his last undisputed step in aggression, and that the one he now contemplated must bring Britain and France in arms against him. But in the circumstances of that moment he regarded a war confined to the West as a comparative bagatelle. Accordingly, on September 1, having concocted a deliberate farce about an ultimatum, he made undeclared war on Poland by invading that unfortunate country from three sides. The Anglo-French guarantee became immediately operative, and two days later the Second World War began.

The Fall of France and the Isolation of Britain

France and Britain were utterly unprepared to wage war on the grand scale. Germany, realising this as well as they did themselves, knew that she had nothing yet to fear in the West and concentrated on the annihilation of Poland. The campaign furnished the first example in history of what the Germans called *Blitzkrieg*, or lightning war, which they were to use again

and again with such diabolical results as the war proceeded. An overwhelming concentration of armour and dive-bombers supplied both the element of surprise and a weight of power to which no small state, depending on comparatively ill-equipped, though heroic, troops, could make an effective reply. Added to the horrors of the *Blitzkrieg* was the disruptive effect of Germany's calculated use of the services of pro-German Poles in a paralysing combination of espionage, treason, and sabotage. This Fifth Column,¹ as it was called, was, like the *Blitzkrieg*, used by the Germans with increasing effect, in all their later land campaigns of the war, as they moved relentlessly into almost every continental capital. Thus, with every circumstance of good fortune on their side, the Germans in a fortnight had overrun the whole of western Poland, and the Polish Government had to flee from Warsaw. This situation was so dangerous for the Russians that, as a defensive measure, they occupied eastern Poland. The heroic resistance of the Poles broke down as they found their country thus once more partitioned between their traditional enemies. Thereupon, Russia took further defensive steps, and occupied Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which offered no resistance. But when she attempted similar action in Finland, the Finns would not permit it, and so she was involved in the Finnish War.

Meanwhile, in the west a very different picture from that of 1914 unfolded itself. There a British Expeditionary Force, as before, was safely landed, but the opposing forces settled themselves in the great defensive positions which both had slowly and laboriously built, the French in the Maginot Line and the Germans in the West Wall. There followed a strange period of apparent inaction, called, in the graphic phrase of the Americans, the "Phoney War"; though, in fact, while among the French the Maginot complex tended to induce an attitude of defeatism, for the Germans the West Wall was, in effect, a marshalling yard. In reality, if we had only known it, the new generation of German war-lords were, during this apparent lull, working in a manner very far from "phoney." Just as German diplomacy removed the 1914 danger of a war on two fronts by neutralising Russia, so German strategists planned the overthrow of France on a much more sweeping conception than that based on a mere

¹ Apparently this phrase was first used by Franco in the Spanish Civil War, when, before he had taken the capital, he spoke of his four columns of armed followers in the country, and a civilian "fifth column," on which he could depend, inside Madrid.

infracture of Belgian neutrality. Early in April 1940, the Germans suddenly tore down their defensive veil, and, without the slightest warning, struck at the peace-loving and impeccably neutral states of Denmark and Norway. Denmark succumbed without a blow. Norway offered resistance, but the *Blitzkrieg* and the Fifth Column were too much for her, and within a few days the principal Norwegian ports and airfields were completely in German hands. The King and the Government fled to Britain, and Germany found a pliant tool¹ among the Norwegians to set up a puppet government under German protection.

Britain was profoundly shocked by the German assault on Norway and tried to help. But in vain, for the Allied forces which were landed in Norway, on either side of Trondheim, in the middle of April, had to be withdrawn in a fortnight, while those sent to Narvik, farther north, could not remain after the French disaster in June, and were then re-embarked. Meanwhile, in Britain itself vigorous political action was taken. On May 10 Mr. Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, and, supported by a Coalition Cabinet, initiated a new era of verve and drive in British war policy. On the same day—that is to say, within a month of their unheralded onslaught on Scandinavia—the Germans started their next great sweeping movements in the West. They then launched a simultaneous offensive on Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, to all of whom Hitler had pledged his everlasting friendship. The Dutch, helpless before a ruthless use of the Fifth Column and an even more inhuman manifestation of the *Blitzkrieg*, gave up at the end of four days, and the Queen and the Government escaped to England.

Next came the turn of Belgium and France. The German armour, moving across the Ardennes, broke through the Allied defences at Sedan, where the Maginot Line ended near the Belgian frontier, and, turning north, forced the Belgians to capitulate and cut the Allied forces into two. The Germans reached the coast, spread eastward and pressed the Allies towards the sea. But their intentions were largely frustrated by the decision to embark the troops. The result was that the Germans seized most of the Allied equipment but failed to capture the majority of the men. Nearly a quarter of a million British and

¹ The name of this particular Norwegian, *Quisling*, came into use as a generic term to signify any such collaborationist in every country occupied by the Germans.

more than 100,000 other Allied troops escaped to Britain by sea from Dunkirk, whose name will be immortally associated with this superb epic of heroism and devotion.

The crushing of the remaining French resistance was now only a matter of time. The victorious Germans relentlessly pursued the French westward. On June 14 they entered Paris, as they had done seventy years before but had not succeeded in doing in 1914-1918, and on June 21 an armistice was signed. Three days later the Italians, who had attacked France while she was being overwhelmed by the German avalanche, also granted the French an armistice. By the terms of the armistice the Germans occupied most of France, including the whole of the Channel and Atlantic coasts, and leaving only the south-eastern third to be precariously held as an unoccupied portion, which they finally took over when the Americans landed in Africa in November 1942.

The French Government which thus capitulated was led by the aged Marshal Pétain, who set up his headquarters in the unoccupied zone at Vichy, which became for most Frenchmen indicative of all that is discreditable to French courage and honour. Fortunately, however, there were outside Metropolitan France those who were proud to be mobilised, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, as the Fighting French, while, inside the country, still more intrepid Frenchmen organised against tremendous odds an underground movement which was at once a patriotic protest against the feeble "collaborationism" of Vichy and an heroic preparation for liberation, which, four years later, was to be so triumphantly achieved. But meanwhile France had, indeed, fallen, and Britain stood alone facing an enemy controlling an unbroken line of coast from the North Cape to the Bay of Biscay. How could she, in her weakness, hope to withstand the onslaught that such an enemy was able to contrive?

It is generally considered that the German strategy at this supreme crisis of the war was mistaken and that, if Hitler had decided to attack Britain before completing the conquest of France, nothing could have saved the island and its people from disaster. However that may be, the fact is that the Battle of Britain, fought in the air during August and September, was won by the British, and proved the turning-point of the war. All these events are doubtless too near for us to see them in proper perspective, and only the historians of the future will know how to sift the permanent from the ephemeral. But at least one of their con-

clusions we may with certainty forecast, and it is that the "few" who so nobly fought and won the Battle of Britain in that historic summer thereby saved not only Britain but the world.

Germany was thus defeated in her intention to make a land invasion of Britain, and the only expedient to which she could resort was a continuous series of intensive night air raids, lasting for eight months from September 1940, with the object of breaking civilian morale. In this purpose, as all the world knows, Germany was baulked by the skill and daring of the R.A.F. and the indomitable spirit of the British people. Meanwhile, the scene of land operations switched from north-west Europe to the Balkans, Egypt, and the eastern Mediterranean. With great boldness the British Government decided to send all available men and arms, even at the risk of gravely denuding the home defences, to Egypt, where they were joined by contingents from Australia, New Zealand, and India. The voyage was long and hazardous, for, since the western Mediterranean was dominated by Germany and Italy, the British forces could reach their destination only by the sea route round the Cape of Good Hope. Yet it was made possible by the highly imaginative disposition of the restricted British naval forces, while supplies from America helped materially to make the equipment of this Imperial concentration equal to its task. During 1940 American supplies were sent on the basis of the "cash and carry" plan, which had been introduced in 1939, but early in 1941 Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act, which secured the despatch of war material in increasing abundance, despite Britain's dwindling dollar resources, without the financial complications and controversies which had characterised similar transactions in the First World War.

In September 1940 the Italians invaded Egypt from Libya, and in October, without the slightest warning, launched an entirely unprovoked attack on Greece from Albania. But these tasks proved too much for the Italians to accomplish unaided. The courageous Greeks, in spite of their poverty and unpreparedness, first held and then forced back the invaders, while the British, with greatly inferior forces, expelled them, with enormous losses, not only from Egypt but from the adjacent Italian province of Cyrenaica. These reverses brought the Germans to the help of their sorely tried ally, and soon the whole situation in the Balkans and the Middle East was completely transformed. Already in the second half of 1940 the

Germans had begun an infiltration of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugo-Slavia. In all these states Hitler encouraged contentions among the various political factions and supported the Fascist minorities. When Hungary made territorial demands on Rumania, he forced Rumania, under the terms of the Vienna Award (August 1940), to yield to Hungary the whole of northern Transylvania. In return for this generous help Hungary joined Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact of the Axis Powers. In Rumania, after the fall of France, it was no longer possible to play off the Western against the Central Powers, and the Government adopted a new policy based on what was called the "fundamental integration of Rumania with the Axis system." The result was that, before the end of 1940, Germany had established a virtual protectorate over Rumania, with the important result that the Germans monopolised Rumanian oil.

As in the case of Hungary, Bulgaria was forced into the German orbit by Germany's assisting her to filch from Rumania the area known as the Dobrudja. For a time Bulgaria, with the moral support of Turkey and Yugo-Slavia, managed to maintain a precarious neutrality, but in the end the Fascist elements under King Boris triumphed and early in 1941 threw in their lot with the Nazis. The pressure on Yugo-Slavia became irresistible when the Germans decided to come to the aid of the Italians. In March 1941 the Yugo-Slav Government under Prince Paul joined the Axis. But such was the popular opposition to this move that the government was deposed by a *coup d'état*. Thereupon German land and air forces, without warning, mercilessly attacked Yugo-Slavia, reducing a large part of the city of Belgrade to ruins. They then took the Greeks in Albania in the rear. The Greeks, in spite of British support which could ill be spared from the already fully engaged African forces, were hopelessly crushed, and the Germans occupied the whole country and most of the islands of the Aegean.

The Germans then undertook to strengthen the Italians in Africa. The British were forced back beyond the Egyptian frontier, and their situation looked very ugly. But in time the British recovered, and in 1942 and 1943, with the assistance of the Americans, gradually conquered the whole of North Africa, and drove both Italians and Germans back into Europe, thus making Italy their first effective point of re-entry into continental warfare. The effect of the German move into Africa in 1941 was

to place Italy under German control, and she became to all intents and purposes an occupied country. Thus by the middle of 1941 the Germans held in their iron grasp no fewer than fifteen of the capital cities of Europe. Hitler indeed dominated the Continent, but he was a virtual prisoner there. If he could not break out to crush Britain, he must be throttled by the cord of the British blockade and all his dreams of world-conquest would come to naught. But for all the continuation of the aerial *blitz* on Britain, highly intensified submarine warfare, and even some attempt at surface raiding, as with the world's most powerful battleship, the *Bismarck*, which the British soon destroyed, he could not break out of the ring. Like a caged animal he sought ways of escape until, in June 1941, he decided to break yet another solemn peace pact and to attack Russia.

Enter Russia and America

Up to the middle of 1941 Hitler's war had been a European war, though the rest of the world was seriously affected by it. From the end of that year it became a world war in a much more absolute sense than the War of 1914-1918. And the Germans deliberately made it so. In deciding to make an unheralded assault on Russia they saw the immediate prospect of great prizes in supplies and food-stuffs. In this sense the attack was a foray on the grand scale. But if the invasion should fully succeed, it must eventually bring Hitler power and glory beyond the wildest dreams of any previous European conqueror. For it would clearly lead first to the turning of Britain's flank in the eastern Mediterranean, next to the overthrow of her Eastern Empire, and finally, by a junction with Japan, to a Nazi-Nippon domination of the world. Thus the corollary of the German assault on Russia was the Japanese assault on the power of the United States, which took place in the same undeclared manner, before the year was out. One may ask, in perplexity, how Hitler could have dared thus to invite his own destruction. But perhaps, in asking that question, we are merely being wise after the event. Hitler had to break out of his prison or face a stalemate. The chances were worth the hazard, and the gamble very nearly succeeded.

On June 22, 1941, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed M. Molotov, the Foreign Commissar, that the Germans had already crossed the Russian frontier that morning. The

reason given was that Soviet troops had been concentrating on the boundary. M. Molotov truly described this act of undeclared war, in breach of a pact of non-aggression solemnly entered into less than two years before, as "perfidy unparalleled in the history of civilised nations." The immediate effect of it was to bring to active life among the Russians and the non-Russian nationalities associated with them in the Soviet Union a sense of patriotism more fiery than any which has traditionally inspired the nations of Europe. Nor was this strange new family of peoples to be found wanting in its determination to stand solid behind Joseph Stalin and the Soviet leaders. The Germans, later assisted by contingents from Hungary, Rumania, Finland, and even Italy, had, in fact, invaded Russia on a thousand-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Again Germany profited by the element of surprise, by her greater preparedness, and by her superior equipment in armour and all the engines of the *Blitzkrieg*. Before this massed onslaught the Russians had to give ground rapidly, and soon the Germans had overrun the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia (which in 1940 the Russians had retaken from Rumania, who had gained it from Russia as a prize of the First World War).


The Russians fought heroically in terrific battles, in which there were unprecedented losses on both sides, but continued to fall back. As they did so they strictly obeyed Stalin's command to destroy everything of value to the enemy. This "scorched-earth" policy, the 1941 equivalent of the burning of Moscow before Napoleon's advance in 1812, bitter though it must have been to the Russians to execute, undoubtedly harassed the Germans in their advance. All the same, by the end of November the Germans had approached Leningrad and Moscow, and captured the important cities of Odessa, Rostov, and Kharkov. Though the Russians held the Germans for a time, and even undertook counter-offensives, in 1942 the Germans resumed their advance, occupying the Crimea and launching a final assault on Stalingrad. November 1942 will always be remembered as the month in which the tide turned in favour of the Russians and so changed the course of the whole war. In that month the Russians isolated the German army at Stalingrad and then annihilated it, and after that they went forward from one victory to another until not a German soldier remained on Soviet soil and Germany itself became the battle-ground.

It was during the Soviet retreat that the value of Stalin's

Third Five Year Plan, which was then current, became evident. In spite of the loss of vast agricultural areas and invaluable industrial centres, scientific research went on, and a gigantic transfer of technical personnel and plant was made from the west to the safe areas east of the Urals. At the same time, the relations not only of Britain but of America with Russia rapidly warmed. The goodwill of the Western Democracies was demonstrated in the most practical possible way, for they supplied Russia with those weapons, particularly tanks and aircraft, in which she was deficient. It was at this time that British and American production began to get level with the German, and as Russia was now holding her ground the prospects brightened.

The course of the Russian war in 1941, successful though it appeared for the Germans, had not gone as well as they had hoped. In fact, Germany was not succeeding in breaking out of the ring. She, therefore, decided to call on her Far Eastern partner to break it from the outside. In these circumstances, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese, without warning, made an attack, using every engine of modern warfare, on Pearl Harbour and other American and British strong-points in the Pacific within her reach. Later in the day Japan announced that she was at war with Britain and the United States. Three days later Germany and Italy declared war against the United States, and on the same day Congress unanimously recognised the existence of a state of war with Japan's partners in perfidy. The air was now completely cleared and the two great English-speaking Democracies knew precisely where they stood. To withstand this world-wide attack, they must strain every nerve, exploit every resource, and utilise the services of every man and woman. Thus the treachery of Japan at last brought the Americans into what they called the "shooting war," and from that moment the United States heroically faced the colossal task of maintaining total war on two fronts so remote from each other.

America, though her programme of production was well in hand, had much leeway to make up in the training of man-power. Nevertheless, in less than a year, she joined with Britain in landings in French North Africa, a tremendous amphibious operation which, in spite of some Vichy French opposition, was most successfully carried through. A race between the Germans and the British and American forces was just won by the Germans, who occupied Bizerta and Tunis. To this area the German-Italian



forces, now being relentlessly driven westward by the British, retreated, but the Germans failed to hold it as a permanent bridgehead for a later re-entry into Africa. Pressed on east and west, the Germans were gradually squeezed out, and early in May 1943 Bizerta and Tunis fell to the British and Americans. During the succeeding week a quarter of a million men of the Axis were taken prisoner. The way was now clear for the first assault on Hitler's continental fortress, and in the summer of 1943 British and American landings on Sicily took place.

The position in the summer of 1943, therefore, was that the Axis forces were confined to the Continent. Africa had been cleared and Russia had successfully carried through her last great offensive on her own soil. From that point the Russians and the British and Americans, assisted by contingents from various United Nations, moved slowly but inexorably to final victory. The Russians continued their successful offensives, forcing the Germans back farther and farther into their own territory and that of their satellites, while the British and Americans moved northward through Italy, capturing Rome in May 1944, and going forward in slow pursuit of the retreating enemy. But the most remarkable movement of all was the invasion of France on June 6, 1944 (D-Day), and the subsequent liberation of France, Belgium, and Holland. France, at first stunned by these unexpected events, slowly recovered some of her strength, so that she was able to play an active part in the final stages of the war. So Germany did not escape war on two fronts after all, and, preoccupied as she was with the struggle for her own soil, she had to watch with what forbearance she could command the successive defection of her satellites and partners in crime—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary—who accepted armistice terms and “worked their passage” to the security of Allied protection.

When the war reached their own frontiers the Germans momentarily recovered, but their resistance gradually broke before the growing strength of the attack on west, south, and east. For Germany retribution was at hand, and nothing could save her from the doom she had deliberately courted. After a series of piecemeal surrenders in April and May 1945, the broken remnants of the arrogant host, which barely six years before had set out in the full panoply of world conquest, at last capitulated unconditionally before the victorious arms of the United Nations, and the cause of liberty and right stood triumphant over the most monstrous tyranny that had darkened the modern world.

Nazism versus Western Civilisation

The war that Hitler made was in one sense merely a resumption of the war which, as most of the world supposed, had ended with the Armistice of November 11, 1918, but which, as Hitler always contended, the Germans had never lost. But, just as that earlier struggle was different not only in degree but in kind from any previous war, so the resumed war was much vaster in its scope and implications than the original conflict. It was, in fact, a deliberately planned bid for nothing less than the domination of the world. In this sense it was a new kind of war, in which the Germans used, with premeditated villainy, every device of modern science and technology, every vehicle of propaganda, and every expedient of human cruelty to achieve their ends. The period of Hitler's dominance was certainly a period of dynamism, but it was devoted not to progress but to barbarism and destruction. The Second World War was, therefore, not only a political war on a gigantic scale, but a mechanical war, an economic war, a psychological war, and an ideological war.

As a war of mechanics, Germany held in it an enormous initial advantage, built up by the exploitation of her material resources and the employment of her technical experts with the set purpose of destroying her neighbours before they could produce the necessary weapons to resist. As a war of economics, Germany used it immediately to force the peoples of Europe into a bondage in which they were to work for her benefit, and ultimately to seize from the great Imperial Powers their dominions overseas. As a war of psychology, the Nazis used it as a vehicle of propaganda to maintain the morale of the German people and to destroy that of their opponents. As a war of ideology, the Germans fought it on the pretence that they were superior to all other peoples, and on the assertion that, while they were basking in the revivifying sun of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and dictatorship, Britain and her Self-governing Dominions, France, and America were wallowing in the sere remains of an outworn creed called Pluto-Democracy, Russia was implementing and propagating a soul-destroying and subversive doctrine called Bolshevism, and all these nations were being duped and exploited for the benefit of stateless communities of non-Aryans called Jews.

The Nazis capitalised the ideology of the master-people (*Herrenvolke*) to account for every German success and to justify

every act of barbarism. They pretended that their undoubted military triumphs in the first three years of the war were due to their superior martial qualities and their higher capacity for heroic action, though this unsubstantial claim made it impossible for them to explain away their later defeats. In fact, what the course of the war proved beyond all question was that there was nothing to choose between any of the nations in the courage and endurance of their service men and women, or, for that matter, in the dauntless spirit of their sorely tried civilians. The truth is that the early victories of the Germans were simply the result of their deliberate preparedness, their method of making undeclared war, and the ruthless onrush of their overwhelming armour which mere human courage, unsupported by comparable equipment, could not possibly withstand. The initial movements of the Germans had been sufficiently swift and devastating to overwhelm their smaller neighbours and France before they could produce the means of holding them, but their later manœuvres just missed achieving the same result against Britain and Russia. These Great Powers, supported first by the supplies and later by the armed alliance of the United States, thus gained sufficient time to bring their war production into full swing. So, after the first three years, the three Powers began to overhaul the Germans in this sense, and from that juncture the tide turned against the aggressor.

The First World War stopped before the victors ever reached the borders of Germany ; the Second World War went on after the frontiers had been crossed. Now, it is evident that, the Nazis' offensive purpose being what it was, once the United Nations had driven the aggressor back to his political boundaries, so that he found himself waging a defensive war for his own soil, the war for him was lost. Why, then, did he not surrender as his predecessors had done ? The answer is, precisely because the Nazis were fighting not a mere large-scale political war but a war for world conquest. Nazism was merely the latest and most hateful form of Prussian militarism. The Nazis, therefore, looked upon the Second World War not as a struggle by itself, with a beginning and an end, but merely as a phase in an unceasing and intensifying conflict. In other words, to borrow the language of pugilism, they regarded the war as the second round in a global contest. They might lose a round on points, but if they could hold their opponents in a clinch until the gong sounded so that they could retire for a space to their corner,

they might recover sufficiently to administer a knock-out in a later round. That explains both why the Nazis hoped—though they failed—to organise a fight in the last ditch and why the United Nations could accept from the Germans nothing short of unconditional surrender.

When Hitler started the war, he announced that it would determine the fate of Europe for a thousand years. During that millennium the peoples of Europe were to enjoy the ineffable benefits of a New Order, which presented the Nazis in the guise of heaven-sent guardians of European integrity against the Slavonic barbarism to the East and the Anglo-Saxon money-power to the West. But in reality the intention of the German New Order was to enslave all other nations, as was clearly shown during the war, for example, in their ruthless deportation of whole communities. For those nations, therefore, the war that Hitler forced upon them was, in the precise meaning of the words, a war for the preservation and triumph of Western Civilisation. Nazism intended to overthrow that civilisation and all that it stands for. With such an armed doctrine, whether under Hitler or any other leader who might succeed him, there can be no compromise. Its defeat in war must, therefore, be followed by a permanent uprooting of every remnant of it and a determined, constant, and united vigilance against its resurrection. Only so can Dynamic Europe hope to tread again the path of true progress and to reintegrate her civilisation, which this war has all but shattered and which any further war must inevitably destroy beyond salvation. How to accomplish this aim must be for the free peoples of the earth their first common concern, for unless the problem of peace is solved there can be no hope for the realisation of any other social or political purpose.

CHAPTER XXIII

INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE AND POWER

The United Nations

THE end of the Second World War marks the close of an epoch in the evolution of Dynamic Europe, and whether the succeeding age shall be better or worse depends, before everything else, on the kind of international order that the nations establish in the new era at whose threshold they stand. In considering the nature of that first and fundamental prerequisite of peace and progress in the days ahead, we must keep in mind at least two lessons taught by our survey of the background of ferment and change from which contemporary Europe has emerged. The first of these lessons is that it is a delusion to suppose that we can successfully restore an earlier political order without reference to the effect of intervening events. The second lesson follows from the first and teaches that no political machinery will work that does not allow for growth and change in the organism it is intended to serve.

In the first place, therefore, we must not imagine that it is either desirable or practicable for the world simply to return to the state of things that existed before the war, however nostalgic the urge and comparatively attractive though that condition may seem after the misery and suffering of the war years. For surely our examination of the drift to international anarchy which preceded the First World War, of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent its recurrence, and of Europe's consequent declension into the Second World War, should be sufficient warning to us of the dangers of being lured into another such fools' paradise. But, apart from this bemusement, let it not be forgotten that the inescapability of the past lies precisely in the fact that it merges into the present, and that we cannot ignore at our pleasure the influence on our time of the immediately precedent years, more especially if, like those which saw the rise and predominance of Hitler and Nazism, they constitute the most tragic and destructive of all periods. On the contrary, if

the nations, in attempting to shape a happier future, do not apply the lesson of that terrible experience, they will assuredly fail.

Secondly, it must be remembered that the problem of world peace, as it confronts us to-day, is of an unprecedented magnitude and complexity, and is not to be solved by the mere process of treaty-making. It involves, that is to say, not merely the immediate necessity to settle accounts with the defeated aggressors and to repair the ravages of war, but the ultimate need to establish a world organisation in which all peace-loving nations can combine to secure themselves against engulfment in another world catastrophe. The settlement, from both the immediate and ultimate points of view, will therefore call for statesmanship of the first order, with a highly intelligent citizenship behind it, and require machinery of the most flexible and adaptable kind. How, then, is this supreme political task to be accomplished?

The making of the settlement must naturally devolve upon those nations which combined in a grand alliance for the isolation and overthrow of the military might of Germany and Japan. As an armed coalition for the prosecution of the war this alliance came to be known as the United Nations, and the problem which now confronts it is how to maintain its unity for the making and keeping of the peace. The armed combination grew in a fragmentary way, as the various nations were forced into the war against the aggressors. Beginning in 1939 as an alliance of France and Britain pledged to protect the independence of Poland, Greece, and Rumania, it was freely supported by the British Self-governing Dominions. In 1940 it was joined by the exiled governments of Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, as those countries were overrun, and in the spring of 1941 by Yugo-Slavia in similar circumstances. Later in that year the alliance assumed world proportions with the accession of Soviet Russia and the United States, and was further enlarged by the adhesion of Abyssinia, China, and several Latin-American States, while Turkey, having been its non-belligerent friend throughout, actively joined in the last phase of the war. As the war moved towards its close, the United Nations had, besides, the aid of the former satellites of Germany—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary—though the sincerity of their attachment to the Allied cause, forced upon them as it was through the weakening hold of their master, had still to be proved.

The United Nations thus constitute a league of states differing

not only in size, wealth, and influence, but also in national background and outlook. There are the Great Powers : Russia, the United States, Britain, France, and China, which must obviously take the lead. There are the smaller states, whose people have suffered so grievously and whose claims to the fullest measure of rehabilitation both honour and expediency must recognise. There are lastly the renegades from the German camp, whose interests cannot, without damage to the general cause, be ignored. It is, therefore, evident that the reality of this union will be far more searchingly tested in peace than in war. When Mazzini said that " the morrow of victory is always more perilous than the eve," he spoke a true word, of which, in this supreme crisis in world affairs, the nations will do well to take heed. For if the common peril which held them together was grave, the possibility of their falling apart with the apparent passing of that peril is an even graver danger.

The post-war influences tending to a dissolution of the alliance are bound to be both potent and insidious, but they must be resisted at all costs. The nations must not allow themselves to be borne into isolation on a wave of reaction from the horrors of war or through an overwhelming sense of release at the spectacle of the enemies of civilisation lying impotent for immediate further harm. They must not be deterred by the apparent unmanageableness of post-war problems from the task of tackling them together. Nor must they permit themselves to be antagonised by the re-emergence of political, social, and economic differences which the war may have obliged them to sink.

Some of these differences are fundamental, and nothing but distrust and misunderstanding can result from ignoring them : they must be fully recognised and allowed for if the machinery of collective security is not to be sabotaged. This is especially true of post-war relations between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union. The differences here arise not only from historical and geographical causes making for divergent views about the meaning of national and imperial security, but, even more profoundly, from entirely different conceptions of democracy. For, as we have seen, the Parliamentary democracy of Britain and most of the western states of Europe bears little resemblance to the Soviet democracy of Russia, and no amount of argument will make them alike. For good or evil, as a result of the war, Eastern Europe must remain preponderantly under Russian influence, just as our most direct concern is necessarily

with Western Europe. Those nations in the West which successfully tried what we have called the national democratic experiment, until it was violently suspended by Nazi invasion, must be allowed to resume it, with suitable modifications imposed by the march of events, as soon as possible, and it is our plain duty to assist them to do so. But in those states of Eastern Europe where it failed or was never properly launched, the ground of political reconstruction differs widely from that of the West, and Western methods may to that extent be found unsuited to the work of clearing it of the debris of war and of rebuilding the shattered fabric. Hence, for the sake of the larger purpose of preserving peace, we may have to be content to see the task of democratic reorganisation among those nations accomplished under the ægis of the Power without whose mighty victories, after all, the curse of Hitler would never have been lifted from their brows.

But, indeed, such differences exist not only as between one nation and another, but among factions within each state individually. In fact, the situation of each nation is very similar to that of the United Nations, as they escape severally and together from the stranglehold of a common oppressor. Each nation has to rebuild its broken political, social, and economic life, and to resolve for itself the antithesis of order and liberty. In the same way, the nations together have to create a new and effective method of joint protection against a renewal of the threat of aggression, and to reconcile the opposition between international control and unlimited national sovereignty. But it is certain that if they fail in the international task, all their efforts in the national field will be in vain.

In order to succeed in this vital international task, the peace-seeking nations must view the situation following the Second World War with greater realism than that with which they regarded the end of the First. In the intervening quarter of a century they should have learned many truths which were not so self-evident in 1918 as they are to-day. Among these truths are : that aggressive militarism is not simply the armed force of an acquisitive people but a cancer eating at the very vitals of civilised existence ; that this cancer is not to be permanently cauterised by the fires of war alone, but must be continuously treated, after those fires have died down, by the radiology of a creative will to peace ; that mere affirmations of good intentions in international affairs are not only futile but dangerous ; that peace

treaties of themselves have no sanctity while there remains a single nation capable of repudiating them at will; and that collective security cannot be realised through an international organisation with nothing but moral authority behind it.

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of 1918 constituted a programme designed to make the world safe for democracy, but, in spite of the Treaties which enshrined the principle of self-determination and established the League of Nations, democracy was no safer—indeed, it proved to be less safe—after the war than it had been before. Does the same fate await the Atlantic Charter, the 1941 equivalent of the Fourteen Points, which President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill issued as a statement of Democracy's peace aims? The Atlantic Charter contained eight points, and declared that the United States and Britain sought no aggrandisement, desired to see no territorial changes which did not accord with the wishes of the people concerned, respected the rights of all peoples to choose their own form of government, would do their utmost to secure the access on equal terms of all peoples to the trade and raw materials of the world, would aim at securing improved labour standards throughout the world, seek a peace, after the destruction of the Nazi tyranny, which should secure for all nations the hope of living in peace and security and for all men the right to traverse the seas without hindrance, and would do all in their power to achieve at last the abandonment of the use of force and the abolition of aggression as a means of settling international disputes.

The Atlantic Charter was obviously nothing more than a statement, in severest outline, of the political, social, and economic purposes of the two leading democratic nations, and with it, as such, there can be no quarrel. But, after all, it is only a manifesto, and whether its aims are to be realised in practice depends on the nature and strength of the international organisation set up to give them effect. What are the prospects of such an organisation in terms of practical politics? In October 1943, at a conference in Moscow, representatives of Russia, the United States, Britain, and China signed a convention known as the Moscow Declaration. Article 4 of this Declaration stated that the "four Powers recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practical date a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, for the maintenance of international peace and security." About a year

later, in November 1944, the actual framework of such an organisation was informally laid down by representatives of the same four Powers at a conference held at Dumbarton Oaks in the United States, where it was agreed that the proposals should be cast in the form of a treaty, to be known as the Charter, and that the organisation should be called the United Nations. The principles enunciated at Dumbarton Oaks were endorsed, with some modifications, at the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945, and finally formulated, without any radical alteration of the basic design, in a Charter signed by the representatives of fifty nations sitting in conference at San Francisco from April to June in the same year.

The Charter of the United Nations, which was published on June 27, 1945, is a lengthy document, with a Preamble and 111 Articles contained in 19 Chapters. The purposes of the organisation are stated in Article 1 to be primarily two: to maintain international peace and security, and to achieve international co-operation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian questions. In pursuit of these purposes there are to be established six principal organs: first, the General Assembly (Articles 9-22), with a general right of supervision over all the activities of the organisation; secondly, the Security Council (Articles 23-54), composed of five permanent members—Britain, the United States, Russia, China, and France—and six non-permanent members representative of the middle and small states, the seats to be held by these in rotation; thirdly, the Economic and Social Council (Articles 61-72), comprising various special organs for the promotion of international co-operation in social and economic questions; fourthly, the Trusteeship Council (Articles 75-91), to supervise the administration of such non-self-governing areas as may be placed under the trustee system; fifthly, the International Court of Justice (Articles 92-96); and sixthly, the Secretariat (Articles 97-101). The new governing principle behind this set-up, which in other respects bears obvious likenesses to the scheme of the League of Nations, is that "responsibility should march with power."

To ensure this desirable, and indeed necessary, conjunction, the right and duty to take action against threats of war will rest exclusively with the Security Council, which is to have wide powers to deal with any dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." The Security Council may call upon the United Nations to take measures to

this end, and special agreements will be entered into among the members of the organisation indicating the forces which they will place at the disposal of the Council to carry out its intentions. The essence of the plan may thus be said to be "organised defence and concerted activity," and the measures proposed to secure this aim are what constitute the fundamental differences between the new plan of the United Nations and the old plan of the League of Nations. In this vital work the Security Council will be assisted by a Military Staffs Committee composed of the chiefs-of-staff of the Great Powers. This body will give technical advice as to the size and nature of the quotas of military, naval, and air forces which each member-nation will contribute to the common pool. But the problem for the new world organisation is not only how it shall ensure the possession of sufficient armed power to enforce its will on recalcitrant nations but also how that power shall be disposed so as to be in a position to operate immediately and effectively wherever danger threatens. To meet this double need the scheme envisages not only a world-wide organisation, but within it also associations for regional defence, and, going with this regionalisation, a continuous chain of bases under the common control throughout the world.

The new world organisation of the United Nations is the means devised for keeping the war alliance in being for the purposes of peace. Its success or failure will depend on how far the various nations which constitute it are prepared to stand by their agreements to provide their quotas of armed force when called upon to contribute them. In other words, the acid test of the effectiveness of the United Nations plan will come, no less than it did in the case of the League of Nations, when sanctions have to be put into force at the first sign of aggression. Under the Covenant of the League, the Council or Assembly could advise that an occasion for the imposition of sanctions had arisen, but then each state member could decide for itself whether it would put them into force. Under the Charter of the United Nations, on the other hand, it is proposed that each state member should undertake to impose economic sanctions and contribute its agreed armed quota immediately at the demand of the Security Council.

But here we encounter a difficulty of the first magnitude. Under the United Nations plan the method of voting is so arranged that any decision of the Council to impose sanctions

against any of the Big Five Powers may be vetoed by that Power.¹ This right of veto is condemned by many enlightened critics on the ground that, in effect, it will tend to place the permanent members of the Council above the law and the smaller nations at the mercy of the large. Consequently, argue these critics, such a plan must almost inevitably lead to the creation of international cliques, each composed of a number of small states under the protection and control of a Great Power. Moreover, they add, it puts the whole prospect of peace in peril, through lack of checks on the aggressiveness of large states.

Here, then, is raised the whole crucial question of the right of a small and weak people to the same liberty of action as that enjoyed by a large nation. It is an obvious truism that differences of power do and must exist among states, just as they do among individuals within a state. But, in a democratic community at least, we do not admit the right of a powerful individual to use his superior strength against a weaker citizen; on the contrary, in such a state the strong and the weak are equal before the law. Then why, it may be asked, should we in our international relationships start from the assumption that the greater power of the larger state may be so misused? Surely, one may say, the evil that the United Nations have been fighting to destroy is precisely the authoritarian conception of politics, which is an abuse of power both in internal and in external affairs! How, then, can we, on the very morrow of victory, honourably subscribe to so patent a doctrine of force?

The answer to these questions is manifestly to be found in the realities of the contemporary world. The unpleasant truth is that, although most of the United Nations may have established the Rule of Law within the state, they have by no means reached a similar conception of enlightened order in their relations with one another. Nor will they arrive at it except after long and arduous practice in the positive arts of peace, compar-

¹ At Yalta it was agreed that a decision of the Security Council to apply sanctions should require an affirmative vote of at least seven of its eleven members, "including the concurring votes of all permanent members." This proposal was hotly debated at San Francisco, but it is, nevertheless, essentially retained in the Charter of the United Nations, which, in Article 27, adopts the very words of the Yalta agreement (quoted above) in respect of decisions on all but "procedural matters." This means, in effect, that, while the Great Powers may not veto discussion by the Security Council of any dispute threatening international peace, the veto will apply to all subsequent stages: investigation of the dispute, recommendation of enforcement action by the Council, and the actual application of sanctions.

able to the creative processes by which they have built up their own internal political systems. Only so can we look for the day when the principle of the moral equality of all nations shall prevail in spite of the differences of political power among them. Meanwhile, it must be admitted that the method of voting adopted under the United Nations plan only faces the facts. For if a dispute were to reach the stage where a Great Power refused to discuss it further, no international organisation could prevent that Power from acting as it thought proper in its own interests. At such a juncture the world would, in any case, be on the verge of war, and the mere existence of the machinery of conciliation would not alter the fact. Such a possibility is the price we have to pay for our international backwardness.

But whatever the ultimate form and purpose of our international organisation, the alliance of the United Nations is confronted with an immediate post-war task so fundamental and urgent as to override all other considerations. If the alliance is to secure the peace as it has won the war, its first business is, at all costs, to prevent the possibility of the resurrection of Nazism. Whether Germany is ever to be reclaimed as a civilised community from the moral and physical degradation to which the Nazi régime has reduced her depends on the Germans themselves, for true re-education can only come from within. If the German people in the years ahead prove that they are sincerely resolved to undertake this regenerating task for themselves, the United Nations can doubtless help them to find their way back to the confraternity of peoples. But meanwhile the victors dare take no risks: they must maintain the means of immediately crushing any attempt at a Nazi revival wherever it may appear. This is inescapably a question of power, and if it is too much to hope that at this stage the United Nations should secure *common* power among themselves, they must, whatever happens, ensure the continuance of the *joint* power by which they so painfully liberated themselves from Nazi domination.

It is thus with the problem of power as an integral part of the problem of peace that the organisation of the United Nations is first concerned. Under the United Nations plan the means of enforcing the will of the whole body of peace-seeking nations will be constantly under review by experts, who will be in a position to relate the required international force, in terms of national quotas, to the changing circumstances. If, then, it is true that peace without power is a dream, the United

Nations scheme offers a long-suffering world a way to reality, for it proposes to base collective security on the combined and regulated arms of the nations uniting for peace. Thus the plan at least promises to secure order out of the chaos left behind by the war, and this is the first condition of any further advance towards a new international order.

Is a Federal Union Practical Politics ?

It is no part of the intention of the United Nations organisation to interfere with the sovereign rights of its state members. On the contrary, under Article 2 of the Charter "sovereign equality" is specifically preserved. Now, there are those who hold that the real impediment to a true international organisation is precisely the external sovereignty of separate states and that no plan for peace which leaves it essentially intact can possibly succeed. The advocates of this view maintain, quite rightly, that what the modern nation requires to give its genius full play is not sovereignty, which, externally considered, is, in effect, the right to behave as it likes towards its neighbours, but autonomy, or internal sovereignty, which would leave it with undiminished power to control and direct its own local affairs. They argue, with equal cogency, that nation-state sovereignty has served whatever purpose it may hitherto have had, that it is now obsolete, and that the right to make war in the contemporary world should no more belong to a single state than the right to resort to force for the settlement of disputes among individuals is allowed to the citizens of a modern civilised community.¹ The only solution, then, of the problem of world peace, according to these protagonists, is for all progressive states to combine in a federal union to which they would surrender their external sovereignty and whose organs would control the diplomatic relations and the armed activities of the whole body.

Now, as we have seen earlier,² an organisation which gathered into its hands the external sovereignty of the states submitting to it would be not merely an international but a supernational authority ; that is to say, it would be a power not simply among states but above them, and when the testing time came would not decide among varying views of its member states but simply

¹ See, for example, Sir William Beveridge's advocacy of compulsory arbitration in his *The Price of Peace* (1945).

² Page 27.

override them. What, then, in the present state of world opinion, are the prospects of the establishment of such a super-national authority? We have had plenty of evidence in our survey of the background of contemporary Europe that political charters, whether within individual states or among a number of them, are not in themselves sufficient to achieve the objects they are intended to secure. A political constitution is effective not by virtue of the excellence of the document which enshrines it but by the will to make it work of the people for whose progress and happiness it is designed. Indeed, the history of our own country proves conclusively that the most certain and harmonious working of a political constitution may be secured without a document at all, while, on the other hand, the more recent history of several continental states shows, with equal certainty, that the existence of a documentary constitution is no necessary security against the complete loss of rights and liberties. If these considerations apply to the constitutions of unitary states, they apply with greater cogency to those of federal states, and hence with even greater force to international than to national affairs.

Federalism, in one form or another, has had a long and honourable history in the evolution of political Europe and of the communities which have sprung from it overseas. Its roots lie in the remote past, for it was not unknown among the Ancient Greeks. As we have seen, it characterised the German state from the foundation of the First *Reich* in the tenth century until it was violently abolished in the course of the establishment of the Third *Reich* by Hitler in 1934. We find it again in the Middle Ages among the cities of Italy, and it has had a continuous history in Switzerland from its birth in the union of the three Forest Cantons in 1291 to its full stature in the Swiss Republic of to-day. Its more modern forms are found particularly in the United States of America, in the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, and, most recently, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

What, then, is the essence of federalism? The best and most succinct definition of federalism in its modern form is that given by H. V. Dicey,¹ who calls it "a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of state rights." From this it follows that the willingness of states to federate implies a desire for union and for the establishment

¹ In that classic of political science entitled *The Law of the Constitution*.

of a common power, called the federal authority, to which certain rights hitherto enjoyed by each of the states shall be jointly surrendered. Hence there must be a recognisable instrument of common government which shall make a clear distinction between the rights surrendered to the federal authority and those retained by the states. In other words, a federal constitution is in essence a treaty between the states which are the contracting parties, and such a treaty is the basis of all modern federations. Thus all existing federal constitutions are necessarily in documentary form, and the document in every case secures that the powers retained by the states forming the federation cannot be abrogated except by some specific machinery of amendment allowed for in the constitution.

Most modern federations have been established mainly for common action in diplomatic and economic affairs, and, in the process of federating, the states have often overcome considerable obstacles and wide differences. In the case of the United States, for example, as the Union expanded with the westward-moving frontier, the social and economic rift over slavery became so wide that it actually led to the War of Secession (1861-1865). But so basic was the need for union that it survived even this internecine strife, and since the Americans settled their fratricidal quarrel they have presented to the world a perfect example of how peace may be maintained among forty-eight states by the political contrivance of federalism. The Swiss Confederation offers, in some ways, an even more striking instance of overcoming obstacles to union, for in this case the republic is a federation of groups speaking four different languages. But perhaps the most remarkable case of a successful federation in the modern world is the U.S.S.R., for, though the Soviet Union covers generally the area which was until recently under the sway of a highly centralised autocracy, the many different peoples of Soviet Russia, having destroyed that autocracy, voluntarily came together in a federal union to secure the social, political, and economic principles of the Communist Revolution.

If, then, these great difficulties have been overcome by the peoples of North America, of Switzerland, and of Russia, why, it may be asked, should not all differences be sunk in order to gain the inestimable boon of a federal authority for Europe and even the world at large? The answer surely is that, despite the experience of two world wars, the nations of Europe, and still more the nations of the wider world, show not the slightest

disposition to federate. As to Europe, the League of Nations had no element of federalism in its constitution, and such pressure on its members as was attempted in the interests of peace was resented by most of them as an intolerable infringement of their sovereignty. Aristide Briand spent the last years of his life in advocating the need for a United States of Europe, but his devotion to that cause turned out to be a purely academic exercise. When, in 1940, France was falling headlong before the German onslaught Mr. Churchill offered her union with Britain on equal terms, but even in face of that overwhelming disaster she would not accept it. As to a world federation, even supposing that most of the larger nations were ready to form such a union, which they are not, it would be meaningless without the membership of the United States. But when one considers the strength of the traditional American sentiment against permanent international entanglements, it is certainly difficult to imagine the willingness of the United States, within any measurable distance of time, to enter a federal union in which they would sacrifice their external sovereignty to a world authority.¹ These facts, depressing though they may be, must be taken into full account in considering the outlook for federalism.

Doubtless the sovereign nation state, as it now exists after five centuries of evolution in Europe, is, in some respects, decadent. Indeed, it has been paradoxically argued that the Second World War was itself a symptom of the decay of nationalism, and that this explains the success of Hitler's political warfare and the ease with which he exploited Quislingism and collaborationism in the occupied countries.² Nor can it be denied that the present political divisions of Europe are in many ways hopelessly irrelevant to modern needs. Obviously, for example, it is an intolerable anomaly that a large number of petty states should be able, by the exercise of their sovereignty, to stand in the way of a reasonable economic union for the exploitation of the world's resources to the common benefit. It is significant, too, that, at the other end of the political scale, the three Great Powers whose alliance secured the overthrow of Nazism are not, in the older sense, dominantly nationalist in sentiment and outlook. It is evident, for instance, that the

¹ This notwithstanding the fact that it is an American who has made the strongest plea for a federation of democratic states, to be sponsored by the United States. See C. K. Streit, *Union Now* (1939). For the opposite American view, see Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy* (1943).

² See F. Borkenau, *Socialism, National or International* (1942).

strength of Britain lies not alone in the loyalty of an island people but in the bond which holds together a world-wide Commonwealth of Nations. The American people, again, think of the United States less as the home of an American nation than as a "melting-pot" of many nations. And lastly, the integrating force in the U.S.S.R. is not a sense of Russian nationality so much as a "comprehensive Soviet allegiance."¹

But all this is not to say that the only solution of the international problem lies in the formation of a vast multinational state or even of a number of separate multinational states. Indeed, as H. J. Laski says,² the problems before us call "not for the total correlation of areas but for the partial correlation of functions," and this may be best achieved not by political federation but rather by the common control of the functions concerned. A true federation, as we have seen, can only be successfully made among states which *desire* union, and a constitution which, however earnest in intention and impeccable in form, is not in harmony with the will of the people to whom it applies becomes a mere scrap of paper. The truth is that the differences among the nations in background and outlook, in political organisation, economic structure, and social purpose, are so numerous and deep that, at this stage in their evolution, a treaty among them for the mutual sacrifice of their sovereignty is simply not practical politics. And if, despite this truth, such a treaty were signed it would defeat its purpose. For a federal union, created before its time, would not of itself prevent war: it would merely replace the danger of international war by the equally terrible peril of civil war.

Meanwhile, it is much wiser that the nations should secure the necessary power to enforce peace by such a plan as is adumbrated in the Charter of the United Nations. There is, of course, a danger here that the world will become divided into spheres of influence, each under a Great Power—for example, a western sphere under the United States, a middle sphere under Great Britain, and an eastern sphere under Soviet Russia—and that these great regional groupings may become mutually hostile beyond hope of peaceful settlement. On the other hand, it is possible that, in the course of time, the members of these regional groups may develop so strong a sense of common interest and

¹ For a fuller treatment of this theme see E. H. Carr's brilliant essay, *Nationalism and After* (1945).

² In *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (1943), Chapter VI.

purpose as to encourage an urge to political union among them. But even supposing that the growth of antagonism among the groups were the more likely prospect, we should still have to risk that possibility because of the stark necessity with which the civilised world is faced to pool its armed resources in order to prevent a recurrence of German and Japanese aggression. World unity can only take one of two forms : either that imposed by the hegemony of one state, which is the evil the peace-seeking nations have been fighting to destroy, or that achieved through a federal union freely entered by them all, which, as we have argued, is at present impracticable. The first form being intolerable and the second not immediately realisable, we are left with the middle way, to which the plan of the United Nations would seem to point.

If that plan works, the nations of Europe and the world will be given a chance to recover their political sanity and social health. If they can be left in peace for a reasonable period, each may restore the broken tissues of its national life and, under the influence of this healing process, make its proper contribution to a new international order. It is conceivable that that new order is destined eventually to take a federal form, but federalism is a highly developed type of political organisation and is not to be achieved either by wishful thinking or by an academic leap in the dark. It can, in fact, only come by a long process of political education, which has not yet been attempted by any nation, let alone by all those concerned. An opportunity to institute such a process is offered in the scheme of the United Nations, for among the proposed special organs of that body for the promotion of international co-operation is one to be known as the Organisation for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction. If that organ is nurtured with the goodwill and imagination that its purposes demand, the nations may thereby forge a permanent instrument of education in world citizenship which is the only sure foundation of a true world unity.

Recapitulation and Conclusion

In our survey of the evolution of Dynamic Europe we have observed the struggle of the good and bad forces, watched the conflict of the ideals and the ideologies, and seen the pass to which the weakening of the good and the fortifying of the bad have brought us. And is not the lesson of it all that the nations

of Europe suffered the scourge of Nazism because they failed to safeguard and adapt all that was best in their inheritance from the past? The Europe of to-day is assuredly a very different place from the Europe of ancient times, to a review of which we were driven in our search for the origins of the contemporary problem. Yet here we stand, twenty-four centuries after the heyday of Athens, with the problem which she so bravely tackled still unsolved: the problem, that is to say, of establishing and maintaining the Good Society against the forces which constantly strive to undermine and demolish it. Our survey should not have failed to reinforce the truth that progress is not a law of nature, and that we in our complex society cannot sustain it, any more than did the Greeks in their comparatively simple communities, without creative thought and deliberate planning. Moreover, we should have learned from our review of the growth of Dynamic Europe that society cannot stand still; that it has to choose between progress and retrogression, and that it must either vindicate the true principles of Western Civilisation, which were first formulated in those remote days, or revert to barbarism.

The true principles of Western Civilisation, as we have seen, originated in the three unities of the Ancient World: the unity of culture which was the peculiar gift of the Greeks, the unity of government inherent in the system of law and order established by the Romans, and the unity of mankind implicit in the gospel of the Christian Church. It was through the universal sway of the Roman Empire that these three unities were maintained, and consequently they were all three permanently ruptured by the barbarian invasions. In the West the German assaults brought about the transfusion of Teutonic blood into the Latin body and the foundation of the system of separate states. In the East the Moslem incursion gradually cut off south-eastern from contact with western Europe and created the conditions from which arose the Balkan imbroglio of modern times. The mediæval Empire and Church, striving to man the breach, succeeded for a time in restoring a simulacrum of the original unity of the Roman Empire, but ultimately failed to prevent the political dismemberment of Germany and Italy and the schism of the Church into two distinct obediences: the Roman Catholic in the West and the Greek Orthodox in the East.

The events which marked the close of the Middle Ages accelerated the trend to the political division of Europe, and this tend-

ency was reinforced in the Renaissance period by the growth of the principle of state sovereignty. The mediæval conceptions of society were further weakened by the expansion of Europe overseas, which hastened the growth of a middle class devoted to trade interests, while the Reformation disrupted the Catholic Church through the establishment of state churches and the transference of the headship of the Church in Protestant states from the Pope to the Prince. The dominant characteristics of these changes were the divorce of ethics and politics, and the advent of an epoch of wars between the new sovereign states. The wars, complicated by the religious differences induced by the Reformation and the colonial interests arising out of the expansion of Europe, led in turn to a yet greater political atomisation of Germany and to a despotic conception of government against which the French Revolution was a violent reaction. At the same time in Britain the political struggle led to the triumph of the constitutional principle of the "King in Parliament" and the growth of the Cabinet system, while the political repercussions of a continued adherence to an obsolescent mercantile theory of economics brought about the revolt of the American Colonies and the establishment of the United States. These three developments played a highly significant part in the overthrow of the Old Régime on the continent of Europe which ushered in a new era in the nineteenth century.

The new era was shaped by three vital factors which, through their confused impact on the precedent development, hurried Europe into the disastrous phase of ferment and change that our generation has experienced. The first of these factors was a militant nationalism as an incentive to political independence, encouraged by the spread of Napoleon's domination and released by its overthrow. The second factor was the attempted realisation of the ideals of liberty and equality, bequeathed by the French Revolution, through the instrumentality of political constitutions, which, though generally modelled on the slowly evolved pattern of the British Constitution, were mostly promulgated in revolutionary circumstances. The third of the three factors was the Industrial Revolution, which brought in the Machine Age and, in its gradual spread from west to east, changed the whole economic, social, and political structure of Europe, introducing new techniques, exploiting undreamed-of natural resources, applying scientific principles to methods of industrial production, giving birth to a new capitalist middle

class, or *bourgeoisie*, encouraging an unprecedented growth of the population, the greater part of which it depressed into an unprotected and rightless mass of labour, or *proletariat*, transforming many countries in Europe from agrarian to predominantly industrial states, and ultimately creating the conditions of new social and political revolutions.

So was Europe destined to be torn between the mammon of material progress and the idealism handed down alike from the classical peoples and the founders of the Christian Church. In this struggle the ancient unities that formed the nuclei round which our civilisation had first gathered were overborne by the forces of separatism. Not that those forces were in themselves evil: on the contrary, they have been responsible for the enrichment and diversification of Western Civilisation, both in this continent and in countries overseas to which Europeans have carried it. Nor is it desirable, even if it were possible, that Europe should succeed in recapturing the kind of unity once imposed upon it by the Roman domination. For such a unity, under modern conditions, could be realised only by the triumph of aggressive militarism, which, though, like Hitler's so-called New Order, it might afford a prospect of permanent peace, could establish it only at the price of liberty. Yet liberty is not enough, and it is manifest that Western Civilisation must find a new basis of integration, or perish.

The plain truth is that Europe has reached its present parlous condition because the nations have failed properly to control and direct the dynamic factors in its growth, and fully to foster the trend to international co-operation which social development requires and modern technology can facilitate. The principle of nationalism with its noble call to political independence, the ideal of democracy with its splendid spur to individual freedom, the new industrial technique with its promise of leisure and plenty for mankind, have been stunted and twisted to serve the ends of acquisitiveness and power. The national democratic experiment, which was sooner or later tried in almost every European state as a way of bringing these dynamic factors into harmony for the benefit of the nation and its individual members, failed in many of them to achieve that object. The road was thus opened for the trial of authoritarianism in its various forms and for the consequent intensification of civil and international strife. So the nations relapsed into the Second World War, which is only the latest example of the curdling of the morass

of folly and destruction in which the creative purposes of European man have become bogged. But the nations will not extricate themselves from that morass until they build a well-planned causeway along which they can securely march to the overthrow of international anarchy and the permanent triumph of the Rule of Law.

This piece of political engineering is clearly the fundamental need of our time, for without it the work of building the good society, begun in Europe so long ago, can never be completed. The objective of this co-operative effort may still be said to be to "make the world safe for democracy," so long as we determine to take that phrase not as a text for a sermon but as a guide to action. Democracy, that is to say, must be made a vital principle of social and political conduct in the local community and in the national life, before it can inspire the growth of a true comity of nations. It cannot, in fact, be given that vitality except through an instructed citizenship, made conscious of its purpose in the neighbourhood, in the state, and in the world at large. In the creation of a universal sense of citizenship of this formative kind the English-speaking peoples are peculiarly fitted, by the strength of their geographical position, by the stability of their political institutions, and by the liberality of their educational outlook, to set an example to all the world. But if they are to make such an influential contribution to the dynamism of tomorrow they must continue to act with no less vigour and directness than they have displayed in war, and yet with the greater imagination that peace demands. Nor will they succeed in this exemplary task unless they resolve never again to fail in their duty as joint heirs and custodians of all that is best in the European tradition.

BOOK LISTS FOR FURTHER READING

THE bibliography of this subject is so vast that any selection from it is bound to be highly arbitrary. The following lists are not by any means given as an indication of all the books consulted over many years by the author, though they are, of course, among the much larger mass that he has used from time to time. The lists are, rather, intended to assist those who may wish to read further in books readily available and generally procurable in public libraries. The lists follow the main lines of the design of the book itself, and will, it is hoped, at the same time guide various methods of approach to the subject in general and help the reader wishing to concentrate on particular aspects of it. They are, therefore, arranged under the following seven main heads : Geographical Background, the General Story, Political Ideas and Institutions, the Foundations, Mediæval Transition, the Modern Age, and the Contemporary Problem ; most of these main divisions being subdivided into special groups under sub-headings. The date in parentheses after each title is generally that of the most recent edition ; where two dates are given (as with most of the older books), the first is that of publication and the second that of the latest edition. Where appropriate a brief explanatory note accompanies a particular title or group of titles.

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

BOWMAN, I. : *The New World* (1929).

A study in geography and politics.

COLE, G. A. J. : *The Growth of Europe* (1914).

A brief essay in geography and geology.

EAST, W. G. : *An Historical Geography of Europe* (1935).

EAST, W. G. : *The Geography Behind History* (1938).

Both excellent ; the first a full study, the second brief.

FAIRGRIEVE, J. : *Geography and World Power* (1915, 1941).

An introduction to world history from the geographical standpoint.

UNSTEAD, J. F. : *Europe* (1939).

A thoroughly sound geographical survey.

An historical atlas is a necessary companion to any reading in the subject. The following are recommended ; the first for the general story, the second and third for the study of the contemporary problem :

SHEPHERD, W. R. : *Historical Atlas* (1927).

HORRABIN, J. F. : *An Atlas of Current Affairs* (1934).

HORRABIN, J. F. : *An Atlas of Post-War Problems* (1943).

THE GENERAL STORY

FISHER, H. A. L. : *A History of Europe*. 3 vols. (1935).

Also issued in one volume (1938).

The most masterly and readable of all histories of Europe in English.

GRANT, A. J. : *A History of Europe* (1913, 1931).

A sound, straightforward, reliable outline.

LANGER, W. L. (Edited) : *An Encyclopædia of World History* (1940).

A complete survey by various American historians.

MARVIN, F. S. : *The Living Past* (1913, 1932).

A minor classic and a masterpiece of compression.

PERRIS, G. H. : *A Short History of War and Peace* (1911).

A brief survey from the beginnings in Babylon and Egypt to the Partition of Africa.

SEIGNOBOS, C. : *The Rise of European Civilisation* (1944).

A superb account of the evolution of Europe, from its beginnings to the eve of the Second World War, translated from the French.

POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS

The books in this section are arranged in various groups according to the aspect of the subject with which they deal.

A group of books on the theory and practice of British institutions, all of outstanding merit :

BAGEHOT, W. : *The English Constitution* (1928).

An edition of this classic, originally published in 1867, with an Introduction by the late Earl of Balfour.

DICEY, A. V. : *The Law of the Constitution* (1885, 1939).

GREAVES, H. R. G. : *The British Constitution* (1938).

JENNINGS, W. I. : *Cabinet Government* (1936).

JENNINGS, W. I. : *Parliament* (1939).

KEITH, A. B. : *Governments of the British Empire* (1935).

A group of books on general political theory ; all first-rate :

BURNS, C. D. : *Political Ideals* (1915, 1929).

LASKI, H. J. : *A Grammar of Politics* (1938).

LASKI, H. J. : *Foundations of Sovereignty* (1931).

MURRAY, R. H. : *The History of Political Science from Plato to To-day* (1926).

SABINE, G. H. : *A History of Political Theory* (1937).

STAWELL, F. W. : *A History of International Thought* (1929).

A group of books on the constitution and practice of government ; all useful for reference :

BASSETT, R. : *The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy* (1935).

BRYCE, J. (LORD) : *Modern Democracies*. 2 vols. (1923).

The most masterly study of this vast subject.

BUELL, R. L. (Edited) : *Democratic Governments in Europe* (1935).

By various writers.

OSTROGORSKI, M. : *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties*. 2 vols. (1902).

An old but still valuable, and in some respects unique, book, with a Preface by James (later Lord) Bryce. Translated from the French.

PETRIE, C. : *The History of Government* (1929).

SPENDER, J. A. : *The Government of Mankind* (1938).

STRONG, C. F. : *Modern Political Constitutions* (1939).

THE FOUNDATIONS

GREECE AND THE ANCIENT WORLD

All the books in the following group on the history of Greece and the Ancient World are to be strongly recommended :

ABBOTT, E. : *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens* (1895).

Though old, still valuable.

BEVAN, E. : *The World of Greece and Rome* (1928).

A good short introduction.

BURY, J. B. : *History of Greece* (1900, 1929).

A standard work and an indispensable book.

GLOVER, T. R. : *The Ancient World* (1935).

An excellent survey of the three cultures—Greek, Roman and Jewish—in relation to one another.

GRANT, A. J. : *Greece in the Age of Pericles* (1893).

Old but good.

MYRES, J. L. : *The Dawn of History* (1911).

A brief but masterly and significant account of the origin of our civilisation.

A group of books on Greek life, literature, thought and institutions, and what our age owes to them ; all of the first importance :

BARKER, E. : *Greek Political Theory : Plato and his Predecessors* (1925).

BOWRA, C. M. : *Ancient Greek Literature* (1933).

DICKINSON, G. L. : *The Greek View of Life* (1896, 1941).

A gem of a book, which, though first written half-a-century ago, is still indispensable for a true understanding of the foundations of our civilisation.

FOWLER, W. W. : *The City State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1913).

The best brief account of the rise and organisation of the city state in the ancient world.

LIVINGSTONE, R. W. (Edited) : *The Legacy of Greece* (1922).

By various experts in different branches of the subject.

MURRAY, GILBERT : *History of Ancient Greek Literature* (1897).

TAYLOR, A. E. : *Plato* (1926).

TAYLOR, A. E. : *Aristotle* (1943).

The former of these is a full study, the latter a short discussion book.

ZIMMERN, A. E. : *The Greek Commonwealth* (1911, 1932).

A great book on the social and political organisation of the Ancient Greeks.

ROME

The following books on the general history of Rome, arranged chronologically, are all fairly brief and thoroughly sound :

FOWLER, W. W. : *Rome* (1912).

ROBINSON, C. E. : *A History of Rome* (1937).

STEVENSON, G. H. : *The Roman Empire* (1930).

Two books on the later history stand alone :

GIBBON, EDWARD : *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

The best edition of this masterpiece is an illustrated one in 7 volumes, brilliantly edited by J. B. Bury (1914).

BURY, J. B. : *The History of the Later Roman Empire*. 2 vols. (1889, 1923).

A superb book by a great historian.

The best brief account of the Empire in the East is :

BAYNES, H. N. : *The Byzantine Empire* (1905, 1926).

The following books on Roman life, government, literature, and our debt to her are all good :

BAILEY, C. (Edited) : *The Mind of Rome* (1926).

BAILEY, C. (Edited) : *The Legacy of Rome* (1923).

Both are sets of essays by experts, on various aspects.

MACKAIL, J. W. : *History of Latin Literature* (1906).

MOORE, R. W. : *The Roman Commonwealth* (1943).

SHERWIN-WHITE, A. N. : *The Roman Citizenship* (1939).

A life of Julius Cæsar is indispensable. The best is :

FOWLER, W. W. : *Julius Cæsar* (1892).

THE CHURCH

Any of the following will be found helpful :

BEVAN, E. : *Christianity* (1932).

BIGG, C. : *The Origins of Christianity* (1909).

BIGG, C. : *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire* (1925).

BURY, J. B. : *A History of Freedom of Thought* (1913).

GLOVER, T. R. : *The World of the New Testament* (1931).

GORE, C. : *Jesus of Nazareth* (1929).

SELBIE, W. B. : *Nonconformity* (1912).

MEDIÆVAL TRANSITION

The following books, covering the change from ancient to mediæval times, are all valuable :

BURY, J. B. : *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians* (1925).

DAWSON, C. : *The Making of Europe* (1936).

DILL, S. : *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Roman Empire* (1898, 1935).

HOLMES, W. G. : *The Age of Justinian*. 2 vols. (1905, 1907).

LOT, F. : *The End of the Ancient World* (1931).

MOSS, H. ST. L. B. : *The Birth of the Middle Ages* (1935).

The following cover the whole period, from various points of view :

BRYCE, J. (LORD) : *The Holy Roman Empire* (1864, 1918).

An immortal work which has been steadily reissued through the ages and which every good European should read.

DAVIS, H. W. C. : *Mediæval Europe* (1911, 1928).

An able and very readable brief outline.

HEARNshaw, F. J. C. (Edited) : *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediæval Thinkers* (1925).

Lectures by experts on different aspects and periods.

JENKS, E. : *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages* (1897, 1919).

A standard work, which has never been superseded.

MARGOLIOUTH, D. S. : *Mohammedanism* (1914, 1927).

A brief but scholarly account of the rise and character of Islam.

The following biographical studies are all sound and helpful :

D'ARCY, M. G. : *Thomas Aquinas* (1930).

DAVIS, H. W. C. : *Charlemagne* (1900).

MUIR, W. : *The Life of Mohammed* (1878).

PIRENNE, H. : *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (1939).

THE MODERN AGE

GENERAL

Besides the books already mentioned under the heading of the General Story, which in their later sections cover the modern age, the two following general histories are most helpful :

FYFFE, C. A. : *Modern Europe*. 2 vols. (1924).

HAYES, C. J. H. : *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*. 2 vols. (1916, 1936).

For the opening of the period the following is invaluable :

POLLARD, A. F. : *Factors in Modern History* (1907, 1926).

For the later part of the period any of the following are excellent :

GOOCH, G. P. : *A History of Our Time* (1911).

A brief survey of the world during the period 1885-1911.

A magnificent study of liberty and Liberalism, translated from the Italian.

GRANT, A. J., and TEMPERLEY, H. : *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (1940).

CROCE, B. : *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (1934).

LIPSON, E. : *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (1940).

MOWAT, R. B. : *A History of European Diplomacy* (1922).

ROSE, J. H. : *The Development of European Nations* (1905).

A big book on the critical years 1870-1900.

SEIGNOBOS, C. : *The Political History of Contemporary Europe since 1814*. 2 vols. (1901, 1915).

A valuable study of the background, translated from the French.

PARTICULAR MOVEMENTS

THE RENAISSANCE

Any of the following group of books throws a flood of light on this vital aspect of the evolution of the Modern Age :

DYER, L. : *Machiavelli and the Modern State* (1904).

HEARNSHAW, F. J. C. (Edited) : *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation* (1925).

SICHEL, EDITH : *The Renaissance* (1917).

A brief survey of the artistic achievements of the period.

SYMONDS, J. A. : *The Renaissance in Italy : The Age of the Despots* (1875, 1923).

The first volume of Symonds' monumental work : a standard book on the historical background of the Renaissance.

VILLARI, P. : *The Life and Times of Machiavelli*. 2 vols. (1883, 1928).

This old book, translated from the work of a great Italian historian, remains the authoritative statement on the period.

THE REFORMATION

All the following are standard works on the subject :

LINDSAY, T. M. : *Luther and the German Reformation* (1900, 1925).

MURRAY, R. H. : *The Political Consequences of the Reformation* (1926).

WARD, A. W. : *The Counter Reformation* (1889).

WEBER, MAX : *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930).

A difficult book, translated from the German, but worth a great effort.

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

Any of the following will repay the closest study :

FISKE, J. : *The Discovery of America*. 2 vols. (1892).

MUIR, RAMSAY : *The Expansion of Europe* (1917, 1939).

SEELEY, J. R. : *The Expansion of England* (1883, 1928).

WILLIAMSON, J. A. : *The Ocean in English History* (1941).

A delightful book by one of the foremost historians of British expansion.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND AFTER

Of the many books on the Revolution the following are specially interesting and useful :

BELLOC, H. : *The French Revolution* (1911).

A brief and brilliant essay.

MADELIN, L. : *The French Revolution* (1916, 1930).

The best full account, translated from the French.

THOMPSON, J. M. : *The French Revolution : Documents* (1933).

Indispensable for the documentary history.

WOODWARD, E. L. : *French Revolutions* (1934).

A brilliant study of the various revolutions from 1789 to 1871.

WRIGHT, E. H. : *The Meaning of Rousseau* (1929).

For the philosophical background. For this also see :

HEARNshaw, F. J. C. (Edited) : *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great French Thinkers of the Age of Reason* (1930).

On the epochs of Napoleon and Metternich and their political consequences the following throw much light and are all highly recommended alike for their scholarship, penetration, and readableness :

FISHER, H. A. L. : *Napoleon* (1912).

FISHER, H. A. L. : *Bonapartism* (1909).

HEARNshaw, F. J. C. (Edited) : *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Age of Reaction and Reconstruction* (1932).

LASKI, H. J. : *The Rise of European Liberalism* (1936).

RUSSELL, BERTRAND : *Freedom and Organisation, 1814-1914* (1936).

WOODWARD, E. L. : *Three Studies in European Conservatism* (1929).

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS

The three following books, though first written some years ago, have been revised and are still reliable for the general story :

BEARD, C. : *The Industrial Revolution* (1901, 1929).

MACGREGOR, D. H. : *The Evolution of Industry* (1911, 1932).

TOYNBEE, A. : *The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century* (1884, 1908).

Popular addresses, notes, and other fragments by the coiner of the term, Industrial Revolution.

The following, embodying the latest research in the period, are all brilliant and absorbing :

CLAPHAM, J. H. : *The Economic Development of France and Germany* (1936).

CLAPHAM, J. H. : *The Economic History of Modern Britain* :
Vol. I. The Early Railway Age (1926).
Vol. II. Free Trade and Steel (1932).

HAMMOND, J. L. and BARBARA :
The Skilled Labourer (1919).
The Town Labourer (1932).
The Village Labourer (1932).

The two best general works on the growth of Socialism are :

KIRKUP, T. : *A History of Socialism* (1920).

MARKHAM, S. F. : *A History of Socialism* (1930).

On Marx the following are helpful :

COLE, G. D. H. : *What Marx Really Meant* (1934).

LASKI, H. J. : *Karl Marx : An Essay* (1922).

RÜHLE, OTTO : *Karl Marx : His Life and Work* (1929).

A sympathetic biography, translated from the German.

Among indispensable books on special aspects are :

DICEY, A. V. : *Law and Opinion in England* (1885, 1939).

A masterly statement of the interplay between political thought and action during the nineteenth century.

HALEVY, E. : *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism* (1928).

A translation of a great book by a great Frenchman.

PRICE, L. L. : *Political Economy in England* (1896, 1931).

An old but still valuable review, with excellent chapters on Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo.

WEBB, SIDNEY and BEATRICE : *The History of Trade Unionism* (1894, 1920).

WEBB, SIDNEY and BEATRICE : *Industrial Democracy* (1898, 1920).

Two vital studies by two great scholars.

VARIOUS STATES

Any of the books given under this heading may be safely consulted as the work of reliable writers.

BRITAIN

ENSOR, R. C. K. : *England, 1870-1914* (1936).

POLLARD, A. F. : *The History of England* (1912).

A short study in political evolution.

POLLARD, A. F. : *The Evolution of Parliament* (1920).

SMELLIE, K. B. : *A Hundred Years of English Government* (1937).

A survey of the century beginning with the Reform Act of 1832.

TREVELYAN, G. M. : *History of England* (1937).

TREVELYAN, G. M. : *British History in the Nineteenth Century and After* (1938).

TREVELYAN, G. M. : *English Social History* (1944).

FRANCE

BROGAN, D. W. : *The Development of Modern France* (1940).

GUEDALLA, P. : *The Second Empire* (1941).

MARRIOTT, J. A. R. : *A Short History of France* (1944).

OGG, D. : *Louis XIV* (1933).

RECOULY, R. : *The Third Republic* (1928).

Translated from the French.

ITALY

CROCE, B. : *The History of Italy* (1929).

Translated from the Italian.

KING, BOLTON : *A History of Italian Unity* (1899, 1912).

KING, BOLTON : *Life of Mazzini* (1912).

THAYER, W. R. : *The Life and Times of Cavour*. 2 vols. (1915).

TREVELYAN, G. M. : *Garibaldi* (1933).

VILLARI, L. : *Italy* (1929).

GERMANY

GOOCH, G. P. : *Germany* (1925).

HEADLAM, J. H. : *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire* (1899).

LUDWIG, E. : *Bismarck : the Story of a Fighter* (1927).

REDDAWAY, W. F. : *Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia* (1904, 1926).

ROBERTSON, C. GRANT : *Bismarck* (1918, 1929).

TREITSCHKE, H. VON : *The History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1919).

The perfect Prussian statement.

RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC

BAIN, R. NISBET : *The First Romanoffs* (1905).

The story of the rise of the Russian royal family, 1613-1725.

BAIN, R. NISBET : *Slavonic Europe* (1908).

A political history of Russia and Poland down to the partitions of the latter.

MAKEEV, N., and O'HARA, V. : *Russia* (1925).

PARES, B. : *The History of Russia* (1937).

DYBOSKI, R. : *Poland* (1933).

PHILLIPS, W. A. : *Poland* (1915).

HALLENDORF, C., and SCHUCK, A. : *The History of Sweden* (1929).

AUSTRIA, TURKEY, AND THE BALKANS

MACARTNEY, G. G. : *Hungary* (1934).

MARRIOTT, J. A. R. : *The Eastern Question* (1914, 1925).

MILLER, W. : *The Balkans* (1896, 1923).

MILLER, W. : *The Ottoman Empire* (1913, 1934).

STEED, WICKHAM : *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (1919).

TOYNBEE, A. J., and KIRKWOOD, K. P. : *Turkey* (1926).

An account of the rise of modern Turkey.

WARING, L. F. : *Serbia* (1917).

OTHER STATES AND NATIONS

BARRY, W. : *The Papacy and Modern Times* (1911).

ENSOR, R. C. K. : *Belgium* (1915).

HUME, MARTIN : *Spain, its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788* (1898, 1913).

MADARIAGA, S. DE : *Spain* (1930).

RENIER, C. J. : *The Dutch Nation* (1944).

STEPHENS, H. M. : *The History of Portugal* (1891, 1908).

STRONG, C. F. : *The Story of the American People* (1942).

THE CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

ALLEN, C. K. : *Law and Orders* (1945).

A criticism of the most recent bureaucratic tendencies of social legislation. [See also Hewart : *The New Despotism* (below)].

BAKER, J. R. : *Science and the Planned State* (1945).

Emphasises the dangers of an over-planned society to the freedom of science.

BERNAL, J. D. : *The Social Function of Science* (1944).

A critical and stimulating examination of what science does and what it might do to assist social progress.

BORKENAU, F. : *Socialism, National or International* (1942).

A short critical essay on the theory, practice, and future of Socialist organisation.

BOSANQUET, B. : *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899, 1923).

The classical statement in English of the Hegelian conception of the state.

BROGAN, D. W. : *The Free State* (1945).

A political tract in defence of liberal institutions, written originally for the enlightenment of the Germans.

CARR, E. H. : *Nationalism and After* (1945).

A brilliant short essay on nationalism and power.

COBBAN, A. : *National Self-Determination* (1945).

An interesting statement of the place of nationalism in modern political organisation.

HAYNES, WILLIAM : *This Chemical Age* (1945).

A detailed, but popular, account by an American chemist and economist of "the miracle of man-made materials" and the new age which it portends.

HEWART, LORD : *The New Despotism* (1932).

A criticism of the bureaucratic trend of modern social legislation. [See also Allen : *Law and Orders* (above).]

HILL, A. C. : *Democratic Realism* (1945).

A study of liberty and democracy with a slightly aristocratic bias.

LASKI, H. J. : *Authority in the Modern State* (1919).

LASKI, H. J. : *Liberty in the Modern State* (1930).

(The latter issued also in the Penguin Series, 1937.)

LASKI, H. J. : *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (1943).

These three books, written with the author's usual scholarship and trenchancy, throw a flood of light on current politics.

LIPPMANN, W. : *The Good Society* (1939).

A warning of the dangers of Collectivism and over-planning, and a restatement of Liberalism, written in the attractive style which characterises all the work of this American publicist.

MARITAIN, J. : *Christianity and Democracy* (1945).

A defence of Christian Socialism. Translated from the French. Not easy reading in English.

RECKITT, M. B. (Edited): *Prospect for Christendom* (1945).

A collection of essays by various authors, strongly influenced by Maritain (above), on how to create and maintain a Christian society in the conditions of to-day.

SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD: *Everybody's Political What's What* (1944).

Ostensibly an attack on the "gross maldistribution of domestic income"; actually a highly readable critique of current problems in general.

STREIT, C. K.: *Union Now* (1939).

A powerful American plea for a federal union of the Western Democracies.

WHITEHEAD, A. N.: *Science and the Modern World*. (A Penguin book, 1938.)

A brief but highly authoritative statement on the social implications of scientific progress.

WOOD, H. G.: *Christianity and Civilisation* (1942).

A short essay on the place of Christianity in modern society.

ZIMMERN, A. E.: *Nationality and Government* (1918).

An older book, but still valuable as an aid to understanding the present situation.

SOVIET RUSSIA

The following list constitutes only a very small selection from the great mass of books on this subject, but the reader will find them all helpful towards a comprehension of the various aspects of the complex problem of Soviet Russia.

BASILY, N.: *Russia under Soviet Rule* (1938).

The view of a former Russian aristocrat.

COLE, G. D. H.: *Europe, Russia and the Future* (1941).

DOBB, M.: U.S.S.R.: *Her Life and Her People* (1944).

DURANTY, W.: U.S.S.R.: *The Story of Soviet Russia* (1944).

An American journalist's account, with some useful original documents in the Appendix.

EASTMAN, MAX: *Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution* (1926).

LASKI, H. J.: *Communism* (1927).

An invaluable background book.

PARES, B.: *Russia* (1941).

A Penguin book, by the foremost English authority on Russia.

SLOAN, P. A.: *Russia in Peace and War* (1941).

SLOAN, P. A. : *How the Soviet State is Run* (1944).

The latter, issued in the Marxist Text Book Series, is an excellent brief statement of the working of the Soviet political machine.

STALIN, JOSEPH : *Leninism* (1942).

The authorised English translation of Stalin's own lectures, delivered at the University of Sverdlov in 1924, on the background of the Russian Revolution and its triumph under Lenin.

WEBB, S. and BEATRICE : *Soviet Communism : A New Civilisation?* 2 vols. (1935). (Issued in one volume in 1937.)

A standard work on every aspect of the Soviet State up to 1935.

FASCIST ITALY

FINER, H. : *Mussolini's Italy* (1935).

The most authoritative book on the subject by an English writer.

MASSOCK, R. G. : *Italy from Within* (1943).

An American journalist's account of events from 1924 to the eve of Mussolini's fall.

SALVEMINI, G. : *The Fascist Dictatorship* (1928).

The view of an Italian Liberal (translated).

SCHNEIDER, H. : *The Fascist Government of Italy* (1936).

Translated from the German.

SILONI, I. : *The School for Dictators* (1939).

A study of dictatorship in the form of a Socratic dialogue. Translated from the Italian.

NAZI GERMANY

BRECHT, A. : *Prelude to Silence* (1945).

An account of the rise of Nazism, which attempts to distribute the responsibility for it among non-German as well as German forces.

DARMSTAEDTER, F. : *Germany and Europe* (1945).

A study of political tendencies in Germany from Frederick the Great to Hitler.

HILLER, KURT (Edited) : *After Nazism—Democracy?* (1945).

Four essays by different authors on the form of government best suited to a regenerated Germany.

HITLER, ADOLF : *Mein Kampf* (1942).

This unexpurgated edition, translated by James Murphy, is the best English version of Hitler's own source book.

LICHTENBERGER, H. : *The Third Reich* (1938).

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